MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (MCIA)

STUDY OF
THE INSURGENCY
IN
ANBAR PROVINCE, IRAQ

13 June 2007

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introductory Letters 1

Executive Summary 2

Potential Pathways of Evolution for the Sunni Arab Insurgency in Iraq with Attention to Anbar 10

Chapter One - Background: Rise of Modern Iraq: Pre-1929 to 1991 15

Chapter Two - (classified) The Interregnum: Post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm - Roots of Current Insurgency (1991-2002) 33

Chapter Three - (classified) Anbar Insurgency: The Seeds are Planted - The Formation and Motivating Factors (2003) 51

Chapter Four - (classified) The Insurgency Grows and Fights Pitched Battles (2004) 96

Chapter Five - (classified) Anbar: Insurgency Grows, Strengthens, Elections (2005) 154

Chapter Six - (classified) AQI Dominates the Insurgency (2006) 266

Chapter Seven - (classified) Rise of the Anbar Salvation Front (2007) 508

Appendix A: Understanding Islam: Sunni-Shi'a Divide 589

Appendix B: Tribes of Anbar Province 598

Appendix C: Six Cities in Anbar 612

Appendix D: Naming Conventions and Spellings 620

Appendix E: Selected Bibliography 626

Appendix F: Not Used 633

Appendix G: (classified) Significant Attacks in Anbar Province 634

Appendix H: (classified) Insurgent Profile Data: Anbar Province 682

Appendix I: (classified) Insurgent Organization Evolution Chart and Legend 729

Appendix J: (classified) Index of Insurgent Groups 735

Appendix K: (classified) Profiles of Five Insurgent Groups 760

Appendix L: (classified) Insurgent Influence Chart 814

Appendix M: (classified) Assassinated Anbari Sheikhs 815

Index 816

Dear Marine and Reader:

(U) As a country, the United States and our Allies have had a long interest in stability in the Middle East. In World Wars I and II the area we now know as the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran held our attention. Even before the beginning of kinetics in Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-1991, and now in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we had an intense interest and we need to understand the region where we are now fighting.

(U) This publication, commissioned and sponsored by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) is the first effort to describe for the Marine what is happening (a narrated chronology) and to analyze and understand what is happening. This study is focused on the insurgency in Anbar Province.

(U) There is no effort to analyze United States activities, or to predict future activities.

(U) Professional military and civilian historians and social scientists may differ and have different interpretations of the insurgency in Anbar Province. Marines, sailors, and soldiers have lived, breathed and died there. We have taken a step back from the combat in Anbar and attempted to provide an analysis and understanding of the people, tribes, culture, religion, governance and economy, and how this affects and influences the insurgent groups. Such an understanding contributes to our counter-insurgency efforts.

(U) We commend to you a full reading and understanding of what follows. It will help you know where you are going, where you are, and where you have been. It will help you understand the situation on the ground as you head into unfamiliar territory, and as you interact with the local people who are very different than you, with ways and customs unfamiliar to us, yet who are still very human.

(U) Any comments you have can be sent to either of us or to Major Drew Cukor, Chief, Middle East Branch, MCIA, MCB Quantico, Virginia.

Colonel John Crane, Commander, MCIA

Brigadier General Richard M. Lake
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Winston Churchill, in Volume Five of his epic *The World Crisis*, describes Iraq between 1921 and 1925 by "… its vast distances, the unsettled nature of many of its inhabitants and its huge desert frontier, over which really effective control is impossible…" [1] In 1921, as Colonial Secretary, Churchill was faced with the Iraq "situation" when a "local uprising on the Euphrates developed into a serious rebellion which was suppressed with much difficulty and with the aid of reinforcements sent from India."[2]

(U) Iraq has long been consumed by strife, war and occupation. Iraq has been pulled by Pan-Arab dreams and politics towards Ba'athism, divided by Kurdish nationalistic ideals, and stressed by Sunni-Shi'a conflict. Its mix of nomadic and sedentary tribes, religions, cultures, languages and political philosophies have created a country of great cultural diversity where each community holds closely the ideals of its great and historic past. One thing that has unified Mesopotamians, and now Iraqis, is their resentment of outsiders: whether Ottoman Turks, the British, or now the Multi-National Coalition.

(U) Sunnis are a minority (only 20% of the population) within Iraq, but have effectively ruled for almost 500 years. As a result, although Saddam was not from Anbar, Anbaris held many senior government positions and Anbaris supported Saddam. In return, Anbar was rewarded for its support and was better off than the other provinces. Despite Anbari ties to Saddam's regime, many of the tribes in Anbar stuck to their ancient and nomadic ways; crossing borders at will, herding their flocks, smuggling, crime, and raiding other tribes and the settlements of farmers and merchants.

(U) In 1991 the United States led a multi-national coalition to contain Saddam Hussein's ambitions. After the conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the Shi'a and Kurds responded to President Bush's encouragement and revolted against the Hussein regime. They were suppressed violently, in some places with chemical weapons. Saddam's Sunni security forces may have killed as many as 100,000 Shi'a.

(U) In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition toppled Hussein. Reflecting their traditional resistance to outsiders, some Iraqi groups launched an insurgency against the United States. The global Sunni Islamic Jihadist terrorist group, Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, saw this as an opportunity to further its anti-Western global war and quickly became involved. They allied themselves with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, an Al Qaeda associate who had moved to Iraq after the fall of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan. Acting as Al Qaeda's representative, Zarqawi took over a number of disparate insurgent groups by persuasion, murder, intimidation and, even financing and support.

(U) **The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)** commissioned this study in mid-2006 to develop a chronological analysis of the insurgency in Anbar Province. The project team analyzed the

[1] [Open Source | CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK, 1929: WINSTON CHURCHILL: THE WORLD CRISIS, VOLUME V | (U) |] p. 495.
[2] Ibid., p. 491.

social, economic, political, cultural and religious factors; the structure and functions of the insurgents and the insurgent groups; what sustains and motivates them; and finally, the insurgency's dynamics, resilience and adaptation to U.S. military operations. The goal of the study was two-fold: 1) provide intelligence analysts with a classified base-line reference and the historical context to assist their work; and, 2) provide an unclassified primer to operational personnel to understand better the conflict so they can adapt quickly to the environment and avoid mistakes -- thereby minimizing combat casualties.

A Note on Data and Sources

(U) This report is based on the available information and intelligence. The authors used intelligence information up to 1 May 2007. The authors believe that the data provided by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity to be the best available at the classification level of the study. Additional information was gleaned from opens source intelligence. Many Marines, in-theater and in CONUS have poured over and analyzed HUMINT, SIGINT, and other forms of intelligence at the Tactical Fusion Center (TFC). Many of the reports used to prepare this study are based on the TFC's vetted capstone daily reports for General Officers in-theater. These excellent reports (such as MNF INTSUMs and GRINTSUMs) are the best sources currently (2006-2007) available. Better histories may be written in 10-15 years when more information is available.

(U) Any study and analysis is only as good as the data and the sources available. For this study, the analysts relied on both classified reporting and open source literature. Classified reporting was provided to the study team by MCIA and came in many forms and formats. As in any war, information can be missed or lost in the heat of battle. Many times, the intelligence reports were in different formats, with tribes, places and people spelled the way the originator heard it – despite the best efforts of the Coalition's Tactical Fusion Center (TFC) to impose standardized spelling conventions (Appendix D provides the desired standardized spellings). This spelling and transliteration problem was particularly apparent when reviewing reports of interrogations. The authors retained the spellings used in the primary source documents, even when different than the TFC conventions.

(U) Analysis of insurgent interrogations is based on those insurgents captured in locations and AOs where U.S. forces operated. We believe the analysis to be solid and the best available of who the individual insurgent is. A careful reading of the introduction to that analysis is recommended.

(U) The analysis of significant incidents depends on those attacks that are reported. It is possible that several reports of the same incident found their ways into official reporting. The analysts responsible for this appendix, sifted through thousands of reports, working to insure that each incident meeting the algorithm criteria was considered only one time. This analysis is important to U.S. military personnel being deployed into Anbar as it describes AO by AO the activities, types of attacks, and tactics and techniques used by the insurgents chronologically.

Outline of the Study

(U) Both the classified and unclassified versions are organized in a similar manner: seven chapters and multiple appendices. Obviously, a number of appendices included in the classified version are just that: classified, and can not be included in the unclassified version.

(U) **Introduction: An introduction, titled "Potential Pathways of Evolution for the Sunni Arab Insurgency in Iraq with Attention to Anbar Province"** provides some context on the types of insurgencies in Anbar Province. This part of the study provides an overview of the multiple insurgencies underway in Anbar Province. It outlines the elements or building blocks of an insurgency as occurring in Anbar. In the case of Anbar, these insurgencies are occurring in many locations, by different insurgent groups, simultaneously and overlapping, and not following any specific model that we in the West may try to devise. Instead, the insurgencies in Iraq follows the pattern established in Afghanistan and Palestine – spontaneous uprisings by loosely affiliated groups that mature over time into highly effective but never unified insurgents organizations. Like Afghanistan, these groups cannot agree on any agenda beyond expelling the outside power.

(U) The key point is that modern insurgencies cannot be understood the same way as the monolithic, hierarchical Maoist model. Rather, such insurgencies, to include the one in Iraq, are really a loose coalition of many insurgencies. Each of the insurgencies in Iraq has its own long term goals and the only factor that encourages cooperation is the common agreement that the first goal must be driving the United States out of Iraq. Once that goal is accomplished, the insurgents will still have to resolve who governs what parts of the country and what life-styles may be imposed.

(U) When analyzing the conflict, the study team noted that the insurgency in Anbar Province does not follow the classical Maoist model, nor is the insurgency in Anbar uniform across the Province. This was expected since the Anbari insurgency and the greater Iraqi insurgency resemble the recent insurgencies in Afghanistan (against both the Soviets and the current Coalition), Chechnya and Palestine. Different insurgent groups in different areas of Anbar have different political goals and are capable of different levels of military effort from simple drive-by shootings or assassinations up to coordinated combined arms ("complex") attacks. This is to say, there is no easy way to describe the insurgency as it is occurring in Anbar. Perhaps it is best thought of as a loose network of the willing. Essentially, any Iraqi who is willing to fight the Coalition is free to do so. Some do so as individuals, families or small groups. Others band together into larger groups based on previous association or common beliefs. Still others fight as members of tribal militias. Many elements of the insurgencies may not even be acting according to an overall plan for the conduct of their (various) insurgencies. Others fight for the money ("salaries") offered them.

(U) **Chapter 1 ("Background: Rise of Modern Iraq: Pre-1920-1991")** covers the history of Mesopotamia (Iraq) to the eve of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM in 1990. It explains the tribal basis of Anbari society and its characteristic independent streak, resistance to outsiders and internal squabbles that still color Anbari views today. It also explores why the Sunni, in their 500 years of ruling either for themselves or as surrogates for occupying powers, came to believe only they could rule in Iraq. It provides the political, social, cultural and economic history of Iraq as a

backdrop for the rise of the pan-Arabist Ba'ath Party, Saddam's seizure of power, , the impact of the Iran-Iraq War of the 80s on Iraqi society, and the place of the Sunnis in Anbar Province prior to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. In particular, this chapter explores the mutually beneficial relationship between Anbaris and Saddam.

(U) **Chapter 2 ("The Interregnum: Post-Desert Shield/Desert Strom – Roots of the Current Insurgency – 1991-2002")** provides a quick look at Operation DESERT STORM, the 1991 surrender at Safwan Airfield, United Nations sanctions, No-Fly Zones, Oil for Food, and the Public Distribution System for food. Next, the chapter covers truly critical events in recent Iraqi history -- the revolts by the Kurds in the north, the Shi'a in the south, and the Albu Nimr tribe in Anbar. Seriously shaken by the intensity of the uprisings, Saddam savagely suppressed them. Of even more importance, many of his subsequent decisions concerning his security forces and even his foreign policy were shaped by his deep fear of another such uprising. Also covered in this chapter are the U.S. and allied military operations during the 1990s. Scared by the sudden uprisings and frustrated by the Allied operations, Saddam initiated a number of policies to strengthen his rule: a renewed emphasis on tribes, a "faith" campaign of renewed importance for religion in Iraq, and the creation of the para-military Fedayeen Saddam to include delegation of command authority and resources to lower levels specifically to protect himself from another uprising. After looking at the broader picture in Iraq, the chapter focuses on Anbar Province just prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. It shows that there were not many Iraqi Army units stationed in Anbar Province. Even more important, it reveals that Anbaris enjoyed a life-style and economic prosperity better than average Iraqis. They had industry, government jobs, farming, and smuggling as sustainment. For Anbar, the fall of Saddam carried very tangible economic costs as well as the intangible loss of prestige and power.

(U) **Chapter 3 (2003) ("Anbar Insurgency: The Seeds are Planted – The Formation and Motivating Factors")** While there appears to have been little planning for an insurgency in the event of a U.S.-led coalition attack, resistance to the Coalition grew as Anbaris came to resent outsiders in their land. While intended as protection against another internal uprising, Saddam's pre-war decisions to create paramilitary units, distribute arms and delegate command authority to local commanders provided structure, resources and weapons for the emerging insurgency. The resistance was initially disorganized, consisting of only small unit and individual actions. Elements loyal to Saddam (the Former Regime Loyalists – FRLs) relied on the deposed-Saddam for guidance, financing and support. Former Regime Elements (FREs), people who wanted a return to Sunni rule but not the return of Saddam, also tapped into Saddam's resources and used their military and intelligence training to resist the U.S., but also to provide income. When Saddam was captured late in 2003, the FRL insurgency suffered a severe blow and lost hope that he would somehow be restored to power – their ultimate goal. At the same time, Zarqawi was slowly building Al Qaeda in Iraq, relocating the center of Sunni Religious Extremists (SRE) resistance from the Kurdish north to Anbar, Diyala and Baghdad. Over the course of the year, AQI continued to organize and grow by absorbing elements of discouraged FRLs and using Iraq as the magnet for foreign fighters.

(U) **Chapter 4 (2004) ("The Insurgency grows and Fights Pitched Battles")** This chapter traces the insurgencies' growth in size, organization, coordination and sophistication. During 2004, the

two primary remaining threads of the Anbar insurgency, the Former Regime Elements and the SREs, each grew from splintered groups with diverse goals to organized forces able to engage in pitched battles. The vastly different goals of the two groups meant they could not unify into a single force but each group filled local power vacuums left by the absence of Coalition forces. Yet neither group successfully unified the various factions that supported its vision for the future. The best they could do was create loose coordinating councils that allowed temporary, tactical cooperation. In Fallujah in 2004, in two significant battles the insurgents demonstrated a willingness to engage the Coalition in entrenched warfare. After the first battle of Fallujah (Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE) in April, the insurgents claimed a great victory. While they could not stand against the U.S. military, they had forced a withdrawal for political reasons. This "victory" provided a great boost to insurgent morale. Later in the year Operation AL FAJR, the second battle of Fallujah, crippled the insurgent organizations in Fallujah. However, the survivors took advantage of the absence of Coalition forces elsewhere in the province and spread out to regroup in safer areas – at times moving into areas with no prior insurgent presence. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (to be differentiated from, though affiliated with the global Al Qaeda movement) overcame infighting and consolidated a number of groups under its banner. The year ended with preparations for the upcoming national elections in early 2005.

(U) **Chapter 5 (2005) ("Anbar: Insurgency grows, Strengthens Elections")** is written in two parts. 2005 was a year of blood feuds among tribes, between tribes and Al Qaeda, between Al Qaeda and Former Regime Elements and even Al Qaeda with other tribes against the U.S. The divisions among the insurgents were reflected by the infighting among insurgent leaders, most notably between Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and Muhammad Mahmoud Latif. With Saddam in captivity and Ba'athism losing its appeal, the FREs turned increasingly to Islam as their organizing principle, frequently using mosques as critical command and logistics nodes. The shift becomes so pronounced that analyst renamed the FRE as Sunni Arab Resistance since their goals now became the restoration of Sunni power but with a more religious framework. Even with the FRE shift to a more religious approach, they did not accept the Islamic Caliphate that was the goal of AQI and the other Sunni Religious Extremists.

(U) During 2005, the Coalition conducted a series of operations throughout Anbar particularly along the Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV) and the border with Syria. Learning from Fallujah, the insurgents tried to avoid the Coalition forces. They operated in the gaps, gaining influence, frequently by assassinating mayors and officials to intimidate the populace in the absence of Coalition forces. While many Anbaris boycotted the January 2005 national elections, they soon realized the mistake, as they were left with little representation or say in national affairs. Learning from their failure, the Sunnis dramatically increased their participation in both the October Constitutional Referendum and the December 2005 National elections. The willingness of SAR elements to participate in the elections deepened the conflict between those groups and SREs, particularly AQI, which adamantly opposed participation. With the Constitution approved and the national elections successfully completed, Iraqis started the difficult process of forming the new Iraqi Government to replace the Interim Iraqi Government. And, despite the divisions within the insurgency, it grew in numbers, organization, and external support.

(U) **Chapter 6 (2006) ("AQI Dominates the Insurgency")** describes AQI violence and the responses to it. It focuses on AQI's attempts to consolidate and move to a higher state of organization and warfare. Their murder and intimidation campaigns had success as rival insurgent groups "folded" into AQI, rather than being killed by them. Despite Sunni participation in the Iraq political process, AQI was able to regain its momentum from the reverses of 2005. After mounting a major campaign against its rivals, AQI carried out the bombing of the (Shi'a) Golden Mosque (the al-Askari Mosque) in Samarra in late February 2006. Despite appeals from Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali-Sistani, the attack triggered a wave of sectarian violence that radicalized many Sunnis and allowed AQI to establish itself as the dominant insurgent group in Anbar. This gained AQI a number of advantages, allowing them to use their new position of prominence in Anbar to affect adversely security throughout Iraq. In early June 2006, AQI suffered a serious set-back when its leader, Abu Musa al-Zarqawi was tracked down and killed near Ba'quba. His killing "netted a treasure trove of counter terrorism intelligence information," now used to further attack AQI, according to a Coalition spokesman.

(U) Yet the same brutality that AQI had used to ensure its preeminence also sowed the seeds of dissent against it and possibly the seeds of its own demise. Its violent tactics, led the important tribal sheikhs in the fall of 2006 to decide to fight AQI and create the Sahawa al-Anbar (Anbar Salvation Front, SAA) as the first serious opposition to AQI in Anbar. This group, organized by Ramadi tribal leaders, gradually began to challenge AQI during the latter half of 2006. At first AQI saw it as a mere nuisance, but it was soon to increase to a larger organization posing a serious threat to AQI. At the same time, these important sheikhs decided to decrease their resistance to the Coalition, and in many cases even to work with the Coalition. While AQI was far from defeated by the end of 2006, the rise of Sahawa al-Anbar represented a major shift in the situation in Anbar in favor of the Coalition and the Iraqi government.

(U) **Chapter 7 (early 2007) ("Rise of the Anbar Salvation Front")** covers the first three months of 2007 (1 January to 31 March 2007). With the rise of the resistance to AQI by the sheikhs and their Sahawa al-Anbar, AQI quickly found itself on the defensive in Anbar as tribal leaders took action against the group. This resulted in major reverses against the group in Anbar that led to dramatic increases in security and stability throughout the province. While by no means defeated, this state of affairs led to a severely degraded AQI and a major success for the Coalition. To counter this shift in favor of the Coalition, AQI began resorting to even more ruthless methods of attack including the use of chlorine gas and anti-aircraft squads to target Coalition helicopters. While these attacks were indeed deadly, they only served to alienate further the population of Anbar against them.

(U) As the Sahawa al-Anbar continued to grow, the organization's leader Sheikh Abdul Sattar attempted to better integrate it into the Iraqi political system, forging ties with provincial and national government figures in an effort to establish himself in Iraqi national politics. With the success enjoyed by the Sahawa al-Anbar's efforts to establish a higher degree of security in Anbar, Sheikh Sattar and his followers were now major figures in the province.

Appendices with Significant Contextual Information

(U) The Appendices contain information and important analyses the reader will want to review and study.

(U) **Unclassified Appendices**: Appendices describe Islam and the differences between Sunni and Shi'a practices; detailed information on the tribes in Anbar Province; information on six key cities in Anbar Province; naming and spelling conventions; and, a bibliography of unclassified sources which the reader may want to consult for further information.

(U) **Classified Appendices**: Several important classified appendices provide detailed descriptions and analysis of:

- **Significant Incidents in Anbar Province**. The contents are derived from an analysis of insurgent attacks on U.S. forces. Attacks were selected using an algorithm based on a threshold number of U.S. military personnel killed or wounded, damage to materiel, new enemy tactics, techniques or sophistication, and the use of complex tactics or multi-weapon types. The color-coding is designed to assist the reader find specific types of attacks that occurred in the areas of operations (AOs).

- **Insurgent Profiles Data**. The analyst responsible for this classified appendix analyzed over 25,000 reports of interrogations, developed detailed statistical analysis of the demographic characteristics of the insurgents and determined a number of trends in the composition of the insurgent forces.

- **Insurgent Organization Evolution Chart and Legend**. This classified chart graphically traces the initial appearance of insurgent groups, their mergers into and separations from other insurgent groups, the evolution and devolution of groups, and their various affinities. It provides a graphic illustration of the complexity characteristic of modern, networked insurgencies.

- **Index of Insurgent Groups**. This classified appendix describes the different insurgent groups by year.

- **Profiles of Five Insurgent Groups**. This classified appendix is a detailed description of five insurgent groups, their leadership, activities, and operations.

- **Insurgent Influence Chart**. This classified chart is a rough, non-precise estimation of the relative influence of the types of insurgents.

- **Assassinated Anbari Sheikhs**. This classified appendix lists those sheikhs of Anbari tribes known to have been assassinated by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Acknowledgements

(U) The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) wishes to acknowledge the study team that developed and prepared this publication:

- Major Drew Cukor, Middle East branch head, MCIA, and Study Director, was the driving force behind the work.

- A contractor study team was led by the prime contractor: RCI/Serco Inc of Vienna, Virginia.

- Subcontractors include: AMERICAN SYSTEMS and Sapient Corporation.

- Contractor team members included: Amatzia Baram, Michelle Buckholtz, Adam Couch, Daniel Darling, Terri Ebner, James Froehlich, David Haimsky, Thomas Hammes, Mary Habeck, Alan King, Steven Kerchner, Christopher Meulemans, Wanda Napier, John Nelson, Michael Quantrille, Leon Steinfeld and Samuel Watson.

- Additional support was provided by MCIA staff members: Captain Michael Lorino, Patrick Devenny, and Sergeants Rick Cordero and Luke Schemenauer.

POTENTIAL EVOLUTIONARY PATHS OF THE SUNNI IRAQI INSURGENCY WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO ANBAR PROVINCE

(U) Unlike the various theoretical frameworks modeled after communist rebellions of the twentieth century or theories of urban warfare and nationalist strife, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq in general and in Anbar Province in particular has developed under unique socio-economic and political conditions that are not particularly attributable to the numerous causal/contributing factors of past civil conflicts. As such, a separate model of the insurgency is required for an improved social science understanding of the current conflict, its origins, and evolution.

(U) Contrary to the traditional mainstream theoretical scholarship on insurgent warfare, which presents insurgencies in terms of exclusive, stage-like sequences where each new phase begins when the previous one ends, one of the main distinguishing factors of this theory is that it is continuous/progressive, rather than differential. As the insurgency grows, its phases occur simultaneously, as opposed to exclusively of one another. That is, the operations in the higher phases complement and build upon those in the lower ones instead of substituting them, as displayed in Figure 1 below. An insurgent movement as a whole may progress to entrenched or mobile warfare, but continues to carry out terrorist and guerrilla operations in order to tie down government forces.

(U) Moreover, the Anbar case is unique because it does not present a single national insurgency, but numerous local ones occurring concurrently, each with its own motivations, goals, and rates of progression, which greatly complicates any assessment of the overall political situation there. Every district, town, village, and neighborhood may be experiencing various phases of the rebellion at different times, which is attributable to the decentralized nature of the revolting groups that are constantly trying to cope with the ever-changing socio-political, religious, cultural, and economic environment. Some of these groups, like Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Ansar al-Sunnah, evolve to higher stages of the insurgency, but most never progress past the lower ones. They either collapse and dissolve shortly after their conception or become fully engulfed by larger organizations.

(U) The third underlying theoretical distinction has to do with the goals of the insurgents. While past theories have focused on the insurgents' aim of total victory at the national level and subsequent governmental takeover, the Anbar revolt is no longer based on such unrealistic intentions as reestablishing Sunni control over Shi'a dominated Iraq as a whole, given the strength of the Shi'a-Kurdish alliance, which enjoys political, military, and financial backing from the U.S. and Iran. Moreover, the increasingly polarized socio-political environment precludes any substantial cross-sectarian cooperation or power-sharing arrangement at this time. As such, the evolution of the Sunni Iraqi Insurgency is based on the rebels' objective of consolidating and maintaining control over the Sunni areas of the country, as well as either establishing total independence from the Shi'a dominated central government or obtaining a high degree of autonomy and self-rule. Below is a detailed description of the six phases of this insurgency.



Figure 1: Theoretical Diagram of the Iraqi Sunni Insurgency

1. (U) ***Organizational Phase:*** Unlike many communist insurgencies of the past, where this initial phase was extensive, protean, and versatile in nature, the rebellion in Iraq's Sunni provinces was born out of organizational networks and structures already in place under the former regime, and thus, experienced a relatively short initial organizational phase following OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom). The FRL (Former Regime Loyalists) groups, which were arguably the best organized and financed associations of insurgents in 2003, operated under their former Ba'athist hierarchical structure and were already set up administratively, financially, and militarily, despite their lack of preparedness for a protracted guerrilla war. Since the membership of major groups involved in the rebellion included high ranking intelligence officials, elite Republican Guard units, Saddam Fedayeen, and other former regime elements, the insurgents had the necessary military capabilities, as well as internal and external bases of support in place well before the outbreak of hostilities that followed the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. Moreover, the large sums of money that disappeared from Saddam's reserves have resurfaced shortly afterwards in the coffers of these emerging insurgent movements. The planning and strategizing that took place during this phase was focused primarily on forging alliances between the various FRL, FRE (Former Regime Elements) and SRE (Sunni Religious Extremist) groups; mitigating conflicting political/religious agendas; expanding financial resources by engaging in criminal activities and seeking sponsorship from sympathizers world-wide; and establishing new support bases, as well as escape and evasion nets, which facilitated the flight of the former regime leadership as Coalition forces advanced on Baghdad. While the insurgency progressed, the organizational structure of the groups involved mutated constantly. As some organizations merged together while others collapsed, the main players have had to continuously undergo this phase in order to regroup and readapt to the ever-changing socio-political environment in Iraq.

2. (U) ***Repression Phase:*** At the same time as emerging insurgent movements were undergoing the organizational phase following the fall of Baghdad, they began to undermine and demoralize governmental authority, as well as the coercive/counter-insurgent powers in

place. In Anbar, this translated into attacking Coalition troops, as well as Iraqis suspected of collaborating with them; intimidating authority figures, such as provincial governors (who changed fairly rapidly over the years, as a result of being threatened, kidnapped, or killed), mayors, and police officers; and targeting translators, contractors, and others accused of supporting the CPA in any way. The first significant signs of this phase appeared in May of 2003, when insurgents began carrying out small-scale, coordinated terrorist attacks against Coalition troops and civilians. The situation intensified when AMZ's (Abu Musa'ab al-Zarqawi's) network, along with Ansar al-Sunnah launched a major terrorism campaign that summer that began targeting foreign government entities, as well as non-profit and inter-governmental organizations, as evidenced by the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy and the attack on the UN Headquarters and the International Red Cross in Baghdad. The kidnapping and killing of foreigners and their Iraqi supporters also served as an effective intimidation tactic and a deterrence measure to prevent more foreigners from coming in and to discourage Iraqis from supporting them. Meanwhile, insurgents stepped up their subversive efforts by recruiting well placed individuals to infiltrate key government institutions, as well as the security services. This served to further undermine and demoralize the authorities by not only increasing the number and scale of successful attacks against them, but subverting them from within as well. Iraqi insurgent groups have never ceased their campaign of terror, harassment, and repression, even as they progressed to the more advanced stages of the insurgency. AMZ's network, for instance, frequently and consistently attacked civilians, particularly Shi'a, in a bid to draw support by polarizing the population.

3. (U) ***Small Guerrilla Phase:*** In an effort to further erode central governmental authority, insurgents attacked hard military targets by setting up ambushes and employing hit-and-run tactics. In Anbar, some insurgent movements progressed to this phase almost in conjunction with the previous one by carrying out coordinated IED and RPG assaults, which began in May 2003, as well as suicide bombings targeting military convoys, security personnel, police stations, and police recruiting centers, with the aim of forcing the government on the defensive and compelling it to refocus its efforts on protecting its territory and personnel rather than on hunting down the opposition. For the most part, Anbari guerrillas have been operating in small, clandestine, cellular structures within enemy territory, relying on their vast network of safe houses and enclaves of support from which they carried out their operations. The development of these networks was, at least in part, a result of the backing of the local population, as well as better organization and closer coordination among insurgent groups, as was seen in late 2003 and early 2004.

4. (U) ***Large Guerrilla Phase:*** While the rebels achieved early successes in expanding their bases of support (both, geographic and demographic) in the previous phase, the formation of the two major insurgent umbrella organizations in early 2004 (the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura and the Ramadi Shura Council) facilitated an even greater level of cooperation between various groups and consolidation of resources and manpower, which ultimately enabled the insurgents to establish de-facto control over the entire city of Fallujah, as well as pockets of territory throughout Anbar. The insurgents' improved organizational, military, and intelligence capabilities resulted in larger scale and more effective guerrilla attacks against

the Coalition and Iraqi forces, which produced higher casualties and further eroded governmental authority in the province. The insurgents' attempt to free inmates by launching a large scale attack on Abu Ghraib Prison in April, 2005 epitomized this phase of the insurgency.

5. (U) ***Regular/Entrenched Warfare Phase:*** Some of the classical mainstream theories of insurgency suggest that when guerrilla tactics have sufficiently degraded the government's capabilities, the insurgents must transform themselves into a regular army with access to heavy military hardware, ranging from tanks, helicopters, artillery batteries, anti-aircraft guns, and the like. Although in the case of Iraq, the Sunni insurgent leadership may hope to acquire such armaments eventually, it does not deem them necessary to take over territory, or win the war for that matter. Throughout the struggle, insurgents demonstrated their ability to hold terrain and successfully fight Coalition and Iraqi Government troops from entrenched positions by a combination of small and large scale guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks. This was evidenced by their seizure of power in Fallujah in early 2004, where they established Shari'a law and created quasi-governmental institutions that provided basic human services, including healthcare and law enforcement. For almost a year, the rebels used their newly-acquired stronghold to fend off Coalition strikes until Operation AL-FAJR finally dislodged them. Their success in Fallujah has been duplicated in other parts of the country over the years to a greater or lesser extent, proving that the traditional military-centric theoretical models of insurgency are not necessarily applicable to the Iraqi case.

(U) Aside from scoring military points by holding territory, the insurgents enjoyed the benefits of coercive authority over the population, which became dependent on them for basic sustenance. By following the example of Hizbollah and Hamas, Sunni insurgent movements in Iraq achieved a public relations coup by compensating citizens and families for the losses they incurred during Coalition strikes. Citizens were also compelled to subscribe to the insurgents' agenda by being rewarded for their cooperation and punished for lack thereof. The insurgents achieved this, at least in part, by enhancing their internal security and counter-intelligence apparatus, which was designed to root out informants within their ranks and/or enemy collaborators within the population at large.
The insurgents' perceived psychological advantage over the Coalition, at least in part, stems from the fact that they have been fighting a much larger and better equipped force with smaller arms and fewer men. The political utility of this approach has arguably surpassed potential advantages of a traditional military campaign. Insurgent leaders, for the most part, continue to operate under the assumption that their persistence will ultimately compel Coalition forces to withdraw, after which the Iraqi security forces would inevitably fold.

6. (U) ***Mobile Warfare Phase:*** Once the government's forces have been sufficiently weakened and demoralized, the rebels will be poised to emerge from their entrenched positions and launch an all-out offensive aimed at establishing total control over Anbar and adjacent provinces, which will require employing a combined tactical approach drawn from all of the previous phases. Although conventional armaments, such as tanks, helicopters, and artillery batteries are not required to conduct a successful mobile warfare campaign in Iraq's Sunni

provinces, the development of a more sophisticated logistics and communications network, along with secure and consistent sources of funding and the continued, long-term commitment of sponsors is essential. Moreover, a more unified insurgent front must be established by incorporating splinter groups under a cohesive insurgent agenda through a combination of co-option and coercion. This will enable fighters to conduct joint operations in larger geographic settings and advance more easily from one urban area to another, consolidating their control over as much territory as they can hold. Meanwhile, insurgents will continue to focus on establishing effective civil and military administration in areas under their rule, facilitating social and economic development, providing basic human services, mobilizing the population around their political/religious agenda, and protecting it from hostile attacks. As the rebels continue to gain the upper hand militarily, more government defections can be expected to take place, which will further erode the regime's rapidly declining authority over its Sunni provinces. Ultimately, a final confrontation will either forcibly evict the government, or compel it to surrender its claims to the Sunni Arab-occupied territories and formally acquiesce to the partition of Iraq.

Chapter One

Background: Rise of Modern Iraq: Pre 1920 - 1991

Ottoman Turk Conquest to 1991

(U) *Introduction: Anbar Province has a long history of resentment of outsiders. For millennia, the people were sheep and camel herders who followed the grazing areas between what is now Saudi Arabia and what is now Syria. They did things their own way, without government interference. A tribal society, they relied on family, clan, and tribal relationships for protection of both their property and their way of life. For thousands of years, governments have come and gone but the tribe has remained. Due to historical factors, most Anbaris are Sunni. Under Saddam, Anbaris provided many of the senior leaders to the government and security forces. As a result, Anbaris were loyal to Saddam Hussein. In return, they received preferable lands, subsidized industries, and, when compared to other provinces, better social services, hospitals, and patronage.*

(U) Long called Mesopotamia, "the land between the two rivers," Iraq has been continuously settled for over 6,000 years. The Iraqis are proud of the fact that their nation was the cradle of civilization and the center of the Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian empires. What Americans consider ancient history is a very real part of the daily lives of Iraqis; Tradition, honor, tribal customs, and religion guide their actions and beliefs even today.

(U) The Anbaris interpret their history through the lens of tribal lore and customs: herding flocks before modern international borders existed, resistance to central authority, distrust of outsiders, and conflict between the Sunni and Shi'a. Since 579 BC, the area has been conquered by Greeks, Mongols, Persians (Iranians), Ottoman Turks, British, and Americans. Anbaris deep distrust of outsiders is a natural outcome of these repeated conquests and occupations.

(U) By far the most important invasion shaping modern Iraq was that of the Islamic religion. In their rapid expansion immediately following Mohammed's death, in 637 AD Islamic forces conquered the "land between the two rivers" and Islam became the dominant religion of Iraq. (See Appendix 1 for details.)

(U) Two great impacts of the Islamic conquest still affect every aspect of daily life in Iraq. First, Mohammed saw the church and state as a single entity. This did not mean that Mohammed wanted to persecute the Jews and Christians. In fact, the Koran's chapter two, verse sixty-two says:

> "Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians, any who believe in God, and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord on them and they shall not know fear, nor shall they grieve."[3]

[3] [| Open Source | ZENITH PRESS/ALAN KING: TWICE ARMED | 2006 | p. 121 | (U) |]

(U) However, while Mohammed tolerates the other great faiths, he does not see the same separation of Church and State that is the standard in the West. This tradition is reflected in the thinking of many Iraqis today. For many Iraqis, there is no separation between religion and politics.

(U) The second overwhelming impact of Islam is the continued struggle between the Sunni and Shi'a. While the original split took place 1300 years ago (See Appendix 1), the separation between the two sects has caused as much bloodshed as the Catholic-Protestant split within Christianity did in the 14th and 15th centuries. That bloodshed continues today.

MCIA Insert Map of Anbar Province Here

(U) A second invasion whose memory is very much alive in the minds of Iraqis is that of the Mongols in 1258 AD. Under the leadership of Hulagu, grandson of Genghis Khan, the Mongols sacked Baghdad. In particular, the Iraqis remember that the Monguls killed all the scholars, and piled their skulls in a pyramid. Some Iraqis believe that the Mongols killed a million Iraqis.[4] Regardless of how many they killed, the Mongols shattered the Islamic Abbasid dynasty so thoroughly that Iraq descended into chaos for almost 300 years.

(U) This chapter and the next will tell a story of how the past still colors the way Iraqis and Anbaris think about issues, foreigners, and each other. They are a prelude to the chapters on the 2003-2007 insurgency. Chapter One will trace Anbar from the occupation by the Ottoman Turks up to the months just prior to Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991. Chapter Two will review Desert Storm and Desert Shield and carry the story to the months just prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. Additional information about religion, economics and the principal cities can be found in the Appendices.

Under the Ottoman Empire

(U) The chaos following the sack of Baghdad lasted until the Turkish Ottoman Empire conquered the area in the early 1500s. The period of Ottoman rule would reinforce many of the Anbaris traits – resistance to central control, raiding for profit particularly against the Shi'a, loyalty to family, sub-tribe and tribe over outsiders. For, despite the fact that the Ottomans heavily favored their Sunni co-religionists, the Sunnis of Anbar maintained their tradition of resisting outsiders.

(U) In contrast, the Shi'a saw the Persians as the lesser of two evils. They knew the Ottoman Empire was strictly Sunni, and they would never be treated as equals with the Sunnis. Rejected by the Ottomans, the Shi'a turned to Persia (Iran) for trade, culture, and political leadership. In return, the higher religious schools of Najaf, Karbala, Kazimayn, and Samarra, became important centers of religious learning for all the Shi'a. This provided the Shi'a with prestige as well as income from the religious pilgrims.

[4] [| Open Source | THE NEW YORKER/IAN FRAZIER: DESTROYING BAGHDAD | 20050424 | (U) |]

(U) The religious base of these cities allowed the Shi'a to expand their territory northward under the Ottoman reign. During the 18th and 19th centuries, Sunni nomadic tribes from the Arabian Peninsula settled down along the southern Tigris and Euphrates and were converted to Shi'ism by the clerics of the holy cities. By the end of the 19th Century the Iraqi south, starting from twenty or thirty miles south of Baghdad all the way to Basra, was almost entirely Shi'a.

(U) While gaining territory, the Shi'a suffered greatly from discrimination under the Ottomans. Throughout Ottoman rule, which lasted until the end of World War I (1914-1918),[5] the Sunnis were part of the Ottoman ruling elite. If they could speak, read, and write Turkish, the Sunni prospered. In contrast, the Shi'a were almost excluded from the elite.

(U) Because much of Iraq did not produce wealth that could be easily taxed, the Ottomans never attempted to control large parts of it. The Anbar region was ruled only loosely. In fact, Iraq was never ruled as a unified state. Rather, warlords were given control of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul.

(U) **Ottoman Attempts at Reform.** In the late 1800s, the Ottomans attempted to reduce the power of the tribes by abolishing the tribe's collective ownership of the land. The Ottomans encouraged each family to register title to their land with the central government. They felt this would tie the tribal members to the government rather than the tribes. In Anbar, these reforms ran into the traditional resistance to central authority. The peasants did not trust the government and so would not register as their own names but only as the name of their sheikhs. They were confident they could maintain their rights within the tribal system, but did not trust a central government run by men who they did not know.

(U) **Ottoman Policies toward the Sunnis.** In the late 1800s, the Ottomans established a number of free schools, to include a military academy, where Sunni children were taught religion, languages, science and history. This enabled Sunni lower middle class families to secure a military career for their children, and by the beginning of the 20th century, many Iraqi Sunnis were serving in the Ottoman army as officers. The modern education given to the young generation of city-dwellers in Iraq allowed the creation of a mostly secular Iraqi and Arab national movement. Just as important, the educated Sunni youth became the backbone of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the Iraqi provinces.

(U) Virtually excluded from schools and government, the few educated Shi'a went into private business. This reinforced the Sunni disdain for Shi'a capacity to govern. The Sunni's near monopoly on educational and governmental services led them to perceive the Shi'a as inferior, heretics, and beholden to foreigners (Iranians). It also created a strong sense of Sunni entitlement to rule even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. In short, the Shi'a were marginalized even before the Iraqi nation-state was founded.

[5] The Turks were part of the Central Powers, consisting of Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey, which opposed the Allies of France, the United Kingdom, Russia and later the United Sates.

MCIA Insert Map of Grazing Areas and Routes of the Bedouin Here

(U) **Anbar under the Ottomans.** The caravan road (now known as the Western Euphrates River Valley – WERV) from Baghdad to Damascus held great significance for the Anbaris. The availability of water along the Euphrates River made it the best route for travel between the two cities. As a result, the road provided two sources of wealth. The tribesmen from Fallujah could raid the caravans and also enforce a road tax. They generally did both.

(U) The nomadic tribes of Anbar also made money by raiding agricultural settlements. At times, the nomadic tribes raided the towns along the Upper Euphrates, but more often, they attacked the Shi'a villages and farming towns on the fringe of the desert in the Lower Euphrates valley. Inflaming the conflict between Sunni and Shi'a were the Wahhabi tribes. Wahhabism dictates destruction of Shi'a as apostates, people who have heard the word of Allah but have fallen away.

(U) Three centuries of living on the fringes of the Ottoman Empire left the Anbaris fiercely independent and no strangers to violence. While they do not like government interference in their lives, they still wanted state services and economic support, which often provided their only means of subsistence in their desert environment.

Collapse of the Ottoman Empire, World War I, British Occupation and the Mandate 1914-1932

(U) In WWI, a fading Ottoman Empire allied with Germany. In turn, the British targeted the Turkish Ottoman Middle East as a way around the stalemate on the Western Front. T. E. Lawrence, a British intelligence officer, convinced certain Arab tribes to support the British Armies. Foreshadowing Arab ability as insurgents, the tribes fought a skillful insurgent campaign against the Ottoman lines of communication. In return for their support, the British promised the Arabs independence after the war. Instead, at the end of the war, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles divided up the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire with the British taking what we now know as Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq, while the French were given Lebanon and Syria. Each was given a mandate to govern for a fixed time. The British assured themselves of an oiling port enroute to India as well as access to the increasingly important oil supplies of the Middle East. As industry and transportation shifted from coal to oil for its primary fuel, the vast oil reserves of the Middle East became a critical strategic asset.

British Mandate in Iraq

(U) **Iraq is created**: Thus modern Iraq came into being in 1920 when the British and French drew the boundaries of the Middle East that are seen today. Despite the promises to gain their support during WWI, the Arabs were not consulted about this division of Arab homelands.

(U) So, what was the brand new state like at the end of WWI?

(U) In terms of religious sects within Islam, the British found the Shi'a made up just over 50% of the population. They were concentrated south of Baghdad with a few communities further north (such as Dujayl and Samarra). Baghdad was Sunni by majority, but with a large Jewish minority, and a smaller Shi'a minority, together with some Christians. Baghdad in 1919 was connected equally to Persia and to the Ottoman center, with an assortment of currencies, measures, and cultures. In addition to Baghdad, Sunni Arabs lived in what is today called the Sunni Triangle (Baghdad-Tikrit-Ramadi), along the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers.

(U) The south, with its major city of Basra, had strong religious and trading ties to both Persia and India through the sea-lanes. In fact, the currency, weights and measures in most of the south were Indian or Persian rather than Ottoman.

(U) In the mountainous area in the northeast of the country were the Kurds, about 18% of the population and almost all Sunni. Despite the fact the Kurdish language is almost a twin to Persian, the Kurdish province was centered on Mosul and was tied tightly to the Ottoman Empire to the north (modern day Turkey). As of 2006-2007, there is a bitter ongoing Kurdish insurgency against the Turks in parts of Turkey.

(U) These proportions and sectarian/ethnic regions remain essentially the same today, except that by 2003 Baghdad had become a Shi'a city, consisting of around 70% Shi'a,[6] and the rest mostly Sunnis but also some Kurds and Christians. Following very potent anti-Jewish public sentiment in the 1950s, there was a mass exodus of Jews leaving only a handful in Iraq today.

(U) Obviously, the Iraq that Britain occupied at the end of WWI was not a unified entity. The three old Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul had little in common. There was also a split between the rural tribes and the city dwellers. In fact, some of the tribes still made a living by raiding the towns.

(U) Even the tribes were fragmented, fighting blood feuds as a result of struggles over land and water. The large tribes had ceased to function as effective political units. This deterioration of the tribes was particularly the case in the Shi'a south, but also remained true in many Sunni areas, where tribal leadership was on the decline.

(U) Among the tribes, there was a distinct hierarchy. The deep desert, camel-riding, Bedouin tribes enjoyed the highest social status. Next on the social ladder, were the tribes that made their living by raising sheep and goats. The next lower echelon were the farmers. Below them, are the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq, mostly Shi'a. A Bedouin from a camel-raising tribe, for example, would never permit his daughter to marry a Bedouin from any of the lower tiers of tribal society. The camel tribes, which often came from the Arabian Peninsula, would raid the settled tribes. This created friction on another level and further inflamed sectarian animosities, because the raiding "camel" tribes were Sunni, while the settled tribes along the lower Euphrates were Shi'a.

[6] This statistic is highly suspect as it is an official Government of Iraq figure at a time when Saddam Hussein was trying to show that he was religiously tolerant and even allowed large numbers of Shi'a in his capital.

(U) The new nation had little claim on the loyalty of its citizens. The typical Anbari's loyalty was generally to his family, sub-tribe, tribe, and then the tribal confederation (if one existed). His loyalty to Iraq came only after these. Anbaris took family loyalty very seriously. To dishonor an Anbari's family, or his ancestors for five generations back, is to dishonor him. Only acts of revenge can restore his honor. The following figure shows a rough approximation of his loyalties.

(U) Iraqi Tribal Structure. As in most of the Middle East, social relations in Iraq are dominated by tribes rather than class. The foundation of the tribal structure begins with the smallest grouping (the family) and ends with the largest (the tribal confederation):

- A khams is the extended family, within which every man owes allegiance to one another. If a member of the khams is killed or dishonored, the rest of the khams is obligated to avenge his death or dishonor either through retribution or by receiving an agreed financial blood price from the killer and his khams, or by receiving an apology in the case of dishonor.
- A bayt is a much larger extended family that includes hundreds of members related by blood or marriage. There are usually multiple khams in every bayt. A number of bayts make up a fakdh, usually referred to as a subtribe or clan.
- A group of fakdhs form an 'ashira or tribe. In Fallujah, the al-Fallujiyyin tribe after which the city is named is made up of 16 fakdhs. Fakdhs can vary in size from several thousand to upwards of 100,000.
- An alliance of 'ashiras form a qabila or tribal confederation. In al-Anbar, there is only one qabila, the Dulaymis.



Figure 1: Anbari Loyalties

(U) This loyalty to family impacts everything in Iraq today. As in many cultures, an Iraqi is morally bound to take care of his family – even if it hurts his tribe or nation. That's why you will find Iraqis hiring brothers or first cousins for key jobs despite the fact there are much more qualified individuals willing and eager to work. If those qualified individuals are not from his family or sub-tribe, it is a moral failing for an Iraqi to hire them before a less qualified family or tribe member.

(U) **Local Leadership:** In addition to being fragmented in 1920, the new state had no recognized leadership even within the three provinces. For example, in the town of Basra, Sayyid Talib was an influential man, but he was not always recognized as the leader of the entire town. He was a Sunni and the tribal sheikhs were by majority Shi'a. Most cities had similarly divided leadership. Yet most citizens, Sunni and Shia, lived in harmony.

(U) However, within the religious families of Baghdad, there were major divisions between the purist and extremist sect of Sunni Wahhabis (see Religious Annex) and the more mystical Sufis. The Wahhabis could not accept the presence of either Sufis or Shi'as in their midst.

(U) **Anti-British Revolts and Aftermath:** The most serious challenge to British rule of Iraq was a series of uprisings known as the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920. Even though the uprisings are remembered as primarily Shi'a, the revolt actually started in 1919 in the Sunni areas. In the north the tribes revolted because they believed (wrongly) that the British were weakening. Due to a political agreement with the French in Syria the British agreed to withdraw their troops from Deir al-Zor (on the Euphrates River in Syria, east of the Kurdish areas of Iraq). This was seen as a sign of British defeat and the tribes rushed to take advantage of it. They started attacking British convoys and positions around Tal 'Afar. In Khandhari near Fallujah, the revolt started after a British colonel offended the sheikh (by comparing him to the colonel's dog). As Iraqi folklore explains, he was shot like a dog and the tribe was in revolt. To this day the tribe is extremely proud of the event. Surprisingly, though, the revolt was easily suppressed in the Sunni areas.

(U) In the Shi'a south, where the rebellion started in June 1920, the suppression took six months. It cost the lives of about 400 British soldiers and 40 million pounds sterling, a large sum for the British realm in those days. While the Sunni tribes lost scores of fighters, the Shi'a rebel tribes lost thousands. The Shi'a revolt was caused by a host of grievances, most notably exorbitant taxation. The clerics did their part declaring jihad, which added a religious tone. The tribal people who revolted against the British in the south had no chance. British forces used the Royal Air Force, which strafed and bombed rebellious villages freely. In a few instances, the British even used chemical weapons.

(U) Despite the fact it was quickly crushed, the Iraqis take great pride in the revolt. That they speak of it with such pride is further indication of their deep resistance to outsiders.

(U) **British Attempts to Unify Iraq:** Following the suppression of the revolt, the British decided they must unite the three diverse provinces into a highly centralized state ruled from Baghdad. They imported a king from Arabia, King Faysal I (1921-1933) of the Hashemite family of Mecca and after conducting rigged elections, anointed him in August 1921. The local Sunnis that opposed him were either co-opted or coerced into submission to join the new system. Others were exiled.

(U) **Pan-Arabism:** By forcibly uniting Iraq under a Sunni monarch and bureaucracy, the British subjugated a Shi'a majority (over 50% of the total population) and a large Kurdish minority (18%) to minority Sunni-Arab rule (about 20%). Sunni rule was never considered legitimate in the eyes of almost 70% of their countrymen. In an attempt to gain legitimacy, the new monarchy stressed a pan-Arab ideology with Islamic undertones. They hoped they could appeal to the 70% of the Iraqi population that were Arabs and some kind of Muslim. They hoped if the royal house was both Arab and Muslim, it would make no difference that it came from outside Iraq. The Hashemite monarchy even argued for the pan-Arab unification of the Fertile Crescent - Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-

Jordan, the Palestine Mandate, and some of the Arabian Peninsula, with Kuwait as a special prize due to its excellent harbor.[7]

(U) But the Shi'a saw pan-Arabism as a Sunni invention, designed to mask the fact that Sunnis were ruling over the Shi'a majority in Iraq. In Iraq, the Shi'a were a downtrodden majority, but in a united Arab state they would have become an insignificant downtrodden minority. The Shi'a saw themselves as Arabs, but in terms of their religious identity they felt closer to Iran. This produced a great deal of confusion and ambivalence towards the Iraqi state.

(U) **British Tribal and Land Policies in Iraq:** British tribal and land policy, too, created more long-term problems than they solved. To save expenses and manpower, the British gave the tribal sheikhs, who were ready and willing to collaborate, complete authority over their tribesmen. The sheikhs became de facto dictators. The British even enforced sheiks' claims to individual peasant's lands. Thus, a sheikh, chosen by his people as a reward for his ability to fill important social and political functions for the benefit of the tribe, now became their landlord. The peasants had to pay him a significant proportion of their yields in addition to state taxes. He became rich, detached from his people, and ruled through his militia. He eventually moved into town and became an absentee landlord. This was particularly the picture that emerged in certain parts of the Shi'a south.

The Years of the Monarchy, 1932-1958

(U) In 1932, the British mandate came to an end. Iraq was granted formal independence, but British influence on Iraqi politics remained substantial. Even after WWII, when only a few British military units remained on specified bases on Iraqi soil, the monarchy and its court politicians remained close to Britain in terms of foreign policy, oil policy and general relations.

(U) **Iraq in World War II:** The situation in Iraq during World War II showed the power of Britain and, at the same time, the growing Iraqi rejection of their former rulers. Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, the Iraqi Prime Minister, openly expressed sympathy for the Nazis who were threatening to invade the Middle East. So, during early 1941, the British removed Prime Minister Rashid Ali. Removed from his post, Rashid Ali turned around and immediately seized power again in a coup. The British responded by landing more troops at Basra, and strengthening their airbases at Habbaniyah (near Fallujah) and Shaiba (near Basra). Rashid Ali sent Iraqi army units to attack the British RAF base at Habbaniyah but were defeated by them.

Iraqi Attack on Habbaniyah Royal Air Force Base In 1941

(U) On April 3, 1941, pro-Axis Iraqi politician Rashid Ali, backed by four generals (one was the uncle that raised Saddam Hussein), formed the group "The Golden Square" and seized power in Baghdad from the pro-Anglo Regent, Emir Abdullah Illah. With the younger, nationalistic Arabs seeing the occupation of Iraq by the

[7] Iraq did not have a large harbor on the Gulf and used Basra as its main outlet. However, the route from Basra to the Gulf meant that one had to go through the Shatt al-Arab, nearly 100 kilometers under Iranian guns.

British as more of a violation of the Arab sovereignty, the goal of the group was to unite the Arab people throughout the Middle East. Abdullah Illah fled to the RAF Base Habbaniyah, 50 miles west of the Iraqi capital. Under the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty the RAF maintained forces at Habbaniyah.

(U) On April 30, following the further deterioration of relations between Britain and Rashid Ali's government, Iraqi forces totaling 9,000 troops with 28 pieces of artillery took up positions on a southern plateau overlooking RAF Habbaniyah. In defense of the base, 70 training aircraft were rapidly adapted to carry light bombs. The base's Infantry forces were composed of an ad-hoc battalion fielding six companies of local militia, of which, only the four companies of Assyrian Christian conscripts, or Levies, could be considered reliable.

(U) After several Iraqi threats and ultimatum, Air Vice-Marshall H.G. Smart decided, at 0445 on May 2, to attack. The Iraqis responded with heavy shelling of the station and adjacent airfield. Although the shelling was highly inaccurate, it did force the RAF aircraft to take off under observed fire and make improvised landings on the base golf course. Effects of the Iraqi shelling were minimal as there were only three RAF aircraft lost out of total 193 sorties flown throughout the day. The fighting during the following days was fierce and continuous. Iraqi ground forces probed and attacked the perimeter. British air forces attacked Iraqi positions. The small Iraqi Air Force attacked the runway, hangers, and planes. During the night of May 5th, the Iraqi militia men decided to withdraw from their fighting positions on the southern plateau. They were soon followed by the Iraqi regular army units. By the next evening, it was clear that the morale of the Iraqis had been broken and their forces pulled off the plateau overlooking RAF Base Habbaniyah. This was due to the constant attacks and suppression by the RAF on the Iraqi artillery pieces.

(U) To cover their retreat, the Iraqis set up a blocking force along the Baghdad-Fallujah road. This Iraqi force engaged the pursuing attacking British forces and had them pinned down until an Assyrian (Christian) force attacked the Iraqis. (The official RAF history credits the Assyrian force's vicious fighting to its memories of the 1933 massacre of unarmed Christians). This ended the siege of Habbaniyah. Although less important tactically, the victory of the Habbaniyah defenders over a vastly superior Iraqi army was a huge strategic victory. Britain was able to use Iraq as a platform for war against the Germans and Japanese, and to supply the Soviet Union with arms for their fight against the Germans.

(U) Today RAF Base Habbaniyah is known to Coalition Forces as "TQ" or Al Taqqadum. It is still a strategic stronghold that serves as an airbase, hospital, and logistics center, among other things.[8]

(U) **Post-War Developments.** When the war ended, Iraqi public opinion, especially among the Sunnis, turned decisively against the British. This opinion was only exacerbated by British recognition of Israel in 1948. Once again, outsiders had established a new country in the Middle East without consulting the Arabs. Despite the fact it was the British who had handed power to the Sunni Arab minority and kept them in control, any close cooperation with Britain became stigmatized as treason by the Sunnis. Sunni-Arabs led the 1941 Rashid Ali revolt. And it was the Sunni-Arab controlled Iraqi army that initiated the coup d'etat against the monarchy in July 1958, which ended influence and removed the British-installed king.

(U) Paradoxically, even though they were at the receiving end of extremely harsh British military repression several times, the Shi'a were less hostile to the British. Once again, the Shi'a had to pick between the lesser of two evils. They knew that only British resistance to pan-Arabism kept it from smothering the Shi'a. This did not mean that the British were popular with the Shi'a, but Shi'a hostility could never compare with the hostility of most Sunni Arabs both in Baghdad and in Anbar.

(U) **Sources of Anbari Privilege:** When high schools became more common place in all the provinces during the 1930s, Anbaris maintained their advantage over both Shi'a and Kurds because Sunni-Arabs were favored during the rule of under the Ottomans, the British, and the monarchy. They insured Sunnis were given the best jobs. This created in Anbar a certain sense of privilege. Young men from Anbar could realistically aspire to good civil service jobs (railroad, post office, oil industry, government) and even to highly prestigious officers' positions in the armed forces, the police, and internal security apparatus.

(U) Since the monarchy could not trust Shi'a, due to suspected ties to Iran, Sunnis had a natural advantage. After 1936, when a Kurdish army general attempted the first military coup d'etat in Iraq, Kurds, and Shi'a, were more or less excluded from the Iraqi officers' corps.

(U) With very few exceptions, this pattern of excluding Shi'a from officer ranks continued until the monarchy was toppled by the successful army coup d'etat of 1958. Until 1958 there were no Shi'a generals in the Iraqi army. This meant that under the monarchy, Anbaris—much like young Sunni men from Mosul or Samarra or Tikrit—had a disproportionate representation in the state's institutions.

[8] [| Open Source | RAF MUSEUM AND U.S. 506TH INFANTRY MUSEUM, www.rafmuseum.org.uk/milestones-of-flight/british_military/1941_2.html ; http://www.506infantry.org/CYB05/History%20-%20Btl%20of%20HAB.htm | (U) |]

A Rapid Succession of Coups: 1958-1968

(U) **Qasim Coup – 1958:** On July 14, 1958, General 'Abd al-Karim Qasim seized power in Baghdad and executed the royal family and its senior politicians. He abandoned the pan-Arab ideology of the monarchy to focus on Iraqi affairs. In a remarkably progressive move, General Qasim opened all the avenues of social-economic mobility for the Shi'a, including the staff college. The Shi'a could now rise to the rank of general. He even tried to reach an agreement with the Kurds, but failed. During this period Anbar was quiet. There were no meaningful anti-regime eruptions in the province, though army officers from Anbar resented the new rights bestowed upon the Shi'a.

(U) **Ba'ath (Renaissance) Party and Ba'athism.** The Ba'ath party was formed in Syria in 1943 and soon had branches throughout the Arab-speaking world. In a sense, it was modeled on European socialism and was opposed to imperialism. Branches of the party took power in Syria and Iraq where it proved to be highly authoritarian and centralized. In 1966 the two parties split over ideological differences. Hafiz al-Assad (and his son Bashar) in Syria and Saddam in Iraq were members of these parties and the Ba'ath party remains the only legal political party in Syria. Ba'athism has an added feature that race (Arab) is more important than religion.

(U) **Arif Coup – 1963:** In February 1963, a retired army colonel named 'Abd al-Salam Arif initiated a coup d'etat with the help of the Ba'ath party and personally assassinated Qasim. The Ba'ath party was pan-Arab and active in all parts of Iraq but this was the first national level Ba'athist action in Iraq. And, at the time, they were not a particularly Sunni organization. Indeed, their 1963 leadership included many Shi'a, but joint party-army rule ended in November of 1963 when Arif and his pan-Arab army officers took over and imprisoned the Ba'ath leadership.

(U) **The Jumayli Tribe, the Arif Brothers, and the Legacy of 1966:** General Arif originated from the tribe of Jumayli, an important Anbar tribe whose members are to be found in Falluja, 'Anna, and Ramadi. In April 1966, Arif died in a helicopter crash, and was replaced by his older brother, 'Abd al-Rahman Arif. The two brothers, each in his own turn, stocked the army officers' corps with officers who hailed from Anbar.

(U) Although dominated by Anbaris, the pan-Arabists did not completely exclude officers from other parts of the Sunni triangle. Under Arif (and his brother 'Abd al-Rahman Arif, who replaced him in 1966), Anbar also received special attention in terms of government budgets and jobs in the administration. This was, in fact, a permanent feature of all the regimes in Iraq until 2003. Because the Sunni rulers could not trust the Kurds or the Shi'a, they had to use Sunni manpower to run the state.

Iraq Under the Ba'ath 1968- 1991

(U) **Bakr Coup – 1968:** In July 1968, a different group of army officers, again in cooperation with the Ba'ath Party, overthrew the government. The coup installed Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as Prime Minister, and Saddam Hussein as chief deputy prime minister. This time, the Ba'ath quickly used their new power to imprison the army officers who had helped them carry out the coup. Even at this early stage it was obvious that Saddam, although nominally a subordinate of al-Bakr, was in charge of the Party.

(U) This second Ba'ath regime (1968-2003) recruited Tikritis (Saddam's home in Salahuddin Province North of Baghdad) and Duris in disproportional numbers for the top leadership positions. But Anbaris were still prominent at those levels, and even more so at the middle and lower levels of party leadership, military command, and internal security. The fact that the Ba'ath regime ousted the Abd al-Rahman Arif regime, which rested heavily on Anbaris, posed a certain risk when Anbaris were recruited. Yet, once again, the Sunni fear of Shi'a and Kurds forced Saddam to employ the Anbaris. To protect themselves, the Ba'athists quickly established brutal and ruthless security services, deliberately modeled after Hitler and Stalin's security organizations.

(U) **The Syrian Connection:** The Syrian regime has a problem similar to that of Saddam. President Hafiz al-Assad's (who died in 2000 and was succeeded by his son Bashar) main power base is the 'Alawite minority. The 'Alawites are an offshoot of the Shi'a, but they represent only some 12% of the Syrian population. In order to rule, they must co-opt many Sunnis and conciliate those whom they do not co-opt. By allowing Syrian Sunnis to help their tribal cousins across the border in Iraq, the regime is thus placating a potentially powerful opposition.

(U) **Iraq's 1970s Quest for WMD:** Perhaps recalling the use of chemical weapons by the British in the 1920s, the new Ba'ath regime began its own development program for chemical and nuclear weapons. Saddam began a nuclear weapons research program in the 1970s while vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.[9] In the mid-1970s, in conjunction with a Belgian firm, Iraq constructed a phosphate chemical fertilizer plant in al-Qaim, in Anbar Province on the Syrian border. This phosphate plant could produce the phosphoric acid necessary for uranium extraction. Later, Iraq built a plant nearby to produce yellowcake, the core ingredient for producing reactor-grade uranium. The yellow cake was transferred to a number of nuclear facilities around Iraq, including the Osiraq reactor near Tuwaithal which is near Fallujah. The Israeli Air Forced bombed the facility on June 7, 1981.

(U) **Young Saddam's Rise to Power:** Born in the small town of al-Awja near Tikrit in 1937, Saddam Hussein attended a nationalist secondary school in Baghdad. Under the influence of his uncle, he joined the Ba'ath Party in 1957. After General Qassim

[9] [| Open Source | AIR FORCE MAGAZINE: JOURNAL OF THE AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION/ REBECCA GRANT: KEEPING SADDAM AWAY FROM MASS-DESTRUCTION WEAPONS REQUIRES PATIENCE, PERSEVERANCE AND AN OCCASIONAL BULLET BETWEEN THE EYES | 20020800 | (U) |]

overthrew King Faisal II, Saddam took part in the Ba'ath plot to assassinate Qassim. Wounded in the attempt, he was forced to flee to Syria when it failed. He returned to Iraq during the 1963 coup to join other Ba'athist leaders in Arif's new government, only to be dismissed and imprisoned the following year. Escaping in 1967, he established himself as a key leader in the Ba'ath Party and helped to mastermind Arif's overthrow from behind the scenes.

(U) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr's 1968 coup that brought the Ba'ath Party to power in Iraq paved the way for a number of Tikritis related to him to occupy senior posts in the newly-created Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Saddam became al-Bakr's top deputy and received the rank of four-star general despite his lack of military service or training. From 1968-1973, Saddam and al-Bakr carried out a series of show trials, executions, assassinations, and intimidations designed to crush all opposition to Ba'athist rule in Iraq. While Saddam needed al-Bakr to guarantee the support of the military and Arab nationalists, he was adept at out-maneuvering or eliminating his perceived enemies during the purges. He soon became the dominant personality within the RCC. These purges institutionalized Tikriti power and influence within Iraqi society. They dominated all sensitive political and military positions by 1977. Al-Bakr's frequent illnesses and family tragedies led him to depend more and more on Saddam to run Iraq in his stead. Saddam exploited this turn of events by establishing himself as a kind of de facto regent and ordering all party bureaus, intelligence agencies, and ministers to report only to him. On July 16, 1979, al-Bakr resigned as president and Saddam replaced him.[10]

(U) **"A Friend Brings a Friend":** In Middle Eastern societies, nepotism and the principle of "a friend brings a friend" is very potent and widespread. The very fact that Anbaris occupied many middle level government positions was a guarantee that they would perpetuate this representation. An officer brings young members of his tribe and/or region into his unit. In keeping with the Arab hierarchy of loyalty, even it the officer does not personally know the candidate he still must give him priority as long as he is from the official's region or tribe. Sunni officials give heavy preference to Sunni candidates. Tribal affinity affords even a Shi'a young man some chance but this is a far cry from an equal opportunity. By the late 80s, Anbaris remained privileged even though they no longer held many high offices.

The Significance of the Revolutionary Command Council

(U) The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was formed in July 1968 to serve as the top decision-making body for the Iraqi state and exercised both executive and legislative powers. The rationale for establishing the RCC was to separate power from corrupt or reactionary elements of Iraqi society in order to implement the collective will of the general population. The RCC chairman serves as president of Iraq, with the vice chairman (Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri since 1979) serving as the next in

[10] [| Open Source | LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDY, IRAQ | | (U) |]

line of succession rather than the country's vice presidents. The number of RCC members has varied widely from time to time depending on Saddam's need to broaden his power base by appointing new members or tighten control to a handful of key loyalists. All members of the Ba'ath Party Regional Command are considered members of the RCC as a means of ensuring the Party's control over all organs of the Iraqi regime.

(U) The RCC enjoyed extremely wide-ranging powers under the Iraqi constitution including the ability to perform legislative functions, approve government regulations concerning national defense and internal security, declare war, order general mobilization, conclude peace, ratify treaties and international agreements, and approve budgets independent of collaboration with any other government branch or agency. All Iraqi cabinet members, ministers, legislators, intelligence officials, and military commanders are accountable to the RCC, making it the true power in Iraq.[11]

(U) **Saddam's Tribal Policies 1968-1991:** After the 1968 coup, Saddam Hussein was placed in charge of state domestic security. In this role, he went much further than his predecessors in co-opting tribal sheikhs and using tribal affinities for regime security. By late 1968, he started recruiting members of his own tribe into the Presidential Guards (al-Hamada). In the following years, he recruited young men from Sunni tribes, including those from Anbar, for the intelligence apparatus.

(U) In theory, the Ba'ath should have eliminated tribalism altogether in favor of a national or pan-Arabist philosophy. In fact, Ba'ath official policy defined tribalism (al-'asha'iriyya or al-qabaliyya) as "backward" and "reactionary." On paper, the party was committed to eliminating the function of the sheikh and seizing most of his land. The problem for the regime was that socialism and tribalism do not go well together. Tribal loyalty is based on kinship. It clashes with a state that regards every member as a citizen regardless of kin relations and promotes common good at the national rather than the tribal level.

MCIA Insert Chart of Revolutionary Command Council Here

The Revolutionary Command Council

(U) Saddam was willing to relinquish Ba'athist principle in favor of practicality. He established close relationships with the sheikhs, both in the Shi'a and the Sunni areas. He offered perks for them and services for their tribes. Most tribal sheikhs were ready to cooperate and thus became the representatives of the government in their tribal domain. Those tribal chiefs who were hostile to the regime were removed quietly through economic pressure. Rarely did the regime execute or even arrest a hostile sheikh just because he was not ready to cooperate. Such actions create a blood debt. Instead, the regime would simply channel funding to the tribe through a new, more compliant sheikh. In the Sunni areas, most sheikhs were ready to work with the new regime once they realized

[11] Ibid

that the Tikritis were not hostile toward them because of past confrontations between the two regions.

(U) Cooperative sheikhs received state lands and became rich. This did not adversely affect ordinary tribesmen in Anbar because the state did not confiscate their land to enrich the sheikhs. In the Sunni triangle, including Anbar, the regime gradually gave tribal chiefs large sums of money to distribute amongst the tribesmen. These handouts became a routine practice, so much so that there were a few cases when the regime "forgot" to deliver this money and sub-tribal units revolted. These revolts were minor and meant only to "remind" the regime of the tribe's expectations. This tactic invariably worked.

(U) **Saddam and the Status of Tribal Sheikhs:** In the 1970s and 1980s, Saddam's policy toward the tribes had a mixed effect on the status of the sheikh in the eyes of his tribesmen. On the one hand, the tribal sheikh became much richer and more powerful than before. Under the regimes of Qasim and the 'Arif brothers, the state took most of the lands of the sheikhs. Now, Saddam went the other way and gave them state lands, money and power over their tribe. They could even impose tribal traditions in court cases instead of the law of the land. Some of them became, much like under the British.

(U) At the same time, however, those tribal sheikhs who became intoxicated with the power became estranged from their tribesmen. The tribesmen had no choice but to receive some money and government services through their sheikh. But if the sheikh took advantage of his position, he lost the tribesmen's support and admiration. By 1991, many tribesmen no longer saw their sheiks as real leaders and would not follow their orders.

(U) This process occurred mostly in the Sunni areas, because in the Shi'a areas everyone realized that the tribes had no choice. If they wanted to survive, they needed to work with the hated regime. As long as the sheikh did it quietly and respectfully, the tribe had no problem with it.

(U) In the Sunni areas, including Anbar, the tribesmen were much freer. They were historically less coerced both by their sheikhs and by the regime. For its own stability and protection, the state in fact needed the Anbaris more than they needed the state. Under the Ba'athists, the Anbari sheikhs were tasked by the regime with providing young men from their tribes to the armed forces and security apparatuses. During the Iraq-Iran War, they were considered more loyal and more anti-Iranian due to their deep Arab roots and traditions, and more courageous in battle, due to their tribal values of manliness.

(U) **Saddam and Ordinary Tribesmen:** In a move that would have sweeping consequences for the economy of al-Anbar, Saddam allowed tribesmen to smuggle almost without intervention by the border guards and police. In the 1980s, smuggling became big business. Then, under the UN sanctions regime of the 1990s, smuggling surged dramatically as a way to circumvent the UN Oil for Food (OFF) program, providing a source of regular income for the average tribesman of Anbar.

(U) However, Saddam cut another traditional source of tribal income—raiding. Once Iraq built the highway between Baghdad and Amman in the 1970s, such acts stopped almost completely. They only resumed following the fall of Saddam in 2003.

(U) Saddam made sure that the tribes of Anbar received not just money but also services such as electricity, roads, health and education services. As a matter of routine, whenever Saddam appeared in a tribal domain the tribesmen would sing, dance and praise him. When asked why they were praising him so much, they would reply that he had provided them with electricity or with a new well and other such favors. They truly regarded him as their benefactor, saying correctly that "in the days of our forefathers we never had such things."

(U) In the 1970s and 1980s the tribes were not deeply religious, although they were certainly traditional. Thus they could admire and be grateful to Saddam. They understood when Saddam made the sheikh responsible for the behavior of his tribesmen. When a crime was committed on the road from Amman to Baghdad, Saddam demanded that the sheikh discipline his people, return the stolen property or he would punish the whole tribe.[12] On the whole, such cases were few and far between. The tribes knew being on Saddam's good side was very beneficial.

(U) **The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988:** When the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979, Saddam saw an opportunity to go to war with Iran over long-standing border disputes. After a few early successes, the new Islamic Republic of Iran, with a larger population and military, repelled the invasion and began to advance into Iraq. Saddam's army managed to hold the line in most areas and the war settled into a World War I style stalemate, characterized by trench warfare, extensive use of chemical weapons, including nerve agents and mustard gases, and suicidal frontal assaults by both sides. By the time the war ended in 1988, over one million men were dead and the war had cost over $1 trillion for no gain by either side. During the early phases of the war, between 1980 and 1982, Saddam reached the conclusion that many defeats of his army were the result of a lack of fighting spirit on the part of his foot soldiers and even more among junior and middle level officers.

(U) **Anbaris and the Army:** In order to change this deficiency Saddam decided to recruit and promote mainly young men from the hinterland, country boys from the area between Baghdad and Mosul as well as Anbar. As Saddam saw it, they were more Arab in their identity and thus naturally suited to fight the Persian-Iranians. They had not grown up with Shia and thus could be relied upon to hate the Iranians sufficiently to fight them well.

(U) No less important, in Saddam's view, village tribal youth retained the traditional values of the desert Arab tribes. They were brave; bound by the tribal value of manly honor. As a result they would fight to the death, because honor was more important to them than life. Finally, Saddam believed that country boys were well-acquainted with the night in the countryside, with its specific sounds and animal life, and thus they were excellent material for commandos and other special units.

[12] [| Open Source | See for example, 'AL-'IRAQ | p. 3 | 19910925 | (U) |]

(U) **Internal Opposition to the War with Iran:** Saddam faced internal opposition to the war with Iran from two camps: the Kurds, who saw it as an opportunity to assert their independence, and from Shi'a leaders, who Saddam saw as favoring Iran.

(U) The Shi'a, whose clerics were already held in disfavor by the Ba'athists, found themselves being actively targeted for arrest or murder by Saddam out of the fear that they would side with Iran. While the most prominent Shi'a clerics like Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qassem Khoe'i and Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani were too powerful for even Saddam to attack directly, their access to the general population was kept tightly controlled for the duration of the war for fear that they would incite a rebellion. During the war a number of Iraqi Shi'a went over to the Iranian side to fight against Iraq. Religion was more important than their country. While the traitors were only a small fraction of the number of Shia who fought loyally, Saddam feared a Shi'a revolt and insured Sunnis filled every important job in his government.

(U) Saddam's tribal allies recruited tens of thousands of such young men, including many from Anbar. They were pushed through crash courses in the military academy to become lieutenants. During the war, many of them reached the rank of major and even lieutenant colonel, commanding frontline units in the war. After the war, these officers were either transferred into the security apparatuses or retained in the armed forces and promoted further. In turn, these officers and security officials further recruited young men from their own tribes, towns, and villages.

(U) This development meant that Anbaris did not suffer as much as other Iraqis when the war with Iran ended. During the war, Arab Gulf states had provided substantial financial backing to Saddam in order to prevent an Iranian Shi'a victory. When the war ended, the aid stopped. Most Iraqis—except for the top echelons of party and state security—experienced high levels of unemployment. Anbaris, even in this problematic time, were part of that privileged community.

(U) **Other Iraqis Suffered**: the Anfal Campaign: The Iran-Iraq War also had tragic consequences for the Iraqi Kurdish population. From 1986 to 1989, Saddam's cousin Ali Hasan Majid carried out the al-Anfal Campaign against the Kurds living in northern Iraq that included a conventional ground campaign, the aerial bombardment of Kurdish cities, the systematic destruction of Kurdish settlements, and the use of concentration camps, firing squads, and chemical weapons in an act of ethnic cleansing against the Iraqi Kurds. Between 50,000 to 182,000 Kurds were killed during the course of al-Anfal Campaign. The most infamous and well-known incident was the March 15-19 1988 use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish city of Halabja that killed 17,000 civilians and earned Ali Hasan Majid his infamous nickname of "Chemical Ali."

Summary

(U) The Anbaris' history has given them an inherent distrust of outsiders, a defiance of central authority, loyalty centered on the family and tribe, and a nearly completely Sunni population that has a sense of entitlement that includes the 'right' to rule Iraq.

(U) Despite their inherent distrust of central regimes, Anbaris had every reason to be satisfied with their lives under Saddam prior to Desert Storm. They had opportunities for employment, education and advancement that ensured lives of power and privilege. That their status depended on the suppression of the Shi'a and the Kurds did not overly concern Anbaris. Sunnis had run the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra for almost 500 years. Though not sure, they firmly believed both that Sunni Arabs were a majority in the country and that they best represented the true Iraq.

(U) Anbaris also understood that they owed their lives of privilege to Saddam and thus, even though they had already sacrificed much during the war with Iran, the Gulf War would begin with Anbaris fully supportive of Saddam. This new conflict would, however, have unexpected consequences for Anbar transforming the province and its inhabitants in ways that no one could have foreseen.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Chapter Two

Iraq and Anbar Between the Wars: Desert Shield to OIF, 1990-2003

(U) *Introduction: As a result of its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was subjected to Desert Storm, United Nations sanctions, trade embargoes, searches for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and military actions in the northern and southern no-fly zones as well as Operation Desert Fox. In his weakened state, Saddam Hussein searched for ways to keep the population loyal. He altered policies towards the tribes to reinforce their loyalty, emphasized religion, and stressed the connections between religion and the State. Anbar's loyalty to Saddam was exemplified by the number of Army recruits and officers from there. In return, Anbar was rewarded. The government supported Anbar industries to insure employment. While minor revolts occurred, they can be mostly attributed to tribal honor. Anbaris for the most part were satisfied with their status. As Saddam began to emphasize religion in the 1990's, Anbaris too, became more publicly religious, open to new and radical ideas and influences. While the whole of Iraq suffered from Desert Storm and Desert Fox, on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Anbar remained fairly well off by Iraqi standards.*

(U) Desert Storm, Weapons Inspections, UN Sanctions, Oil-for-Food Program, and Military Action Effects on Anbar from 1991-2003[1]

(U) **Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990-February 1992) and Its Aftermath**:

(U) After the long, bloody, and costly eight-year war with Iran, Iraq's economy was crippled. Inflation and unemployment were high and the national debt insurmountable. In an effort to increase income, Saddam pushed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to raise the price of oil through new restrictive quotas. He also asked Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to declare their $40B war loans to be gifts and to provide major contributions to Iraq's economic reconstruction. When these countries failed to comply, Saddam decided that he would take over Kuwait.

(U) On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and "annexed" it within 24 hours. Saddam immediately claimed Kuwait as its 19th Province, a claim he traced back to the 1920s when Britain established the states of Kuwait and Iraq from the Ottoman Empire.

(U) **Desert Storm**: The UN Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Saddam refused. On January 16th, 1991, Desert Storm began. In over five weeks of aerial bombardment, a great deal of civil infrastructure was destroyed along with military targets. The massive allied ground offensive began on February 24, 1991. Four days later, Saddam asked for and received a cease-fire agreement.

(U) **Saddam's Reality Check**: Seeing the apparent weakness of the Saddam Regime, President Bush called for the Kurds and Shi'a to overthrow Saddam. Ad hoc uprisings broke out in the Kurdish north and the Shi'a south. During these revolts, Saddam quickly lost control of 15 out of

[1] Derived from the following primary sources: a) *Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD*, 30 Sep 04, Charles Duelfer, b) *A History of Iraq*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Charles Tripp, c) R. Lee, *The History Guy: Issues: Iraq Crisis*, www.historyguy.com/issues_iraq_crisis.html; (no-fly zone) d) Arms Control Today, Jan-Feb 2006, *Report Confirms Iraq Used Sarin in 1991,* e) http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/index.html, and f) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_disarmament_crisis_timeline_1990-1996.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the 18 provinces in Iraq. Notably, Anbar did not revolt. To ensure his regime's survival, Saddam immediately turned his Republican Guard on both the Shi'a and the Kurds.

(U) **1991: The Shi'a Revolt:** In the south, the Republican Guard crushed uprisings in Basra, 'Amara, Nasiriyya, Najaf, and Karbala. They even used Sarin-filled bombs against Shiites on March 7th near Karbala. The brutal action by the Republican Guard units forced the revolts' most prominent supporter, Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al Khoe'i, to declare support for Saddam and end the rebellion on March 21, 1991. The Shi'a subsequently claimed Saddam killed over 100,000 Shi'a in suppressing the revolt. Many Shi'a blamed the United States for first inciting the revolt and then allowed Saddam to crush it so brutally. For the Sunnis, their fears of a Shi'a-Iranian connection were reinforced when fighters from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), headed by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, poured over the border from Iran to support the failed rebellion.[2]

(U) **The Islamic Da'wa Party (Da'wa).** Da'wa was formed in Iraq by Shi'a in the late 1950s to combat secularism, communism and the Sunni government. Dawa became a family tradition for the al-Sadr family. One of its early leaders was Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr's uncle. (Muqtada al-Sadr became a prominent political figure in 2003.)

(U) During the 1970s, Da'wa began an armed campaign against the Ba'athis regime in an effort to create an Islamic state. In response, Saddam imprisoned or killed many of its members. In 1979, Da'wa supported the Iranian Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini's seizure of power, although the group did not believe that clerics should control the government.

(U) In 1980, Saddam executed Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr. In response, Da'wa attempted to assassinate Saddam in 1982. Saddam persecuted Da'wa, and its surviving members were forced to flee to Iran. In February 1999, Muqtada al-Sadr's father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr and his other sons were killed in Najaf by Saddam. (In 2003, Da'wa returned to Iraq and became the dominate power in Nasiriyya. The party participated in the 2004 elections.)

(U) **The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)** is Da'wa's main Shi'a competition. It was formed in 1982 after Da'wa was weakened by Saddam's repression. Although it too is a Shi'a group dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state, unlike Da'wa, SCIRI supports Khomeini's vision of a state run by Islamic clerics. After Saddam's regime fell, SCIRI also returned to Iraq, led by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. (In August 2003 al-Hakim was assassinated by a car bomb in the city of Najaf. His brother took over in his place. In 2004, SCIRI participated in the election process. It also maintains an armed militia called the Badr Corps.)

(U) **1991: The Kurds Revolt Seeking Autonomy**: The Kurdish rebellion in the north was also crushed by March 29, 1991. Better organized, the Kurdish rebellion started well, but Saddam's use of chemical weapons cause it to rapidly collapse.

[2] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/religion-shia2.htm

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) **Northern Watch No-Fly Zone and Operation Provide Comfort**: In response to Saddam's brutality, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688 in April, which called on Iraq to end repression of its own population. But the use of chemical weapons had already caused a mass exodus of Kurds. Tens of thousands were living outdoors in snow and rain. The original northern no-fly zone, declared by the US in early April 1991 (with British and French support and involvement), was to protect coalition aircraft during the airdrops of aid to Kurdish refugees on the Turkish border. By mid-April, the US put ground troops from 10th Special Forces Group, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and the 3/325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team into Northern Iraq. They were jointed by British forces in their efforts to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Operation Provide Comfort.

(U) No explicit endorsement in the form of a Security Council resolution was obtained for either Operation Provide Comfort or the no-fly zone. When coalition ground troops were withdrawn, the no-fly zone was left in place to protect the Kurds and the international humanitarian workers based in the north. As a result, the Iraqi government decided, in October 1991, to withdraw its ground troops -- and all funding -- from the three Kurdish governorates. In effect, the region became an independent state controlled by two major Kurdish groups – the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). These two Kurdish parties subsequently fought each other in a civil war from 1995-1998. In 1998, they arranged a truce and have cooperated well in ruling the Kurdish areas of Iraq as part of the current Iraqi government.

(U) **Southern Watch No-Fly Zone**: On August 2, 1992, members of the Gulf War coalition announced the establishment of a second no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, on a line just to the north of Najaf and Amara. Too late to stop Saddam's massacre of the Shi'a who revolted in 1991, the immediate trigger for action was Saddam's ongoing efforts to wipe out the largely Shi'a population of the southern marshes. Although the no-fly zone prevented some aerial attacks on the southern marshes, it did not prevent Republican Guard artillery and armed helicopter attacks. Nor were civilians protected from ground attack in either zone. Since it prohibited only the use of fixed wing aircraft, the southern no fly zone did little to protect the Shi'a.

(U) **Anbari Loyalty to Saddam Increases:** All the available data indicates Anbari loyalty to Saddam only increased after the Shi'a revolt. They had looked into the abyss of a successful Shi'a revolt and all doubts about Saddam disappeared. They believed that a Shi'a revolt (with Iranian help) would mean the demise of the Sunni Anbari tribes. Saddam understood these fears well and warned the Iraqi people that if they allowed a revolt to succeed, Iraq would become like Lebanon, split into warring factions where chaos ruled.

(U) In such a civil war, the Anbaris believed the Sunni Arabs would be the big losers. They had ruled Iraq for 500 years, repeatedly brutalizing the Kurd and Shi'a populations and could expect no mercy if the Sunnis lost power. Retired army officers from Anbar and other Sunni Arab provinces

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

volunteered to lead troops against the Shi'a revolt. Despite crushing the Shi'a revolt quickly, Saddam could not simply return to the status quo.[3]

(U) **Inspections and Destruction of WMD:** As part of the cease fire agreement and UN Resolution 687, all long-range missiles and WMD (nuclear, biological- and chemical-weapons and their delivery systems) were to be destroyed by Iraq. In May 1991, the first United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM) teams began their work in Iraq. They quickly realized that the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs were much more extensive than originally thought. At this point, years of Iraqi denial, deception, and obstruction began.

(U) Initially, the regime appeared to cooperate by providing an inventory of all remaining CW and BW to the UN inspectors. This inventory became the focus for destroying caches, factories and research and development activities. At the same time, Saddam engaged in an extensive effort to deceive UN inspectors about the true status of his program.

(U) Fallujah in Anbar Province became a focus for inspections due to the CW and dual-use chemical plants in the area. Among the WMD sites in Anbar Province was the former RAF Habbaniyah airbase near Fallujah. Before the first Gulf War, the regime used it as a chemical and biological weapons (CW/BW) storage area, a CW training site, and possibly a nerve agent production facility.

(U) From 1991-1997, Hussein continuously engaged in attempts to obstruct, deceive, or expel inspectors looking for Iraq's WMD program, while simultaneously taking measures to have sanctions lifted and no-fly zones removed. He also used a series of air defense confrontations, UN inspection confrontations, and international lobbying for humanitarian empathy toward this goal. It was not until after the invasion that the United States was able to determine that Saddam had in fact shut down his programs although he continued using information operations to convince the world he still had a covert program.

(U) **Operation Desert Fox**: In response to Saddam failure to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, the United States and United Kingdom conducted a four-day campaign of air and missile attacks from 16 - 19 December 1998.[4] The mission was to "strike military and security targets in Iraq that contribute to Iraq's ability to produce, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction," with mission goals of :

- degrade Saddam Hussein's ability to make and to use weapons of mass destruction
- diminish Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war against his neighbors
- demonstrate to Saddam Hussein the consequences of violating international obligations[5]

(U) President Clinton called Saddam a threat to his people and to the security of the world, offering: "The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government -- a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people.[6]" Operation Desert Fox came less than two months after President Clinton signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA). It came one month after the President identified regime change as an official

Approved for Release

[3] Iraqi Perspective Project, p. 44.

[4] www. Defenselink.mil/specials/desert_fox

[5] Ibid.

[6] *"Clinton: Iraq has abused its last chance,"* CNN.com, December 16, 1998

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

component of U.S. policy toward Iraq. And, during Operation Desert Fox, President Clinton specifically stated that his administration would work with Iraqi opposition forces but stopped short of calling for another uprising.

(U) At its conclusion, the United States publicly announced the campaign met its military objectives. General Anthony Zinni, CINC Central Command (now referred to as Commander, Central Command), indicating there was no need to continue into Ramadan (which began on the 19th of December) as this would represent "bombing for bombing's sake.[7]" The operation did not, however, result in a new Iraqi government. The government withstood the strikes. Saddam remained in power. And, the regime's resistance only increased, with further UN inspections refused. The inspections would not resume until 2002.

(U) **Oil for Food**: To alleviate some of the hardships caused by its sanctions, the UN offered the Iraqi Government the opportunity to sell oil to pay for food and medicine as early as 1992. Saddam refused. Despite the suffering of his people, Saddam did not agree to begin the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program until May of 1996. Even then the program was manipulated for profit over the next five years by officials within Iraq, the UN, and other countries (most notably Russia and France). Still OFF had a mixed impact on the Anbar Province. It helped the overall humanitarian situation but hurt agriculture and altered the nature of many smuggling operations.

(U) **Public Distribution System (PDS):** The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) developed a food distribution system that provided a standardized food package to each Iraqi.

(U) Despite concerns that sanctions may have worsened the humanitarian situation, the Oil for Food program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. According to the United Nations, the average daily food intake increased from around 1,275 calories per person per day in 1996 to about 2,229 calories at the end of 2001. In February 2002, the United Nations reported that the Oil for Food program had considerable success in several sectors such as agriculture, food, health, and nutrition by arresting the decline in living conditions and improving the nutritional status of the average Iraqi citizen.

(U) The Public Distribution System run by Iraq's Ministry of Trade was the food portion of the Oil for Food program. The system distributed a monthly "food

[7] Tom Clancy with General Tony Zinni (Ret) and Tony Koltz, *Battle Ready* (New York: G.P. Putnam's and Sons, 2004)

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

basket" that normally consists of a dozen items to all Iraqis. About 60 percent of Iraqis relied on this basket as their main source of food. The basket included: wheat flour, rice, vegetable ghee (semi-fluid clarified butter used for cooking), pulses (edible seeds of various leguminous crops, such as peas, beans, or lentils), sugar, tea, salt, milk, infant formula, weaning cereal, soap, and detergent. [8]

(U) During the sanctions, Saddam did little to help the average Iraqi. Iraq developed into a society highly dependent on oil-for-food welfare, smuggling, and tribal affiliations. The overall economy and health situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate. However, Anbar, as a favored Sunni-dominated province suffered much less than the Shi'a-dominated provinces.

(U) **Impact of Economic Sanctions on Anbaris**: As a reward for their loyalty during the revolt, Saddam insured the Anbaris were among the least affected by the sanctions. During the years of the embargo, public servants, army officers and career soldiers received extra food rations, government cars, special shops with luxury goods, plots of lands for home, subsidized loans and even loan forgiveness after the birth of their second or third child. Saddam's belief in the value of tribal fighters from rural areas was as strong as ever and Anbaris experienced consistent upward social mobility. In fact, the security system was even happy with young men who failed high school studies. Knowing that the private market would not take them, such men were sure to be very grateful and intensely loyal.[9]

(U) The sanctions also made smuggling even more profitable. The Anbaris strong transnational tribal relationships allowed them to cross the borders at will. They smuggled out scrap metal, sheep and oil; products that were very cheap in Iraq but expensive in Jordan and Syria. They smuggled in cigarettes, alcohol, and electric appliances, mainly from Jordan.

(U) There was even tacit complicity by Saddam's family. Uday Saddam Hussein became the single largest sponsor of contraband merchandise sales in Baghdad. When some merchants tried to compete with him, selling smuggled goods in Shorja Market, he hung about forty of them on the door frames of their own shops. However, Saddam still did not allow the Anbaris to attack convoys or individual cars crossing from Amman to Baghdad.

Approved for Release

Saddam Shores Up His Power Base

(U) After Desert Storm, Saddam was greatly weakened. He saw a need to create as much support for his regime and policies as he could. He increased security, changed tribal policies and emphasized religion. He even affected an image of himself as a pious man.

(U) **Fedayeen Saddam:** The post-Desert Storm uprisings unnerved Saddam so much he formed a paramilitary organization, the Fedayeen Saddam, that would be unwaveringly loyal.[10] The Fedayeen

[8] Source: UN FAO
http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/food-facts.html

[9] Interview With Harith al-'Anni, Washington, DC, June 1999. Husayn Kamil defected in ****, was de-briefed by U.S. officials on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, and on re-defecting back to Iraq with a promise of amnesty was killed

[10] Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 52

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

were positioned in areas prone to anti-regime activity, to include potential coups by the Iraqi Army. Formed in October of 1994, the Fedayeen grew to between 18,000 and 40,000 members before the war. Their mission was to immediately suppress anyone who challenged the Regime and control the situation until the Special Republican Guard could arrive to destroy the revolt.

(U) One reason for an individual Fedayeen member's devotion was the benefits. The monthly salary for a Fedayeen fighter was 40,000 dinars, twice the typical state-employee salary. Veteran fighters could earn up to 100,000 dinars.[11] Training for the Fedayeen soldiers also differed greatly from the regular army. These units focused on small arms, small-unit tactics, sabotage techniques, military surveillance and reconnaissance tasks.[12] With Saddam's support and Uday Hussein's involvement, the Fedayeen received both superior personnel and material.[13] The need for immediate reaction meant the Fedayeen and their weapons were widely distributed around Iraq. This tactical distribution provided an ideal base to start an insurgency.

(U) **Anbaris in the Ba'ath Party Hierarchy during the 1990s**. Anbari fortunes followed their success in the Ba'ath party hierarchy. While the number of Anbaris at the very top levels decreased after 1995, they held by far the highest percentage of mid-level positions. Even Tikritis, Baghdadis and Mosulites, who came second, had a far lower representation.

(U) This relative success in the party meant that mid-level Anbari party officials could promote their own tribesmen and regional neighbors. A typical senior ex-Ba'athi who escaped from Iraq would say: "I joined the party as a part of the tribe. This was done automatically; you didn't really feel that you had joined the party. The family is sweeping you with it when [as a collective] it becomes Ba'athi."

(U) On the individual level, if a young man wanted to join the Air Force, attend the Military Academy, or even join the Faculty of Education at Baghdad University, he needed a recommendation of good character, or an "attestation of integrity" (*tazkiya*) from a middle level or senior official in the Ba'ath or in the government. Coming from a town in Anbar made it quite easy. Such a young man also had to be a party member.[14] The Anbaris had no reason at all to complain. They were highly privileged. Even school drop-outs had opportunities based on their origin in Anbar Province.[15]

Ups and Downs of Saddam's Tribal Policy

(U) In the 1990s, after the Shi'a revolt, Saddam realized that he needed even more support from the Sunni tribes and their sheikhs. He was willing to change long held Ba'ath Party policy to gain that support. In the 1970s, the Party had forbidden members to mention their tribal or even regional

Approved for Release

[11] Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006)
[12] Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 53
[13] ibid, p. 53
[14] Interview With Harith al-'Anni, Washington, DC, June 1999

[15] This was a tradition from the first years of Ba'ath rule. The Ba'ath in Anbar, under the guidance of RCC member 'Izzat Mustafa (1969-1977), who was born and bred in 'Anna, recruited young men who dropped out of high school and took them to Baghdad where they entered as students in the Preparatory Police School that was run by the Ministry of the Interior. When they graduated they became Deputy Officers in the police. After a period of time, the young men received the rank of police officer, and from there they could be integrated into the internal security system. In fact, this was the career trajectory of General Hussein Kamil (Kamel), Saddam's cousin and son-in-law.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

origins. Even, Saddam, who usually had the title "al-Tikriti" after his name and sometimes also "al-Nasiri," deleted both titles. Now, however, members of the party were allowed to return to the older system of naming and to indicate the towns and tribes from which they came.

(U) Saddam began giving full media coverage to his visits to tribal areas, meeting with local sheikhs and inviting them to visit him in the Republican Palace. He demanded that when the sheikhs came to see him, they should bring with them their rifles and tribal flags to do their tribal war dances for him. This legitimized and gave prestige to tribal culture and made it a part of the Iraqi national culture. The press publicized Saddam's monetary gifts and land grants to tribesmen and their sheikhs. The press also reported when tribes were given weapons and ammunition to include heavy weaponry like howitzers, heavy machine guns and armored troop carriers. These measures proved most necessary in the Shi'a south, because Saddam's smaller army could no longer effectively patrol the long border with Iran, and Sunni tribes were paid to do it for the regime.

(U) On December 2, 1992, Saddam made a stunning declaration: "*al-Ba'ath 'ashirat kull al-'asha'ir*" ("the Ba'ath [party is] the tribe of all the tribes"). By this he meant that the ruling party would from then on incorporate the tribes without, however, dissolving them. In other words: rather than a one-to-one relationship between each individual Iraqi and his government, a new system was put in place under which many Iraqis would legitimately be represented by their sheikhs and through their tribal affiliations. This was nothing short of an ideological revolution.

(U) Insofar as Anbar was concerned, however, Saddam's tribal policy had one great disadvantage for the sheikhs. The UN sanctions regime meant that tribal leaders, despite sizable revenue from smuggling, were more dependent on the government for handouts—which they passed on to their fellow tribesmen. This helped the tribes to survive, but it made the sheikhs government officials rather than genuine sheikhs. Saddam also replaced some of the sheikhs, whom he did not consider real allies, with more docile and collaborative members of their families or even of other tribes. This created an estrangement between some sheikhs, though clearly not all of them, and their tribes.

(U) **The Tribal Bureau**: This bureau, also referred to as the Directorate of Tribal Affairs, became an important contact point between Saddam and the tribal sheikhs. Whenever an important sheikh died, the bureau would send a senior representative, sometimes a member of Saddam's own family, to participate in the funeral and convey the president's condolences. Such visits were given great publicity, demonstrating how important the tribe (or the sheikh) had become. Saddam's divided the sheikhs into two categories: "A" and "B". The category determined the individual's importance and the salaries that the government would pay him.

(U) **Support for Saddam**: Saddam's reliance on the tribes meant the tribes of Anbar benefited even while the rest of Iraq suffered. In Anbar, employment was high; as was the social status of many Anbaris due to their jobs in the security apparatus and other government positions. According to reports by United Nations of the embargo on Iraq during the 1990s, children's malnutrition and, in all likelihood, mortality were low, potable water supply was reasonable, sewage treatment was not a serious problem.[16] However, the economy was failing and the middle class was losing ground. Yet in Anbar, there were many rich families because Saddam provided contracts to his supporters, salaries to the sheikhs and occasional money handouts to the tribes. In short, when comparing their status with that of most other Iraqis, the Anbaris knew they were doing well.

[16] For details see Amatzia Baram, "The Effect of Iraqi Sanctions: Statistical Pitfalls and Responsibility", in *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 2000), 194-223.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) But there was much more that explains Anbari support for Saddam. Had the regime disintegrated, the Sunnis knew the Shi'a majority would confront them. Chaos meant Shi'a rule. Their traditional sense of superiority, distrust of Shi'a and hate for Iran meant they could not tolerate such a prospect. To be ruled by Shi'a mullahs seemed to them the deepest degradation. Only Sunni knew how to rule Iraq. In their view, the Shi'a were uneducated and incapable of running a state and the mullahs, the leaders of the Shi'a community, were inept. In short, while Saddam was not widely loved, he was preferable to the alternatives.

(U) **Another Reversal of Saddam's Tribal Policies**: Saddam's policy of empowering sheikhs and their tribes did create some problems for his regime. Some tribes took advantage of their new status to impose their will on state institutions, including the police and security forces. They even attacked police stations where their own men were held in custody. They attacked schools and teachers who rebuked students belonging to the tribe and even clashed with army units that tried to prevent smuggling.[17] Yet Saddam only made a few minor modifications to his tribal policy, rather than radically altering it.

Taking Advantage of Saddam's Perceived Weaknesses

(U) As a result of grievances arising from perceived regime abuses, a number of Anbari tribes revolted during the 1990s.

(U) **The 1995 Albu Nimr Revolt:** In Ramadi, during the summer of 1995, the Dulaym confederation's Albu Nimr sub-tribe carried out armed attacks against local government forces and offices, until Saddam sent in the Republican Guard and the Saddam Fedayeen to restore control. This was the first trial by fire for the Fedayeen and the place where they established their unsurpassed ferocity. Within a few days, the revolt was crushed with hundreds of people killed or imprisoned. Following the defeat of the rebels, tribal sheikhs from Dulaym, including a few from Albu Nimr, sent letters of admiration and support to Saddam.

(U) **A Matter of Honor:** While some analysts thought the revolt was a sign the regime's hold on the tribes was weakening, the revolt had nothing to do with relations between the tribe and the regime. Rather, it was a result of the Saddam's execution of an influential member of the Albu Nimr tribe. To avenge his death became a matter of honor for the tribe. They knew that they were taking a huge risk and the chances of success were not good. But they felt that if they did not revolt, they would be seen by everybody in Anbar as weak and cowardly. What probably made it easier to decide on a revolt was the fact that, by June 1995, Saddam's regime seemed to be nearing an end, due to the international embargo and the political impasse into which it had maneuvered itself. Once the revolt ended, Albu Nimr rejoined the rest of Anbar in collaborating willingly with Saddam. But they still had unfinished business with the regime.

(U) **Other Revolts.** In August of 1999, the Albu Nimrs, Albu Fahds and Albu Alwans attacked regime forces in Anbar. Members of these tribes were also involved in the assassination attempt of Uday Saddam Hussein in 1996 in retaliation for the arrest and execution of a leading sheikh from the Dulaym federation.

Approved for Release

[17]For the original article that appeared in the US, see Amatzia Baram, "Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies, 1991-1996", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 (1997), 1-31, mainly 18-23.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) The key factor in both revolts was tribal honor. Despite the near certainty of defeat, the specific tribes felt they had to fight to recover their honor. Honor is so fundamental to Sunni tribesmen that they must restore it even at the risk of death. And of course, in keeping with their values, family members are required to fight alongside those dishonored.

(U) **The 1993 Faith Campaign and its Consequences.** As these events were transforming tribal relations in Anbar, Saddam announced another policy that would change the face of religion in Iraq. He pushed Iraqis to become more religious.

(U) The first group to become more religious in Iraq was the Shi'a. With the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran during February 1979, the Iraqi Shi'a masses became transfixed by the power of religion. Many, perhaps the majority, hoped to see a similar Islamic [Shi'a] Revolution in Iraq. They hoped an Iraqi Khomeini would emerge and deliver them from Sunni rule. The man everyone had in mind was Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. The Shi'a even tried a series of uprisings in 1979. But by early 1980, the regime had suppressed the Shi'a disturbances and executed Sadr.

(U) During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that followed, the Iraqi soldiers and, through them, the population at large was impressed with the enthusiasm and readiness for sacrifice shown by the Iranian troops. People identified religiosity more and more with state power, rather than the quieter versions of Islam traditionally practiced in Iraq. Even Sunnis started to frequent the mosques more and gradually showed more Islamic piety. This process worried the ruling party a great deal, since Ba'athism was explicitly secular. At first, the regime came out against religious revival unequivocally. However, by the early 1990s the regime realized they could not beat the growing Islamic sentiment and decided to join it. In 1993, Saddam saw religion as a way to shore up his regime and inaugurated his Faith Campaign (*al-hamla al-imaniyya).*

(U) The first sign of the Campaign was when bars, pubs and many entertainment places began to be closed down. One could still buy spirits in shops, but it could not longer be consumed in public. This is in line with traditional Islamic views of alcohol and other intoxicants as sinful. Then Saddam initiated a nation-wide campaign of teaching the Qur'an. More than five million copies of the text were printed and given away free. Qur'an classes became compulsory at all school levels, including in the universities. Even party members were forced to study the Qur'an.

(U) Saddam next spent large sums on new mosques, mainly in the Sunni triangle and Baghdad. 'Ulama' and other mosque staff (imams, preachers, and others) were given high salaries and provided with new services. Mosques, which had been relatively neglected in the previous decades, became the site of state-sponsored Qur'an classes for children and adults. This turned mosques into a crucial social nexus in Anbar.

(U) The social status of clerics was elevated as never before, especially in the Sunni areas. Before the Faith Campaign, Sunni imams and 'ulama' had never enjoyed high prestige. Now, however, clerics became local leaders, competing for social influence both with the traditional tribal sheikhs and party officials. There was no animosity in Anbar between the three categories, but there was certainly a degree of competition. The moment the Ba'ath regime collapsed, and party officials were gone, the clerics became important key leaders.

(U) **Islamic Clerics.** Within Sunni Islam, the term "imam" means any leader, but especially the prayer leader in a local mosque. Imams are chosen by their congregation (in the US) or by the state (in most Islamic countries). The word "ulama" (or ulema), which means scholar, is a general term for any Islamic cleric who has studied Islamic law or theology. A "faqih" (pl. fuquha) is a member of the

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

'ulama' who studies Islamic law and jurisprudence (in Arabic "fiqh") in particular, while a "mufti" is a member of the 'ulama' who is qualified to issue independent fatwas (legal opinions).

(U) **Saddam the "Pious"**: Saddam even demonstrated to one and all that he had become very religious. Photographs of him praying in his palace started to appear in the daily press. In earlier years, anyone who showed up too often in the mosque was suspect, now such practice was encouraged. The sermons were still monitored by the regime, and often texts were provided and distributed to clerics. But, in the Sunni areas preachers, were allowed more freedom than ever before. Perhaps by itself this policy would not have made a great difference, but since it came together with genuine growing religiosity, both in the Sunni and Shi'a communities, the synergy was tremendous. Even party members who had not frequented mosques before now had to do so. It was not just recommended by the party, but insisted upon. Those party members who were inclined towards Islam beforehand now gave their inclination full expression.

(U) **Religion in Anbar:** Anbar had been a religious area even under the 1931-1958 monarchy. Religion there was moderate, a combination of orthodox and Sufi Islam. As Iraqis turned more to religion, the regime itself became more religious so one could still be a Ba'athi and yet a religious Muslim. Then, towards the end of the 1990s, even the Islamization of the Ba'ath party no longer sufficed for some Iraqis. Some became radical Islamists. The centrality of the mosques was unprecedented. They became the only public place where one could meet people of similar Islamic inclinations without risk.

(U) What served as a catalyst in this process was a growing sense, even inside the party, that Ba'ath ideology had lost its relevance. It dawned on people that the Ba'ath were just looking out for themselves. They had no inspiring vision to improve the lot of the Iraqi people. This ideological and intellectual crisis in turn became an emotional one. People need something to believe in and, when they could no longer believe in Ba'ath ideology, the fallback alternative was to return to Islam. Iraq, long regarded as a secular state, was joining much of the Middle East in its movement back to Islam.

(U) **Fallujah as Case Study**

(U) To illustrate the changes that occurred within Anbar because of Saddam's tribal policies and his Faith Campaign, as well as to explain why Anbar became a center of the 2003 insurgency, a closer look at one city—Fallujah—is in order. This description of Fallujah's society and the attempt to explain why it became such a stubborn insurgency center is representative of most other towns in Anbar.

(U) Fallujah is an ancient town. Its first name was "Anbar", which means "a storehouse" or "a magazine". In 750 AD, the Caliph al-Saffah made it his capital city. Later, when the Abbasids moved their capital to Baghdad, Anbar remained important as the center of a very fertile area bordering the desert.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) Sometime in the late 9th century or early 10th century the town's name was changed to Fallujah, apparently borrowing its name from a geological fault or land rift in the area (the root in Arabic means crevice or fissure). About the same time, it lost its importance and became a marginal farming town for over 1000 years until the arrival of the British.

(U) **Modernization and Growth**: The British hoped for better things from Fallujah. In the 1920s, they modernized the old caravan road that ran through Baghdad to Damascus and in the process built the important Iron Bridge that connects Fallujah to the western bank of the Euphrates River. (This is the same bridge from which the mob hanged the bodies of the four Blackwater contractors in 2004.)

(U) Thanks to the combination of proximity to Baghdad, (and thus good health services and education), available government jobs, and now a major road through the town, Fallujah experienced a population explosion, growing from 4,300 in the late 1940s to about 300,000 by 2003.[18]

(U) **Social and Economic Structure:** Fallujah was more tribal than most provincial towns. Since much of its population lived in surrounding small villages, everyone had tribal kin. In fact, Fallujah was described as a center for cross-border smuggling in 2003.[19] These tribal connections helped Fallujahns prosper during the international embargo, by providing ready-made routes for smuggling goods from neighboring countries.

(U) In addition to smuggling, Fallujah remained favored by the regime. The city was heavily industrialized before 2003 with the construction of several large factories, primarily state-owned enterprises (SOEs).[20] While operating well below capacity due to mismanagement, these tax subsidized facilities meant good jobs for Anbaris. In addition, the area surrounding Fallujah produced dates, sesame, millet and corn so that the community was self-sufficient in food production[21]

(U) Another major source of employment for Fallujahns was government service. Saddam's emphasis on hiring and promoting Anbaris meant that a large number of Ba'ath party members, army officers and internal security agents came from Fallujah. Following our invasion, tens of thousands, including army and intelligence officers, lost their jobs. They began looking for some way to redress the wrongs that they felt they had suffered.

(U) **Islam and Islamism in Fallujah:** As in the rest of Iraq, an old-new force—Islam—was introduced into the town by Saddam's Faith Campaign. Some tribal sheikhs complained that their authority was eroded under the Faith Campaign, which gave the clerics more influence. Fallujah has, however, always been a very conservative town. Some called it "The Town with One Hundred Mosques." There is some disagreement as to the actual number of mosques in Fallujah: some

Approved for Release

[18] 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, *al-'Iraq Qadiman wa Hadithan* (Sidon, Matba'at al-'Irfan, 1948), pp. 241-242.

[19] Rosen, N., "Inside the Iraqi Resistance," 15 July 2004, www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/FG16Aa02.html.

[20] See Footnotes 1, 2 and *Fallujah Recovers Its Sense of Everyday Life*, Solomon Moore, Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2005.

[21] http://www.answers.com/topic/fallujah

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

historians say there were between 50 and 100. In any case, during the 1990s they began to attract more people than ever before.[22]

> (U) **Sufism.** Sufism is a mystical and ascetic form of Islam that developed in what would later become Iraq in response to the worldliness of the Umayyads. Sufis practice a number of special rituals, such as whirling and the hypnotic repetition of God's name, and are organized into fraternal orders that are spread throughout the Islamic world. Sufis recognize numerous saints and believe that these powerful mystics can perform miracles. Although Sufism is widely practiced by both Sunnis and Shi'a, the Wahhabis see them as heretics and persecute them.

(U) As a result, the line between tribal and religious duties blurred in Fallujah in the mid-1990s. To some, there was no line separating religion and politics; everything they did was service to God and decreed by the Qur'an.

(U) In the years just before the 2003 war, some of the young people of Fallujah started moving from the traditional tolerant version of Islam to fundamentalist Islamic movements. A number of *madrassas* (Islamic schools) were opened, while notable Sunni clerics like Ahmad Kubaysi and Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz Al-Samarra'i preached radical sermons in the city.

(U) When the regime opened a cinema in the mid-nineties the Islamists blew it up along with music and video shops. The Salafi groups even bought TV sets simply to smash them in the main street. Men began to wear long beards and religious attire, while women covered themselves as they never had in the past.

(U) Rather than confront this religiosity, Saddam tried to contain it by providing more services and employment. He continued support for the *madrassas* and did not punish those who attacked the shops and cinema. He only closed one mosque where the more radical elements met. Once Saddam's Faith Campaign started, almost all limitations on religious fundamentalist teaching disappeared. Some young men started spending all their time in the mosque. This was allowed, even though Saddam's security apparatus watched them carefully. But because it was so heavily dependent on Anbar, the regime did not move against the Islamists. The result was that Islamism was allowed to flourish in Fallujah in a way that it could not elsewhere in Iraq.

(U) While Fallujah is representative, a description of the other major cities in Anbar Province is found at Appendix C.

(U) The Military and Security Conditions in Anbar Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (2002-2003)

~~(S)~~ The military presence in Anbar Province on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom was relatively low key. Most major Iraqi Regular Army units were deployed in the south or along the Iranian border. Aircraft had been buried for later use. Republican Guard units moved from garrisons in Anbar Province to concentric defensive circles around Baghdad. The only Special Republican Guard unit left in Anbar was protecting the Haditha Dam and other important regime sites nearby.

(U) Unfortunately, in October 2003, Saddam released up to 9,000 prisoners, many felons. A significant number of these found there way to Anbar province and in particular Falluja and Ramadi.[23]

---

[22] In 2004, US Marines counted 133 mosques, with 26 being used as fighting positions and weapons caches. Source: Briefing, MNC-I, *Operation Al Fajr Roll Up*, 28 Nov 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2004/d20041203entire.ppt

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S~~) ***Pre-OIF Iraqi Military Presence in Al-Anbar.*** Prior to OIF, the Iraqi military maintained a sizeable presence in Al-Anbar made up of troops from the regular army and units from the Hammurabi Division from the Republican Guard (RG).[24] These forces, a mixture of infantry, mechanized infantry, anti-aircraft units, artillery, and armor, were located at major Iraqi military bases in Al-Anbar such as al-Asad and al-Taqaddum and around major population centers such as Fallujah, Habbaniyah, Haditha, and of course the provincial capital of Ramadi.[25] In many cases these population centers were themselves home to prominent military facilities such as the Habbaniyah Headquarters Air Base and the Fallujah Supply and Transportation Command.[26]

(~~S~~) Among the notable Iraqi military units stationed in the province were the following:[27]

- 121 Artillery Regiment of the Hammurabi Division (Habbaniyah)
- 15 RG Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Habbaniyah)
- 63rd Tank Regiment (Habbaniyah)
- 17th RG Armored Brigade (Fallujah)
- 3rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion (Ramadi)

(~~S~~) The majority of Al-Anbar's offensive missiles were focused in the so-called "Scud box" in the western desert near al-Asad, with the cities of Fallujah, Ramadi, al-Qaim, and Haditha all boasting a number of SAMs for us in anti-aircraft defense.[28] The Special Republican Guard unit based in Tharthar Dam also had access to offensive FROG (free rocket over ground) weapons.[29]

(~~S~~) Additionally a sizeable amount of Iraqi air power was based at Al Asad, Taqaddum, and Habbaniyah, consisting of dozens of interceptor squadrons of aircraft in varying states of decline.[30] Saddam, however, had decided early on that the Iraqi Air Force would not participate in OIF so that he could preserve it for future need and ordered commanders to hide their aircraft.[31]

(~~S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR~~) The Iraqi Border Forces (BF), which were responsible for defending Iraq's borders against foreign invasion, were present at all of its major border crossing and controlled directly by Border Forces Command Headquarters in Baghdad.[32] While there were occasions in the past where BFs were reinforced by mechanized infantry or armor, in general they were neglected by the regime and suffered from low morale, substandard living conditions, and low pay in contrast to their counterparts on the Iranian side of the border.[33] This was due in part to the fact that the Anbari BFs were primarily made up of conscripts and were last in the line for fuel, ammunition, and equipment, making them easily susceptible to corruption and unwilling to taken any serious measures to interdict smuggling in the province.[34]

Approved for Release

---

[23] Barr, C., "Jailbirds Fly Free," *Christian Science Monitor,* 22 Oct 2002
[24] Iraq Republican Guard Units Line in Block Chart, October 8, 1998
[25] RT-1130-IZ-0001-99
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] RT-1330-IZ-0002-99
[31] *Iraqi Perspectives Project,* p.40
[32] NGIC-Crisis Assesment-0331
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/NF~~) The Saddam Fedayeen active in Al-Anbar fell under the responsibility of the Baghdad command, one of the four regional commands that had been established to manage the paramilitary organization and would later serve as the inspiration for Saddam's decision to divide Iraq into 4 military districts.[35] In Al-Anbar they numbered roughly 4,000 members under the command Iraqi military intelligence officers and were intended as much to ensure the political loyalty of units stationed in the area as to serve as a serious military challenge to the Coalition.[36]

(~~S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR~~) The Special Republican Guard (SRG) was also active in Al-Anbar in the form of the 3rd Special Republican Guard Battalion located at Tharthar Dam (Habbaniyah Dam) that was assigned to defend Presidential Palace and VIP residential complex in the area.[37] While most of the SRG was recalled in and around Baghdad to defend the Iraqi capital during the run-up to OIF, the 3rd Battalion remained at the Dam because the Tharthar Lake Presidential Palace was one of Saddam's favorite retreats and he wished to preserve it against possible attack by the Coalition.[38]

(~~S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR~~) In keeping with Iraqi military doctrine, Saddam's strategy for maintaining control in Al-Anbar consisted of forward deployments of infantry and armored units from the regular army's II Corps reinforced by elements of the Hammurabi Division from Habbaniyah and Fallujah.[39] The defense of Ramadi itself was left o a combination of two light infantry divisions and paramilitaries from the al-Quds Army.[40] The goal of this deployment strategy was to bolster the outer ring of Baghdad's western defense in order to better protect the capital.[41]

(~~S/NF~~) This forward deployment strategy was initiated in January 2003, when the 3rd Armored Division was deployed near Ramadi to join the 12th Armored Division together with the al-Mu'tasim Tank Battalion of the 3rd Armored Brigade, both of which had previously been located in Hit and Qara Tappah respectively.[42]

(~~S/NF~~) The Iraqi deployments from Fallujah, which along with Habbaniyah maintained the largest concentration of RG forces in Al-Anbar, occurred in semi-chaotic fashion as RG armor, most of it in the form of T-72 tanks, was frantically concentrated in and around Baghdad during the run-up to OIF. This was apparently done in an effort to mount a protracted tank battle to prevent the Coalition from reaching the capital.[43] RG forces that had previously been stationed in Rutbah were also dispatched to assist in the defense of Baghdad.[44] Following the shift, the 22nd Brigade of the RG Nebuchadnezzar Division was deployed west of Ramadi in order to help ensure regime control of the western desert.[45]

(~~S/NF~~) Following these redeployments, Ba'ath Party leaders in Fallujah undertook a major effort to inventory all cars, cargo trucks, and buses newer than 1990 for seizure and began issuing weapons to

Approved for Release

[35] NGIC
[37] NGIC
[39] NGIC
1.4c
[42] TI
[43] TI
[44] TI
[45] TI

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

groups of 10-20 young men drawn from the civilian population in order to maintain control of the city once the Coalition invasion began.[46]

(~~S/NF~~) In an effort to prevent the Iraqi security services that Saddam so heavily depended upon from being targeted by Coalition airstrikes on Baghdad, the General Security Directorate (Al-Amn Al-'Amm) and the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS, Mukhbarat) both relocated their respective headquarters to Abu Ghraib and al-Garma.[47] The relocation of these agencies coincided with a large number of Iraqi security officials taking refuge in Al-Anbar with their families.[48]

(U) The reasons for these deployments may have been as much political as military. The regular army was considered least trustworthy by Saddam and for that reason was placed at the outskirts of his defenses, followed by the slightly more trustworthy Republican Guard.[49] This desire to ensure maximum political rather than military reliability was forced by Saddam's enduring obsession and paranoia with his own personal security and political survival at the expense of sound military planning and contributed significantly to the rapid collapse of the Iraqi military following the fall of Baghdad.[50]

(~~S~~) In summary, the Iraqi military presence in Al-Anbar prior to OIF was made up of regular army units bolstered by elements of the Hammurabi Division of the RG. The province also housed a considerable (by Iraqi standards) air force presence and air defense network, though neither were successfully employed by the regime prior to OIF, as well as Saddam's ubiquitous security and paramilitary forces. The SRG's 3rd Battalion maintained a presence at Tharthar Dam, being one of the few SRG units that was not recalled to Baghdad to assist in the defense of the capital. During the run-up to OIF, Al-Anbar was home to far fewer RG and SRG forces as its northern or southern counterparts, but this should be viewed within the context of Saddam's "ring" strategy for defending Baghdad.

Summary

(U) On the eve of the Coalition invasion, the Anbaris were far better off than most Iraqis. Yet despite holding a privileged status, the Anbaris still retained two key characteristics that would influence Iraq's future. Anbaris continued to defy central authority and maintain a firm belief that only Sunnis could rule Iraq.

(U) The decade following the Gulf War also brought major changes to Anbar. The policy changes by Saddam, the Shi'a revolt that occurred immediately after the Gulf War and the sanctions regime set up by the international community combined to transform the province in unexpected ways. The new tribal and religious policies of Saddam created a province with stronger tribal ties, more loyalty to Saddam, and much more religious fervor. They had also reinforced the Anbaris' conviction of their right to power and privilege.

(U) The growing strength of radical Islam was having great impact. Although Anbaris had been religious in the past, their faith had been heavily influenced by Sufism and was rather moderate. The new Islamism was fervent and had views of jihad that traditional Islam does not support. Some Islamists envisioned an Islamic Caliphate which would unite the world's entire Islamic community.

[46] TD-[redacted] 1.4c
[47] TD-[redacted]
[48] Ibid.
[49] *Iraqi Perspectives Project*, p.27
[50] *Iraqi Perspectives Project*, p.77

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) By the end of the nineties, even Ba'athist party members were turning to Islam in large numbers, creating a nexus between the supposedly secular party and religion that would be further strengthened after 2003.

(U) Equally important for later events was the Sunni expectation that they would retain their position in Iraq because the Anbari sense of privilege and entitlement went along with a deep-seated fear of the Shi'a. Indeed right up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Sunni-Arab elites feared pro-Iranian Shi'a subversion, defection, and treason. The Sunni pointed to the fact Shi'a religious leadership in Najaf and Karbala has many connections with the Iranian Ayatollahs, and several thousand of them actually fought alongside Iranian troops against the Iraqi armed forces during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). In building this argument, the Sunni conveniently overlooked the fact hundreds of thousands of Shi'a fought and died in the Iraq Army to repulse the Iranian invasion of the south.

(U) The Sunnis were adamant that control of Iraq had to remain in the hands of the only true Iraqis—the Sunnis who had ruled the country since its founding. Many Sunnis also firmly believed that Sunnis were actually a majority in Iraq. They stated Sunnis made up over 50% of the total population and the Shi's and Kurds were distinct minorities.

(U) As always, Anbaris smugglers continued to thrive -- and the sanctions increased the profitability of their smuggling. Exploiting cross-border tribal ties, Anbaris slipped easily into Jordan, Syria and even Saudi Arabia to buy scarce goods and bring them back to Iraq. These ancient smuggling routes, used by Anbaris for centuries, would find other uses once the 2003 war with the Coalition began.

(U) This mix of ancient characteristics and recent Islamic fervor awaited the American forces that would move into the province.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1

10th Special Forces Group, 3

2

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 3

3

3/325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team, 3

A

al-Hakim, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir, 2
al-Sadr, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq, 2
al-Sadr, Muqtada, 2
Al-Samarra, Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz, 13

B

Baghdad, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14
Basra, 2
Bush, President, 2

C

Clinton, President, 5

D

Damascus, 12
Desert Shield, 1

F

Fallujah, 4, 12, 13, 14
Fedayeen Saddam, 7

G

Gulf War, 3, 4, 14

H

Habbaniyah, 4
Haditha, 14
Haditha Dam, 14
Hussein, Saddam, 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10

I

Iran, 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 14
Iraq Liberation Act, 5

J

Jordan, 6, 15

K

Karbala, 2, 14
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 2, 10
Kubaysi, Ahmad, 13
Kurdistan Democratic Party, 3
Kuwait, 1

L

Lebanon, 4

N

Najaf, 2, 3, 14
Nasiriyya, 2

O

OIF, 1
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1, 14
Oil-for-Food Program, 1
Operation Desert Fox, 1, 4, 5
Operation Provide Comfort, 3
Ottoman, 1

P

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 3

R

Ramadan, 5
Ramadi, 9, 14

S

Saddam Fedayeen, 9
Samarra, 13
Saudi Arabia, 1, 15
SCIRI, 2
Sufism, 13, 14
Syria, 6, 15

U

UN, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8
United Nations, 1, 4, 5, 9

Z

Zinni, General Anthony, 5

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Chapter Three

Anbar Insurgency: The Seeds are Planted – The Formation and Motivating Factors (2003)

MCIA Insert Metaphorical Picture Here Of: Capture Of Saddam

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, launched in March 2003, overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime in a few weeks. Early resistance to the Coalition was minimal. A number of weak local figures and opportunists attempted to move into the governance power vacuum. Over time, the disruption of previous social, economic, and political power left many Anbaris sympathetic to the resistance, allowing it to develop into an insurgency. Individual and disorganized resistance elements gradually consolidated into regional and national insurgent groups. Toward the end of 2003, nationalist and international jihadi groups became active in Anbar. The year ended with the capture of Saddam; while this had the effect of splintering former regime loyalists, it did not end the insurgency.*

Introduction

(U) On December 14, 2003, soldiers from the Raider Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division and U.S. special operations forces acted on a tip from a member of Saddam Hussein's clan. They conducted a raid on the property of Saddam's former personal attendant in the small town of al-Dawr, 15 miles south of Saddam's hometown of Tikrit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Focusing on a rural farmhouse, U.S. troops cordoned off the area and found a narrow cellar or "spider hole" covered by a rug inside a hut. In it they found Saddam himself. The former Iraqi despot had surrounded himself with symbols of his lost power – two AK-47s, a pistol, and $750,000 in cash. Offering no resistance, the bewildered Saddam surrendered. As soon as his identity was confirmed U.S. administrator Paul Bremer proudly announced to journalists in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, "Ladies and gentlemen, we got him."[1]

(U) It soon became clear that Saddam's capture did not end the violence in Iraq and was merely one transition point in the insurgency—that was consuming Anbar Province. The conditions for insurgency had been set during the first five months of 2003. Actions by Saddam, the Coalition, and by radicals who wanted to provoke an insurgency—exacerbated by high unemployment, poor living conditions, and strong religious and nationalist sentiments—coalesced. In response, former regime elements (FREs) and former regime loyalists (FRLs) initiated what was, at first, a disorganized resistance. Over time, they organized, first at the local and then the national level, into an effective resistance to Coalition Forces. To combat the insurgency, the Coalition focused on hunting down former regime leaders, most notably Saddam Hussein. During 2003, they achieved some successes, including Saddam's capture, and ended the year with the splintering of the FRL groups that had been dedicated to the return of Saddam to power. Yet the insurgency in Anbar, while weakened by

[1] [| Open Source | TIME MAGAZINE/NANCY GIBBS: WE GOT HIM | 20031214 | (U) |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the loss of Saddam, remained active in the form of FRE, Sunni religious extremist (SRE), and Al Qaeda organizations destined to play a larger role in 2004.

> ~~(C)~~ **FRL, FRE AND SRE.** During the first year of the insurgency, Coalition Forces used a variety of terms to differentiate insurgent groups by motivation, objectives and/or origin. Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) were supporters of Saddam who fought the Coalition in order to return Saddam's regime, in its entirety, to power. Former Regime Elements (FREs) were members of Saddam's regime who did not want to see Saddam return to power, but were instead motivated to fight the Coalition for a variety of tribal, regional, and sectarian reasons. Sunni Religious Extremists (SREs), on the other hand, primarily fought for sectarian or religious reasons and did not necessarily have any ties to the former regime.

Pre-OIF Error! Bookmark not defined.**, OIF and the War in Anbar (January – April 2003)**

(U) How did the insurgency begin? What were the key factors that led ordinary Anbaris to take up weapons against Coalition Forces? To understand the genesis of the insurgency, we must begin with the plans made by the combatants for the war and for a post-war Iraq.

Iraqi Pre-War Planning

(U) There is no evidence that Saddam Hussein developed any detailed plans for post-war resistance against the Coalition.[2] Senior Iraqi leaders believed that either international pressure or the use of unconventional weaponry would deter the Coalition from overthrowing its regime.[3] Nevertheless, the regime's military preparations included an irregular component that helped to create the conditions and organization that would later prove invaluable to the formation of the insurgency.

(U) Saddam's real fear was another uprising like the one in 1991. Based on that fear, he made three key decisions that later greatly assisted the organization of the insurgency. First, in order to protect himself from another Shia or Kurd uprising, Saddam established irregular and paramilitary organizations like the Saddam Fedayeen and the al-Quds Army (or Jaysh Quds). Second, as early as January 2003, the regime began giving large numbers of weapons (including RPGs, anti-aircraft guns, and anti-tank weapons) to loyalist tribal sheikhs to assist in controlling his borders and dissidents.[4] Finally, in early 2003, Saddam decentralized command and control of the Iraqi military by dividing Iraq into four military districts.

(U) Saddam's intent was to insure his commanders had the forces, equipment and authority necessary to take immediate action against anti-government uprisings in their sectors. To protect himself against potential uprisings, Saddam was forced to grant local and regional commanders more

Approved for Release

[2] [| Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY REPORT: INTELLIGENCE BRIEF ON THE STATE OF THE INSURGENCY | 20060622 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[3] [| Open Source | INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS: IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT | pp. 31-32 | (U) |]
[4] [| Open Source | NEW YORK TIMES | 20030105 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

autonomy than in the past.[5] In doing so, Saddam enabled them to initiate their own pre-planning for guerrilla and terrorist operations without central direction from Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.

~~(S)~~ The terrorist component of Saddam's strategy also served as an impetus for the insurgency. In late 2002, Saddam Hussein instructed Iraqi intelligence to send members of the elite M-14 directorate (Special Operation and "Anti-Terrorism") to key Iraqi cities in to assist local commanders with carrying out attacks against Coalition forces using explosives.[6] While many M-14 operatives were killed during the Coalition invasion, those who survived were well trained, widely dispersed and in place to provide the nucleus for much of the early Iraqi insurgency.

(U) To prepare the people mentally and spiritually, some government-sponsored mosque sermons in Anbar preached stridently anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric, exhorting Iraqis to participate in resistance—a jihad—should the Coalition invade Iraq. The declaration by the prominent Islamic Research Center of al-Azhar University[7] that a U.S.-led war in Iraq would compel all Muslims to participate in jihad further served to legitimize anti-Coalition violence even among Islamists who hated Saddam's secular regime.[8]

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ In contrast to Saddam and his inner circle, a number of senior members of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) were far less optimistic about the regime's chances for survival in the event of a Coalition invasion. They began making survival plans of their own, independent of Saddam.[9] These plans called for the IIS to operate as a clandestine organization, take over Sunni mosques under an Islamist façade, preserve arms caches and accumulate weaponry, assassinate members of the returning Iraqi émigré population who might be able to identify them, and infiltrate any new political parties and NGOs to sabotage these institutions from within.[10] While these plans were only known to senior IIS officers, they helped to form the framework for many FRE and FRL groups to organize in the early stages of the insurgency.

Coalition Pre-War Planning

(U) As would be expect, the United States also conducted planning for post-OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Iraq. On January 20, 2003 President Bush created the Office of Reconstruction and

Approved for Release

[5] [| Open Source | REUTERS: IRAQ GOES ON WAR FOOTING, DIVIDES NATION INTO 4 MILITARY DISTRICTS | 20030315 | (U) |]
[6] [| Military | JITF-CT: IRAQ: M-14 AND M-16 DIRECTORATES: CAPABILITIES AND TACTICS | 20040326 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[7] [| Open Source | Cairo's al-Azhar University is the most prestigious center of Sunni theological authority in the Islamic world | (U) |]
[8] [| Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS | 20030310 | (U) |]
[9] [| Military | CJSOTF INTSUM: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ KEY REPORTING FROM FROM 27 MAY TO 17 JULY 03 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[10] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) within the Department of Defense (DoD**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) under Lieutenant General Jay Garner, U.S. Army, (Retired), to assist Iraqis in developing democratic governance and reconstructing the country once Saddam Hussein was deposed. While DoD war planners created a branch plan for a post-war insurgency, no detailed contingency plan was written, nor were any resources for a counter-insurgency built into the final war plan.

Pre-War Planning by Islamic Militants

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Islamist militants, by contrast, made very definite plans to wage a guerrilla campaign against the Coalition. Although suppressed by Saddam, Al Qaeda and associated groups were already active inside Iraq pre-OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** under the leadership of senior Al Qaeda associates Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (AMZ), Abu Ayyub al-Masri, and Lu'ai Saqa.[11]. The vast majority of Islamist activity took place in the Kurdish areas where Operation NORTHERN WATCH protected them from Saddam's forces. Ansar al-Islam (AI) served as their primary hub in northern Iraq even as they maintained a presence inside regime-controlled areas including Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[12] Senior Al Qaeda leaders including 'Usama bin Ladin and Sayf al-'Adl called on Iraqis to resist the Coalition, with al-'Adl even going as far as to write a military manual for Islamists fighting in Iraq which included Al Qaeda's "lessons learned" from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[13] Between forty and eighty Arab and Arabic-speaking members of Al Qaeda and its Pakistani associate group Lashkar-e-Taiba traveled from the Pakistani border with Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia under the cover of the Hajj. From Saudi Arabia, they entered Iraq for the specific purpose of fighting Coalition forces.[14]

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of AMZ

(U) **ABU MUS'AB AL-ZARQAWI (Zarqawi)** began life as a street thug in Zarqa, Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. During a stint in prison he met Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a charismatic Islamic cleric, who convinced him to dedicate his life to *jihad*, to the *Wahhabi* version of *tawhid*, and to implementing an extremist version of *shari'a*. Zarqawi also developed an intense hatred for the Shi'a, whom he thought of as heretics and "the worst of mankind." Once released from prison, Zarqawi made his way to Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, where he met 'Usama bin Ladin and other Al Qaeda leaders. While the exact relationship of Zarqawi to Bin Ladin is unclear, Zarqawi received assistance from Bin Ladin even though he did not subordinate himself to Bin Ladin to the degree other Al Qaeda leaders had. Instead, he convinced the leadership of Al Qaeda to allow him to create a separate camp in Herat to train his own fighters. In Herat, Zarqawi attracted potential *jihadis* from Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Jordan, and Iraq and began to form the nucleus for a new jihad in those countries. When the Taliban regime was destroyed by the United States, Zarqawi and his fighters escaped from Afghanistan through Iran**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to northern Iraq,

Approved for Release

[11] [| (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[12] Ibid.
[13] [| Open Source | NBC NEWS | 20030324 | (U) |]
[14] [| Open Source | SOUTH ASIA ANALYSIS GROUP, PAPER NO. 941/B. RAMAN: MASSACRES OF SHI'AS IN IRAQ & PAKISTAN – THE BACKGROUND | 20040303 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

where they sought refuge with Ansar al-Islam. Zarqawi again did not want to join another militant group and soon formed his own, named Jihad wa'l-*Tawhid*. Only much later would Zarqawi decide to join Al Qaeda and rename his group Al Qaeda fi al-Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers), aka Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**). Zarqawi was killed by Coalition Forces in June 2006.

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Al-Masri

~~(S/NF)~~ **ABU AYYUB AL-MASRI/ABU Hamza AL-MUHAJIR** was a senior member of al-Sunnah organization within Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) under Al Qaeda senior leader Thirwat Salah Shihata. Active in EIJ since the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the 1980s, al-Masri first met Zarqawi in Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Like Zarqawi, he fled to Iraq after the overthrow of the Taliban. Arriving in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** ahead of Zarqawi, al-Masri renewed his contact with the other terrorist leader and agreed to continue to work with him on behalf of EIJ. Prior to OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, al-Masri ran a terrorist training camp at a farm in Diyala**Error! Bookmark not defined.** that he obtained through his Iraqi contacts. Following the overthrow of Saddam, he traveled to Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and commanded a group of foreign fighters under Umar Hadid. After Zarqawi's demise, al-Masri assumed control of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as its new amir with 'Usama bin Laden's blessing under the *kuniyat* (assumed name) of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Lu'ai Saqa

~~(S/NF)~~ **LU'AI SAQA** was a senior Al Qaeda associate known as Ala al-Din and "the Doctor" who provided logistical support for jihadi groups all over the world. Starting in the mid-1990s, he provided forged documents, money, and safehouses to AQ operatives. Prior to OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, he operated mainly in Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Turkey**Error! Bookmark not defined.** but based himself in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** with Zarqawi by 2004. Regarded by many JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.** members as Zarqawi's second-in-command or external operations chief, he was actually the direct link between the Iran**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based Al Qaeda senior leader Abu Muhammed al-Masri and Zarqawi, having met the latter in Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in 2001. He played a key role in the November 2003 bombings in Istanbul that targeted 2 Jewish synagogues, the British Consulate, and the HSBC bank that killed 61 and was apprehended in Turkey in August 2005 while plotting to attack Israeli cruise ships.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Despite his secular ideology and distrust of Islamists, Saddam actively recruited foreign volunteers across the Arab and Islamic world to prepare to fight the Coalition.[15] While not all of these foreign volunteers were Islamists (many belonged to other branches of the Ba'ath Party or were simply anti-American), a number of them were.[16] One of these, Abu Iyad al-Urduni, was a Zarqawi associate who styled himself as "Amir of the Mujahideen in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not**

Approved for Release

[15] [| Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS/NO AUTHOR: IRAQ ESTABLISHES TRAINING CAMP FOR FOREIGN SUICIDE BOMBERS | 20030311 | (U) |]
[16] [| Military | OPTIMIZED TRIBES AND RELIGIOUS ENGAGEMENT IN RAWAH AND AL QA'IM | 20030407 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

defined." in communiqués sent to the London-based Islamist Center for the Defense of Legitimate Rights.[17]

MCIA INSERT PICTURE OF AL-URDUNI

(U) **ABU IYAD AL-URDUNI.** He later issued a public statement declaring the formation of the Armed Islamic Group of Al Qaeda, Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Branch, one of the first public indications that Al Qaeda was active in the city.

(U) **ISLAMISM (SALAFISM) AND JIHADISM**. Islamism (or Salafi Islam) is a political movement within Islam that was developed during the late 19th century. Islamists (or Salafis) are Muslims who believe that Islam must be practiced as it was in the 7th century and that Islam must have political power and a state. As a minimum goal, Islamists support the imposition of *shari'a* by an Islamic government. More radical members believe there must also be a Caliph, and therefore the creation of a Caliphate, for Islam to be correctly practiced. Islamists are divided over the means for creating the Islamic state, however. Some support democratic methods and the election of Muslims who will impose *shari'a*, while others believe that democracy is evil and therefore that some sort of socialization process—such as convincing Muslims to practice their religion more diligently through argument, by providing social services, or through intimidation—is the only way to create the perfect Islamic state. Jihadists (also called jihadis) are those Islamists who argue that an Islamic state can only be created through violence. Some non-Muslims call all jihad fighters "*jihadis*," but this is incorrect: the proper term for jihad fighters in general is "mujahidin." This is a term of respect and confers legitimacy on the fighter and the war. If the war is illegitimate or the fighter is a criminal, he should be knows as a "mufsadoon."

OIFError! Bookmark not defined. **in Anbar**

(U) OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** began on March 19, 2003 and Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fell on April 9, far sooner than many Coalition or Iraqi planners had anticipated. Tikrit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Kirkuk**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fell just days later. Combat with the remaining Iraqi military forces consisted only of minor skirmishes. Major combat persisted in a few areas such as in al-Qa'im where, on April 11, the 3rd ACR defeated regime loyalists attempting to escape into Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[18] Regime loyalists also continued fighting at the K3**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Pumping Station near Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, a key oil infrastructure facility that was seriously damaged during the course of the fighting.[19]

(U) Except for the fighting in al-Qa'im and K3**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, the Coalition's entry into Anbar was relatively bloodless. Small numbers of U.S., British, and Australian special operations forces had been active in Anbar since the beginning of OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, searching for possible Iraqi Scuds in the desert, hunting for Iraqi leaders, and securing valuable infrastructure such as the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Dam and al-Asad Airbase

[17] [| Open Source | COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS (CDLR)/TRANSLATED BY JIHAD UNSPUN | 20030418 | (U) |]
[18] [| Open Source | CNN | 20030411 | (U) |]
[19] [| Open Source | STRATFOR | IRAQ: DOWNED PUMPING STATION SHOULD HAVE LIMITED IMPACT ON EXPORTS | 20030619 | (U) |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(between Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Haditha near Khan-al-Baghdadi, 10 km west of the Euphrates River) to prevent their sabotage or destruction by fleeing regime loyalists.[20]

(U) The official surrender of the remaining loyalist forces in Anbar province took place on April 15 at a special operations compound 30 miles west of Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. There, Major General Muhammed Thumayla, Western District Commander for the Iraqi Army, surrendered to (b)(3), (b)(6) of the 4th Brigade of the U.S. Army.[21] During the surrender, Major General Thumayla informed (b)(3), (b)(6) that although he had originally had more than 16,000 troops under his command, the majority of them had deserted him within five days after OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** began. Following his surrender, (b)(3), (b)(6) asked Major General Thumayla to remain in uniform for the next 30 days, take control of his remaining troops, and assist the Coalition in restoring order in Ramadi.[22]

(U) By the end of April, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment were sent to occupy cities and towns in Anbar and to suppress any remaining resistance from Iraqi loyalist military and security forces. Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was occupied by the 82nd Airborne Division on April 24 but they were soon replaced by the 3rd Infantry Division's 2nd Brigade. The 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment was headquartered in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and, along with units from the 2-325th Airborne Infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division and the Florida National Guard's 1-124th Infantry, was responsible for overseeing the rest of Anbar province.

City Story: Hit Error! Bookmark not defined.

(U) The small city of Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, located on the main route between central Iraq and Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, illustrates how the course of OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** affected cities in Anbar. Hit, together with the nearby communities of Muhammadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Kubaysah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, had about 105,000 inhabitants, many engaged in farming and agriculture. Like the rest of Anbar province, Hit was better off than the Shi'a areas of Iraq but still the town was poor and to some extent neglected by the central government. Hit had no television or radio stations of its own, nor did it have a central sewage system, and its one hospital could only hold 100 patients. Like much of Anbar, Hit depended on the central government for cooking fuel and gasoline as well as other necessities, especially since the imposition of sanctions on Iraq and the creation of the Oil-for-Food Program.[23]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Once the war started, these resources were less available, a fact that would deeply affect life in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** by May 2003. Yet electricity and water

Approved for Release

[20] [| Open Source | Globalsecurity.org | (U) |]
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] [| Military | 3RD ACR: ASSESSMENT OF HIT, IRAQ | 20030630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

would only be cut intermittently during the fighting and, after combat ended, was restored to pre-war levels. In fact these communities—like most of Anbar—suffered little damage from the Coalition during OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Coalition forces, thinly stretched over the vast reaches of Anbar, could not physically occupy each small city. Hit was essentially left to its own devices until a first assessment by USAID**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on April 27, while the military would not assess the situation there until May 14.[24] This benign neglect would become important as the insurgency began to form in April and May.

A Marine Looking At Anbar Province Sees Conditions for an Insurgency

(U) What would a Marine observe in the streets, shops, and mosques of a typical Anbari city following the collapse of government authority in early April 2003? What lessons could he draw from his observations, and how might the sights and sounds of that time inform his understanding of the events that followed?

Economy and Governance

(U) Anbar's privileged status resulted from Saddam use of government largess in order to ensure the population's loyalty to the regime. As a Sunni Arab area and an essential part of Saddam's power base, Anbar, in particular the towns along the Euphrates, benefited from the attention of the central government.

(U) Between 1970-1990 under the Ba'ath regime, Anbar became a center of quarrying and industry that included glass, cement, phosphate, milling, and engineering. In addition, collectivized agriculture around the provincial capital of Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** constituted one of the province's main sustainable employers. Prior to Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, about 20% of Anbaris made their living from agriculture, mainly growing dates, wheat and barley, and raising livestock such as sheep, camels, goats, and cattle. After Operation DESERT STORM, the primary source of food for Anbaris from the 1990s until 2003 was the United Nations, Oil for Food (OFF) program via the UN**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Food and Agriculture Organization's Public Distribution System (PDS). This UN program devastated the market for agricultural products in Anbar and thus the Anbar agricultural system.

(U) Other industries - primarily cement factories and construction firms - were heavily dependent on state subsidies to operate. Municipal officials owed their positions to the central government and were unaccustomed to decision-making independent to Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Saddam believed that guaranteed employment and patronage would assure Anbaris' loyalty to his regime. Others made their living from black market and smuggling activities which were largely run by clients of the Hussein family and other senior members of the regime.

Approved for Release

[24] [| USAID**Error! Bookmark not defined.** | DART ASSESSMENT OF HEET, AL HADITHAH | APRIL 27, 20030427 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ In Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, employees at the hydroelectric dam and K3**Error! Bookmark not defined.** oil pumping station (15 km south of the Haditha Dam) were as privileged as any in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, receiving free schooling, housing, and other benefits from the regime similar to the privileges of those in the Ministry of Oil and Gas.[25]

(U) Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s economy depended, to a large extent, on employment at the nearby dam over the Euphrates River. Haditha was home to the major oil pipeline crossing the Euphrates River and the K3**Error! Bookmark not defined.** pumping station.[26] Some oil was refined at K3 for local use. Our Marines would see convoys of trucks headed toward the Syrian border. Under Hussein, many Anbaris found employment trucking oil and refined petroleum from Iraq to Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. The oil and oil products trucking system continued to function until 2003 and was used as a means through which Iraqis illegally sold oil through Syria. Other Anbaris found illicit employment smuggling oil and other goods into Syria and Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, a vocation perceived as entirely legitimate by Anbari merchants, tribal leaders and other elites who profited from the trade.

(U) Anbar was also far better off than many provinces of Iraq with regard to road infrastructure, sewage, water treatment, medical facilities, schools, and houses because of Saddam's patronage. Many mid-level Ba'ath Party members and security personnel lived in Anbar in areas comparable to the middle to upper class neighborhoods in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. In fact, many Anbari neighborhoods had all the amenities of the more affluent sections of Baghdad.

(U) The Marine would undoubtedly be taken aback by the disorder following OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in the three largest Anbari cities: Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. With the collapse of central government in Iraq, the disintegration of the Ba'athist state's political and economic infrastructure soon followed, leaving a power vacuum that would not be filled for several critical weeks. As a result, he would see unemployed men and a lack of basic infrastructure common to any functioning city. He would see looting, although not on the same scale as that which occurred in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Fallujah, for instance, was spared serious looting by the appeals of religious and tribal leaders to respect law and order. Conversely, in Ramadi government property was looted by men who would later go on to form insurgent groups in that city. Only the public school system continued to function adequately following the invasion. Hospitals and police departments were unable to retain staff, pay the salaries of those who remained, or obtain needed supplies. Some police departments swamped by a deluge of criminal activity – bank robbery, looting, and petty theft – were unable to independently restore order.

Approved for Release

---

[25] [| Military | b 3, b 6 | PSYOP ASSESSMENT OF HADITHAH | 20040108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[26] [| Open Source | K3**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was one of a series of major pumping stations along the national Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline that ran from the major refining center at Bayji (on the Tigris River about 37 km north of Tikrit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in bordering Salah Ad Din Province) west towards Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) Though Anbar was better off than many other provinces, our Marine would find the physical infrastructure in an advanced state of deterioration. Fuel distribution centers lacked adequate supplies of propane, which most Anbaris used for home cooking and benzene, used by most Anbaris to fuel their vehicles. Sewer systems and other public water infrastructure often required wholesale replacement, with some sewage sluices emptying into sources of drinking water. The province's electrical grid never quite recovered from the 1991 Gulf War, and again suffered some damage during the 2003 invasion.

(U) On a positive note, subsistence and collectivized agriculture, already crippled by the UN**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Oil for Food program, was not directly damaged by the war. Further, the UN Public Distribution System was functioning and continued to provide food supplies for upwards of the 60% of the population. Other Anbaris found assistance through local mosques.

(U) The situation for ordinary Anbaris was, however, grim. Unemployment in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** reached as high as 80%, and in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** between 40-60%. In the spring of 2003, a typical Anbari breadwinner could find food, but not cook it; find a hospital, but not receive medical treatment; and if lucky enough to find work or retain an old job, not be paid. The disintegration of Anbar's infrastructure and command economy, including the officially sanctioned oil convoys, left Anbaris two employers: the farm and the black market.

Religion

(U) If the Marine spent a day or more in a post-Ba'athist Anbari city, he would observe high traffic at the local mosques, and probably conclude these places of worship were the strongest remaining centers of authority in the chaotic scene before him. Indeed, after April 2003, mosques and other religious establishments assumed even greater significance in the life of ordinary Anbaris. The fall of Saddam released religious as well as political controls. Islamist and jihadist preachers could, for the first time, spread their ideas freely in the mosques, away from the eyes of our American Marine. To the outside observer, it might seem as if all were quiet, but within the mosques radical opinions about the Americans, the Coalition and the need for resistance were already being spread.

Resistance

(U) Knowing only that the Sunni Arabs of Anbar were of the same ethnicity and sect as the leaders of the Ba'ath Party, and that many Anbaris benefited from Saddam's rule, the Marine probably would express surprise at the generally low level of resistance to American forces upon their arrival in Anbar province in April 2003. One explanation for this was the tenuous relationship between many leading Anbari tribes and the Ba'athist regime. Despite the government subsidies, many Anbaris had serious grievances against the regime. Their hostility to the regime mitigated, for a brief time, Anbaris' traditional suspicions of foreigners as they directed their discontent toward remnants of Saddam's rule. In reality, some Anbari tribes welcomed the liberators who had rid them of Saddam while others were deeply suspicious and resented the Coalition because of the regime's downfall.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Lessons

(U) Along with most Iraqis, Anbaris expressed astonishment and resentment that an army capable of destroying the Ba'athist regime in under a month could not prevent the total breakdown in law and order and the collapse of government services province-wide. Widespread unemployment, lawlessness, and criminality would gradually undermine the goodwill toward Coalition forces created by the ouster of Saddam Hussein, and fuel a budding insurgency.

City Study: Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined.

(U) How would all these conditions come together in an actual town? A look at the city of Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, a community of around 90,000, illustrates some of the underlying conditions for the insurgency. Haditha's position on the Euphrates River gave it strategic and economic importance. It straddled the main trading route into Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and also had a major source of water and electricity for Anbar, the Haditha Dam. Haditha had expanded as it grew to include some rural (and tribal) areas, which depended on jobs in security, smuggling or farming for a living, while the townspeople provided the administrators, merchants, engineers, and doctors.[27] The war left the Haditha Dam intact but there was little kerosene or gas for ordinary citizens. Twenty schools were damaged during the fighting, and looters had helped themselves to government property, crippling even the undamaged schools and leaving the hospital with little medicine. Teachers and other government employees had not been paid since the war ended and there were only twelve police officers available to keep law and order in the town.[28]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The lack of any governance in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** allowed Nayil al-Jaghayfi (or Jurayfi), an influential member of the al-Jaghayfah tribe, to simply declare himself mayor and seize control of the town with the help of his tribe before Coalition forces arrived. When troops from the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment entered Haditha, 1.4c gave them intelligence on Ba'athists and became a trusted intermediary to U.S. commanders, espite allegations that he and his tribesmen had looted the public buildings in the city. Al-Jaghayfi's influence was sufficient to appoint his fellow tribesman 1.4c as the 1.4c [29]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ At the same time, there was little sign of any active resistance to the Coalition. Only the ominous appearance of anti-American graffiti on the outside wall of a mosque in the north

Approved for Release

[27] [| Open Source | www.answers.com/topic/haditha; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haditha | (U) |]**Error! Bookmark not defined.**; [| Open Source | www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/haditha.htm | (U) |]; [| Open Source | IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE US, SUMAIDA'IE: WEB MEMO | 200306 |]; and [| Open Source | www.sumaidaie.com/PersonalWeb/AlAnbarMemoforweb.pdf | (U) |]
[28] [| Military | 3rd ACR: ASSESSMENT OF HADITHAH, IRAQ | 20030613 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[29] [| Open Source | IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE US, SUMAIDA'IE: WEB MEMO | 200306 | www.sumaidaie.com/PersonalWeb/AlAnbarMemoforweb.pdf | 20030701 | (U) |] and [| Open Source | AL-JAZEERA/JIM KRANE | 20030716 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

of Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** showed that not everyone in the town was happy to see Coalition forces.[30] Yet in July the first insurgent group, called the Iraq Liberation Movement, showed itself in Haditha by carrying out sporadic attacks on Coalition troops and distributing leaflets warning Iraqis against "collaboration" with the U.S. A warning that when not heeded, led to the assassination of the mayor and his son on July 16.[31]

The Proto-Insurgency (April-May 2003)

(U) The sudden collapse of effective governance and the economy in the province was not, however, enough to create the insurgency. The Coalition added to these basic conditions by disbanding the Iraqi Army. This action meant thousands of soldiers returned to their hometowns ready to listen to the various figures making their separate plays for power and influence. While the early insurgency was unorganized and lacked coherence, it nevertheless posed a significant challenge to the new Iraqi government and its coalition allies.

Iraqis Interpret Coalition Actions

(U) With the end of major hostilities around April 11, 2003, the Coalition imposed civilian governance by creating the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA**Error! Bookmark not defined.**). Ambassador Paul Bremer, formerly head of the Department of State (DOS) counter-terrorism office was appointed the head of CPA in May 2003. This contributed to the continuing power vacuum in Iraq since there was no on-scene American political authority for almost a month.

(U) During this period, the Coalition sought to restore order through the selection of new national leaders, provincial governors and mayors for the major cities. On a national level, General Garner (and his ORHA**Error! Bookmark not defined.** staff) invited roughly 100 Iraqis from different tribal, religious, and political groups to an April 15 conference in Nasariya to discuss the composition of a new Iraqi administration. The Sunni community was represented in proportion to their actual percentage of the Iraqi population, but many Sunnis believed that there should have been a higher number of Sunni given their sense of their previous importance in running Iraq. They thought, after all, that they were the majority of the Iraqi population and the true representatives of Iraqi nationalism, while the Shi'a were more Iranian than Iraqi. When combined with the facts that only one representative from Anbar was chosen to attend and that no Anbaris were part of the core of the group (known as the Iraqi Leadership Council (ILC)) formed in December 2002 at a conference in London), many Anbaris regarded these actions as both a slight from the Coalition as well as vindication of the belief that Iraqi Sunnis were not being properly represented in the new political process.

Approved for Release

[30] [| Military | 3rd ACR: ASSESSMENT OF HADITHAH, IRAQ | 20030613 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[31] [| Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS/JIM KRANE: NEW VIOLENCE WRACKS IRAQ | JULY 1, 20030701 | (U) |]; [| Open Source | AL-JAZEERA: NEW CASUALTIES TEST US RESOLVE," JULY16, 20030716 | (U) |]; [| Open Source | WASHINGTON POST/RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN: IRAQI MAYOR'S KILLING REINFORCES FEAR | 20030718 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ GOVERNOR	TERM IN OFFICE	REASON FOR LEAVING
Abdul Karim Burjis al-Rawi	April 11, 2003—August 4, 2004	Forced by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to resign as a condition to secure the release of his kidnapped three sons.[32]
Mohammed Abed Awad	August 4, 2004—November 8, 2004	Sacked by Prime Minister Allawi after allegedly cooperating with terrorists.[33]
Fasal Raikan Najris al Gaoud[34]	November 8, 2004—February 2005[35]	Forced out of office by local tribal leaders.[36]
Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi	February — May 9, 2005	Kidnapped by insurgents in May 2005 and later killed in captivity.[37]
Maamoon Sami Rasheed al-Awani	June 1, 2005—Present	Incumbent

Table 1: Governors of Anbar Province 2003-2006 (~~S/NF~~)

(U) On a local level, Anbar had a succession of governors. (see Table 1 above). Former Ba'athist and police officer Abdul Karim Burjis al-Rawi was chosen on April 11, 2003 to serve as Anbar governor following an informal selection process overseen by the sheikhs of the Albu Ali Sulayman tribe of the Dulaimi confederation.[38] In Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, religious and tribal leaders had already appointed their own civil management council before Coalition troops arrived. After Coalition forces took control they recognized this choice, Taha Bidaywi Hamad, as mayor, as well as the members of the new city council that he (and other tribal leaders) had appointed. In Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Naim Abd al-Muhsan, from the al-Goud tribe, was an official from Zuwayya and an opportunist who presented himself to Coalition forces upon their arrival and persuaded them to appoint him as mayor. Meanwhile the mayor of Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had simply seized power, an act recognized by the Coalition after the 3rd ACR arrived in town.

Approved for Release

[32] [| Open Source | AL JAZEERA ENGLISH ARCHIVE: IRAQI OFFICIAL QUITS TO WIN SONS' FREEDOM | http://english.aljazeera.net/News/archive/archive?ArchiveID=5588 | (U) |]
[33] [| Military | AL ANBAR CURRENT LEADERSHIPDRAFT_WORKING_050205 | 20050502 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] [| Open Source | SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE/AAMER MADHANI: US TROOPS FIND BODY OF ANBAR GOVERNOR | 20050601 | (U) |]
[38] [| Open Source | IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE US, SUMAIDA'IE: WEB MEMO | 200306 | www.sumaidaie.com/PersonalWeb/AlAnbarMemoforweb.pdf | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) While these efforts served the Coalition objective of reestablishing local and tribally-supported governance in Anbar, only the government of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had the support of Anbaris. The other attempts at appointing leaders were regarded as heavy-handed and undemocratic foreign interference. This would help to create a popular perception in Anbar that U.S. rhetoric about bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq was not to be taken seriously.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Also on April 11, a Coalition bombing raid killed the influential tribal leader Malik al-Kharbit and 21 members of his family. Inaccurate intelligence indicated the Kharbits were sheltering Saddam Hussein.[39] In actuality, the Kharbits were opposed to Saddam and were a potential ally of the Coalition.[40] The Kharbit clan (leading members of the Dulaimi tribal confederation) sought to avenge their sheikh's death for the next two years under the leadership of his son Mudhir Abed al-Kharbit.[41] They mounted a failed attempt to seize control of the Dulaimi confederation, took up arms against the Coalition, and provided financial and logistical support to insurgent groups with similar aims, seemingly without care for their ideology or tactics.[42]

(U) Matters took an even more serious turn on April 28, 2003. Fallujahs demonstrated at a school being used as a U.S. observation post. They claimed the troops in the school could see into private family compounds where unveiled women went about their chores. The local population regarded this as a gross violation of the town's women and a serious insult to their men[43]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ While the demonstration was intended to be peaceful, Jalil al-Nur, a local demagogue and supporter of Saddam Hussein, organized a small group of followers and agent provocateurs called the "Saddam Mujahideen." They infiltrated the crowd and began firing at the Coalition forces observing the demonstration.[44] Coalition forces returned fire, killing fifteen and injuring eighty-five. This would be the first of many actions in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** that turned the city into a major insurgent sanctuary in 2004.

Trained but Unemployed Soldiers Return to Homes in Anbar

(U) The situation in Anbar was further complicated by the mass return of officers and ordinary soldiers to their homes, families, and tribes in the province. Desertion of the Iraqi army began before fighting ended, but turned into a flood once the regime fell.

(U) In early May Ambassador Paul Bremer, the newly-appointed head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA**Error! Bookmark not defined.**), dissolved the Iraqi armed forces. In accordance

Approved for Release

(b)(3)[5] **Error! Bookmark not defined.** | b_3_50 USC _3507 | 20031019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

[40] Ibid.

[41] [| Military | 1ST BCT/TARGET FOLDER: (b)(6) | 20040128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

[42] Ibid.

[43] [| Open Source | VANITY FAIR/WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT | 200611 | Page 319 | (U) |]

[44] [| Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** BDE Links | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

with international law, he stated that Coalition forces were "occupiers." He issued CPA orders that officially disbanded the Army and removed all Ba'athist from the new Iraqi government (de-Ba'athification).[45] By this point, the Iraqi Army had essentially disbanded itself. But the official disbandment removed all hope of rejoining the Army and sent more discontented, armed and trained men to Anbar looking for an opportunity to confront the Coalition.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Many of the individuals who would later become prominent in FRE and FRL organizations were former Iraqi military men, including officers and soldiers in the Special Republican Guard (SRG), as well as intelligence officers from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) and Special Security Organization (SSO). Members of Saddam's two paramilitary groups, al-Quds Army and Saddam Fedayeen, would also return to their homes in Anbar, contributing their expertise in irregular warfare.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ These trained men would bring to the developing insurgency skills in interrogation, bomb making, and intelligence gathering—as well as irregular tactics and operational planning. Even more important, they maintaining their professional connections which created a network spanning the province. Members of former IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** units such as M-14 ("Special Operations and Anti-Terrorism") or M-16 (Directorate of Criminal Investigations) had detailed knowledge about the construction of IEDs and would use it to build weapons for various insurgent groups.[46] These skills were highly valued among insurgents, who, in the early days of the insurgency, would send requests to associates in order to secure the services of specified bomb makers or engineers.[47]

> ~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ **M-14 AND M-16.** Former members of the IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** directorates Special Operations and "Anti-Terrorism" (M-14) as well as Criminal Investigations (M-16) were involved in planning and conducting many of the IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Vehicle Borne IED, and Remote Controlled IED attacks throughout Iraq from 2003 through 2006. Pre-OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, M-14 had consisted of the *Ghafiqi* ("Challenge") Project that involved the creation of explosive devices and remote-controlled detonators, an assassination unit made up of convicted criminals and murderers, and a special cadre of 15-20 suicide bombers known as the *al-Numur* ("Tiger") Group who carried out many of the regime-sponsored suicide bombings during the invasion. All M-14 and M-16 personnel were cross-trained in a variety of special operations skills that would make them invaluable assets to any terrorist or insurgent group. After the fall of the Iraqi regime, former M-14 and M-16 personnel began providing their services to a variety of FRE and FRL insurgent groups as well as to Al Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, and Ansar al-Sunna.

Fill the Religious Vacuum-Association of Muslim Scholars

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ FREs and FRLs clearly dominated the early and somewhat confused insurgent environment, but were not the only insurgents. The religious vacuum in Iraq was rapidly filled by radical Iraqi clergy who encouraged the growth of religious resistance to the occupation embodied in

[45] In the Middle East, the term "occupation" draws parallels to either colonialism or to the Israeli-Palestinian issues.
[46] Ghafiqi TGTs not in Baghdad.**Error! Bookmark not defined.**
[47] [| SIRHAN | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

SRE groups. Some of the most important figures in this movement were Sheikh Dr. Harith Sulayman al-Dhari, his son Muthanna Harith, and a number of other former regime clerics who formed the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) on April 14. This all-Sunni religio-political organization claimed to represent the legitimate voice of the Sunni community. They seized control of Sunni mosques, appointed mosque preachers, and took over the Ministry of Awqaf. Anti-Coalition in outlook, AMS received the support of many local SRE and FRE groups opposed both to the Coalition and the rise of the Saudi supported "*Wahhabis*" influence.

(U) **MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.** The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is the largest Islamist organization in the world. Founded in the 1920s by an Egyptian, Hasan al-Banna, the MB was designed to draw Muslims back to Islam as it was practiced in the 7th century through persuasion and education. It also had an armed branch that tried to overthrow the Egyptian government through violence. After WWII, the MB spread to almost every Islamic country. Brutal suppression by the Egyptian regime, forced the MB in Egypt to renounce violence. But splinter groups in Egypt, Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and elsewhere refused to give up violence and became jihadist in orientation. Today, the international MB will not engage in violence to create an Islamic state, but it does support "defensive" jihads in Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and elsewhere around the world.

(U) ***WAQF*** means "religious endowment" and refers to any property or money that is given as charity for the good of the Islamic nation as a whole. *Waqf* property is endowed in perpetuity for the Islamic nation and cannot be bought or sold, while waqf funding is to be spent on charity for the poor and unemployed or to pay the salaries of the clergy. In many Islamic countries a government institution, the Ministry of Awqaf, manages *waqf* property and oversees the distribution of *waqf* funding.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Because of its prominence and national organization, the AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** often served as de facto spokesman for many religious FRE and SRE insurgent groups, enabling it to gain influence and prestige within the Sunni Anbari community. The nationalist bent of AMS led it to oppose any foreign influence inside Iraq, whether American, Saudi, or Iranian in origin. Thus, while al-Dhari disliked the Iraqi Sh'ia and regarded Shi'a leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani as an Iranian puppet, he showed a willingness to cooperate with anti-Coalition Shi'a, such as those loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army, based on what he perceived as common interests.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Nor was AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** the only religio-political organization to form among Iraqi Sunnis during this early period. The Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.**), which had operated clandestinely under Saddam Hussein, emerged from hiding to establish itself as a major player in Sunni areas. Led by Dr. Ahmed al-Kubaysi, the IIP quickly grew from an underground organization to a legitimate Islamist party, to the point where it could maintain 2,500 party activists in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and 2,000 in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** by the summer of 2003.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) **SADDAM'S REPRESSION OF POLITICAL PARTIES.** According to an e-mail from Amatzia Baram (19 January 2007) (and to be included in his forthcoming book, *Mosque and State in Iraq 1968-2006*, United States Institute for Peace Press, due 2007), "In 1969-1970, as soon as Saddam Hussein was safely established as the highest authority in domestic security, he introduced his stategy of total control that left no room at all for competing political forces. He cracked down first on the Communists, then the Shi'a Da'wa, then on the MB and on the Sunni Tahrir Party. …. While in the early 1970s the Da'wa went into deep underground but continued its activity, switching from chiefly educational work to violence, the MB simply moved abroad. …. While in exile in Europe the MB changed their name to the IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** [Iraqi Islamic Party]. They resumed meaningful activities in Iraq only in 2003. They themselves claim that they did opposition work in Iraq under the Ba'ath. If true, then this was some kind of quiet educational work."

~~(S/REL TO AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ Unlike AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, which was controlled by a tight-knit clique of Sunni clerics led by al-Dhari, IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had a more divided leadership between moderate and extremist Islamists. As long as this divide persisted, the moderate faction that included al-Kubaysi prevailed and the IIP officially supported the presence of Coalition forces inside Iraq. IIP refused to call for jihad against them, instead calling for Iraqis to wait and see if the Coalition fulfilled its promises. The extremist faction led by Abd al-Hafid Atiya Hamash opposed this stance and was supported by Islamist clerics in Saudi Arabia and Europe. [48]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Allying itself with Al Qaeda and a number of FRE organizations, extremist IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** members set about carrying out attacks against Coalition forces in al-Qa'im and Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** using small arms and mortars. These extremists based themselves in several Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** mosques where they had established weapons caches and recruited FREs. While the IIP leadership did not support these actions, they did not want to intervene too forcefully for fear that the extremists might break off or join the openly and increasingly anti-Coalition AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Given their differing political agendas, tension between AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** is not surprising. Because AMS saw itself as the voice of the traditional Sunni religious establishment, it regarded the IIP with suspicion and frequently accused it of serving as a tool with which to market the occupation to Islamists.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ In early 2003, Al Qaeda and associated Islamist movements became active in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. They circulated a video over the internet and in all of the major mosques that purported to show the rape of Iraqi women by Coalition forces. Aided by sympathetic *Wahhabi* non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the al-Haramain Foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organization, Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, and the Joint Relief Committee, Al Qaeda operatives began using Fallujah as a base of operations inside Iraq.[49]

Approved for Release

[48] [| Military | CJSOTF INTSUMS: KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[49] [| Military | 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION ACE: FOB-53 INTELLIGENCE UPDATE | 20030923 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION ACE: WEEKLY TRENDS & PATTERNS BRIEF | DECEMBER 7-14, 2003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

These operatives linked up with Islamist foreign fighters loyal to Abu Iyad who had fled Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** when the situation became untenable, Arab members of Ansar al-Islam who fled south into central Iraq after their main base was destroyed during OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and small clandestine cells of Iraqi Al Qaeda members that had been established years earlier.[50] Al Qaeda had only an extremely small network inside Iraq during this period and focused primarily on recruiting, propaganda, and indoctrination. An AI training camp is believed to have been established at Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (about 260 kilometers northwest of Baghdad, near Anah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on the Euphrates River) around this time for the purposes of handling new recruits and those foreign fighters infiltrating in from [redacted] **Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[51] A mujahideen diary later recovered by Coalition forces lists pr l 25, 2003 as the beginning of the jihad in Iraq.[52]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ **AL QAEDA IS A GLOBAL ISLAMIST TERRORIST NETWORK** formed in 1989 and led by 'Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Made up of a central leadership, regional nodes, decentralized cells, and satellite or allied terrorist organizations that cooperate, work with, or are subordinate to the central leadership, Al Qaeda currently serves as the vanguard of the global jihad against the United States and its allies. One must be careful to distinguish between the global AQ and its local branches, such as in Iraq (AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, QJBR).

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ **AL QAEDA IN IRAQ (AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**).** While AQ maintained cells throughout Iraq in 2003, much of its activity in the country was overseen by allied groups like Ansar al-Islam or JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. In 2003, AQ (global AQ) sent representatives to Iraq (foreign AQ members, Afghan Arabs, and some Iraqis) to evaluate the situation there and to lay the groundwork for later QJBR/AQI organizational activities. During this period, Zarqawi developed his plan for establishing an AQ in Iraq and obtained approval from bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. With AQ's approval, in 2004 Zarqawi's JTJ merged directly with Al Qaeda to form Al Qai'da in Iraq (AQI), which answered directly to the senior leadership of AQ (global). This allowed JTJ access to the network's global resources in addition its own external networks.

Snapshot: The Insurgency in April-May 2003

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ In April and May 2003, the insurgency was in its early organizational phase. It was mostly a local phenomenon characterized by individual resistance that looked like isolated acts of violence. At the same time, recruitment and organizational activity was occurring as insurgents formed groups. The budding insurgent groups were overwhelmingly FREs and FRLs, motivated by nationalist sentiment, by personal grievances, by resentment over the loss of Sunni power, and by the terrible economic conditions in Anbar. This latter point should not be underestimated. Insurgent groups offered salaries that were ten times what Iraqis made working for the government. They also offered large bounties for killing Coalition troops or Iraqi

[50] [| Open Source | COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS (CDLR) AS TRANSLATED BY JIHAD UNSPUN, APRIL 18, 2003 |]
[51] [| Military | CJSOTF INTSUMs | Key Reporting from 27 May 03 to 17 July 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[52] [| Military | 1/9 INFANTRY IN RAMADI: TRANSLATION OF A MUJAHIDEEN DIARY: CAPTURED ON 23 DEC 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

"collaborators." Working for the insurgency was particularly attractive for unemployed Anbar residents, many of whom were former military and security officials.[53] Despite these incentives, the only serious incident during this time period was the demonstration and shooting in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on April 28. FRE and FRL insurgents were quietly taking advantage of the perceived grievances of ordinary Anbaris to build organizations capable of executing attacks throughout the province.

The Insurgency Surfaces (May-August 2003)

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Throughout the late spring and summer of 2003, the insurgency began to show itself openly. By the end of the summer, over eighty insurgent groups in Anbar had formed and carried out attacks against the Coalition, Iraqi police, and Iraqi infrastructure.[54] Coalition forces saw these attacks as a problem of law and order, rather than the start of an insurgency, and the actions taken to restore stability show the effects of this reading of the situation.

Insurgent Growth and Cooperation

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Throughout the spring and summer of 2003 new FRE groups (such as Ta'if al-Mansura and Ala Alafa'a) were formed, recruiting and propaganda efforts continued; additional bounties were offered for the killing of U.S. soldiers; and lists of suspected "collaborators" were drawn up. In keeping with historical norms, FRE organizations formed along social, tribal, and former regime status lines. In numerous cases, former officers contacted as many individuals as possible from their old units or tribes to ask if they would be willing to reenlist with them to fight the Coalition. In other cases, former Iraqi military and intelligence officials used religious rhetoric that they themselves did not agree with as a means of motivating local Islamists to fight for them.

> (U) PHASES OR STAGES OF INSURGENCIES. Insurgencies are difficult to characterize as to their phases or stages. Few have actually laid out a plan. Among those that have are Mao and Che Guevara. Neither of their descriptions fit or describe the insurgency in Iraq as theirs were political and nationalistic, whereas in Iraq it is a religio-nationalistic motivated insurgency. As such, Western attempts to fit the insurgency in Iraq into neat phases or stages was doomed to failure.
>
> ~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR AND NZL)~~ ZARQAWI'S STRATEGY FOR THE INSURGENCY. Little good information exists on how the Iraqi insurgents view their organizational structure or how they conceptualize the process of insurgency. The closest possible description of their process is found in an interrogation report published by MNC-I, CIOC, 22 July 2005, 20150722 ~~(S)~~ Subject: Paper One of a Two Part Series Assessing the Detainee Debriefs of Abu Umar al-Kurdi – Statements Regarding Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Strategy. This report lists Zarqawi's strategy as:

Approved for Release

[53] [| MILITARY | CJSOTF INTSUMS | KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] As of May 2003, one group of FRLs was providing $3,000 per month to recruits, with additional payments of $5,000 per operation and $10,000 for the killing of one American soldier. (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 **Bookmark not defined.** | (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | 20031009 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

- Inflame existing sectarian tension
- Force the West to lose political will to wage war, and eventually leave
- Reverse Shi'a domination
- Bring the jihad to regional "apostate" regimes in the Arab Middle East, and then spread the global jihad.

(U) A STRATEGY TEMPLATE. For purposes of this Study, a number of sources were consulted including the new Army & Marine Corps FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Appendix M provides a discussion of the evolution (pathways) of the insurgency in Iraq.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The relationship between the FRE organizations and their FRL counterparts, who sought a revival of Ba'athist rule and a restoration of Saddam Hussein, was a curious one. While FRE organizations in Anbar routinely used Saddam's name for propaganda and intimidation purposes, few of them possessed any genuine loyalty to the former regime. As a result, when Saddam and his FRL subordinates attempted to contact FRE organizations and consolidate them under his control they found themselves rebuffed. FRE organizations were more than happy to accept cash and logistical assistance from Saddam and FRL groups, but as 2003 wore on the FRL leaders found their former subordinates more and more difficult to control.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Ironically, the once cool relationship between FREs and Islamists, both domestic and international, led to a degree of mutual cooperation. While numerous IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** FREs attempted to use religious rhetoric to manipulate the Islamists to serve their purposes, many more became willing converts to Islamism and joined Islamist organizations out of genuine religious sincerity. In retrospect, this is not surprising as many low-ranking FREs had grown up under the influence of Saddam Hussein's mid-1990s Faith Campaign. Moreover, many Islamist organizations were initially better organized and better-funded than their FRE equivalents by virtue of their international support networks and thus seemed far more likely to prevail against the Coalition.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ An interesting example of this phenomenon is the rise of Abdullah al-Janabi, a prominent Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** religious leader. Janabi was a former member of Saddam's security services who became religious during the Faith Campaign. In the summer of 2003, Janabi actively coordinated and planned attacks against Coalition forces in Fallujah, where he was widely known as the "spiritual guide" for insurgents fighting throughout the city. Janabi cooperated with most insurgent factions operating in and outside of Fallujah, including SREs, FRLs and FREs, but he also headed his own insurgent organization, known as the Muhajideen Army. Janabi worked especially closely with Umar Hadid, an Islamist preacher who was also radicalized by the Faith Campaign and trained in Herat, Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** by Al Qaeda. The two were known to visit Fallujah mosques and religious schools, giving fiery anti-American sermons and recruiting for a variety of insurgent groups.[55]

[55] [| Military | CTC 2004-30132 AND SHEIKH ABDULLAH AL-JANABI: BST RALEIGH HVT NO. 2 | 20040801 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] Reporting from the era described Janabi as "the most powerful man in the city," as he continually displayed the ability to influence the actions of most insurgent factions in the city. In November 2003, Janabi became frightened by rumors that the US wanted to send him to Guantanamo, and went undercover until February 2004 (~~S/NF~~).

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Janabi

~~(S/NF)~~ **ABDULLAH JANABI.** A former member of Saddam's security services, Janabi later served as the imam of the Sa'ad Bin Abi Waqas Mosque in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. He has been involved in anti-Coalition attacks since November 2003, but a rumor that any religious leaders who called for jihad against the Coalition would be sent to Guantanamo Bay forced him to lower his profile until February 2004. A well-respected figure in Fallujah, he was allied with but not subordinate to Zarqawi and has urged his followers to fight against the Coalition at every opportunity. A pragmatic leader, he has been able to facilitate cooperation between various insurgent groups across tribal, ideological, and sectarian lines. He is regarded as a religious lunatic and an outcast by his own Janabi tribe.

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Umar Hadid

~~(S/NF)~~**UMAR HADID.** The amir of JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Hadid has been involved in Islamist and criminal activity since the late 1990s. He led a Salafist group in Fallujah targeting liquor stores and unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the head of the Ba'ath Party in Fallujah in 1997. Fleeing to Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, he attended a terrorist training camp but departed before the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Returning to Fallujah in 2002, he met Zarqawi and established himself as the leader of a Sunni extremist group, traveling to Saudi Arabia during the 2002 Hajj as part of a special Iraqi unit to recruit Afghan, Pakistani, Saudi, Syrian, and Yemeni fighters to come to Fallujah prior to the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Insurgent Groups: Former Regime Elements

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ During this time period, the vast majority of insurgent groups appear to belong to local FRE organizations, which had relatively few members and relied on local or tribal support and access to nearby weapons caches. The following table indicates the most important and representative of the FRE groups in Anbar during May to August 2003.

~~(S/NF)~~ Insurgent Group	Areas Where Active	Comment
Ta'if al-Mansura		
Ala Alafa'a Organization (AAO)		
Anbar Forces (AAF)		
Sarhid Abdi Sarhid Network (ASA)		
Awhal Group (AG)**Error! Bookmark not defined.**		

Table 2: Anbar FRE Insurgent Groups (May – August 2003) (~~S/NF~~)

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ **Ta'if al-Mansura.** Of the four, this was the earliest to emerge. It was formed by Ba'athists led by Sheikh Ghanim al-Sabawi to avenge perceived grievances against the Iraqi Sunni community.[56]

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS AND GBR)~~ **Ala Alafa'a Organization (AAO).** Created by General Halaf La'al Russi, AAO opposed the Coalition for both religious and nationalist reasons. The leaders of AAO believed that Muslims should not be ruled by non-Muslims and that the **Error! Bookmark not defined.** controlled the new Iraqi government.[57] Based in Hawijah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (a city in Diyala**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Province, northeast of Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**), AAO also had a presence in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Kirkuk**Error! Bookmark not defined.** where it threatened local officials for cooperating with the Coalition and ran auto theft rackets.[58] AAO Shakir al-Duri was from the same tribe as Saddam's top lieutenant Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and AAO favored a restoration of Ba'athist rule in Iraq. However, the group regarded the leadership of Saddam and his immediate family as a disaster for Iraq and wanted a new dictatorship led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri's first cousin, Hashim Hussein Ramadan instead.[59]

(b)(3) 50 USC §403

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Al-Duri

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI served as the Vice Chairman of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council under Saddam Hussein from 1979-2003 and is the only surviving leader of the 1968 coup that brought the Ba'ath Party to power. The son of an ice seller from the region near Tikrit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (earning him the nickname "the Iceman"), he became one of the leading FRL insurgent figures following the capture of Saddam Hussein. He has allied with a variety of groups including Ansar al-Islam and JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. He is known to have leukemia and has periodically issued print and audio statements in support of the insurgency. The Albu Duri tribe is located in Salahudddin province.

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ **Anbar Forces (AAF).** AAF had as many as 3,000 former army, Ba'athist and Fedayeen members in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[60] While AAF used religious rhetoric to both recruit and justify its activities, they apparently had no established political or religious agenda. Instead, its members were mostly recruited out of a desire for revenge against the Coalition or to increase the power and influence of the Albu Eissa (or Issaawi) tribe.[61]

Approved for Release

---

[56] [| MILITARY | CJSOTF INTSUMS KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ **Sarhid Abdi Sarhid Network (SAS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**).** The final major FRE group, SAS, was named after its leader Sarhid Abdi Sarhid, a former member of Iraqi Military Intelligence, who shared control of the group with Rukan Razuki Abd al-Ghafar Sulayman al-Nasiri, a former bodyguard for one of Saddam's cousins.[62] SAS was established through a series of personal visits by Sarhid and Rukan to the homes of former military, IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Saddam Fedayeen members from the Zuba tribe (of which he is a senior member and cousin of the ruling sheikh) in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Diyala**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (a city north of Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**).[63] During these visits Sarhid and Rukan appealed to their kinsmen's sense of Iraqi patriotism and fears of both Saddam's wrath and the rise of Iranian influence. While both men were deeply secular, they often used Islamist rhetoric at mosques to attract prospective recruits.[64]

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Sarhid

~~(S/NF)~~ **SARHID ABDI SARHID** was a member of the Directorate of Military Intelligence and a senior Ba'ath Party official under Saddam Hussein. Close friends with Saddam's former chief bodyguard Rukan Razuki Abd al-Ghafar Sulayman al-Nasiri and Saddam's cousin Deputy Chairman of the Office of Military Industrialization Muzahim Sa'ab al-Hassan, Sarhid used his background as an intelligence officer and Ba'ath Party leader to form a group of 750 insurgents recruited from his family and the Zuba tribe.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ A major focus of FRE organizations early on was identifying and retrieving Iraqi weapons caches and recruiting former members of IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s M-14 and M-16, both of which had specialized units skilled in creation of explosive devices.[65] While a majority of the early improvised explosive device (IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) attacks in Anbar appear to have been the work of unskilled amateurs, as 2003 progressed, the IEDs became far more sophisticated as a result of insurgent groups successfully recruiting trained individuals who had been members of these IIS directorates.

Insurgent Groups: Former Regime Loyalists

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The other major insurgent groups in Anbar were composed of FRLs. In contrast to the FRE insurgents that frequently rebuffed Saddam's efforts to control them, FRL organizations enjoyed close relationships with Saddam and his inner circle and sought nothing less than the restoration of his regime. The leaders of FRL groups were often former high-ranking military officers, Ba'ath party officials or even members of Saddam's family who had a personal loyalty that outweighed (at least during 2003) religious, tribal or ethnic partisanship. The largest and most active FRL groups active in Anbar were Hizb al-'Awda and Jaysh Muhammed. The following

[62] [| | Unknown | NESA SF 2003-30175 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

table indicates the two most important and representative of the FRL groups in Anbar between May and August 2003.

Insurgent Group	Areas Where Active	Comment
Hizb al-'Awda (HA)		
Jaysh Muhammed (JM)		

Table 3: Anbar FRL Insurgent Groups (May – August 2003) (~~S/NF~~)

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The **Hizb al-'Awda (HA).** Between the two, Hizb al-'Awda (HA) or the "Party of Return," was perhaps the most important during 2003. HA's leadership consisted of some of Saddam's inner circle, men such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti (Saddam's half-brother).[66] Members of HA were former Fedayeen or al-Quds Army soldiers who had been left unemployed and without social status following the fall of the regime.[67]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ HA recruitment soon expanded to encompass rank-and-file Ba'athists.
In contrast to Islamist groups, HA employed women as its primary recruiters and couriers,[68] and organized through word of mouth, using Saddam's reputation combined with the group's access to regime assets. HA had its main hub in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, where it began.

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Ramadan

(U) **TAHA YASSIN RAMADAN** was one of two vice presidents of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Originally a bank clerk, he joined the military and met Saddam Hussein in 1956 after being inducted into the then-illegal Ba'ath Party. A long-time regime loyalist, he was made vice president in 1991 and remained loyal to Saddam even after his overthrow in 2003. He was captured by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in August 2003 in Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and turned over to Coalition forces.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ **The Jaysh Muhammad (JM)**. JM has a more colorful pedigree and history. Originally formed by Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti with Saddam Hussein's permission post-OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, JM was intended by FRLs to serve as a religious nationalist organization that could be used to drive the Coalition out of Iraq and then be either co-opted or crushed following the restoration of Ba'athist rule.[69] JM had another, perhaps more important

[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] [| Open Source | THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. / SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE: HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS OF UNDERGROUNDS IN INSURGENCIES | 1965 | (U) |] Studies of insurgencies in Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam show a high percentage of females (usually under 30) as covert underground elements, i.e., support roles. Pp. 73-77. .
[69] [| Unknown | OIA SF 2004-30002 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

purpose: it could also be used to preoccupy the Coalition while Saddam Hussein and other senior Iraqi leaders made their escape. Towards this end, millions of dollars in "seed money" were given to the group's leaders from senior FRL leaders through intermediaries that included Counterintelligence Director Saad al-Samarari.[70]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The religious-sounding name Jaysh Muhammad ("Army of Muhammad") was chosen to conceal the true motivations of the group's FRL backers.[71] The Saraya al-Jihad subsidiary group formed later in 2003 as more sincerely religious individuals began to replace the JM leadership.[72] As FRL leaders were captured or killed by the Coalition they were increasingly replaced by Islamists, leading to a gradual radicalization of the group. Despite the rise in religious influence over JM near the end of 2003, former Iraqi leaders like FRL Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and FRE Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad (prior to his capture in January 2004) continued to exercise considerable influence over the group even following the capture of Saddam Hussein.[73] Because of JM's religious nationalist orientation, the group quickly established ties with Iraqi Salafist leaders. However, JM cell leaders were instructed by IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** FRLs occupying mid-level positions in the organization not to coordinate with foreign fighters because they could not be trusted.[74]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Growing from a small cadre of 500 Saddam Fedayeen and 75-100 "Wahhabis," JM soon included as many as 1,000 members, many of whom were trained by an FRE general in small arms and explosives.[75] As a result of this training, JM was able to conduct RPG, IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and mortar attacks against Coalition forces to include downing two U.S. helicopters using MANPADs.[76] JM was also involved in assassinations and the sabotage of Iraqi oil pipelines. Set up using classic insurgent cell structure, JM was based primarily out of mosques in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Samarra**Error! Bookmark not defined.** with a council of seven amirs reporting to an unidentified sheikh in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[77] The group's most active leaders were Abd al-Jabbar al-Sai'di (amir of Saraya al-Jihad's military wing) and Uday Mashadani (Ramadi amir and IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** FRE).[78]

(U) **AMIR** literally means "commander." The term Amir is consistently used by jihadis to indicate the leader of an entire jihadist group or any sub-units of that group.

Approved for Release

[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] [| Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS: HELICOPTERS SHOT DOWN OR CRASHED IN IRAQ | 20040113 | (U)] The two helicopters shot down by JM members were a Chinook near Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on November 2, 2003 and an OH-58D near Fallujah on December 9, 2003.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) Saddam, meanwhile, was unable to take an active role in the insurgency, though his name was often invoked to coerce behavior by the population. He attempted to influence events by issuing periodic audiotapes exhorting Iraqis to take up arms against the Coalition and by sending letters via couriers to trusted subordinates ordering them to take certain actions, but his primary role in the insurgency was financial. His knowledge of those individuals entrusted with the care of Iraqi funds stored in Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Lebanon**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and the UAE**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, combined with the infamous reputation he made for himself as dictator of Iraq, made him invaluable as a symbol to those elements of the insurgency that sought to restore the former regime.

Insurgent Groups: Sunni Religious Extremists (SRE)

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ In addition to the IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** extremists, smaller groups of isolated SREs also existed throughout Anbar. Those IIP splinter groups which disagreed with that organization's political engagement with the Coalition began purchasing weapons, looting arms caches, and recruiting former al-Quds Army members into clandestine cells in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Balad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Samarra**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to carry out attacks against Coalition forces. Often allied with local FRE organizations and supported financially by Islamist groups in 1.4b, 1.4d 1.4b, 1.4d **Error! Bookmark not defined.**, these early SRE organizations would form and then collapse or be reabsorbed into either the IIP or existing FRE organizations following the capture of their leaders.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ SREs briefly operated Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based Islamist training facilities in the summer of 2003, but these were soon located and destroyed by Coalition forces along with those of their AI counterparts in Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. However, some trainees survived long enough to bring the tactics taught there onto the battlefield. Their presence increased the sophistication and lethality of insurgent attacks.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ A number of mosques in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** also served as planning centers, arms depots, and training facilities for SRE insurgents. One such mosque was the al-Hassan Mosque in Fallujah, where the unexpected detonation of an IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on June 30, 2003 during an insurgent training course resulted in the death of a local imam and 9 others while injuring 15.[79] Despite the fact that this incident occurred entirely as the result of insurgent actions, insurgent propaganda in Fallujah at the time claimed that the Coalition was responsible and had intended to destroy the mosque.

~~(S/REL TO USA, GBR, CAN, AUS)~~ Other more sophisticated splinter groups of Iraqi Wahhabis and Salafis such as those loyal to Shamil Husayn al-Hilul had more experience at managing clandestine organizations. They were able to carry out small arms, land mine, and sabotage attacks in

[79] (b)(3) 50 USC 3507 **Error! Bookmark not defined.** | b,,3, 50 USC , 3507 | 20030630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Anbar using weapons supplied by FRE or FRL organizations. Al-Hilul, in particular, attempted to bolster his organization by falsely claiming to be an Al Qaeda leader and citing 'Usama bin Ladin's declaration of war as a justification for his activities.[80] Other *Wahhabi* groups, such as the one led by Saudi Mohammed Abdul Rahman, soon lost their initial religious focus and became heavily involved in the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** drug trade.

Insurgent Groups: Foreign Fighters and Al Qaeda

(~~S/REL TO US, AUS, CAN, AND GBR~~) Not all SREs were Iraqi in origin. The following table indicates the most important and representative of the foreign fighter groups in Anbar from May to August 2003.

~~(S/NF)~~ Insurgent Group	Areas Where Active	Comment
Katibat al-Faruq (KAF)**Error! Bookmark not defined.**		
Jamaat al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad (JTJ)**Error! Bookmark not defined.**		
Armed Group of Al Qaeda, Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Branch		

Table 4: Anbar Foreign Fighter Insurgent Groups (May – August 2003) (S/NF)

(~~S/REL TO US, AUS, CAN, AND GBR~~) **Katibat al-Faruq (KAF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**).** A number of Islamist foreign fighters from Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Algeria, and Libya, while not loyal to Abu Iyad pre-OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** nevertheless fled with him to Anbar following the fall of Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Over time, they gradually reorganized into Katibat al-Faruq (KAF) under the leadership of Sadiq 'Arif al-Karkhi, a former Iraqi soldier who together with a number of FREs embraced Islamism as an alternative ideology to Ba'athism.[81] KAF was infiltrated by FRL and FRE IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** agents who used religious rhetoric in order encourage anti-U.S. attacks, and the group was given $23,000,000 in funding by former Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan.[82] Despite this support KAF had no apparent loyalty to former regime leaders and engaged in attacks on Coalition forces in the al-Qa'im area with the help of a Syrian-based Al Qaeda associate and facilitator nicknamed Abu Bakr, who provided KAF members with training facilities and safe haven.[83] While this cross-

Approved for Release

[80] [| MILITARY | CJSOTF INTSUMS KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

cooperation would have been unthinkable before OIF, various groups were able to put aside their differences in order to operate against the Coalition in Anbar.

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) **Ansar al-Islam (AI)** and **Jamaat al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad (JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.**)**. Compared to FRE groups already mentioned, Al Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam (AI), and Zarqawi's Jamaat al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad (JTJ) were far less active during this time period. Zarqawi spent much of the summer of 2003 organizing for future warfare and traveling to neighboring states (Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Lebanon**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) to link up with the facilitators and financiers of his JTJ organization.

(U) **AFGHAN ARABS** is a term used by the U.S. to refer to those Muslims, generally Arabs, who either fought in Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** against the Soviet Union during the 80s or early 90s (supported in large part by Saudi Arabia) or were trained during the 90s by Al Qaeda in special camps scattered throughout Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. At times it is used as a synonym for Al Qaeda. For Iraqis, the term "Afghan Arabs" means any foreign *jihadis*, and is not limited to those fighters trained in Afghanistan or to Al Qaeda affiliated warriors.

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) At the same time, AI was still recovering from the losses suffered in its defeat at the hands of U.S. military in Kurdistan at the beginning of OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. AI had been reduced to a force of 300 Kurdish members and 60-70 Afghan Arab members who were able to escape to a safe haven inside Iran**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[84] Other Arab AI members fled south towards the Provinces of Salahaddin and Anbar. Turning against AI's Norway-based leader Mullah Krekar, AI military chief Abu Abdallah al-Shafi'i implemented a new strategy in June 2003 to turn AI away from its Kurdish roots and into an umbrella organization that would unite other Sunni Islamist groups across Iraq. AI infiltrated members into Iraq [1.4b, 1.4d] solicited funding from al Qaeda and other Islamists abroad, and recruited and trained suicide bombers at Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and other locations.[85] Al-Shafi'i's reorganization would later serve as the foundation for the November 2003 establishment of Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna (JAS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**).[86]

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Krekar

(~~S/NF~~) **MULLAH KREKAR** is the *kuniya*t (assumed name) used by Faraj Ahmad Najmuddin, an Iraqi Kurd who studied Islamic jurisprudence under 'Usama bin Laden's mentor Abdullah Azzam and first met the Al Qaeda leader in Peshawar in 1990 while seeking funding for his Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK). Following the 1991 Gulf War, he received refugee status in Norway and led a state-funded Islamic congregation throughout the 1990s between trips to Iraqi Kurdistan. He disappeared following the September 11 attacks and reemerged in December 2001 as the leader of Ansar al-Islam. Expelled from Iran**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in September 2002, he was arrested in the Netherlands and deported to Norway. He has been involved in a number of protracted legal battles to

Approved for Release

[84] [| Military | CJSOTF INTSUMS KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[85] Ibid.
[86] [| 50 USC § 3507**Bookmark not defined.** | b 3 50 USC 3507 | 20031106 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

(b)(3)

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

prevent him from being deported to Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (where he is wanted for heroin smuggling) or Iraq (where he is accused of being a terrorist), but he remains a free man in Norway because it is not illegal under Norwegian law to lead violent or military resistance in one's homeland.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ **Armed Group of Al Qaeda, Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined. **Branch.** In addition to AI, Al Qaeda established another small group inside Iraq led by Abu Iyad, who announced the establishment of the Armed Group of Al Qaeda, Fallujah Branch in July 2003. His announcement was not followed by any specific attack claims. According to Zarqawi's January 2004 letter to the Al Qaeda leadership, the Al Qaeda groups active inside Iraq throughout 2003 were still extremely weak and believed that claiming responsibility for specific terrorist attacks inside Iraq would draw attention to them and jeopardize their security situation.[87]

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Al-Shafi'i

~~(S/NF)~~ **ABU ABDALLAH AL-SHAFI'I** served as the leader of the Al Qaeda associate group Jund al-Islam who agreed to subordinate himself to Mullah Krekar in December 2001 to form Ansar al-Islam. Following Mullah Krekar's deportation to Norway in September 2002, al-Shafi'i served as Ansar al-Islam's amir, ruling first in Krekar's name and then actively deposing him following the group's losses in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He is currently based in Iran**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, where he serves as the leader of both Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunnah.

Typical Insurgent Attacks and TTPs

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The majority of attacks carried out by these insurgent groups during the summer of 2003 were small arms fire (SAF) attacks, at times combined with RPGs or grenades. The figure below shows the types of attacks during this period. An ambush carried out against Coalition forces in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on July 2 was typical. Two or three Iraqis fired their weapons at a Coalition patrol and then ran away when engaged, with no injuries on either side.[88] A more complex attack was typified by an August ambush of troops on a presence patrol in Ramadi. Insurgents fired RPGs and small arms at the troops. There were again no injuries or damage to Coalition forces but Coalition troops were unable to kill or locate the insurgents, who followed typical hit-and-run guerrilla doctrine.[89]

Approved for Release

[87] [| Source unknown | ZARQAWI LETTER, JANUARY 2004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[88] [| Military | Battlecpt-198751896859154 | ~~(S/NF~~) |]
[89] [| Military | 3ACRLNO-765972965757004 | ~~(S/NF~~) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506



Figure 1: Types of Insurgent Attacks on U.S. Forces – Summer 2003 (S/NF)

Coalition Actions and the Insurgency

(U) The Coalition recognized the growing disorder in Anbar, and concentrated on three efforts to stabilize the situation:

- economic and reconstruction efforts
- working with the Iraqi police
- a major operation in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.

(U) Coalition forces in Anbar had access to Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) funding, which commanders could spend at their discretion on building projects or infrastructure repair/creation. The first cache of CERP funding came from a stash of $100 million of Saddam's money recovered by Coalition forces. In the six months after recovering this portion of Saddam's money in June 2003, this money funded 12,000 projects, ranging from civic cleanup, electricity and irrigation to school buildings, healthcare and sanitation. By the end of the year, most of this money was spent and the U.S. Congress would soon appropriate $18.6 billion for further reconstruction aid.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ A perception that the majority of the trouble in Anbar was caused by criminals and a lack of police presence, prompted the Coalition to focus on the Iraqi police as the best way to restore order to the province. The Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** police force shows the problems the Coalition faced with this strategy. They had little or no law enforcement training, were

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

"very ineffective," and not respected by the local population.[90] Insurgents stepped up their attacks with a spectacular bombing of a police graduation ceremony in mid-July.[91] Many Ramadi police refused to return to work or, if they did, refused to accompany Coalition military police on patrols.[92]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Insurgents also turned their attention to the chiefs of police across Anbar, leading to chaotic conditions in some cities, as Coalition force hiring tried to keep pace with assassinations. There is no better illustration of this problem than the situation in al-Qa'im. The first chief, LTC Nasser, was assassinated by either insurgents or "smugglers" in October 2003, his successor was wounded two weeks later, the third chief was killed, and his replacement resigned because of concerns for his safety. [93]

(U) In addition to distributing CERP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** funds, the Coalition took aggressive action to stabilize Anbar. In mid-June the 2 BCT/3ID conducted Operation SPARTAN SCORPION in and around Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in an attempt to remove remaining Ba'ath Party and paramilitary forces. The objectives were a suspected Saddam Fedayeen training facility, headquarters, safe house and possible weapons cache. The raids were followed up with humanitarian aid, but did not stop the escalating insurgency.

City Story: Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The deterioration in the situation in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** illustrates the growing strength—and yet chaotic nature—of what would become a full-fledged insurgency. The insurgency advanced from a "defensive" stage to the "offense" during the summer of 2003. By July 2003, U.S. units in and around Ramadi were largely restricted to a handful of small bases.[94] A major problem facing U.S. forces was the ability of insurgents to infiltrate the new Iraqi security organizations which were supposed to combat them. No better example of this penetration existed than General Jaadan Muhammad al-Alwani, chief of police in Ramadi. A replacement for the previous chief who had been removed by the coalition in May Al-Alwani simultaneously cooperated with the coalition and enabled insurgents to carry on their attacks against the Coalition. This cooperation included replacing police killed by the insurgency with insurgents who were former members of the IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Al-Alwani found himself in trouble when the Coalition took over hiring, and the new recruits began to show their effectiveness. In response to this perceived betrayal, al-Alwani was targeted by insurgents, barely escaping with his life after an RPG attack on his house in August.[95]

Approved for Release

---

[90] [| Military | 3rd ACR, ASSESSMENT OF AR RAMADI, 13 JULY 2003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[91] [| Open Source | Source unknown / b 6 IRAQ TOWN BLAMES US TROOPS FOR FATAL EXPLOSION AT CADET GRADUATION | 20030707 | (U) |]
[92] [| Military | 3rd ACR, ASSESSMENT OF AR RAMADI, 13 JULY 2003 | (NO CLASSIFICATION) ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[93] [| Military | 432nd CA BN: CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF AL-QA'IM, IRAQ | 20040128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] and [| Military | 3rd ACR | ASSESSMENT OF AL-QA'IM | 20030713 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[94] [| Open Source | ww.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ramadiyah.htm | (U) |]
[95] [| Military | General Jadon point paper (NO CLASSIFICATION) |] and [| Military | 3rd ACR: ASSESSMENT OF AR RAMADI | 20030908 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL US, CAN, GBR, AUS)~~ A look at groups active in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** show that FRLs and FREs dominated the insurgency in the city, but that Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaeda had an increasing presence.[96] The multiplicity of small groups many unknown outside Ramadi shows the depth of support for resistance to the Coalition and, at the same time, the inability of these groups to unite against their common enemy. The reaction of ordinary citizens to the escalating violence showed the widespread hatred of the Coalition. As we have seen, the police in Ramadi were targeted by insurgents throughout the summer of 2003, beginning with the killing of police cadets at a graduation ceremony. The response by locals to this attack was to accuse the Americans of planting the bomb and marching the first police class in their deaths in an effort to turn Sunni against Shi'a.[97]

Snapshot: The Insurgency May-August 2003

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Most insurgent groups active in Anbar during this time period did not possess a well-developed political or religious agenda beyond grievances against the Coalition, a desire for Sunni Arab control over Iraq, and a common conspiratorial worldview. Some, like the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based Awhal Group (AG**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) of FREs were formed to deal with the insecurity that plagued the area post-OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Only later would groups develop a political ideology through the influence of larger insurgent organizations and transition or merge into full insurgent groups. The only exception appears to have been in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, where SRE organizations, some of which maintained contact with or possessed ties to Al Qaeda, were active. The overwhelming majority of the attacks carried out by insurgents in Anbar during the spring and summer of 2003 occurred primarily due to the efforts of these local and in some cases regional organizations, and were characterized by simple SAF or IDF, at times combined.

(U) The evolution of the insurgency in Anbar coincided with the rise of resentment against pro-Coalition officials in the province. This culminated in a concerted insurgent assassination campaign. The need to replace assassinated leaders created problems for the Coalition. For instance, when two gunmen assassinated the mayor of Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in July 2003, the commander of the 3rd ACR, (b)(3), (b)(6) appointed Hawash Khalaf Muteb as the new mayor. Later Hawash handpicked the men who chose a tribal leader to represent the town in the new provincial council in January 2004. The insurgents claimed Hawash's appointment by an American proved the United States had no real interest in democracy but sought only to conquer the people of Iraq. Similar propaganda played well to the receptive minds of the Anbar population.

V. Consolidation of the Insurgency (August – November 2003)

Approved for Release

---

[96] [| Military | CJSOTF INTSUMS KEY REPORTING FROM 27 MAY 03 TO 17 JULY 03: ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN IRAQ | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[97] [| Open Source | Source unknown / b 6 IRAQ TOWN BLAMES US TROOPS FOR FATAL EXPLOSION AT CADET GRADUATION | 20030707 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ FRL and FRE organizations carried out the overwhelming majority of attacks against the Coalition during the late summer and fall of 2003. Whereas the insurgency started as local and disorganized groups, by the end of October a number of the local organizations in Anbar had consolidated into national or regional groups, with those remaining (or emerging) local organizations working in close tactical cooperation with their larger counterparts. Individuals like (b)(6) maintained simultaneous ties to most of the major FRL, FRE, SRE, and AI as well as local and tribal-based organizations. Thus, they became extremely important in both facilitating and escalating the insurgency in Anbar.[98] [99]

Zarqawi Begins to Influence the Insurgency

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The return of Zarqawi to Iraq in July 2003 offered a preview of the coming major shift in the composition and ideology of the insurgency. His organization carried out mass casualty terrorist attacks against the Jordanian Embassy on August 7 and the United Nations Headquarters on August 19. While Zarqawi primarily focused his attention against Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based targets, there is some evidence that he directed the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in An Najaf on August 29. Zarqawi himself claimed responsibility for the attack to senior Al Qaeda facilitator Lu'ai Saqa and also in a letter to the Al Qaeda leadership. His claim was disputed by some in the intelligence community who attributed the attack to Shi'a radical Muqtada al-Sadr.[100] Despite Zarqawi's debut as a major player in the insurgency, the relatively small size of his organization (which was dominated by foreign fighters) meant that Al Qaeda would remain in the background for much of 2003. A letter sent from Zarqawi to the Al Qaeda leadership in January 2004 stated that they had carried out twenty-five suicide bombings during the course of 2003 but he did not believe their security situation secure enough to issue any claims of responsibility.[101]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The effect of Zarqawi's entry into the insurgency was not immediately apparent. Day-to-day attacks continued to be dominated by the groups that came into existence over the spring and summer as well as new or consolidated insurgent organizations that emerged during the fall. Nevertheless, the establishment of Al Qaeda in Iraq combined with the rise of Iraqi SRE groups as a major force within the insurgency led to widespread formal and informal tactical cooperation between them and a number of FRE and FRL organizations in Anbar. As a result of both the Faith Campaign and the aggressive *Wahhabi* proselytizing that had taken place in the province since the fall of Saddam, many Anbaris now viewed Islamism as an attractive alternative ideology to Ba'athist secular Arab nationalism.[102] An example of this is one of the purported masterminds of the UN**Error! Bookmark not defined.** HQ bombing Thamir Mubarak Atruz. A former Iraqi officer

Approved for Release

[98] [| Source unknown | (b)(6) - R N I FOR TARGETI , ~~S/NF~~) |]
[99] [| Military | 1st BCT/TARGET FOLDER: (b)(6) 20040128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
(b)(3) 50 USC 3507 **Error! Bookmark not defined.** | b 3 50 USC 3507 ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[101] [| Source unknown | ZARQAWI LETTER, JANUARY 2004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[102] [| Military | CTC 2003-30149 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

and Sunni Arab from Khaldiyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (a town in Anbar) he fled to Saudi Arabia and joined Al Qaeda, returning to Iraq pre-OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to fight against Coalition forces. The growing problem of foreign fighters and their radical ideology was reflected in an early September statement by IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader al-Kubaysi that attacks on Coalition forces were being coordinated by "outsiders."[103]

Insurgent Strategy and Consolidation

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ During the fall of 2003 FRL insurgents also began to consolidate into fewer, but larger, groups. (The Insurgency Organizational Evolution Chart provides an illustration of the merger trend.) While Saddam remained isolated from day-to-day operational planning, he and his subordinates made a concerted effort to unify the Ba'athists and Saddam Fedayeen loyal to them in al-Qa'im, Khalidiyah, Habaniyah, Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Also in this "organizational" or "defensive" phase, Syrian-based FRL and FRE insurgents tried, with little success, to coordinate financial and logistical support for reestablishment of Sunni Arab control in Iraq. An example of this intensified cooperation and coordination among FRL organizations is the network headed up by Khudair al-Halbusi, who planned to carry out coordinated attacks against Coalition forces in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on Saddam's orders in November 2003. While the al-Halbusi network was something of an exception among FRL organizations because of Saddam's direct operational role, it illustrates how organized the FRLs had become at this point.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The FRL strategy, to the extent that one existed beyond conducting regular attacks on the Coalition, appears to have been developed along quasi-Maoist lines. It viewed Anbar and its neighboring province of Salahaddin as rural sanctuaries in which they could regroup, reequip, and train. Though these ideas were not well-developed by the time of Saddam's capture, it appears the FRLs saw these rural sanctuaries as areas from which they could launch attacks into Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ As noted previously, many Anbaris were wary of Saddam Hussein during his rule of Iraq and thus regarded his attempt at consolidation of FRL insurgent organizations with disdain. While FRE and SRE organizations continue to cooperate tactically with FRLs, they made it quite clear they would not subordinate themselves to Saddam.[104] In one such case, Saddam attempted to reach out to AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Harith al-Dhari, only to be told that al-Dhari had grown powerful enough that he did not need Saddam or his support.[105] The threat of Saddam's power and the consequences of defying him were no longer able to motivate insurgent commanders. New leaders had moved into the power vacuum and saw little need for Saddam or his money.

Approved for Release

---

[103] [| Military | CJSOTF INTSUM 322 | ~~S//NF~~ |]
[104] [| Source unknown | (b)(6) | - PERSONALITIES FOR TARGETING | ~~(S//NF)~~ |]
[105] [| Open Source | b 6 | TWICE ARMED: AN AMERICAN SOLDIER'S BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS IN IRAQ | 2006 | p. 140 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Insurgent Motivations and Ideology

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Motivations for the rank-and-file insurgents during this period still varied widely. Some Anbaris continued to fight against what they saw as an unjust occupation. Others fought to avenge tribal grievances against perceived Coalition abuses such as the killing of Iraqi police in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on September 12 or the detention of prominent Fallujah religious figures like SRE leader Barakat Albu Eissa.[106] Following the apprehension of Barakat Albu Eissa, warnings were circulated by insurgent groups and their supporters that Western contractors might be targeted by the insurgency. This foreshadowed what would occur in Fallujah in April 2004.[107]

(U) During this period, FRE and FRL propaganda framed the conflict within both a nationalist and a jihadist context. The Coalition was portrayed as an infidel power that occupied Iraq with various nefarious motives, such as neo-colonialism or as part of a conspiracy to destroy Islam. The average Iraqi saw the CPA**Error! Bookmark not defined.** announcement that the U.S. was an occupier as explicitly comparable to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Further, they saw a parallel between those Iraqis who supported the Coalition and those nations that supported Israel, thereby legitimizing their murder under either a political or a religious rationale.

(U) Another major element of Sunni insurgent motivation was the new role of Shi'a organizations such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) in the new Iraqi government. Their long-standing ties with Iran**Error! Bookmark not defined.** played directly on Sunni Anbari fears of what they saw as the minority Shi'a controlling Iraq at the

1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d Both FRE and FRL propagandists understood the fears of their fellow Anbaris, and knew the messages most likely to push them into active insurgency.

Typical Insurgent Attacks and TTPs: Major Turning Points

(U) This "consolidation" stage enabled the insurgents time and space to develop new TTPs and improve existing ones as evidenced by the appearance of IEDs and suicide bombers. Insurgents attacked several categories of targets: Iraqi infrastructure, Iraqi security forces, Iraqi civilians, and Coalition forces. The following chart shows the types of attacks during 2003.

Approved for Release

[106] [| Open Source | INTERVIEW: b 3 b 6 | OCTOBER 2006 | (U) |]
[107] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506



Figure 2: Insurgent attacks against Iraqi infrastructure, Iraqi security forces, Iraqi civilians, and against coalition forces ~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ [108]

(U) Attacks on Anbar's infrastructure suggested the insurgents believed they had enough popular support and internal security to carry out these attacks without fear of a popular backlash. Insurgents also continued to attack Iraqi governance within Anbar, particularly leaders put into positions of power by or simply viewed as too close to the Coalition.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ One of the first infrastructure targets was the rail system. Throughout late summer and fall, Jaysh Qods in cooperation with organized criminal elements carried out a number of attacks on the railroads. These attacks showed that at least part of the insurgency was becoming more sophisticated in its techniques.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Significantly, the first record of a casualty-producing IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** killed a solider in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on July 18, 2003. The first IED used against the railroad system was near Fallujah on August 28, 2003. Within just a few weeks, the new weapon became common throughout Anbar. The insurgents began to refine their TTPs for the use of IEDs. In some cases, IEDs were used to initiate ambushes affording the

[108] [| Military | 82nd Airborne Division/ SIGACTS (significant actions) | ~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ |]
Data used to construct these graphs is a compilation of 82nd Airborne Division SIGACTS (significant actions). This data base includes primarily data starting in June 2003 and may not be fully representative of all incidents in al Anbar Province. The number of relevant incident and attack reports was 700 from a total of 1,128. ~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

insurgents a low-risk stand-off weapon. In other cases, IEDs were used as minefields to provide early warning and deny, or hinder coalition forces entry into areas.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ A November 12th attempt on the rail lines was particularly instructive. The 3rd BCT discovered a remote-controlled IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on the tracks as well as eight 125mm rounds daisy-chained together.[109] Both innovations represented a significant leap in technique for the insurgency, one that would soon become a familiar sight to Coalition forces. By the end of the year, IED attacks had multiplied dramatically. However, from the start, they showed huge fluctuations in numbers, reflecting both the time of year (attacks would spike just before and after Ramadan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) and availability of materials with which to build them. The following figure shows the timing and numbers of IED attacks.



Figure 3: IED Error! Bookmark not defined. **Attacks 2003 ~~(S/REL to MCFI)~~**[110]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Railway attacks were not the only infrastructure sabotage by the Anbar-based insurgency. Water and power lines were cut frequently in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Throughout Anbar attacks on gas pipelines, electrical grids, and other critical infrastructure became common during the fall of 2003.

Approved for Release

[109] [| Military | 82LNO-92595144 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[110] [| Military | 82nd Airborne Division SIGACTS (significant actions) | ~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ |]
Data used to construct these graphs is a compilation of 82nd Airborne Division SIGACTS (significant actions). This data base includes primarily data starting in June 2003 and may not be fully representative of all incidents in al Anbar Province. The number of relevant incident and attack reports was 321 from a total of 1,128. ~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Perhaps the first known attack on power lines occurred in September, when Coalition troops caught two Iraqis pulling down the lines near the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Dam.[111] Because the power lines were sold as scrap metal, it is unclear if it was an insurgent attack on the infrastructure per se, or a criminal profit-making activity, or both. In either case, the infrastructure attacks demonstrated that the Coalition was unable to protect the population and its infrastructure.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The suicide bombing in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on October 10, 2003 was the first indication that Al Qaeda and other foreign Islamist elements were active in the province. In the first recorded use of the technique in Anbar, an Iraqi simply walked up to an FOB with a box containing the bomb and detonated it as Coalition troops approached.[112] A tactic employed almost exclusively by global *jihadis* and other foreign fighters, suicide bombings would prove as difficult to stop as IEDs, while also causing large-scale casualties among the civilian population of Iraq. However, for 2003 suicide bombers were not deployed in the numbers or the scale achieved in later years.

(U) Another innovation was the use of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) or car bombs. Some of the most spectacular VBIEDs attacks in Anbar targeted government institutions, particularly the police. In September, a VBIED attack on the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** police department's training area caused massive casualties, while a December VBIED killed 17 police officers and wounded 33 in Khalidiyya.[113] Fortunately, VBIED attacks were very limited in 2003.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The police were under siege throughout the province. Various insurgent groups apparently concluded that only the defeat of the police would allow them to succeed. The situation was worst in al-Qa'im and Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. As we have seen, the police chiefs in al-Qa'im were repeatedly attacked or intimidated into quitting and the entire police force was also threatened. Twenty armed men entered the al-Qa'im station on October 16 and told the officers that they would be killed if they continued to work with the Coalition.[114] The police station at Husaybah was also repeatedly attacked by insurgents during October, culminating in nine separate attacks during the last week of the month and the assassination of the police chief.[115] On November 6, insurgents launched a coordinated attack against municipal buildings in Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, including the police station, while also engaging responding units. In Hadithah there were two spectacular attacks on the police station in November; The first involved insurgents boldly entering the station and seizing weapons from the hands of the police, while in the second, dozens of insurgents gathered along the main road on November 12 and carried out an attack on the beleaguered city police station using RPGs.[116]

Approved for Release

---

[111] [| Military | 82LNO-957591543931681 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[112] [| Military | 3ACRLNO-277401438698699 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[113] [| Military | ICDC Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Briefing and 82LNO-71001738 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[114] [| Military | 82LNO-70911860309790 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[115] [| Military | 82LNO-443487664528391 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[116] [| Open Source | BOSTON GLOBE [b 6] IRAQI TOWN GAINS SENSE OF NORMALCY | 20040201 | (U) |]; [Open Source | THE GUARDIAN/[b 6] UNDER US NOSES, BRUTAL INSURGENTS RULE SUNNI CITADEL | 20050822 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Attacks against U.S. forces showed a steady increase leading up to Ramadan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, which began October 26, 2003, and then a small decline after Ramadan. Small arms fire, RPGs and indirect fire comprised the major forms of attack against U.S. troops in 2003. IEDs were sometimes used in conjunction with the attacks. The figure below indicates the types of attacks in 2003.

Attack Data (September – December 2003)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (September to December 2003). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following six charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED **Error! Bookmark not defined.**) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. There was no data available for Complex Attacks for this period.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was the lowest sustained level of the entire insurgency. There are two patterns of interest that can be seen in the data. The first is that the TFC dataset recorded no Direct Fire or Indirect Fire incidents during the month of October 2003. In fact, the only category with recorded incidents is IEDs. This is more likely a recording error rather than a data outlier. The other significant pattern is a significant spike in activity within the Overall, Direct Fire, and Indirect Fire categories during the week of 6-12 November, likely related to Ramadan. Much of the spike can be attributed to activity in AO Denver, which had been very quiet otherwise. Almost all recorded activity previously was in AOs Raleigh and Topeka. There is also a smaller spike during the week of 18-24 September. The IED data shows a slightly different pattern that rises gradually, peaking during the week of 23-29 October, then gradually falls from there.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506



Figure 4: Coordinated attacks, small arms fire and RPG, and indirect fire attacks from June to December 2003 (~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) [117]

Approved for Release

Coalition Forces and the Insurgency

(U) Reacting to the growing unrest, Coalition forces mounted a series of operations in Anbar designed to suppress the insurgents. The CPA**Error! Bookmark not defined.** claimed the insurgent attacks were work of a few left-over Ba'athists, criminals, or "dead-enders," and separate, unconnected incidents provoked by local concerns. Due to this poor analysis, almost all Coalition actions focused on one city at a time, had limited objectives, and were "cordon-and-search," rather than "clear-and-hold," operations. Some involved a thousand troops in very small areas. In Operation BULLDOG MAMMOTH, a brigade searched one apartment complex in Abu Gharyb. Others, such as the 82nd Airborne's Operation OK CORRAL in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, attempted to cordon and search large parts of an entire city. A large number of operations involved targeted actions against former regime leaders, searches for weapons caches, and attempts to close the border to foreign fighters or to halt smuggling. After October 2003, the Coalition

[117] [| Military | 82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION/ SIGACTS (SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS) ~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ |] Data used to construct these graphs is a compilation of 82nd Airborne Division SIGACTS (significant actions). This data base includes primarily data starting in June 2003 and may not be fully representative of all incidents in al Anbar Province. The number of relevant incident and attack reports was 380 from a total of 1,128 ~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

increasingly undertook actions designed to find and destroy the IEDs that were causing increasing casualties for both Coalition and Iraqi forces.

~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ The month of November saw over fifty IEDs explode in Anbar; twenty in the week of November 2-9 alone. This indicated a steady increase in the use of IEDs compared to June, July, and August. Throughout the fall, there was also growing concern about the number of foreign fighters filtering across the border, but there was no consensus about the ideology or motivation for these fighters.

City Story: Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined. **and Al-Qa'im**

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Smaller towns and villages across Anbar were not spared the continuing upsurge in insurgent activity, especially areas near the Iraqi-Syrian border. The city of Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** witnessed a noticeable increase in violence during the month of October, as its proximity to the Syrian border and long history of profitable smuggling was exploited by the insurgents. The profits available from this trade also encouraged the rise of a criminal element within the insurgency, as local crime bosses allied with insurgents to maintain control over smuggling routes. Their resulting profits were then funneled into attacks targeting the coalition and their Iraqi government allies. The killings and intimidation of both Husaybah and al-Qa'im police facilitated the rise of crime syndicates and insurgent groups and encouraged them to work together. The new boldness of the insurgency was shown by the types of attacks that they carried out after August. In October, insurgents brought down an OH-58 helicopter with small arms fire, while thirty-eight separate RPG attacks took place in September and October, suggesting a greater willingness among insurgents to conduct direct fire attacks.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Much like nearby Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Al-Qaim's status as a hub for cross-border trade gave rise to a criminal organization which was populated by former Ba'ath Party officials. These same figures aided small numbers of foreign fighters who transited the Syrian border, while also giving refuge and aid to local insurgents who facilitated their control of the smuggling routes. Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** also suffered due to its historic role as a center for smuggling. Small groups of foreign fighters utilized centuries-old smuggling routes in order to infiltrate the area. With the aid of insurgents from Husaybah, Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based insurgents set up small training camps around the town to replace the one destroyed earlier by the Coalition.

(U) As coalition forces attempted to create a system of order and economic stability, those who had profited from crime and patronage frequently made common cause with insurgents. This dynamic of criminal elements allying with insurgents – or insurgents acting as profit-driven criminals – became a constant problem for the Coalition. It was particularly serious in the border towns such as Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Al-Qa'im, where unregulated cross-border trade had long been a way of life.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ One group embodied this synthesis. Dubbed "Al-Theeb" (The Wolf) the Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based group included amongst its ranks criminals, former Ba'athists, and foreign fighters. Al-Theeb was founded long before OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.** by a former Iraqi soldier named Turki Abd Majid who called himself Abu Theeb ("Father of the Wolf").[118] Traveling to Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Lebanon**Error! Bookmark not defined.** before returning to Iraq in 1997, Majid made contact with Islamist extremist groups, some of which were linked to al Qaeda, and agreed to assist them in moving personnel in and out of Iraq.[119] Following the destruction of the AI training camp at Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** by Coalition forces in July 2003, Majid assisted the survivors in fleeing to Ubaydi, al-Qa'im, and Husaybah. There he enlisted them as the leadership of AT, a purely criminal venture which dominated the smuggling routes through al-Qa'im.[120] Once it began to control profit flows and area commerce, religious extremists and other Iraqis who were more ideologically motivated joined the group, creating a criminal insurgency.[121]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ This sort of inclusive insurgency, where names meant little when compared to the need for cooperation, was commonplace in Anbar. After Majid's capture in August 2003, FRL Major General Abed Mohowsh al-Mahalowi assumed control of AT and completed the group's transformation from a criminal organization to a hybrid network based around organized crime, foreign fighter smuggling, and anti-Coalition activity.[122] While somewhat geographically isolated from the rest of Anbar, Al-Theeb serves as a perfect example of how cooperation and accommodation between insurgent groups frequently bypassed ideological differences.

Snapshot: The Insurgency August-December 2003

(U) The insurgent environment in these border towns accurately represented the complex, broader threat environment facing the Coalition by the latter part of 2003. Far from a mass of uncoordinated groups and factions, the insurgency was showing signs of real organization and hierarchy, even though many factions seemingly opposed each others' initiatives. The consolidation of smaller insurgent groups into larger coalitions was part of a larger trend that saw supposed ideological enemies willing to work together against the Coalition and its Iraqi supporters.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Insurgent attacks continued to show greater sophistication, both technically and tactically, although attack levels tended to vary considerably throughout the year. The development of IEDs, VBIEDs and suicide bombers gave insurgents a wide variety of new weapons for their arsenal, while growing numbers of complex attacks—involving the use of RPGs and SAF—showed that at least some insurgents were learning close combat. Both the use of IEDs and complex attacks showed the insurgents were increasingly sophisticated.

Approved for Release

[118] [| Source unknown | INTREP #04-019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[119] Ibid.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Al-Theeb
[122] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The insurgency in Anbar was now dominated by FREs, as vigorous Coalition targeting of FRL figures—and pursuit of Saddam—crippled this part of the insurgency and would soon lead to the capture of Saddam. At the same time, the reappearance of Zarqawi with spectacular mass attacks in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and elsewhere, showed the threatening future of the insurgency in the province.

The Capture of Saddam Hussein (November – December 2003)

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Believing that Saddam Hussein and his surviving subordinates were responsible for much of the violence (either directly or by proxy by his top lieutenants such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri or Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad), the Coalition intensified its efforts to hunt him down. Operations in November and December netted a number of senior FRL leaders including Brigadier General Daham Al Mahmedi in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, who had indirect contact with Saddam through human couriers, as well as Jassam Mejbil and Mahamed Jassam Abad, two Fallujah crime lords who had been involved in financing, conducting IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** attacks, and supplying weapons to FRL and FRE insurgent groups.[123] [124]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Ironically, after having more or less consolidated FRL organizations under his leadership, Coalition actions forced Saddam deeper underground. This forced him to rely even more on top subordinates such as his half-brother Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti or Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, though FRE Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad remained one of the most active facilitators of FRL insurgents in Anbar. Coalition pursuit eventually chased Saddam to al-Dawr where he was captured in December.

Saddam's Influence Diminishes

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ While Saddam's remaining influence waned in Anbar as a result of his return to hiding, FRE and SRE organizations continued to grow. Making good on Barakat Albu Eissa's previous threats, an SRE from Albu Eissa's village near Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** successfully downed a U.S. Chinook helicopter on November 2, 2003 causing 16 U.S. KIAs.[125] The image of the downed helicopter was prominently reflected in print and electronic insurgent propaganda from that point forward, even among groups opposed to Albu Eissa. And while FRLs were forced to lessen their attacks under pressure from the Coalition, groups like JM continued to carry out high-profile operations in Anbar such as the assassination of Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** mayor Na'im 'Abd al-Muhsan and his chief of police in November 2003, prompting the installment of 'Ali Hamdi Nassar al-'Awi as his successor. The success of these attacks encouraged the insurgents and gave them renewed confidence to continue their attacks against the Coalition.

Al Qaeda in Iraq Expands

[123] [| Open Source | CENTCOM: Press Release | 20031203 | (U) |]
[124] [| Open Source | CENTCOM: Press Release | 20031211 | (U) |]
[125] [| Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS: LIST OF DOWNED US HELICOPTERS IN IRAQ | 20040108 |(U)|]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) leadership saw an opportunity as Ba'athist influence both in Anbar and across Iraq was waning. As early as September 2003, groups loyal to AQI and Zarqawi's JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.** were actively recruiting Iraqi members at the mosques in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and seeking to form alliances with local FRL, FRE, SRE, and tribal-based insurgent groups. While the vast majority of insurgents fighting the Coalition in Anbar, even those described as "*Wahhabi*," did not agree with Al Qaeda's political or religious views, insurgent leaders like AI's Abu Talha in Ramadi and JTJ's Zarqawi in Fallujah were able to persuade enough FREs and SREs to support them that by November 2003 JTJ had a viable organization in Anbar. The rise of Zarqawi's JTJ intensified divisions within Ansar al Islam. Several factions split off from the Iran**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based Ansar al Islam leadership to align with Zarqawi or to become part of Abu Abdallah al-Shafi'i's umbrella organization Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna (AS).

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Nor was the opportunity lost on Usama bin Ladin. As early as November 2003, he apparently convened a summit of the Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan and informed the Taliban that he would begin providing $1.5 million a month to the Iraqi insurgency.[126] Bin Laden ordered senior and mid-level Arab and Turkish Al Qaeda associates to travel to Iraq to assist in the insurgency there. He instructed them to identify a commander he could appoint as the overall emir in Iraq. Among those who were sent to Iraq were KSM associate Hassan Ghul and Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, a high-ranking member of the organization's global leadership who had previously been involved in the Afghan insurgency. In response to al-Iraqi's request for a war plan for jihad in Iraq, Zarqawi's wrote up a lengthy letter to the Al Qaeda leadership that would be captured by Coalition forces in January 2004.

Saddam Demythologized: Splintering of FRLs

(U) After over a month and a half of concerted effort, on December 13, Coalition forces captured Saddam Hussein near Tikrit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Those in the Coalition who saw the insurgency as primarily motivated by FRLs thought that the end of Saddam, together with the earlier coalition killings of his two sons Uday and Qusay in Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on July 22, 2003, would serve the death blow to the violence in Iraq. For those FRL and FRE organizations that had relied on Saddam and his reputation as a symbol or rallying point, his capture was an enormous psychological blow. His supporters in Tikrit could not initially believe it was him.

(U) During the course of his long and bloody rule of Iraq, Saddam had painstakingly constructed a mythology for himself in which he embodied the ideal of a strong Arab leader who dared to defy the West. He was regarded, even by those who opposed him, almost as a kind of demigod. Both his capture and the humiliating circumstances under which it occurred served to deconstruct him before the entire population of Iraq on national and satellite television.

[126] [| Open Source | NEWSWEEK: BIN LADEN'S IRAQ PLANS | December 8, 2003 | (U) |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

FRL Organizations Survive the Infighting after Saddam's Capture

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ According to Arab press and insurgent accounts, the capture of Saddam Hussein led to immediate clashes and infighting for control among FRL organizations.[127] Three groups remained relatively effective. The following table illustrates the remaining groups.

Approved for Release

[127] [| Open Source | (b)(6) | WHO THE COALITION IS FACING IN IRAQ | 20031230 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Insurgent Group	Leader	Area of Operations		
	Colonel Hani Abdul-Latif al-Tilfah al-Tikriti			
HA	Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri			
	Muhsin Khudhair al-Khafiji			
Ferka et Hadi	Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad			

Table 5: Insurgent Groups Remaining – December 2003 ~~(S/NF)~~

Approved for Release

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The largest FRL group that remained was led by members of the Tikriti clan and headed up by Saddam's cousin Colonel Hani Abdul-Latif al-Tilfah al-Tikriti and his brother and financed by Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti. HA and most of the surviving Ba'ath Party organization including many of the FRL Saddam Fedayeen fell under the control of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri. Al-Duri was the one-time Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In late 2003, he was the titular head of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. The third and final major FRL organization that emerged at the end of the infighting was led by Muhsin Khudhair al-Khafiji who sought to improve relations with the Syrian Ba'athists and retained the services of FRE Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad for his Ferka et Hadi organization. Al-Khafiji was the most powerful FRL leader in Anbar.[128]

Summary

Snapshot: The Insurgency at the End Of 2003

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The capture of Saddam removed any realistic chance of restoring the regime to power, but rather than discouraging FREs into giving up the fight, it prompted most of them to seek other reasons, reflected in their propaganda, to continue resisting the occupation. Previously, almost all the major insurgent organizations had espoused a mixture of nationalist or religious slogans to rally Anbaris to their cause. A majority of Anbaris chose some form of Islamism or jihadism as their basic ideology. Anbaris did not seem to perceive any contradiction between these two ideals, and some groups began to mix nationalism and Islamism in a way unthinkable before Saddam's capture.[129]

---

[128] [| Source unknown | (b)(6) —PERSONALITIES FOR TARGETING | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[129] [| Military | CTC 2003-30149 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Looking Ahead

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ This mixing of nationalism and Islamism continued to develop through the beginning of 2004, setting the stage for Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's debut at the center of the Iraqi insurgency in Anbar Province.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Chapter Four

The Insurgency Grows and Fights Pitched Battles

(2004)

Introduction

~~(S/NF)~~ *The capture of Saddam Hussein in late 2003 represented a watershed event. The man who ruled so long and loomed so large was now a prisoner. Hopes for the regime's restoration had ended. The prominence of the FRLs also soon ended. While 2004 saw the splintering of the FRLs, this did not end the insurgency. As the year would show, the insurgency proved adaptable and resilient. Although 2004 began on a hopeful note with a reduced level of insurgent activity, various FRE, SRE, and Al Qaeda insurgent groups swiftly filled the power vacuum in Anbar. Insurgent activity increased not only in frequency but in complexity and intensity, most notably in the two major battles fought in Fallujah (Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and Operation Al FAJR).*

~~(S/NF)~~ *Although each battle resulted in numerous insurgent deaths and captures, insurgent groups showed their resilience and continued to reorganize, recruit, and re-arm. Despite the losses of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, the insurgency managed to exploit opportunities – such as negotiations, the creation of the Fallujah Brigade, and the Coalition's need to focus on Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army – to increase its influence throughout much of Anbar. Insurgent influence was demonstrated by the fact the new government was unable to project its authority in Anbar. Government officials were often the targets of insurgent threats and violence. After a series of tense stand-offs, negotiations, and skirmishes during the summer and fall of 2004, a second battle took place in Fallujah. In Operation Al FAJR, the Coalition destroyed the center of insurgent power in Anbar, killing or capturing thousands. The year ended with the insurgents again reorganizing and the Coalition and Iraqi Interim Government preparing for upcoming elections.*

~~(S/NF)~~ Saddam Hussein's capture severely weakened the FRLs. Saddam's followers began fighting among themselves for the leadership, funds and infrastructure of the FRE groups. Some, such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, issued propaganda statements seeking to distance themselves from the former dictator's atrocities. Others championed themselves as Saddam's true heirs. FRL members sought to cooperate with insurgent leaders who'd established themselves in 2003. As the FRLs weakened in early 2004, the power gap in Anbar was quickly filled by emerging leaders who were either former regime elements (FREs), Sunni religious extremists (SREs) or members of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Jamaat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (JTJ) organization. These three groups were the Coalition's primary enemies in Anbar for the remainder of 2004.

~~(S/REL)~~ Early in 2004, the insurgency was still very local – no truly national group had yet emerged. FRE influence across Anbar remained pervasive throughout the year among these local insurgent groups (many with criminal or religious motivations). But they gradually changed from a focus on restoring their former influence and power to *Wahhabism* or *Salafism* and used religious rhetoric to

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

rally Anbaris to their cause.[1] Despite their changed mindset, the Coalition continued to classify many of them as FREs because of their positions in the former Iraqi regime.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ In early 2004, Ba'athist infighting finally resulted in the complete splintering of the party. While divisions had been papered over throughout 2003, giving the appearance of a unified power structure, in practice a high degree of factionalization existed. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri (now the titular political head of the Ba'athists as a result of his pre-OIF status as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council) and the head of the Party's military wing, Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad, engaged in a power struggle that would continue throughout the insurgency.

(U) **Iraqi National Guard**: Together with the CPA and U.S. forces, Iraqi officials worked to re-establish a paramilitary presence within the country. In late 2003 and early 2004 the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Iraqi National Guard were established, members recruited, trained and deployed – some to Anbar Province. The ING became the focus of insurgent efforts to prevent the re-establishment of a government presence.

(U) **IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS (ICDC) AND IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD (ING) – 2003-2004.** The ING evolved from the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which was formed in the fall of 2003 by the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA). CPA Order No. 28 established the ICDC on September 3, 2003. It was to be a temporary agency built to complement Coalition efforts aimed at providing security and emergency services. Battalions included mainly non-military Iraqi personnel who worked directly for the Coalition Task Force. Two months later, the ICDC role was expanded to include a Counterinsurgency Battalion composed of 750-850 militiamen selected by five of the main political parties in Iraq.[2] Under extreme political pressure, training time for ICDC members was increased to three weeks and the numbers grew from an estimated 700 initial members to over 15,000 members by January 2004. Their missions include: counter-insurgency operations, working with Iraqi police and fire departments to respond to civil disturbances, securing public buildings and providing security on Main Supply Routes (MSRs).[3]

(U) **IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD: 2004-2005.** In April 2004, the ICDC was transferred to the Ministry of Defense.[4] By July 2004, as the ICDC continued to become more involved in offensive operations, the Iraqi Government decided to convert this force into an Iraqi National Guard (ING). The first new recruits completed training on July 10, 2004 after being trained for 20 days at the ING Training Academy in Tikrit by Coalition and Iraqi instructors with training modeled after U.S. Army Basic Training. Between July 2004 and January 2005, the ING membership fluctuated between an estimated 36,229 members and 43,455 members.[5]

(U) **Iraqi Special Police Forces**: As a law enforcement adjunct to the ING, various national police units were established.

(U) **IRAQI SPECIAL POLICE FORCES: 2004.** Since 2004, Iraqi governments have developed and evolved various forms of national-level police. The Special Police Forces (SPF), composed of

[1] [| Military | GRINTSUM 050208 | 050208 | ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ |]
[2] [| Open Source| http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Iraqi_Civil_Defense_Corps | (U) |]
[3] [| Open Source | http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ing.htm | (U) |]
[4] [| Open Source | http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ing.htm | (U) |]
[5] [| Department of State |IRAQ WEEKLY STATUS REPORT | http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/ | (U) |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

three major elements (commandos, public order brigades, and the 1st Special Police Mechanized Brigade) was formed in 2004 by the government of Iyad Allawi.[6] They are used when local police (the Iraqi Police Service) are unable to contain situations. Many Ba'athist former military personnel were recruited by the Sunni then-Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib.[7]

(U) **PUBLIC ORDER BRIGADES (POBs): 2004.** The POBs are considered a Shi'a organization and frequently referred to as the Shi's Public Order Brigades. They were formed by Ministry of Interior after the Shia gained control of the Ministry post-transfer of authority in July 2004. Their purpose was to provide national-level rapid-response with light armor capability to counter insurgency activities, provide support to Ministry of Interior taskings, crowd control, and security of high value installations. The POBs were trained and supervised by U.S. advisors of the Special Police Transition Teams (SPTT), the National Police Order Division of MNC-I.[8] One example of their activities stands out: the POBs were used in cities such as Fallujah after Operation AL FAJR (2004) to clear remaining pockets of insurgents and establish security until local police could be reestablished.

All Quiet in Anbar from January to March

~~(S/NF)~~ With the capture of Saddam, damage to nationalist ideology, and resulting insurgency reorganization, the beginning of 2004 was quiet in Anbar. There were indications, however, that SRE groups – both newly Islamized organizations as well as established groups – were growing in size. This would prove correct. SRE growth continued throughout 2004. The Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, and JTJ all put out propaganda (leaflets and internet statements in particular), recruited heavily, and took over mosques in preparation for launching an insurgent campaign against the Coalition.

~~(S/NF)~~ The rise of JTJ in Anbar and throughout Iraq soon became a major concern to the Coalition. A number of prominent foreign JTJ members had been killed in Fallujah prior to and following the apprehension of Al Qaeda emissary and KSM associate Hassan Ghul in January 2004. His capture and revelations about JTJ's activities inside Iraq prompted the Coalition to reevaluate its assumptions about Zarqawi and his activities inside Iraq. As a result, the Coalition began to publicize Zarqawi as the primary terrorist threat to the Coalition by early February 2004.

(U) JTJ appears to have responded by dropping the veil of secrecy that had characterized its actions throughout 2003. After the Coalition began to publicize Zarqawi's activities inside Iraq, JTJ and other Al Qaeda-associated groups such as Ansar al-Sunna and Ansar al Islam apparently concluded they had nothing left to hide. They began issuing regular claims of responsibility for acts of violence. They disseminated text and video messages via the Internet or media organizations that coincided with a number of mass casualty terrorist attacks. These attacks were directed against the Kurdish

Approved for Release

[6] [| Open Source | http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1112&Itemid=94 | (U) |]
[7] [| Military | U.K., DEFENSE ACADEMY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, CONFLICT STUDIES RESEARCH GROUP/ JAKUB CERNY: DEATH SQUAD OPERATIONS IN IRAQ/ p. 7. | http://www.da.mod.uk/csrc | 200606 | (U) |]
[8] [| Open Source | http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060217-12529.html and http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/060218/2006021818.html | 20060218 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

leadership during a conference in Irbil in February 2004, against the Iraqi Shi'a in Karbala and Baghdad during a celebration of their holy festival of Ashura, and against a large number of Iraqi police at a recruiting station in Iskandariyah. These attacks provided a clear indication that Zarqawi and his allies were able to back up their threats with action.

~~(S/NF)~~ Relatively little of this terror campaign, however, took place within Anbar proper. There were several reasons for this. First, insurgent groups typically avoid carrying out mass casualty attacks near their primary recruiting grounds and centers of support. While Zarqawi and other insurgents had few reservations about killing perceived collaborators, they didn't target Sunnis in the way they did Shi'a or Kurdish populations. Second, JTJ was still building local alliances. These alliances – with other SRE and FRE insurgent groups and with anti-Coalition elements within powerful Anbari tribes such as the Mohamdi, the Albu Nimr, the Zobai and the Albu Eissa – might have been jeopardized by conducting mass casualty attacks in the province. Third, Zarqawi was interested in starting a civil war between Sunni and Shia and needed the support of the Sunnis.

Khamis Sirhan and the FRLs

~~(S/NF)~~ One of the individuals of great interest to the Ba'athist pretenders that emerged following Saddam's capture was Khamis Sirhan and his Saqlawiyah-based Ferka et Hadi (FeH) network.[9] The former Ba'ath Party chairman in Karbala, Khamis Sirhan had fled to Anbar post-OIF. There he established FeH to fight the Coalition before reuniting with his FRL comrades who were now fighting under the banner of Hizb al-'Awda.[10] FeH was more involved in facilitating the attacks of local groups than with conducting attacks. It soon became an invaluable ally to FRL and FRE insurgent organizations in Anbar. Khamis Sirhan maintained ties with multiple FRL, FRE, and SRE insurgent organizations and acted as a nexus for inter-group communication and cooperation.[11] When Khamis Sirhan agreed that FeH should join Ba'athist pretender Muhsin Khudhair al-Khafiji's organization in late December 2003, it gave al-Khafiji access to one of the best-established FRE insurgent networks in Anbar. It also made neutralizing Khamis Sirhan a top priority for the Coalition.[12]

> ~~(S/NF)~~ **KHAMIS SIRHAN AL-MUHAMMAD.** Formerly the Ba'ath Party Chairman in Karbala, Khamis Sirhan emerged post-OIF as a key facilitator in the Anbar insurgency in late 2003. More interested in fighting the Coalition than in ideology, he and his Saqlawiyah-based Ferka et Hadi (FeH) network supported a variety of anti-Coalition groups in the province ranging from FRLs to Ansar al-Islam. Because he had one of the largest logistics networks in Anbar, Khamis Sirhan's loyalties were heavily sought after Saddam's capture.

~~(S/NF)~~ Khamis Sirhan's usefulness for al-Khafiji would be short-lived. On January 11, 2004 elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and special operations forces captured him in Ramadi. In the absence of Khamis Sirhan and his immediate family, the FeH network either collapsed or was

[9] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: KHAMIS SIRHAN: PERSONALITIES FOR TARGETING POWERPOINT BRIEFING | Possibly created 200401xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[10] [| Military | CIIR-3-66-39-03-084 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[11] Ibid.
[12] [| Open Source | TAHERI, AMIR: WHO THE COALITION IS FACING IN IRAQ | 20031230 | (U) |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

absorbed by other FRE insurgent groups. The dissolution of FeH led in turn to the splintering of the Hizb al-'Awda. With this, whatever tenuous hold the FRLs had hoped to gain in Anbar slipped away. Other FRE and SRE organizations rapidly moved to fill this power vacuum.

Insurgent Networks and Coordination across Anbar

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite JTJ's public debut, the majority of day-to-day attacks inside Anbar continued to be conducted by local and provincial FRE or SRE organizations (though the line between FRE and SRE became increasingly blurred as a result of Islamization). Infighting and rivalries initially hindered FRLs or FREs coordination of activities. Religious organizations stepped into the void and began facilitating cooperation by creating loose but not well-organized coalitions between the various insurgent groups. This cooperation enabled a great deal of permeability between insurgent groups, with members of one organization often blending or merging into another depending on the situation.

~~(S/NF)~~ The clandestine Ramadi Shura Council (an overwhelmingly FRE organization) served as an informal coordinating body for insurgents based in and around Ramadi and throughout Anbar.[13] It was dominated by (b)(6) It met periodically with various insurgent leaders from the Jaysh Mohammed, the JTJ, the 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Green Battalion as well as smaller local groups like Abu Harun Group, Hawra Network, and the Black Flags Battalion at mosques in Ramadi.[14] Like many insurgent clerical organizations, the Ramadi Shura Council maintained close ties to AMS and influential Iraqi Sunnis including the Kharbit family.[15] Similar informal and formal shuras soon appeared in other major cities in Anbar. Though not tightly hierarchical, these shuras remained, in principle at least, subordinate to the Ramadi Shura Council and later the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura.

~~(S/REL USA AND MCFI)~~ **ABD AL-LATIF HUMAYIM AL-KHARBIT**, a wealthy Amman-based banker and scion of the influential Kharbit family, was a major Ramadi Shura Council financier. He was a former religious advisor to Saddam Hussein and the founder of Islamic banks in Baghdad and Ramadi.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Ramadi Shura Council's ideology was as diverse as the groups it worked with. Latif was a deeply religious Sufi with a moderate view of *shari'a*. He sought to restore Sunni power in Iraq and saw himself as a defender of the Qur'an. In contrast, Daham was not very religious in his behavior, despite being a leading member of Ramadi Shura Council and supposedly adhering to a *Salafist* view of Islam.[16]

Approved for Release

[13] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL USA AND MCFI)~~ Another approach, used by Jaysh Mohammed (now based at the southern end of Lake Thar Thar among the many chicken farms), was the creation of semi-autonomous subsidiary groups tailored to suit local interests.[17] Thus, groups like Saraya al-Jihad or Colonel Mohammed Khudyr Sabah al-Halbusi's Green Battalion were set up or reinforced in Ramadi, Karmah, Saqlawiyah, Shahabi, and Khalidiyah with the intent of appealing to Islamist Anbaris from the Halbousi and Jumayli tribes. They drew recruits who might have balked at joining Jaysh Mohammed, which by early 2004 was supported in part through money sent by intermediaries of [b 6] (Saddam Hussein's daughter) and [(b)(6)].[18]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the same time that the insurgent groups were competing and cooperating with each other, important events were occurring in the major cities of Anbar province.

City Stories – Early 2004

(U) Although the insurgency may have been quiet while reorganizing and reorienting, the Coalition was active. Early 2004 saw a great deal of activity designed to stabilize Anbar. To suppress the insurgency, the Coalition based forces throughout the province under the command of the 82nd Airborne Division. Tiger Squadron of the 3rd ACR had three operating bases at Al Asad Airbase, Hadithah Dam and al Qa'im. 1st Infantry Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team (1st BCT, 1st ID) was in Fallujah. 1/124, Florida National Guard and 325th Airborne Infantry were in Ramadi. As Coalition forces spread out, they discovered each city of Anbar had its own particular circumstances that colored the organization, ideology, and activities of the insurgent groups operating there, specifics the Coalition had to consider when designing a strategy for stability and reconstruction.

Al-Qa'im

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ In Al-Qa'im, the insurgency engaged in criminal activity more than attacks on the Coalition. Between January and March 2004, there were fewer than ten attacks on Coalition forces in the city.[19]

Because of its proximity to the border, insurgent groups and their allies in the Albu Mahal tribe used Al-Qa'im as a hub to smuggle insurgents to and from Syria. The two largest insurgent groups were the SRE organization Omar al-Muktar under Ghanem Mohowsh and the FRE criminal organization Al-Theeb (see Chapter 3 for a description of the latter).[20] Of the two, Omar al-Mukhtar had the wider reach, operating in Al-Qa'im, Anah, Rawah, Hadithah, and Muhammadi, but Al-Theeb was unquestionably the predominant group in the Al-Qa'im area.[21]

Approved for Release

---

[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] [| Military | 03JANMCFI | 20040102 |~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 3 ACR TEXT INTSUM | 20040103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 06JANNOFORN | 20040105 |~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 27 FEB NOFORN | 20040226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 09MARMCFI | 20040308 |~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 12MAR NOFORN | 20040310 |~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 14MAR MCFI | 20040313 |~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 14MAR MCFI | 20040314 |~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[20] [| Military | THIRD ACR ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ELEMENT: AL QA'IM LINK ANALYSIS | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[21] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Hadithah

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Disgruntled former Ba'athists, smugglers plying routes to Jordan and Syria, a thriving black market, and sabotaged electric lines (with the metal removed and sold as scrap) were all part of Hadithah's landscape in early 2004.[22] As was elsewhere, the insurgency was relatively quiet. Between January and March 2004, there were only nineteen attacks against the Coalition.[23]

~~(S/NF)~~ Nonetheless, local intimidation efforts remained an issue, and the former mayor of Hadithah, Hawash Kalaf Metab, and police chief, Hosan Horat Waber, continued to collaborate with FRE insurgents in the city against Coalition forces.[24] Hadithah's proximity to Lake Thar Thar and strategic intersection within Anbar meant that the town served as an ideal staging area for FRE groups like Jaysh Mohammed.[25] Senior Ba'athists began relocating to the Hadithah area during the run-up to Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, aided by sympathetic members of the Jughayfah tribe.[26]

(U) To counteract the appeal of the insurgency and to restore water distribution and power throughout Anbar, the Army Corps of Engineers, with support from CPA's Program Management Office, began a $12,000,000 project to overhaul and rehabilitate the Hadithah Dam. The project employed more than one hundred Iraqi workers at any given time, including those who had previously worked on the Dam. Earlier restoration projects in Hadithah had included the restoration of transmission lines to link the hydropower dam to the Iraqi power grid, a project overseen by the Washington Group International.

Hit

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Hit, although far smaller than Hadithah, suffered more attacks during early 2004 compared to November-December 2003. Most consisted of IEDs, although the vast majority were found and defused before being detonated.[27]

Approved for Release

---

[22] [| Open Source | UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA/ AMATZIA BARAM: IRAQ AND ANBAR: A SOCIO-ECOJOMIC ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS | 20061025 | (U) |] Unpublished paper prepared for MCIA.
[23] [| Military | CJSOTF-AP: INTSUM | 20040104 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[| Military | 08JANNOFORN | 20040108 |~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 17JANMCFI | 20040117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[| Military | 02 FEBMCFI | 20040202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 05 FEBMCFI | 20040205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[| Military | 06 FEBMCFI | 20040206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 07 FEBMCFI | 20040207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[| Military | 11 FEBNOFORN | 20040211 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 14 FEBMCFI | 20040204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[| Military | 15 FEBNOFORN | 20040215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 19 FEBNOFORN | 20040219 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[| Military | 05MARNOFORN | 20040305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 07MARMCFI | 20040307 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[| Military | 11MARMCFI | 20040311 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 13MAR NOFORN | 20040313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[24] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: HADITHAH CURRENT ASSESSMENT | 200408XX | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] [| Military | 20 FEBMCFI | 20040220 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [Military | 21 FEBMCFI | 20040221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Insurgent intimidation and infrastructure problems led many Hit residents to see the Coalition as the cause. Residents complained that promises to restore the infrastructure and provide basic needs went unfulfilled.[28] Meanwhile, the city's corrupt police chief, General Salam, facilitated the travel of insurgents and foreign fighters through the town and assisted their anti-Coalition propaganda efforts, while police captain Mohab Nahib provided information to both sides.[29] Salam, however, had earlier been the target of insurgent intimidation, suggesting that his cooperation may not have been entirely voluntary.[30] The intimidation of public officials by insurgents was a common tactic throughout 2004.

Husaybah

~~(S/NF)~~ In Husaybah, the insurgency consisted largely of local FRE groups who mounted retributive attacks, generally with RPGs. They recruited new members from disgruntled tribes and sent them to Abu Kamal in 1.4b for training.[31] Many members of these FRE groups were former military or IIS officers who n trated the local police and were operating in conjunction with Al-Theeb in Al-Qa'im while cooperating on a tactical basis with JTJ.[32] SRE networks also used Husaybah as a way station for foreign fighters and a staging area for attacks in other parts of Anbar.[33]

Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ In Ramadi and Fallujah, the situation was quite different from the rest of Anbar. In both cities, the insurgency was better entrenched and coordinated. This allowed for more sophisticated attacks against the Coalition.

~~(S/NF)~~ Along with Ramadi Shura Council-coordinated activities, two major insurgent networks conducted many of the attacks in Ramadi, the al-Shabani Group and the Brigadier General Abid Sulayman al-Khalifawi network. Most active of the two was the informal FRE network loyal to Khalidiyah-based Brigadier General Abid Sulayman al-Khalifawi. This network, established in July 2003, had expanded by early 2004 to encompass most of eastern Anbar.[34] Also active in Ramadi was the 1.4b also based in Khalidiyah, led by explosives expert (b)(6) [35] (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ Ramadi also hosted a number of major insurgent facilitators and financiers. Foremost were members of the Kharbit family led in Ramadi by Abd al-Hamid al-Kharbit and Abd al-Latif Humayim al-Kharbit. As discussed earlier, they provided funding for a wide variety of insurgent

[28] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: HIT CURRENT ASSESSMENT | 200408XX | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[29] [| Military | AL HIT ASSESSMENT - SPECIAL ASSESSMENT | 200405xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[30] [| Military | 02 FEBMCFI | 20040202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[31] [| Military | 01JANMCFI | 20040101 | | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [Military | 3 ACR: INTSUM | 200401040600 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | AO ATLANTA ASSESSMENT | 20040101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[32] [| Military | AO ATLANTA ASSESSMENT | 20040228 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[33] [| Military | AO ATLANTA ASSESSMENT | 20040202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[34] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30038 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[35] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

leaders and organizations throughout Anbar.[36] Anti-Coalition members of the Ghanim clan of the Albu Khalifah as well as the Fahad tribe facilitated the insurgency in Ramadi proper, providing documents, propaganda, and counterfeiting assistance to many groups active in the city.[37]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ **Ramadi Attacks Grow More Sophisticated**: Over 150 increasingly sophisticated attacks against the Coalition and its supporters occurred from January through March. Insurgents in Ramadi tended to carry out more complex attacks than in the smaller towns.[38] Daisy-chained IEDs produced more deadly explosions.[39] Ramadi was often the site of innovative techniques, among them the placement of IEDs in dead animals.[40]

(U) Even with these attacks, Ramadi's streets were generally more secure than Fallujah's. Coalition forces patrolled actively. Reconstruction efforts proceeded, with rehabilitation of schools, water treatment facilities, irrigation systems, and bridges. Unemployment was at 30% in Ramadi, in contrast to 40-60% throughout Anbar during the same period.

(U) Meanwhile, the Coalition worked to establish institutions that could govern both the city and the province. In January 2004, a 400-member conference of experts, notables, and professionals met at the Government Headquarters of Anbar Province in Ramadi. Conference committees organized caucuses and elections. Those with criminal records and senior members of the Ba'ath Party and IIS were ineligible. Press reports noted the debate regarding the status of former Ba'athists. The caucus system also generated friction between opposing factions and left some Anbaris feeling excluded. In the end, the caucuses selected the council, with Ali Mukhlif al-Assafi as head of council administration. The new council had one woman member (selected by the women's conference) and a broad swath of men from across Anbari society. Members included tribal chiefs, businessmen, clergy, engineers, health and education sector workers, lawyers, laborers, and a former soldier in the Iraqi army. The IIP, Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and the Anbar National Congress (ANC) were all represented in the council, as were ten tribal leaders.[41]

Approved for Release

[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] [| Military | MCFI: 02JANMCFI | 20040102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; MCFI: 06 FEBMCFI | 20040206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; [| Military | 28 FEB MCFI | 20040228 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[39] [| Military | 03JANMCFI | 20040103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 18JAN REL 4 EYES | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 20JANNOFORN| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 12 FEBMCFI | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 28 FEB MCFI | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; [| Military | 09MARMCFI | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[40] [| Military | 18JAN REL 4 EYES | 20040118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; [| 21JANREL 4 EYES | 20040121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[41] [| Open Source | WISAM M. KARIM AL-JAF: GOVERNORATE WEST OF BAGHDAD SHRUGS OFF INSTABILITY AND INSURRECTION TO HOLD PEACEFUL BALLOT | http://iwpr.net?p=icr&s=f&o=168411&apc_state=heniicr2004 | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Insurgent Reorientation and Reconciliation (January – March)

Further FRL Splintering

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ It would be a mistake to assume with the capture of Saddam Hussein that the remaining Ba'athist leaders immediately gave up. Despite the splintering of the Hizb al-'Awda infrastructure, FRL leaders still regarded themselves as the best-organized insurgents. They believed they were the ones most likely to triumph against the Coalition. In the absence of Saddam's cult of personality, FRL propaganda reminded members of the 1960s, when the Party had to operate as a clandestine organization prior to rising up and seizing control of the country. Despite their efforts, the FRLs faltered. They were unable to reestablish the organization that had been in place during the fall of 2003. Infighting, factionalization, and a steady stream of defections by Ba'athists to stronger and more active FRE and SRE insurgent groups continued to diminish FRLs in Anbar and across Iraq.[42]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The decline of FRL influence in Anbar represented a major success for Coalition counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts. Through targeting of FRL leaders, facilitators, and financiers, the Coalition successfully disrupted their ability to organize and conduct attacks. Moreover, COIN efforts degraded FRL facilitation of allied groups in the province. The decline of the Ba'athist FRLs prompted a major restructuring of the insurgency. Many key individuals who had previously been active with FRLs joined or allied with FRE or SRE organizations. In many cases, the 1993 Faith Campaign (see Chapter 2) that Saddam engineered in order to bolster his rule appears in the case of Anbar to have worked entirely too well. Over the course of 2004, many Anbari FRLs and FREs found Sunni Arab nationalism or the religious appeal of the international *jihad* movement more attractive as an organizing principle than the socialist and pan-Arab ideology of the Ba'ath Party.

Anbar SREs and Al Qaeda

~~(S/NF)~~ **The Beginnings of Zarqawi and JTJ**: As the influence of FRL groups declined in Anbar at the beginning of 2004, other insurgent groups – particularly those with an Islamist outlook – capitalized on that decline to improve their position. As noted in Chapter 3, a number of Al Qaeda operatives, associates, and allied terrorist organizations were active in Iraq in 2003, with Zarqawi's JTJ the largest single group. While JTJ was responsible for a number of spectacular terrorist attacks in 2003, perhaps as many as twenty-five suicide bombings, the group had only a small presence inside Iraq. They spent most of the year forging alliances and building coalitions with the assistance of SRE and FRE insurgent organizations.

~~(S/NF)~~ **Merger Talks**: In late 2003, senior Al Qaeda leader Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi apparently met with Zarqawi, possibly in Fallujah, to discuss a direct merger between JTJ and Al Qaeda. Zarqawi

[42] [| (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | IRAQ: BA'ATHISTS WEAKENED, OTHERS FIGHTING ON | 20040112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

apparently thought this meant he was being offered overall command of the *jihad* in Iraq. In response to al-Iraqi's request for a detailed war plan for the Iraqi insurgency, Zarqawi wrote a 17-page letter meant for the global Al Qaeda leadership. He entrusted the letter to Hassan Ghul, an associate of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who served as the primary liaison between JTJ and Al Qaeda senior leadership. Ghul had come to Iraq with the intention of expanding Al Qaeda presence in the country.

(U) **ABDUL HADI AL-IRAQI.** A member of the Al Qaeda leadership and trusted lieutenant of Osama bin Ladin, al-Iraqi serves as the emissary and public face of the Al Qaeda *shura majlis* (ruling council) to Zarqawi and other Islamist leaders of the Iraqi insurgency.

(U) In January 2003 Hassan Ghul was captured near the town of Kalar by Kurdish *peshmerga* with Zarqawi's letter in his possession. Another copy was discovered on a compact disc recovered from a Zarqawi safe house in Baghdad. It appears, however, that his message eventually reached Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi and the rest of Al Qaeda's senior leadership.

~~(S/NF)~~ **Zarqawi's Plan for Sectarian War**: Zarqawi's letter to Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi reveals much about the state of JTJ in early 2004. According to Zarqawi, JTJ had found it difficult to create a base inside Iraq to train new recruits. It was also hesitant to issue a general call to arms since Iraq has "no mountains to seek refuge or forests in which to hide." Zarqawi also complained that the Iraqi population "will give … refuge" to JTJ fighters, but that they "will not allow you to make their home a safe house."

(U) Despite these limitations, Zarqawi stated that JTJ had been involved in "overseeing, preparing, and planning" as many as twenty-five suicide bombings throughout Iraq in 2003. Although he agreed that the United States, the Kurdish factions, and the Iraqi security forces were enemies, Zarqawi argued that it was most important to target Shi'a religious, political, and military symbols. This would incite an Iraqi civil war that would force the Sunni population to side with him and keep the Coalition from taking over the country.

(U) **No Civil War Yet**: Zarqawi's plans to mount a sectarian war in Iraq were initially rejected. According to a May 2005 letter by second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda (a Sunni organization) leadership believed a sectarian war in Iraq would antagonize Iran (a Shi'a country). This was not desired at a time where Al Qaeda sought Iran's cooperation against the U.S. Attiyat al-Jaziri, another senior Al Qaeda leader, provided an alternate justification. In a December 2005 letter, he reminded Zarqawi how disastrous the fighting in Algeria had been for the Al Qaeda associated groups Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching (Call) and Combat (GSPC). During the 1990s, the GIA massacred tens of thousands of Algerian civilians, which drove a majority of the population into the arms of the government to the detriment of the Islamists.

(U) According to a Zarqawi statement released in October 2004, JTJ and the Al Qaeda leadership conducted extensive negotiations in the period between Hassan Ghul's capture in January and September 2004. They finally reached an understanding. The primary issue was Al Qaeda's

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

insistence that its associated groups adhere to two rules: maintain an anti-U.S. focus and not worsen intra-Islamic disputes until after the U.S. was defeated. By September, they reached agreement concerning the second rule. Zarqawi's desire to gain bin Ladin's blessing for JTJ was not merely symbolic. It meant access to Al Qaeda's global network of resources, personnel, propaganda, and financing.

~~(S/NF)~~ **Zarqawi and Umar Hadid** While negotiations with Al Qaeda leadership were taking place, JTJ expanded its activities in Fallujah and Ramadi. Although often characterized as foreign terrorists, by 2004 JTJ had recruited enough Iraqi members they now represented a majority of the organization's rank-and-file members.[43] While foreign fighters constituted most of JTJ's leadership, Iraqi *jihadis* also held senior positions within the organization. In addition to Thamir Mubarak Atrouz (mentioned in Chapter 3), by early 2004 Umar Husayn Hadid al-Khurayfawi al-Mahamdi (Umar Hadid) had become one of Zarqawi's most trusted lieutenants and facilitators in the Fallujah area.[44] This allowed Zarqawi to recruit Iraqis into his organization by exploiting mosque connections, family ties, and tribal rifts (in addition to his ruthless command style and robust international support).

~~(S/NF)~~ **The Golden Chain**: The activities of JTJ and other Al Qaeda groups in Anbar were aided by the financial support they received from members of the Golden Chain. The Golden Chain is a global network of radical Islamist businesses, financiers, clerical organizations, and NGOs who support Al Qaeda and associated *jihad*ist movements. Drawing on supporters from Saudi Arabia (Sulayman al-Alwan), the UAE (Salim al-Shamsi) to Jordan (Jamal al-Basha), the UK (Muhammad bin Surur) and the U.S. (Luqman Aleem), these individuals channeled large amounts of money to JTJ and similar organizations in Anbar and throughout Iraq.[45] International Islamist organizations including Hizb al-Tahrir and the International Muslim Brotherhood also raised money for *jihad*ist groups active in Iraq.[46]

~~(S/NF)~~ **The Iraqi Salafists**: Early 2004 saw an increasing Islamization in the insurgency. Existing Iraqi SRE organizations, and in particular Salafist groups, moved to exploit the power vacuum in Anbar left by Saddam Hussein's capture and the decline of the more political and nationalist FRLs. The two earliest manifestations are the rise of Mahdi Sumaydi's Salafi Jihad organization and the Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi Network (see Index of Insurgent groups). Both used or infiltrated existing Sunni religious and political organizations such as AMS and IIP in order to recruit fighters to carry out anti-Coalition attacks.[47]

Approved for Release

---

[43] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30029 | ~~S/NF~~ |]
[44] [| Military | CTC 2004-30132 | | ~~S/NF~~ |]
[45] [| b 3 50 USC 3507 | IRAQ: VAST, DISPERSED NETWORKS FUNDING JIHAD | 20040122 | ~~S/NF~~ |] The Golden Chain is a term used to describe the international network of organizations and individuals that support Al Qaeda's global jihad against the United States.
[46] Ibid.
[47] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30052 | ~~S/NF~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ These Salafist groups formed in 2003. They had operated primarily as clandestine organizations and hadn't taken an active role in conducting attacks on Coalition forces.[48] Salafi *Jihad* was the larger of the two, with an estimated 3,000 followers in Kirkuk, Baghdad, Mosul, and Fallujah.[49] Following the January 2004 detention of Mahdi Sumaydi, Salafi Jihad's military leader Abd al-Jabbar al-Habuth al-Saidi (Abu Rukiya) took control of the group, allying it closely with Jaysh Mohammed and Zarqawi. Abu Mohammad al-Adnani's Secret Islamic Army formed as a result of the latter alliance. Secret Islamic Army acted as an umbrella organization to facilitate cooperation between Salafi Jihad and Zarqawi.[50]

(U) **MAHDI SUMAYDI.** The self-proclaimed "Amir al-Salafi" in Iraq, Sumaydi founded the Tamil al-Qur'an Salafist secret society in the al-Yusufiyah neighborhood of Baghdad in early 2001. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, he formed the Salafi Jihad organization to fight the Coalition and was detained as a result from January to November 2004.

~~(S/NF)~~ **ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-NAQSHBANDI.** An Iraqi Salafist leader, he issued a *fatwa* in October 2003 calling for jihad against Coalition forces. He married the widow of a Naqshbandi Sufi leader and adopted her name in order to conceal his Salafist views. He operated throughout Anbar and served as one of the most prominent Iraqi Salafist leaders within the insurgency in early 2004.

~~(S/NF)~~ Salafi Jihad's greatest asset in Anbar lay in the ability to use Sumaydi's name and self-declared title. This title, Amir al-Salafi ("Commander of the Salafi"), helped attract funding from Salafist movements in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Morocco, and Egypt. Salafi Jihad also received funding from Lebanon-based Al Qaeda leader Muhammad Salim and even the Secretary General of the Arab Nationalist Movement in Lebanon, Ma'an Bashur.[51] This foreign funding enabled Salafi Jihad to enhance its influence in Anbar far beyond its actual size by actively financing a variety of FRE and SRE groups.[52]

~~(S/NF)~~ **Networks**: As with Salafi Jihad, the Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi Network was also aligned with Jaysh Mohammed and other FRE organizations.[53] Believed to possess up to 1,000 members, Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi Network was made up largely of former Iraqi soldiers and intelligence officials who had made a sincere conversion to Salafism following the fall of the Iraqi regime.[54] Adil al-Hadithi, an associate of AMS leader Harith al-Dhari, served as head of the organization's military wing. He was one of the main organizers of Earthquake. This operation, which was planned for December 2003 but not executed, was to involve a massive, coordinated FRE and FRL attack against Coalition forces.[55] This is significant, as it further demonstrates the

Approved for Release

[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid. The attack failed to occur.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

degree of cooperation and cohesion that already existed between FRL, FRE, and SRE groups following the capture of Saddam, a trend that would only intensify throughout 2004.

The Consolidation of FREs

~~(S/NF)~~ Larger FRE organizations such as Jaysh Muhammad and its Saraya al-Jihad subsidiary group had already been active in Anbar at the provincial level in 2003 (as "false flag" FRL/FRE organizations that used religious rhetoric to gain popular support).

> (U) **A "FALSE FLAG" OPERATION** is one where a person or organization pretends to be something else, to cover its real identity and/or to create an appeal or blame based on different motivations. False flag operations are also used to enlist persons to learn their political or religious orientation.

~~(S/NF)~~ By 2004 these groups abandoned their earlier allegiance to Sunni Arab nationalism.[56] Though Anbar was not a hotbed of *wahabbism*, the religious rhetoric, adopted by IIS mid-level officers as a means to enlist Anbaris, was slowly embraced by many insurgents at nearly every level. As its more secular leaders were detained or killed by the Coalition's attacks in early 2004, Jaysh Mohammed expanded its existing alliance with Iraqi Salafist insurgent groups led by Mahdi Sumaydi and Sheikh Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi.[57] These alliances radicalized Jaysh Mohammed (JM) and Saraya al-Jihad (SAJ), leading to their gradual adoption of a religious-extremist agenda and sectarian worldview during 2004 was unthinkable earlier.[58]

~~(S/NF)~~ **The Saraya al-Jihad Group**: For Saraya al-Jihad this radicalization happened quickly as it adopted a variant of Al Qaeda's global *jihad* worldview.[59] Its rapid radicalization can be explained in two ways: 1) it maintained formal and informal cooperation with several radical groups and 2) its Mosul-based leader Abu Haditha fell under the influence of Ansar al-Sunna and JTJ in early 2004.

> (U) **AL QAEDA'S GLOBAL JIHAD**. Before 2001, most jihadist groups were motivated by a belief in jihad aimed at overthrowing local leaders, killing local Shi'a or other "apostates," expelling occupiers of Islamic lands, and/or creating an Islamic state in their own country. In the early 1990s, Al Qaeda's leadership argued that the United States should be the sole focus of jihad, because it was the source of all evil in the world (the "greater unbelief") and because expelling it from Islamic lands was the easiest way to accomplish the other objectives of jihadist groups around the world. Since 2001, Al Qaeda has worked to unite other jihadist groups in this global jihad against the United States.

~~(S/NF)~~ Though originally set up as a subsidiary of Jaysh Mohammed (a nationalist *jihad*ist organization), SAJ's key individuals had pre-OIF ties to Al Qaeda and Ansar al-Sunna's parent organization Ansar al-Islam (AI).

---

[56] [| Military | CJSOTF: INTSUMS: ORGANIZATIONS WITH IRAQ: KEY REPORTING | 2003 0527 to 17 July 20030717 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | JISE: 318-230-0329 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[57] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30052 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[58] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30002 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[59] [| Military | JITF-CT: ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI NETWORK: MOSUL, IZ NETWORK PRESENCE | 20050107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ **ANSAR AL-SUNNA AND ANSAR AL-ISLAM.** After the defeat of Ansar al-Islam in 2003, the survivors of the group who escaped into Iran split into several organizations, the largest of which joined Abu Abdullah al-Shafei to form Ansar al-Sunna. While Ansar al-Sunna cooperated with JTJ and later AQI, al-Shafei blamed Zarqawi for the loss of Ansar al-Islam's base in northern Iraq and refused to accept his authority, sending his own reports to the Al Qaeda leadership that were heavily critical of Zarqawi.

~~(S/NF)~~ **The 1920 Revolution Brigade**: Other FREs grew from small local organizations in 2003 to major players in 2004. The best example is the 1920 Revolution Brigade (Kata'ib Thawrat al-Ishrin).[60] The 1920 Revolution Brigade was formed in July 2003 by Sheikh Muhammad al-Kubaysi (known within the group as Sheikh Abu al-Habib al-Dhahir) and his aides General Hamid Sha'ban and Major General Hamid Mahmud al-Abid. They formed the 1920 Revolution Brigade in response to a fatwa issued in the summer of 2003 by AMS leader Harith al-Dhari. This fatwa called for the Zobai tribe and the Sunni Arab al-Jibur areas of Nineveh, Diyala, and Anbar to form an umbrella Sunni insurgent organization to fight the Coalition. By early 2004, the 1920 Revolution Brigade was still organized along tribal lines, but it had become a national organization, with five regional commands across Iraq. Each region was reportedly led by a former colonel answering to a leadership council of twenty-five tribal leaders.[61] Using the National Islamic Resistance as its political wing and the Islamic Response Movement as its internal security wing, the 1920 Revolution Brigade had established itself in the Fallujah and Ramadi areas of Anbar by early 2004 and formed a loose tactical alliance with JTJ for their mutual benefit.[62]

~~(S/NF)~~ **The Islamic Army of Iraq**: Another major group to emerge in early 2004 was the Islamic Army of Iraq. Islamic Army of Iraq was an umbrella organization for local and regional FRE groups such as the Khaled bin Walid Corps and the Mujahideen Brigades.[63] The group gained a great deal of notoriety in Anbar by kidnapping foreign nationals and contractors. They either killed their captives for political reasons or ransomed them for large sums of money that could be used to support the insurgency.[64]

Further Islamization of the Insurgency

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The movement toward Islam was part of a larger phenomenon. Saddam's capture, the discrediting of Ba'athist secular and nationalist ideology, effects of the Faith Campaign, and an influx of Wahhabi/Salafist preachers resulted in changing motivations, with an Islamization and radicalism expressed in six different ways:

1. Implementation of *shari'a*, especially the *hadd* punishments;

Approved for Release

---

[60] [| Military | US CENTRAL COMMAND: 1920 REVOLUTION BRIGADE (KATA'IB THAWRAT AL ISHRIN) | 20060110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[61] Ibid.
[62] [| Military | DIIR IMEF THT204 0002 05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] (Date based on interview with (b)(3), (b)(6))
[63] [| Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR : INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | Slides 8&9 (No sources listed.)
[64] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) **HADD (PL. HUDUD)** literally, "limits," are the punishments specified in the Qur'an for five different sins: adultery (execution or beating), apostasy (execution), stealing (cutting off of the left hand), murder (beheading) and intoxication (beating). Jihadists as well as radical Islamists believe that the *hudud* must be applied in order to practice Islam correctly.

2. Inclusion of clergy in insurgent leadership and decision-making (through the issuing of fatwas that the groups saw as binding);
3. New emphasis on creating an Islamic state (the Caliphate);
4. Establishment of a shura council;
5. Creation of committees to promote virtue and prevent vice;

(U) **COMMITTEES TO PROMOTE VIRTUE AND PREVENT VICE.** Radical Islamist groups believe they must implement *shari'a* on any territory they control. To ensure all citizens will follow *shari'a*, most Islamists create an institution to enforce Islamic law through beatings, public humiliation or even executions. This organization, traditionally named the "hisba," is usually called by modern Islamists "The Committee to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice," from a Qur'anic verse that calls Muslims true believers only when they promote virtue and prevent vice ("*al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar.*").

6. Belief in a Jewish-led American global conspiracy against Islam and the need to defeat it in Iraq through jihad

~~(S/NF)~~ By early 2004, a plurality of the 57 verified insurgent groups active in Anbar (including many FRE organizations), had not only adopted Islamic rhetoric but had become at least to some degree Islamist.[65] While this did not immediately translate into support for the more radical positions of Salafism or Zarqawi's agenda, it did make many insurgent groups and rank-and-file insurgents more likely to accept these positions as legitimate.

~~(S/NF)~~ The "Islamization" of the insurgency coincided with the rise of Salafist clerics such as Mahdi Sumaydi and Sheikh Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi, in addition to AMS. They provided ideological, and in some cases operational, leadership for insurgent groups. Previously, prominent to mid-level political and military officials from the former regime filled such positions.[66] In 2003, pro-insurgent members of Anbar 's Sunni clergy limited their support to sermons and other public statements. By early 2004, some insurgent organizations enlisted Salafist and other Islamist clerics to assist them in finding religious justifications for their actions and to help in an active operational capacity. This involvement did not reflect the majority of Anbari clerics. Most were "on the fence" regarding whether or not to actively support the insurgency.
(U) The Islamization of the Iraqi insurgency should not be confused with an adoption or acceptance of Al Qaeda's ideology. Insurgents came to view their activities from an Islamist (rather than nationalist) perspective. They saw supporters of the Coalition as apostates instead of collaborators. They viewed the Shi'a as heretics. And, they believed the Coalition's actions occurred within the

Approved for Release

[65] [| Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR : INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | Slide 1 (No sources listed.) |]
[66] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

context of a global conspiracy against Islam. However, in an overwhelming majority of cases, this did not translate into support for Al Qaeda or its tactics (particularly the use of suicide bombers) or Zarqawi's strategy to trigger sectarian war and eradicate the Shi'a. Even within Al Qaeda, Zarqawi was regarded as an extremist and sectarian. This became an issue of contention and negotiation between Zarqawi and the Al Qaeda leadership when he sought to serve as their representative in Iraq.

Snapshot: The Insurgency January-March 2004

~~(S/NF)~~ During early 2004, there was far more religious content in the insurgency's propaganda and motivation. The once clear lines between Arab nationalist and Salafist or Wahhabi groups began to blur. With the splintering of FRL organizations that followed the capture of Saddam Hussein, many former FRLs joined or supported new groups with Islamic or even Islamist ideologies (such as the Islamic Army of Iraq). Other FRL groups, such as those loyal to Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, began providing support to "mixed" FRE/SRE groups. FRE groups like the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh Muhammad also became more religious in their propaganda and justifications for attacks. They adopted the advice and counsel of the 'ulama'. And, they cooperated tactically with SRE and Al Qaeda affiliated groups such as JTJ through a mixture of funding, and joint participation in criminal endeavors.

(U) The emergence of JTJ and Zarqawi as major players in the insurgency underlined this turn toward a more extremist Islamist agenda. Although he had only carried out a few spectacular attacks, Zarqawi's anti-Shi'a orientation found wide appeal in Anbar. Like Zarqawi, the province had always viewed the Shi'a with suspicion and disdain. Zarqawi's negotiations with Al Qaeda would soon yield an agreement that would allow funding and support from the global *jihad* to flow freely to JTJ with two signification consequences. First, Iraq became a central part of Al Qaeda's strategic vision. Second, Zarqawi's targeting of the Shi'a became associated with Al Qaeda, leading eventually to a tarnishing of Bin Ladin's image in the Islamic world because he was seen as killing other Muslims (whereas he desires to be seen as defending Muslims against the 'evil' West).

(U) Anbar seemed quiet during this period with fewer attacks against the Coalition. The decrease in attacks can mostly be explained by a lowered Coalition presence and the withdrawal of the 82nd Airborne Division to bases outside the cities.

(U) Reconstruction and stabilization efforts progressed. Still, the continuing violence in Ramadi and Fallujah indicated that all was not well in this Sunni stronghold. In retrospect, the rapidly changing nature of the insurgency makes clear that the quiet on the surface hid the action taking place below.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE (March - April 2004)

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Fallujah was experiencing a high degree of violence and intimidation. By the end of 2003, the insurgency had developed into a sophisticated network of groups, adept at raising money, recruiting young men, training would-be *jihadis*, and carrying out attacks against the Coalition. Numerous arms dealers made it easy for insurgents to acquire weapons. Moreover, the many FRE explosives experts continued to refine their techniques.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The result was a series of attacks on the Coalition as well as everyday violence that escalated throughout early 2004. On January 6, two French nationals were shot and killed after their car broke down in Fallujah. This was followed on February 12 by an attack on the convoy carrying General John Abizaid. Two days later an organized raid by twenty-five insurgents on a police station killed twenty-three Iraqis who collaborated with the Coalition.[67] The first three months of 2004 saw IED attacks of new sophistication, including increased use of remote detonation (especially with cell phones), concealment in concrete or trash, the inclusion of shrapnel with the explosives[68] and secondary charges. [69]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Insurgents also began to impose their religious ideas on the citizens of Fallujah. They insisted everyone follow their version of Islamic law (*shari'a*), punishing people who refused to comply. Thus there would be no pornography, alcohol, smoking, immodest dress by women or long hair for men. Those who violated these norms were publicly beaten or even killed. Businessmen and merchants received threats if they did not provide basic staples at a "fair" price. These were not idle threats. Businesses that violated the new rules were vandalized or destroyed.[70]

Prelude to Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE

~~(S/NF)~~ **Death of Blackwater Contractors**: The surge in violence reached a tipping point on March 31, 2004. Albu Eissa tribesmen from Islamic Army of Iraq murdered four American Blackwater contractors. International TV (with sources among the insurgents) broadcast video images of their bodies being burnt and mutilated.[71] As noted in Chapter 3, following the detention of Sheikh Barakat Albu Eissa in September 2003, his followers had threatened to target Coalition contractors in Fallujah.[72] This attack made good on that threat. In response to the attack, the Coalition initiated Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. The operation's mission was to deny the insurgency a sanctuary in Fallujah and apprehend those responsible for the murder of American civilians.

Approved for Release

---

[67] [| Open Source | All taken from the Guardian |]
[68] [| Military | 09JANMCFI | 2004 0109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; [| Military | : 14JANMCFI | 2004 0114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; [| Military | 24JANNOFORN | 2004 0124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 15FEBNOFORN | 2004 0115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[69] [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET05 0195 05 |]
[70] [| Military | IMEF HET05: DIIR 0195 05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[71] [| Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR : INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] Slide 9 (No sources listed.)
[72] [| Open Source | INTERVIEW: b 3, b 6 US ARMY, TRIBAL ADVISOR TO CPA | 200610xx | (U) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The Coalition faced groups spanning the full range of the insurgency, from Al Qaeda to SRE, FRE, and FRL organizations. The ease with which these groups were able to operate in Fallujah was due to cooperation with local tribesmen. Tribesmen were generally anti-Coalition in outlook and supportive of the insurgency, though they preferred that violence not affect their own territory.[73] The Ba'athist and IIS remnants of Khamis Sirhan's network were also active in the city and receiving financial support from the surviving members of Saddam's inner circle.[74]

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ **Three Insurgent Groups in Fallujah**: There were, in fact, three large insurgent networks in Fallujah in April 2003. They were:

- FREs and Hizb al-'Awda members from Khamis Sirhan's organization. This network included former Ba'athists, soldiers, and IIS officers led by Fallujah Ba'ath Party leader Nuri Zbar al-Munajit.[75]

- SRE Yasin Hamudi Asaf Group. This network included Fallujah Islamists working closely with foreign fighters in the city.[76]

- The third and largest network was an FRE group led by Brigadier General Ali Daud Sulayman Nayil al-Khalifawi, who maintained ties to Zarqawi and Sheikh Abdullah Janabi.[77]

~~(S/NF)~~ While it would be a mistake to regard any one individual as being the center of the Fallujah insurgency, Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi had assumed the role of general organizer and coordinator.[78] In this role, he drew on his connections to Al Qaeda, JTJ, Ansar al-Sunna, AMS, Jaysh Mohammed, and less prominent FRE and SRE insurgent groups in the city. Janabi (aided by his lieutenant Dafir al-Ubaydi al-Baqiri, better known as Sheikh Dafir) played the most prominent role in Fallujah. Janabi's prominence continued as he later became, in a sense, the grey eminence within the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura serving as its political face.[79]

The Battle[80]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Following the brutal murder of four Coalition contractors by the Fallujah insurgents, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, and CPA Ambassador Paul Bremer decided that a military response was needed to deny the

Approved for Release

---

[73] Ibid.
[74] [| (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | IRAQ: POWER VACUUM AIDED INSURGENTS IN AL FALLUJAH | 20040402 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[75] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30007 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] [| Military | SHEIKH ABDULLAH AL JANABI - BST RALEIGH HVT #2 | 20040801 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[79] Ibid.
[80] [| Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH I | 200404xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; and, Bing West

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

insurgents a sanctuary and to arrest those responsible for the murder of civilian contractors. On April 4, elements of the I MEF launched their offensive into the city. Operation VIGILANTE RESOLVE had begun.

(U) Prior to the beginning of VIGILANT RESOLVE, RCT-1 of the First Marine Division set up a traffic control cordon around Fallujah to isolate the city's insurgent forces and prevent their escape. While food and medical supplies were allowed into the city, only women, children, and old men were allowed to leave. Other Coalition units conducted operations in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Karmah, and northern Babil to prevent outside insurgent groups from aiding Fallujah. Civilians were repeatedly warned to evacuate the city.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ **Marine Units Attack**: On April 4th, the attack began. 2,000 troops, mostly infantry, from two battalion task forces from RCT-1 assaulted Fallujah. They were supported by ten M1A1 tanks, twenty-four AAVP-7 amphibious tractors, and a battery of M198 howitzers. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1) attacked the Jolan district. 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (1/5) attacked the industrial Shuhidah district. The Coalition plan was to trap the insurgent force between these two pincers. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment (2/2) provided a screening force to the south. On April 13, 4th Light Armored Infantry Battalion attacked from the west. Air support included Marine Corps rotary-wing aircraft and AC-130s (particularly feared by the insurgents, with the mere appearance of AC-130s discouraging most of their movement at night).

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Roughly 2,000 Iraqi soldiers and police were deployed in support. Many, however, deserted soon after the fighting began. This forced some Marine units to reposition to maintain the cordon around the city. For instance, of 700 Iraqi soldiers from the 2nd New Iraqi Army Battalion, 38% deserted after coming under fire on April 5 while moving to Fallujah. An exception was the 400 Iraqis from the 36th Iraqi National Guard Battalion that together with seventeen Special Forces advisors took part in the fighting in Jolan.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ After two days of fighting, 2/1 had penetrated into northeastern Jolan and 1/5 had seized a stronghold in the southeastern Shuhidah district that would serve as a staging ground for patrols deeper into Fallujah. These patrols began to push up against the south side of Highway 10 almost immediately.

Insurgent Strength in Fallujah

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The enemy was, on the surface at least, an impressive one. Insurgent forces in Fallujah numbered 500-1,000. They possessed small arms, RPGs, machine guns, IEDs, and mortars. Operating in small teams and conducting hit-and-run attacks, insurgents moved from building to building as they fell back on pre-positioned weapon and supply caches. In addition, insurgents had hardened certain areas of the city with barriers, dug-in positions and traps designed to kill Coalition forces as they advanced.

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi served as de facto commander of the Fallujah insurgents. He, along with fellow cleric Dafir al-Ubaydi, spent the battle encouraging residents to fight. Zarqawi

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

personally oversaw the defense of 5-10% of the city with one hundred foreign fighters while his deputy Umar Hadid led the Iraqi JTJ fighters in the city. Other insurgent leaders active in Fallujah were former Republican Guard (RG) or Special Republican Guard (SRG) commanders, Islamic Army of Iraq leaders, and prominent members of the Mohamdi tribe.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Some higher-ranking insurgent leaders, financiers, and facilitators fled Fallujah prior to the attack, leaving lower-level figures to conduct the fighting.

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ Mosques served as local insurgent command centers with the al-Hadhra al-Muhammadiya mosque the primary command and control center for Janabi and his followers. In most cases, the city's defenses were organized by armed groups of young men tied to local mosques.
~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ There was no city-wide central command responsible for coordinating the activities of Fallujah's fighters. While an organization akin to the later Fallujah Mujahideen Shura existed, it was still informal and ill-defined. A limited amount of operational planning – such as assigning defensive zones to major groups, setting up observation posts, and pre-registering mortars – took place. Once the fighting began, command and control became chaotic and decentralized with many insurgent cells acting autonomously.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Yet it would be false to claim that no command and control existed. Some cells had a clear chain of command, issued written orders, set up observation points, and used organized scouts on motorcycles. Others simply ran towards the nearest sounds of fighting, relying on smoke and fire as reference points for their RPGs and machine guns.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The insurgents generally employed a dispersed, nonlinear defense in depth, although there were some tactical advances by small mobile combat cells. These mobile combat cells carried out hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and standoff attacks using mortars and IEDs. They did not attempt to defend, nor did the Marines attempt to clear every house in a given area. Most insurgents moved in groups of 5-10 as they ran forward, opened fire, and then retreated back into the alleys.

External Support for Fallujah Insurgents

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The Fallujah insurgents were not acting alone. They received support from other networks in Ramadi, Saqlawiyah, Amariyah, and Karmah. As a result, when VIGILANT RESOLVE began, allied insurgents attempted to surge their activities to stretch Coalition forces. They hoped this would allow Fallujah's insurgents to hold their ground. These allied insurgents set up roadblocks, IEDs, and ambushes along key Coalition lines of communication with the intent of interdicting supply convoys and patrols. They also attempted to destroy key bridges, including the Thar Thar canal crossing.

~~(S)~~ Anbar was no longer the quiet province of January through March 2004. Fighting also took place in Husaybah, which like Fallujah had served as an insurgent staging area prior to the beginning of

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

VIGILANT RESOLVE. During this fighting, the Coalition clashed with the entire pro-insurgent Husaybah police department.[81]

~~(C/NF)~~ The fighting in Anbar included large-scale attacks. Some numbered more than one hundred fighters, including those mounted by FREs and Ansar al-Sunna in Ramadi, Qusaybah, and Karmah. Insurgents apparently used the fighting in Fallujah as their model.[82]

~~(S/NF)~~ Al-Qa'im-based Omar al-Mukhtar leader Juma Hamid Khalaf al-Mahalawi traveled to Ramadi with 40-60 fighters to support the Fallujah insurgents.[83] Other leaders in al-Qa'im, Mosul, Kirkuk, Tarmiyah, Tikrit, Sharqat, and Hillah all sent fighters and supplies to Fallujah.[84]
~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ During Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, some allied insurgents were able to move with ease and remained able to enter Fallujah. They infiltrated through the Marine cordon using back roads and hidden trails not blocked by Coalition forces, smuggled weapons and contraband into the city as humanitarian supplies, and relied on bribes or collaborators within the Iraqi police forces.[85]

~~(S/NF)~~ **Shi'a Support for Sunnis in Fallujah**: The Coalition attack on Fallujah stimulated Shi'a support for the Anbari Sunni. Even Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army provided support. By early April 2004, liaison had been established between the Fallujah insurgents and the Mahdi Army. This offered a loose framework for cooperation despite the obvious sectarian differences.[86] In mid-April, Sadr sent weapons, supplies, and even some fighters to Fallujah under the cover of providing humanitarian aid.[87]

Political Pressure and the End of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE[88]

(U) Political pressure for a halt to Coalition military operations in Fallujah swiftly built. Key reasons included the following:

- Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army began attacking Coalition forces on April 2
- The closure of his *Hawza* newspaper and arrest of a top aide
- Al-Sadr's uprising put added pressure on the Coalition

Approved for Release

---

[81] [| Military | CARTER MALKASIAN: I MEF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, MARCH – APRIL 2004 | 20040822 | (U) | Malkasian is a Center for Naval Anal sis field re resentative attached to I MEF in 2004-2005.
[82] [| b 3 50 USC 3507 IRAQ: MORE INSURGENT ATTACKS ON URBAN AREAS, BASES | 20040518 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[83] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[84] Ibid.
[85] [| Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[86] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30014 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[87] Ibid.
[88] [| Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

- Cooperating insurgent cells began escalating attacks in other parts of Anbar, particularly in Ramadi where 12 Marines were killed on April 6 alone
- There was pressure from the British government for a halt to the attack on Fallujah
- The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal became public knowledge in late April 2004, causing widespread anger against the U.S. throughout the Arab and Muslim world
- Al-Jazeera claimed 600 Iraqi civilians had been killed by the Coalition in Fallujah, broadcasting images of dead children across the Arab world
- The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) began to unravel. Three members quit and five threatened to quit. This prompted an April 8 meeting with Ambassador Bremer to discuss Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. Sunni politicians considered the attack on Fallujah to be collective punishment and argued that mass demonstrations were about to occur.

(U) As a result of this pressure, on April 9 the CPA prevailed on General Abizaid to order a halt to offensive ground operations in Fallujah. Despite this, fighting in the city continued, with occasional lulls in the fighting. Although insurgents remained in their defensive positions and did not launch head-on assaults, insurgent mortar attacks remained common, as did minor Coalition maneuvers. Air strikes continued and snipers on both sides made movement through the city hazardous.

(U) Over the next several weeks, Fallujahn sheikhs loyal to Harith al-Dhari's AMS and other local leaders met with CPA, IGC and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) representatives to negotiate conditions for a permanent cease-fire. The U.S. National Command Authority pressed for options other than a return to fighting. On April 30, I MEF and CJTF[1.4a]ended their operations and turned control over to the newly-created Fallujah Brigade. Commanded by former Ba'athist officers, the brigade was a Sunni militia consisting primarily of "former" insurgents. Its effect on the security situation in Fallujah was minimal.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ After twenty-six days of fighting in Fallujah, eighteen Marines were dead and ninety-six wounded. I MEF estimated 600-700 insurgents were killed and an unknown number wounded. In addition, 150 air strikes had destroyed seventy-five buildings including two mosques.

Aftermath of Operation Vigilant Resolve (May 2004)

~~(S/NF)~~ In the aftermath, insurgent networks and organizations based in Fallujah gained prestige and influence in Anbar. In both internal correspondence and public propaganda, insurgent leaders believed they had defeated the Coalition through their superior resolve. They also believed Fallujah's example could be replicated throughout the province.[89]

~~(S/NF)~~ Renewed insurgent cooperation soon followed across much of Anbar. Many smaller organizations merged into larger groups or umbrella organizations. The intent was to reduce

[89] [| (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | IRAQ: MORE INSURGENT ATTACKS ON URBAN AREAS, BASES | 20040518 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

infighting and conflicting goals.[90] An example of this can be seen in the creation of the Fallujah Resistance Brigade (different organization than the above mentioned Fallujah Brigade), which combined the 1920 Revolution Brigade, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin Brigades, and the *Jihad* Brigades of Imam Ali bin Abi Taleb into a single organization.[91]

The Fallujah Mujahideen Shura (FMS)

~~(S/NF)~~ Efforts to reduce internal conflict and improve command and control led to the formation of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura.[92] Fallujah Mujahideen Shura improved the organization and coordination of insurgent groups not only in Fallujah but across Anbar. The Fallujah Mujahideen Shura had no clearly identified leader. Instead it relied on the consensus of various insurgent leaders.[93] The absence of a single leader enabled the most extreme elements of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, such as JTJ, to further radicalize the rest of the Fallujah insurgency and turn the city into a magnet for foreign fighters.[94]

> (U) **IJMA' (CONSENSUS).** For many Islamic cultures consensus is seen as the best way to determine correct action while minimizing conflict within the community. In Islamic law, the *ijma'* of the 'ulama' is one of the traditional methods for interpreting the Qur'an and hadith and thus for establishing the tenets of Islamic law and norms for pious Islamic behavior. Sunnis are more prone to seek consensus among leaders and people; whereas Shi'a tend to rely on their religious hierarchy for guidance. (See Appendix A for more on Sunni-Shi'a differences and similarities.)

~~(S/NF)~~ The two dominant figures in the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura were Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi and Umar Hadid. Other, less influential members within the city included Zarqawi, Sheikh Dafir al-Ubaydi, Sheikh Jamal Nazzal, Sheikh Barakat Albu Eissa, Sheikh Hikmat al-Muhamdi, Sheikh Khalid Hamud al-Jumayli, Ismail al-Jumayli, General Khalaf al-Ulayan, Dr. Mahmud al-Mashadani, Dr. Fakhri al-Qaysi, Abd al-Nasir, and Colonel Hatim Karim Mandib al-Falahi.[95, 96] Fallujah Mayor Ibrahim Juasi al-Muhamdi had no influence among Fallujah Mujahideen Shura or the general population of the city, who believed him to be a homosexual.[97]

---

[90] [| Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR : INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] Slide 2 (No sources listed.)
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.
[95] [| Military | I MEF GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, PERIOD COVERED 0000 24 FEBRUARY 2005 THROUGH 2359 | 20050224 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[96] [| Military |TFC INTREP # 05-008 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[97] [| Military | CJSOTF-AP: INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY #393 - 29 MAY 2004 | 20040529 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
The groups were: Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi's Munadhamat Mujahideen Al Fallujah (MMAF), Mujahideen Front (MF); Zarqawi's JTJ, led in Fallujah by Umar Hadid; National Front for the Liberation of Iraq (NFLI), led by secular and religious RG FREs; Ansar al-Sunna led by Abu Abdallah al-Hasan bin Mahmud; Tanzim al Qari'ah (TQ), which collaborated with Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh Mohammed; 1920 Revolution Brigade, along with its security wing Islamic Response Movement (IRM); Armed Islamic Group of Al Qaeda , Fallujah branch led by Abu Iyad; AI; Saraya al-Mujahideen Brigades (SMB); Abd al-Rahman al-Naqishbandi Network, led by Sheikh Jamal Nazzal; Jihad Brigades of Imam Ali bin Abi Taleb (JBIAAT); Islamic Army of Iraq, along with its associate faction Khaled bin al-Waleed Corps; Saraya al-Jihad, led by Riyadh Matloub (Abu Abdallah); Islamic Jihad Battalions (IJB), led by high-ranking IIS and RG

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The FMS's diverse character is evidenced by the 39 insurgent groups active in Fallujah (and represented to some degree by Fallujah Mujahideen Shura). Members ranged from Al Qaeda-affiliated groups (including foreign organizations) and other SREs to FREs and the remnants of FRLs.[98] Some groups had as few as fifty fighters (MAU). Others had as many as several thousand (MF or JTJ.)[99] Nor were they all Sunni organizations. The names of two (JBIAAT and LI) appear to indicate the presence of Shi'a groups in Fallujah. This may indicate the continued informal cooperation between the Fallujah insurgents and Muqtada al-Sadr.[100] Cooperation was reciprocal: as fighting intensified between al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and Coalition forces in southern Iraq, Fallujah Mujahideen Shura sent heavy arms, ammunition, and fighters from Fallujah, Khalidiyah, and Ramadi to assist al-Sadr's forces in An Najaf.[101]

The Role of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS)

~~(S/NF)~~ The AMS greatly enhanced its prestige by brokering the ceasefire negotiations in Fallujah. The AMS negotiated with the Iraqi Government and the Coalition, acting as an intermediary. The group's representatives provided and guaranteed safe passage for the Government and Coalition negotiators. This brought AMS closer to its goal of being the Sunni community's main voice in Iraq.[102] Its outspoken opposition to the Coalition appealed to many Anbaris, while the fact it stopped just short of calling for violence enabled AMS to "have its cake and eat it too." AMS successfully exploited Anbari support for the insurgency while not being associated with any of its losses or atrocities.[103] The much smaller Iraqi National Unity Movement (INUM), led by UAE-based insurgent financier Ahmed Kubaysi (to be distinguished from the IIP leader of the same name), gained a lesser degree of prominence through much the same means.[104]

Foreign Fighters

~~(S/NF)~~ Not all groups active in Fallujah were Iraqi in origin. As many as 75 members of Palestinian HAMAS traveled to Fallujah through Syria in March 2003 to fight the Coalition. They made up the

---

officers and closely allied with JTJ; Muhammad Messenger of God Forces (MMGF); Ta'if al-Mansura and its foreign fighter wing Martyr Khattab Brigade (MKB); Mohammadi Jihad Brigades (MJB); Salafist Group for Call and Combat, an Algerian Al Qaeda associate group; Fallujah Protective Army, led by an FRE general; Sheikh Ahmad Yassin Brigades (SAYB); Hamza Faction (HF); Iraqi National Islamic Resistance (INIR); Iraqi Islamic Patriotic Resistance (IIPR); Awakening and Holy War (AHW); Allahu Akbar Mujahideen (AAM); Harakat Ahbab al-Rasul (HAR); Jaysh Mohammed; Majmuat Abu Ulayan (MAU), led by Abu Ulayan; Usud al-Islam al-Mujahideen (UIM); Lajnat al-Iman (LI); Islamic Anger Brigades (IAB).| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

[98] [| Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR : INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] Slide 6 (No sources listed.)
[99] Ibid.
[100] [| Military | OIA SF 2004-30014 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[101] Ibid. and [| Militar | OIA SF 2004-30022 | ~~S/NF~~ |]
[102] [| (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 IRAQ: ANTI-COALITION SUNNIS MAY FILL POLITICAL VOID | 20040513 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

core of the Sheikh Ahmed Yassin Brigade (SAYB), named in honor of their group's founder.[105] Ten of the 35 members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) were active in Fallujah. They served as military advisors to several of the larger insurgent groups.[106] The Algerian Group for Preaching (Call) and Combat (GSPC), whose leader had publicly pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in the fall of 2003, had been sending GSPC and other North African Islamist fighters to Iraq via Syria to support Zarqawi since April 2003.[107] By May 2004, enough of them were active in Fallujah to form their own organization, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad bil-Maghrib (JTJM). Later, JTJM would remain an Al Qaeda associate group subordinate to Zarqawi, presenting a security threat in North Africa in 2005.[108]

~~(S/NF)~~ A network of more than fifty professional smugglers, some experienced at circumventing UN sanctions under the former regime, facilitated the arrival of foreign fighters to Iraq and Anbar.[109]

The Fallujah Brigade

~~(S/NF)~~ During ceasefire negotiations, Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi and Sheikh Dafir al-Ubaydi sought to name General Jassim Mohammed Saleh as commander of the Fallujah Brigade. They were upset by the decision to instead name General Mohammed Latif commander because Latif was seen as less amicable to Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi than Saleh. This was due to Saleh's ties to the insurgency.[110] As the Brigade formed, Janabi met with Saleh and Latif, using his influence in the city to force them to accept the inclusion of 300-350 FRE and SRE insurgents into the 2,100-strong Fallujah Brigade.[111] He also had Fallujah Brigade officers fired if they were not insurgents.[112] After the Brigade's formal establishment, Janabi informed foreign fighters and other insurgents he would no longer support activities against the Brigade because it was made up of native Fallujahns.[113] General Latif and General Saleh deferred to Janabi. They consulted with him prior to major decisions or activities in the city.[114] On May 24, General Latif relinquished command to General Abdullah al-Muhammadi, who had been Janabi's second choice to lead the Fallujah Brigade after Saleh.[115]

Approved for Release

---

[105] [| b 3 50 USC 3507 | IRAQ: SOME PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS JOINING INSURGENCY | 2004 0520 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[106] Ibid.
[107] [| Open Source | WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY /HUNT, EMILY : AL QAIDA 'S NORTH AFRICAN FRANCHISE: THE GSPC REGIONAL THREAT – POLICY WATCH #1034 | (U) |]
[108] [| Open Source | TERRORISM FOCUS, VOLUME 2, ISSUE 23/ ULPH, STEPHEN: AL QAIDA NETWORKS UNCOVERED IN MOROCCO | 20051213 | (U) |]
[109] [| (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | IRAQ: ENTRENCHED REGIONAL FACILITATORS AIDING JIHADIST TRAVEL | 20040710 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[110] [| SHEIKH ABDULLAH JANABI – JANABI PACKAGE POWERPOINT | | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[111] Ibid.
[112] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: POST-FAJR – PRE-ELECTION, 'WHAT'S NEXT?' | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.
[115] [| Military | JICCENT: SPECIAL REPORT 04-033 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The Coalition was divided as to the role and effectiveness of the Fallujah Brigade. Many Marines regarded it as a nepotistic "jobs program" heavily infiltrated by insurgent fighters. The Fallujah Brigade was viewed as an expedient method to encourage law and order in the city after the battle. Other Coalition officials saw it as calming the city's population and recommended the possibility of creating similar units for other cities in Anbar, such as Ramadi.[116]

~~(S/NF)~~ Contrary to the latter view, the Fallujah Brigade did not serve as a serious check on Janabi's ambitions or insurgent activities. *Shari'a* law, implemented even before Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE by some groups, was imposed much more widely. So too were the trappings of an Islamist doctrinaire state.[117] *Muhisba* (religious police, meant to "promote virtue and prevent vice") were established. *Qadi*s (religious judges) were appointed to head up *shari'a* courts. Suspected "traitors" received *Hadd* punishments.[118] In one show trial, Janabi served as *qadi*, convicting and personally executing a civilian outside the al-Hadra Muhamadiya mosque.[119] SREs and foreign fighters loyal to Zarqawi based in the Jolan district increased their movements and activities in the city and soon began manning checkpoints on the outskirts of the town.[120]

(U) The insurgency continued to view the battle as a major victory against the Coalition. With the ceasefire in effect and Fallujah Brigade compromised, insurgents possessed a major base of operations in Anbar from which they could conduct attacks elsewhere in Iraq.

Abu Ghraib Prison

(U) While the battle for Fallujah occurred, another major development began to affect the fortunes of the insurgency. The U.S. military had been investigating claims of maltreatment at the prison in Abu Ghraib since December 2003. A military report issued in January failed to attract attention. When photographs surfaced, however, a scandal over Abu Ghraib erupted on the front pages of newspapers and magazines around the world.

(U) The Abu Ghraib scandal had many consequences. Most important for the insurgency in Anbar was the creation of a cause celebre for the *jihad* in Iraq. *Jihad*ist recruiters used the graphic photographs to convince young Muslim men to join the fight in Iraq, just as they would use their belief that Fallujah was a "victory" to argue for the impending victory of the mujahidin.

The Al-Sadr Uprising

~~(S)~~ **U.S. Focus Shifts to Sadr**: After Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, the Coalition focus shifted to southern Iraq to deal with the Mahdi Army uprising led by the Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

Approved for Release

---

[116] [| IMPACTS OF FALLUJAH ON ROLE OF IRAQ SECURITY FORCES | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[117] [| SHEIKH ABDULLAH JANABI – JANABI PACKAGE POWERPOINT | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.
[120] [| Military | JICCENT | JICCENT: IRAQ: FALLUJAH – CURRENT SITUATION | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) **MUQTADA AL-SADR.** The son of the beloved Shi'a cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada has used his father's legacy and his own charisma to build a popular following among poor urban Shi'a in Iraq, though his lack of clerical credentials have forced him to rely on the Qom-based Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khadhim Husayn al-Haeri for religious authority. He is the leader of the Mahdi Army, a sectarian Shi'a militia made up of his followers that have fought U.S. troops and targeted suspected Sunni insurgents as well as civilians since 2003. Because of his fondness for computer games in his youth he was often called "Mullah Atari". Sadr's father, uncle and brothers were killed by Saddam in the 1980s.

(U) The emergence of Muqtada al-Sadr as a major threat to the Coalition in southern Iraq was another reason why the Coalition shifted its efforts away from Fallujah. Having established a following among the Shi'a slums in Baghdad, Basra, and Kirkuk through his father's social services network, Sadr had been a thorn in the Coalition's side ever since April 2003 when his followers were the suspected perpetrators of the murder of the pro-U.S. Shi'a cleric Majid al-Khoei.[121] Sadr believed that establishing himself as an anti-American Iraqi nationalist would make him an acceptable leader of Iraq for Sunnis as well as Shi'a. He refused to accept the leadership or authority of Grand Ayatollah Sistani and openly challenged the powerful Shi'a factions SCIRI and the Badr Brigade.[122]

(U) Establishing a cult-like following among the urban Shi'a poor, Sadr created his Mahdi Army militia and began fighting the Coalition in April 2004, gaining footholds in Baghdad, Basra, and most notably the holy city of Karbala, where commerce provided by pilgrims' visits to the Shrine of Imam Husayn provided him with the funding to continue his operations.[123]

(U Still oun and inex erienced, without religious training, Sadr allowed himself to be manipulated by 1.4b Lebanese Hezbollah, and even Ahmed Chalabi during the course o s upr s ng.[124] n t e summer of 2004, he violated a truce agreement with Coalition forces and occupied the Shi'a holy city of An Najaf and in particular the Shrine of Imam Ali and the vast necropolis surrounding it. Coalition troops fought pitched battles against the Mahdi Army in An Najaf, eventually reaching the walls of the shrine itself, when Grand Ayatollah Sistani intervened to negotiate a cease-fire. While Sistani regarded Sadr as an enemy and had likely intended for the Coalition to put an end to him, he believed that any damage to the shrine itself would spark a fury of popular outrage that could easily result in the disintegration of Iraq.[125]

(U) Following the cease-fire, Sadr rebuilt the Mahdi Army and began challenging SCIRI's dominance in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a regions of Iraq, demanding that SCIRI and the Coalition stay out of the slum areas that he regarded as being within his sphere of influence.[126] Because of his support for a strong Iraqi state, Sadr allied himself with the Da'wa Party (SCIRI envisioned Iraq as a loose federation made up of strong autonomous regions).[127] SCIRI was most powerful in Basra and

[121] [| Open Source | W. W. NORTON & COMPANY | VALI NASR: THE SHIA REVIVAL: HOW CONFLICTS WITH ISLAM WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE | 2006 | (U) |] p. 190
[122] Ibid., p. 193
[123] Ibid., pp. 191-192
[124] Ibid., p. 191
[125] Ibid., p. 194
[126] Ibid., p. 195
[127] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Nasariya where residents were distrustful of Baghdad, while Sadr had the most influence over Shi'a living in the mixed urban areas of Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Mosul. They feared that the loose confederation envisioned by SCIRI would spell disaster for Shi'a living in the mixed region.[128]

Attack Data (January – April 2004)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (January to April 2004). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The first four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following four charts (small format) show the types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED) arrayed over the 2003-2007 time frame and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. Complex Attack data was not yet available during this period.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was similar to the previous period through the end of February, but in the weeks leading up to and during Fallujah I, the number of attacks increased. The rate of attacks peaked in mid-April, particularly in AO Raleigh, during the height of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. Note that the patterns of Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED incidents closely correlate to the overall attack patterns. Also, the IED data was dominated by incidents in AO Topeka.

Approved for Release

[128] Ibid., pp. 195-196

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Summer Interlude (May – August 2004)

(U) Despite the difficulties in Fallujah, the spring and summer saw two notable triumphs for the Iraq Government. First, in May, Ayad Alawi was appointed prime minister of the Iraqi Interim Government. A moderate Shi'a who believed in a secular vision for Iraq, Alawi's appointment suggested political progress toward the creation of a free, independent and stable Iraq. Second, on June 28 (two days ahead of schedule), Paul Bremer handed over control and sovereignty to Alawi and the Iraqi Interim Government.[129] From this moment on, the Iraqi government would have a say in how the insurgency would be fought.

~~(S)~~ The establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government, combined with reduced Coalition presence (resulting from efforts to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army), provided a period of enthusiasm for the new Iraqi government in Anbar.[130] This enthusiasm was short lived. It rested largely on the Sunni perception that Coalition forces would soon withdraw entirely and once that occurred, the insurgency would serve as the catalyst for renewed Sunni rule of Iraq.[131]

~~(S)~~ When this didn't occur and the Iraqi Interim Government adopted an aggressive stance against the insurgency, Sunni moderates decided to adopt a "wait and see" approach. In the early summer, moderate Anbari sheikhs and imams remained warily neutral. They feared for the survival of their local mosques and worried about being targeted if seen as providing support to either side.[132]

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile the larger insurgent organizations such as JTJ and the Ramadi Shura Council were encouraged by their perceived success in Fallujah and partial withdrawal of Coalition forces. They intensified attacks against civilians, police, and government officials to undercut Iraqi Interim Government support.[133] Insurgents also conducted violent attacks on Iraqi contractors engaged in Coalition-funded reconstruction. This kept civilians and local officials from cooperating with the Coalition. The lack of cooperation crippled many of the Iraqi security forces in Anbar throughout July and August 2004.[134] The result was stark: a briefing to General Abizaid described Fallujah as "a safe haven for the best organized, most effective terror network in Iraq." [135]

~~(S)~~ Early enthusiasm for Iraqi Interim Government gave way by the end of the summer to widespread apathy. Many Anbaris thought it better to acquiesce to insurgent demands than to fight them.[136] While the Coalition was tolerated if it provided local protection and civil assistance, Anbaris tired of the constant violence and blamed Coalition "occupiers" for their state of affairs.[137]

Approved for Release

---

[129] [| Open Source | ANSWERS.COM AND USMC COMMAND CHRONOLOGY | 2004 |]
[130] [| Military | CARTER MALKASIAN: I MEF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, MARCH – APRIL 2004 | 20040822 | (U) |]
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] [| OPTIMIZED ZARQAWI NETWORK IN FALLUJAH POWERPOINT | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[136] [| Military | CARTER MALKASIAN: I MEF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, MARCH – APRIL 2004 | 20040822 | (U) |]
[137] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

City Stories – Summer 2004

Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in the capital of Anbar deteriorated noticeably over the summer. The Ramadi Shura Council and other insurgent groups in Ramadi wielded enough influence and control that by late July 2004 AQI was able to kidnap the three sons of Anbar's then-governor, Abdul Karim Burjis (see Chapter 3). While Governor Burjis claimed not to have paid a ransom for their release, he did release a humiliating videotaped statement in which he stated that, in exchange for their safe return, he had "repented" for having collaborated with the Coalition.[138] AQI also forced him to resign as governor.

~~(S/NF)~~ In August 2004, the newly-appointed governor of the province, Mohammad Awad stated that "the province has collapsed and we feel like hostages."[139] The largest and most organized insurgent groups active in Ramadi itself were Jaysh Mohammed, Anbar Mujahideen Brigade, Hizb al-'Awda, Islamic Army of Iraq, Saraya al-Jihad, and the criminal organization Hasnah's Sons, all of which appeared to cooperate under the Ramadi Shura Council umbrella.[140]

~~(S)~~ The Ramadi Shura Council allowed insurgents to better organize. Moreover, it facilitated larger terrorist attacks. Insurgents now could operate in squad to platoon-size units, with several instances of heavy street-fighting in the city.[141] One particular incident, on July 14, stands out for its planning, logistical support and coordinated use of firepower. This indicated that the insurgency was attempting to move to a higher form of warfare. The attack involved as many as fifty insurgents. They carried out a complex attack on a Marine combat outpost with RPGs, machine-gun fire, and grenades. They used trucks to carry fighters to the battle. The attack ended with twelve insurgents dead or wounded and twenty-one in custody, plus the capture of a weapons cache.[142]

~~(S/NF)~~ The relationship between the Ramadi Shura Council and the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura was that of equals working in parallel rather than a chain of command.[143] While the Ramadi Shura Council deferred to the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura on a number of major decisions affecting specific operations, the Ramadi Shura Council was far more unified under Latif and Daham and hence able to maintain a more coordinated alliance of insurgent organizations.[144]

Approved for Release

---

[138] [| Open Source | WASHINGTON POST | CONSTABLE, PAMELA : 300 SHIITE MILITIAMEN KILLED IN IRAQI SOUTH | 20040807 | (U) |]
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.
[142] [| Military | SIGACTS | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[143] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT: STATE OF THE INSURGENCY IN MND-WEST | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[144] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Hit

~~(S/NF)~~ Hit remained a major transit point for foreign fighters, arms smugglers and other insurgent facilitators. Three insurgent leaders were based in the town:

1)
2)
3)

(b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ Hit also became a major staging area for Ramadi insurgents, who seem to have confined local action to attacks against Coalition convoys moving from Ramadi to al-Qa'im. This meant that the level of violence declined during the summer, with the local Albu Nimr, al-Suwatra, Oawam Alin, and al-Botoma tribes more supportive of the Coalition.[145]

~~(S/REL USA, AUS, CAN and GBR)~~ The city council actively cooperated with the Coalition. It formed a "Pursuit Committee" that identified strangers in the city and determined their intentions. Coalition forces concentrated on the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and rooting out infiltrators in the police and security forces. This resulted in the removal of police chief Salam, a decision supported by the city council. Insurgents, as elsewhere, turned their attention to the ISF, carrying out a series of attacks against Iraqi forces during the summer, including three assassination attempts against the commander of the local Iraqi National Guard (ING) battalion.[146]

Hadithah

~~(S/NF)~~ The security situation in Hadithah deteriorated dramatically over the summer of 2004 as a result of the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign. Emboldened insurgents conducted attacks against the Hadithah Dam and the police station. Intimidated local elites turned a blind eye to their activities.[147] The most spectacular attack was a dual car bombing in July of the Iraqi National Guard (ING) and the police station. This attack killed ten men, wounded many others and damaged every vehicle attached to the ING unit.[148] Although the al-Jaghayfah (TFC spelling: al-Jagayefa) tribe was openly anti-Coalition, it had a tense relationship with the insurgents. When a member of the

Approved for Release

---

[145] Ibid. (N.B. Except for the Albu Nimr, these tribes are little known.)
[146] [| Military | HIT CURRENT ASSESSMENT | 20040825 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[147] [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET 03 0058 05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | IMEF IRR HET10 0264 04 | 2004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | IMEF IRR HET10 0269 04 | 2004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | IMEF IRR HET10 0271 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | Spot-RCT7-00002-04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | IMEF IRR HET10 0270 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] [| Military | CIIR-205-325-41-04-015 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | DIIR-HET03-001-04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | DIIR HET03 003 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | DIIR HETO3 0013 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET03 0022 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | DIIR HET03 009 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | DIIR HET03 0061 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | IMEF, TFC, HVT database/RCT7 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
Above sources drawn from [| Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR : INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[148] [| Military | HADITHAH CURRENT ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 2004 | 200408xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

tribe was killed by the mujahidin, the tribe kidnapped twelve insurgents in Husaybah and tortured them in retaliation.[149]

~~(S/NF)~~ As a result of Coalition counter-insurgency operations, the Abd al-Rahman al-Naqshbandi Network that had previously used Hadithah as a base was destroyed. Their leader, al-Naqshbandi, was on the run. Unfortunately the Coalition counter-insurgency (COIN) operations did not defeat the Hizb al-'Awda, the Hwair cell, and the Salafia insurgent groups who remained active in the city. The main insurgent leaders in Hadithah were smuggler Mustafa Wasmi Hamad, foreign fighter facilitator Munir Simran, and Athir Nassif Turki, the leader of the Athir Group street gang (who went to Fallujah after Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and would later be killed during Operation PHANTOM FURY). Over time, these local figures became subordinated to far more dangerous individuals, notably Zarqawi lieutenant Hamed al-Izawi, weapons smuggler Saeed Ali Hwair, and Sheikh Abdul Kareem Hadithah who served as the liaison between the Hadithah insurgents, Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, and Ramadi Shura Council.[150]

(U) The small bright spot was Hadithah's economy, which had somewhat better prospects by the summer. In June, several new transmission projects at the Hadithah Dam were completed. This, along with rehabilitation of a turbine unit, meant for the first time since 1990 four of the six turbines at the Dam were in full operation. Operating at close to full capacity, the hydropower plant could generate 660 megawatts of electricity for both Baghdad and the province.[151]

Al-Qa'im[152]

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in al-Qa'im was similarly dire. Four major insurgent groups were active in the city and surrounding area. The situation was similar to that in Fallujah prior to Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and the creation of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura. Using mosques as command and control centers and supply depots, insurgent leaders delivered strident anti-Coalition rhetoric. Heavily infiltrated by the insurgency, the city would be used as a major base and staging area until well into 2005.

~~(S/NF)~~ Unlike Fallujah, however, in al-Qa'im insurgents were motivated as much by criminal activity as by religion. The long-standing Al-Theeb criminal organization remained the largest and most prominent insurgent and criminal organization in the area. Al-Theeb merged with Omar al-Mukhtar and local Saraya al-Jihad members into a single organization commanded by Riyadh

---

[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] [| Open Source | GLOBALSECURITY.ORG: HADITHA | (U) |]
http://www/globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/haidtha.htm
[152] [| Military | IMEF 1.4c | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military 1.4c | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET 01 0183 04 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Militar ISG DET B 1.4c ~~S/NF~~ ; Milita 1.4c | ~~(S/NF~~ ; [b 3 50 USC 3507 | 1.4c | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 1.4c 1.4c | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
Above sources drawn from [| Military | MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: BRIEFING: ANBAR : INSURGENCY GROUPS | 20061026 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Matloub. After Al-Theeb, the most active groups in the city were General Hassan al-Mahlawi's 1,100-strong FRE organization, Ghanem Hashim Mahowish's Saraya al-Jihad splinter group, and the Lebanese Salafia Group. Of the four major insurgent groups in al-Qa'im, the Lebanese Salafia Group provided funding, direction, and leadership to the others. The Lebanese Salafia Group also successfully infiltrated the local police and border guards, enabling its members to pass freely between Iraq and Syria.

Habbaniyah[153]

~~(S/NF)~~ Habbaniyah served as a key insurgent transit point between Fallujah and Ramadi. While many tribal groups in the area remained neutral, elements of the Albu Eissa, Albu Qartan, Albu Shahed, Albu Sha'aban, Albu Khalifah, Albu Fahid, and Hazeem tribes supported the insurgency. They provided transiting insurgents with safe haven and support. Fedayeen Mujahideen leader Muhammad Khalaf al-Ulayan was the top insurgent facilitator active in the city.

Rutbah[154, 155]

~~(S/NF)~~ Rutbah is a small desert outpost of 17,000 inhabitants, who depend heavily on smuggling for their livelihood. Many tribes in the town were suspicious of the Coalition. The local Shammari tribesmen supported the local insurgency, which centered around the Jordanian-born Hadithah-based SRE Sheikh 'Abd al-Karim Hadithah. The former imam of the Mustafa Mosque, Sheikh Hadithah led a group of criminals, smugglers, and SREs to Fallujah following the conclusion of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. This left control of the insurgency in the area to FREs led by former Ba'athists Tariq Mohammed Sirheed and Ibrahim Bedawi.

Fallujah

~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ Fallujah the Mujahideen Shura continued to serve as the real power in Fallujah given the weakness of the mayor, city council, and other local officials. Umar Hadid quickly established himself as the head the of Fallujah Mujahideen Shura's military wing. As a result, much of the practical power in the city rested with JTJ and other Al Qaeda associate groups.[156] This was soon

1.4c

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

reflected by the prominent insurgent leaders. The most powerful leaders after Hadid were Jaysh Mohammed leader Sheikh Khalid Hamud al-Jumayli; Al Qaeda members Abdullah al-Tunisi, Abu Qudama al-Filisteeni, and Dr. Muhammad Hardan al-Issawi; FREs Karim Karkaz, Mahmud Alawi al-Jumayli; and FRE Lieutenant Colonel Maki Husayn Zaydan al-Jughayfi, who served as Hadid's intelligence chief.[157]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Just as months earlier, the SREs, now dominant in Fallujah, along with foreign fighters loyal to Hadid and Zarqawi patrolled Fallujah. They directed traffic and set up checkpoints.[158] Imposing *shari'a* in the city, they required women to wear the hijab and implemented *hadd* punishments.[159]

~~(S/NF)~~ **Sheikh Janabi's Influence**:[160] Under the direction of Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi, the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura continued its kidnappings and murders against real and perceived enemies in Fallujah and surrounding communities. Attempting to centralize control of Fallujah under his rule, Janabi ran a robust counter-intelligence campaign. He sent sources to the Coalition that provided misinformation. Sometimes, this misinformation appears to have included negative reporting on Janabi. Knowing this would be contradicted by other Coalition intelligence sources, Janabi could disavow claims he was complicit in insurgent activities as being part of a smear campaign. Still, Janabi remained aware of the danger posed by Coalition military intervention. He used his influence within Fallujah Mujahideen Shura to forbid insurgents from carrying out attacks unless they were approved by him. This enabled Fallujah Mujahideen Shura to overcome the tactical impatience of individual insurgent cells and fighters.

~~(S/NF)~~ **Friction Among Fallujah Insurgents**:[161,162] Friction quickly developed between the more pragmatic Janabi and the Zarqawi-aligned insurgents in Fallujah led by Umar Hadid, who favored all-out war against the Coalition. Arguments arose within the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura over the wisdom of carrying out attacks against Coalition forces, fearing a renewed Coalition assault. Tensions rose throughout the summer. Eventually, Janabi and al-Ubaydi issued a fatwa ordering the killing of Abu Azzam, Zarqawi's "Amir fi'l-Anbar" ("Commander in Anbar") and Hadid's superior within JTJ. Azzam had already been expelled from Fallujah by Janabi in May. Azzam had been recruiting local youths to serve as suicide bombers and inciting SREs against non-Salafist groups in the city. Azzam was killed by Jumayli tribesmen when he attempted to return. In June, 450 foreign fighters led by Hadid killed six Shi'a contractors loyal to Janabi, leading al-Ubaydi to kill five Syrians loyal to Hadid in reprisal.

Approved for Release

---

[157] [| Military | CG INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, NOVEMBER 7-8, 2004: OPERATION PHANTOM FURY UPDATE | 20041108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[158] [| Military | I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY | 20040608 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[159] Ibid.
[160] [| Military | IRAQI REACH BACK TEAM: FALLUJAH – IO ANALYSIS (PART B) | 20041001 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[161] Ibid.
[162] [| Military | AO RALEIGH SIGNIFICANT REPORTING,JULY 10-20, 2004 | presumed 20040720 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Possibly fearing for his own safety in light of what had happened to Abu Azzam, Hadid temporarily left Fallujah in late June with a group of JTJ fighters to carry out attacks against targets in Baghdad. When Hadid returned to Fallujah in early July, they reached a reconciliation regarding the religious legitimacy of conducting attacks against Coalition targets in and around Fallujah. Key to this seems to be a July 8 meeting of Fallujah Mujahideen Shura attended by Zarqawi. The JTJ leader reportedly ordered them to put aside internal feuding and threatened violent retaliation if they refused to do so. This led to a split between Janabi and al-Ubaydi. The latter believed that allowing foreign fighters to reside in Fallujah would bring disaster to the city.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The friction within Fallujah was not limited to clashes between Janabi and Hadid. When members of the Albu Eissa tribe attempted to set up a new group of Jordanian-trained police in mid-July, Sheikh Barakat Albu Eissa's nephew Enis was kidnapped by Janabi's SREs. A number of Albu Eissa tribesmen attempted to assassinate Janabi at one of the tribal meetings in retaliation, but the plot was foiled by their own clumsiness.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Fallujah Brigade, already an unreliable force as a result of Fallujah Mujahideen Shura infiltration, proved to be no match for the insurgents—not that they attempted to assert real control. The Brigade deteriorated when, as noted earlier, Janabi began firing non-insurgent officers.[163] Brigade members were further intimidated when Fallujah Mujahideen Shura began assassinating the few non-insurgent officers or members of their families.[164]

~~(S)~~ **Insurgents Attack Fallujah ING Compounds**:[165] A major turning point for the insurgency in Fallujah was the August 2004 attack on the 505th and 506th Iraqi National Guard compounds. JTJ and FMS fighters led by Hadid and Janabi carried out this attack. The compounds fell without a fight. Once secured, Janabi addressed the ING soldiers, informing them that a member of the ING had been cooperating with the Coalition and that the organization would now be disbanded in Fallujah. Seizing all ING weapons and equipment, Janabi told the soldiers to go home and warned that any who returned to Fallujah as ING would be killed.

~~(S)~~ This prompted a conflict between Janabi and the Albu Maree (TFC spelling: Mar'ai) tribal leaders. Tribal leaders gave the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura 48 hours to release the kidnapped 506th commander Lieutenant Colonel Suliman, his deputy Captain Ali, and 505th commander Lieutenant Colonel Jubayr. While Jubayr was able to make a deal with Janabi to secure his release, Suliman and Ali were personally tortured and then executed by Janabi and Hadid. This led to a break between the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura and the Albu Maree tribe. The tribe agreed to support the Coalition in return for a promise they would be allowed to exercise *tha'ar* (vengeance) by killing Janabi and Hadid.

~~(S)~~ Following their "victory" over the 506th and 505th ING battalions, Hadid and 200 foreign JTJ members began using the 505th compound as their command and control center.

---

[163] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: POST-FAJR – PRE-ELECTION, 'WHAT'S NEXT?' | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[164] [| Military | AIF MLCOA FOR NEXT MONTH | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[165] [| Military | 505TH ING COMPOUND, KINETIC STRIKE TARGET PACKAGE | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Snapshot: The Insurgency May-August 2004

~~(S)~~ Several factors encouraged the insurgents in Anbar and in Fallujah: the insurgents believed they had achieved a "victory" over the Coalition in Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, the on-going scandal about prisoner abuse by the U.S. at Abu Ghraib, and Coalition decision to focus on al-Sadr following his uprising in southern Iraq.

~~(S)~~ Insurgent groups began to expand operations across the province. They attempted to kill or intimidate those who cooperated or worked with the Coalition. They used Fallujah and Ramadi as urban bases for attacks throughout the province. The climate they fostered in Fallujah—including the implementation of *hadd* punishments, enforcement of strict norms of dress and behavior, and public beatings or even executions of those who dissented—was a foretaste of the state the Salafists and Al Qaeda affiliated groups hoped to create in Iraq. The insurgency continued to take on a more religious tone in parts of Anbar: in Fallujah there were no serious objections from supposedly secular Ba'athists and nationalists to the imposition of *shari'a* in the city.

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, ordinary Sunnis in Anbar, at first encouraged by the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government, became more distrustful as the summer progressed. The insurgents' intimidation campaigns turned moderates who might have supported the Coalition into wary and weary citizens. Many blamed the Coalition as much as the insurgents for the violence they were suffering.

Attack Data (May – August 2004)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the middle trimester (May to August 2004). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following four charts (small format) show the types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED) arrayed over the 2003-2007 time frame and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. Complex Attack data was not yet available during this period.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was higher than the previous period and sharply increased throughout the period. While the overall attack, Direct Fire, and Indirect Fire incident counts increased, the count of IED incidents remained relatively stable. During this period, the majority of incidents were taking place in AO Raleigh and AO Topeka, while AO Denver levels were still relatively lower. Two weeks in particular showed peaks in the overall, Direct Fire, and Indirect Fire attack counts – the weeks of 24-30 June and 12-18 August, with the increases particularly attributable to activity in AO Raleigh.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Run-Up to Operation Al FAJR (September – October 2004)

Further Tensions in Fallujah

~~(S)~~ Coalition efforts against the Mahdi Army came to at least a temporary conclusion in August 2004. The main focus of Coalition counter-insurgency efforts returned to Fallujah. With the infiltration of the Fallujah Brigade followed by the seizure of two ING compounds, the threat was clear. The Coalition began preparations to remove what had in effect become a parallel center of political authority in Anbar to that of the legitimate Iraqi Interim Government.

~~(S/NF)~~ **Tensions also continued to flare in Fallujah**.[166] Despite their temporary reconciliation, by mid-September Janabi once again found himself at odds with Hadid. He encouraged his followers to distance themselves from JTJ. At the core of the dispute was Janabi's belief that Hadid's activities in Fallujah were eroding public support for Janabi. Janabi had been working with Fallujah Mujahideen Shura in an effort to find a way to continue the insurgency outside Fallujah. Meanwhile, Hadid had been insistent on working with the *muhisba* to implement the most extreme interpretations of *shari'a*. However, this alienated less religious FREs in the city. Another major source of controversy was Hadid's decision to collect a religious tax from residents to support JTJ's activities in Fallujah. Hadid also claimed to have received a *fatwa* from Janabi calling for the seizure of the possessions of those who failed to cooperate. Janabi had never issued such a *fatwa* and was angered that Hadid made such a radical move without his permission.

~~(S/NF)~~ Nor was the *fatwa* the only recent issue of contention. During early September, Hadid executed Ahmad al-Shamsah al-Issawi and Ahmad al-Hasna al-Krifawi, two popular Fallujah residents he claimed were cooperating with the Coalition. In response, the Albu Eissa tried (but failed) to capture Hadid and turn him over to the Albu Hatim, the tribe to which these two men belonged.[167] Although Hadid killed the two men without consulting with the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, the Albu Hatim blamed Janabi and joined the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura's growing list of enemies.[168]

Negotiations and Airstrikes

~~(S/NF)~~ Prior to Operation Al FAJR, the Iraqi Interim Government and the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura representatives met repeatedly. The purpose was to discuss turning the city over to Iraqi Interim Government without fighting. In reality, Fallujah Mujahideen Shura was playing for time. Both Janabi and Sheikh Khalid Hamud al-Jumayli remained active in Fallujah Mujahideen Shura and JTJ activities. At the same time, they were supposedly seeking a peaceful solution with the government.[169] Prior to his detention, al-Jumayli told a group of insurgents in Khalidiyah in early

Approved for Release

[166] [| Military | IRAQI REACH BACK TEAM: FALLUJAH – IO ANALYSIS (PART B) | 20041001 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[167] [| Military | OCTOBER DAILY HUMINT | 20041001 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[168] [| Military | IRAQI REACH BACK TEAM: FALLUJAH – IO ANALYSIS (PART B) | 20041001 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[169] [| Military | AO ATLANTA OVERVIEW, OCTOBER 29, 2004 | 20041029 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

October that the ongoing negotiations were little more than a ruse to allow the insurgents to prepare their defenses.[170]

(U) The Coalition decided against a major assault on Fallujah until after the conclusion of the 2004 U.S. presidential elections.[171] Instead, the Coalition conducted decapitation air strikes against senior insurgent leaders and foreign fighters based in Fallujah and other parts of Iraq. The Coalition scored a number of notable successes.[172] Perhaps most important was the killing of Omar Yusuf Jumah (Sheikh Abu Anas al-Shami), JTJ's spiritual leader who had served as a close advisor to Zarqawi and provided the group with Islamic legal justification for its activities.[173]

Insurgent Preparations

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ As early as the seizure of the ING compounds in August, insurgents began preparing defenses for a possible Coalition attack.[174] Defenders were made up of roughly 50% Fallujahns, 32% other Anbaris, and 18% foreign fighters.[175] The Fallujah Brigade had now ceased to exist as an institution. With the removal of the Iraqi National Guard, Janabi, Hadid, and the rest of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura had complete control over the city. Despite his strength in the city, Hadid began relocating foreign commanders to Ramadi to prevent senior foreign fighters from being targeted in the anticipated Coalition offensive.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The Fallujah Mujahideen Shura coordinated with allied or satellite insurgent groups in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah, Saqlawiyah, al-Amariyah, Karma, Latifiyah, Abu Ghraib, and Baghdad. The purpose was to prepare for widespread attacks as soon as the fighting began.[176]

~~(S/NF)~~ These conventional insurgent preparations coincided with attempts by Zarqawi and Hadid to develop crude World War I-era chemical weapons for Fallujah's defense.[177] Coalition raids in 2004 discovered insurgent cells in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Tal Afar attempting to modify conventional mortar rounds to contain cyanide, pesticides, or industrial chemicals. One of JTJ's Fallujah-based cells attempted to manufacture mustard, tabun, and ricin but was unable to resolve the technical

Approved for Release

---

[170] Ibid.
[171] [| Open Source | LOS ANGELES TIMES/ MAZZETTI, MARK : MAJOR ASSAULTS ON HOLD UNTIL AFTER US ELECTION | 20041011 | (U) |]
[172] Ibid.
[173] [| Open Source | TERRORISM FOCUS, VOLUME 1, ISSUE 5 / STEPHEN ULPH : SHEIKH AL-SHAMI, AL-ZARQAWI'S MENTOR, KILLED | 20041001 | (U) |]
[174] [| Military | IRAQI REACH BACK TEAM: FALLUJAH – IO ANALYSIS (PART B) | 20041001 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[175] [| Military | MNCI | FALLUJAH-RAMADI CORRIDOR," MNCI C2 PLANS, SEPTEMBER 17, 2004 | 20040917 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[176] [| Militar | NGIC | 1.4c | ~~S/NF~~]
[177] [| b 3 50 USC 3507 | IRAQ: ZARQAWI INTENT ON CW ATTACKS | 20040701 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

difficulties prior to the Coalition attack.[178] Had they succeeded, their plan was to fill rockets and mortars with chemical agents and fire them at Coalition forces as soon as they entered the city.[179]

The Birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

(U) As noted, Zarqawi had been actively seeking the blessing of the Al Qaeda senior leadership. He wished to establish himself as the undisputed leader of the *jihad* in Iraq. Moreover, he wanted to consolidate all Al Qaeda associate groups such as AI and Ansar al-Sunna under his leadership. By October 2004, Zarqawi had apparently secured that blessing. He issued a public statement in which he swore *bay'at* to Osama bin Ladin. He renamed JTJ as Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers, QJBR, or AQI, a Coalition term).[180] After eight months of negotiations, the Al Qaeda leadership "showed understanding for the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad movement" and agreed to support Zarqawi's "style and system" provided he adhered to their strategy and directives.[181] Zarqawi gained a great deal of prestige among Sunni Islamists inside and outside of Iraq during the run-up to Operation Al FAJR, paving the way for his emergence as the preeminent leader of the insurgency in Anbar.

Operation AL FAJR (November 2004)[182]

The Battle

(U) In the run-up to the second battle for Fallujah, Coalition forces once again set up roadblocks and encouraged civilians to flee the city. The next Coalition phase consisted of several weeks of air strikes and ground feints by Coalition infantry and armor. This was designed to lure out and kill insurgent fighters. It was also designed to force insurgents to reveal their defensive positions on the east and southeast outskirts of Fallujah. The attack into the city began on November 7 with the seizure of the main hospital and two bridges over the Euphrates River. American and Iraqi forces created a tight cordon around Fallujah, secured the ground lines of communication, prevented insurgents from traveling to and from the city, and conducted robust counter-insurgency operations throughout Anbar.

(U) On November 8, 6,500 U.S. troops from six maneuver battalions breached insurgent defenses along the northern edge of the city, using artillery and close air support to hit suspected insurgent positions. Over 2,000 Iraqi troops followed their U.S. counterparts in a support role to secure lines of communication and clear sensitive buildings such as mosques. Initial Coalition progress was rapid. RCT-7 pushed 800 meters into the Askari neighborhood by the end of the first day. Fighting

Approved for Release

---

[178] [| b 3 50 USC 3507 | IRAQ: POSSIBLE SMALL-SCALE CHEMICAL THREAT IN AL FALLUJAH | 20041110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[179] Ibid.
[180] [| Open Source | TERRORISM FOCUS, VOLUME 1, ISSUE 7: AL QAIDA ENSURES A VIOLENT RAMADAN IN IRAQ | 20041029 | (U) |]
[181] Ibid.
[182] [| Military | NGIC | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

in the western Jolan district was not as fierce as had been expected. Within three days of fighting the Coalition had already swept through the northern half of Fallujah, refitted, and begun their push across Route 10 to clear the industrial district in the eastern half of the city.

(U) As Coalition forces advanced, mosque loudspeakers blared "Prepare for jihad!" and "Allahu Akbar!" The insurgent forces conducted a fluid defense, moving to reinforce defenses as needed. Sometimes seeming to appear from nowhere, they fired small arms and RPGs from groups of 3-6 men before fleeing into nearby buildings. South of Route 10 insurgent resistance stiffened, particularly in the southwestern Resala and Nazal districts. Small groups of insurgents rushed Marine positions and dozens of RPGs struck tanks and other armored vehicles. On several occasions, insurgents fought to the death to defend individual buildings, prompting Coalition infantry to call for air support to flatten the structures.

(U) The Coalition continued to make steady progress, advancing 600 meters every six hours. By November 12, the Coalition had driven the insurgents into their last remaining strongholds in southwestern Fallujah. The smaller their area of operation became, the larger the insurgent cells grew, with some fielding as many as fifty fighters in a single engagement. Many of these holdouts fought to the last man rather than surrender.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ After seven days of heavy fighting, the Coalition had completed its sweep through Fallujah. Clearing operations followed to deal with isolated pockets and unexploded ordnance. Cells that remained active at this point operated in extremely small groups, fighting in close quarters with small arms and hand grenades. A few cells relocated to the "cleared" parts of northern Fallujah. The fighting that occurred in these previously cleared areas appears to have been due to a combination of relocated cells, sleeper cells, and insurgents who had previously fled Fallujah returning to the city to continue fighting.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Between November 16 and late December, Coalition forces conducted further sweeps to clear buildings, sometimes on multiple occasions. It took nearly two weeks before all of Fallujah could be declared completely free of IEDs and enemy pockets. Even so, as late as December 20, surviving insurgent fighters continued to stage small attacks in Fallujah using undiscovered tunnels and facilities. Phase IV operations were then initiated to clean up the streets, restore damaged buildings, and position food and water for the return of the civilian population in late December 2004.

(U) From November 7-30, Coalition losses were seven Iraqi military and civilian deaths and 43 wounded. U.S. casualties included 69 dead and 619 wounded. MNF-I detained 2,052 suspected insurgents and estimated that 2,175 insurgents were killed during the fighting.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Insurgent Strategy

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ As in the first battle for Fallujah, the insurgent's relied on a dispersed, non-linear fluid defense. They used networks of small cells to elude, harass, and attrit Coalition forces as they advanced into the city. Insurgents mixed direct fire with small arms and RPGS, hit-and-run, and indirect fire. Some cells attacked Coalition forces from within one building, relocated to another, and attacked again. Others used mortars in conjunction with the attacks described above. The goal behind these tactics was to inflict casualties while gaining media attention and support for their cause. By defending a well-known symbol, they hoped to focus international attention on the civilian collateral damage and use Fallujah as a catalyst for stirring up retributive violence throughout Iraq.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The insurgent plan for defending Fallujah also called for the dispersal of 50% of the city's total fighters to nearby towns and rural areas from Ramadi to Baghdad and south into northern Babil. The goal was to open a second front by attacking Coalition forces from the rear along the outer perimeter and energizing other insurgent groups into stepping up their attacks. While coordinated insurgent activity did increase throughout the Sunni Triangle, the outer cordon of Fallujah was never seriously threatened.

(U) The reasons for the insurgents' failure to threaten Fallujah's outer cordon were two-fold:

- Aggressive Coalition operations and increased troop presence in Ramadi disrupted insurgent plans to carry out attacks to penetrate the perimeter and relieve Fallujah's defenders. The Coalition established checkpoints, patrolled supply routes, carried out cordon sweeps, conducted counter-rocket and counter-mortar operations, and conducted movement to contact operations combined with the clearing of IEDs.

- Small groups of insurgent fighters did penetrate the outer perimeter to reach Fallujah on foot but were unable to challenge the presence of Coalition combined arms patrols on major roads.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ As earlier, Fallujah Mujahideen Shura assigned defensive sectors and zones to individual cells or groups of cells. They established eight primary defensive sectors, including the Jolan and Sina'a districts. At least some of the planning incorporated detailed maps, sketches, and annotated high-resolution imagery consistent with past urban defenses in other parts of the world.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Despite these preparations, three factors led to unexpected weaknesses in the city's defense.

- On the second day of the Coalition assault, on November 8, Janabi, Zarqawi and many other Fallujah Mujahideen Shura leaders fled Fallujah. This reduced the level of cohesion among the city's defenders.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

- Another significant factor was rivalries within the remaining insurgent leadership, combined with a lack of coordinated communications between groups.

- Orders to individual cells were sent from senior facilitators or remaining Fallujah Mujahideen Shura leaders still present in the city, such as Hadid, though some cell leaders countermanded, ignored, or dismissed these orders and issued their own.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Cooperation between Hadid's forces and those loyal to Janabi was tenuous at best. It is unclear to what degree the two factions set aside their differences in the face of a concentrated Coalition threat. AQI foreign fighters made up only thirty-eight of the detainees after the battle, with another thirty probable foreign fighters identified from the remains of dead insurgents, indicating that most of those that had been present in the city left with Zarqawi on November 8.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Insurgent communications consisted of radios, cell phones, runners, and visual and auditory signaling. Numerous commercial hand-held mobile radios were captured by the Coalition from insurgent arms caches and living quarters, suggesting that they were widely available but seldom used. Fallujah's power was cut off on November 8, degrading landline communication so that cell phones became one of the few means of communication. To supplement the cell phones, black flags were used to signal between groups and mosque loudspeakers broadcast tactical information. Former RG and SRG generals, on the other hand, issued written orders complete with Saddam-era official letterheads to subordinates who snapped salutes.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ As during Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, insurgent cells were small, semi-autonomous and widespread throughout the city. They conducted a decentralized defense. The most common cell organization was a hub network made up of cells of 3-6 fighters, though some were as large as thirty. As the fighting wore on and insurgents were left isolated in the southeastern part of the city, cell size increased to groups of as many as fifty fighters by November 13. No single leader appears to have been in control of more than fifteen fighters, with the exception of Hadid who personally led as many as 200 into battle.

Further Cooperation between Fallujah Mujahideen Shura and Al-Sadr

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ As with his earlier support during Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, Muqtada al-Sadr sent 100 of what he called his "elite fighters" from his Mahdi Army in Thawra to Fallujah to assist in its defense.[183] Al-Sadr also sent Hadid money. This money, raised during the weapons buy-back program, was to be used for the defense of Fallujah.[184] Once the Coalition initiated a full-scale attack on Fallujah, the number of Mahdi Army fighters in the city rose to as many as 350.[185] This is significant, as it illustrates that low-level cooperation was not viewed as

[183] [| Military | INTREP# 04-159 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[184] Ibid.
[185] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

inconceivable between the second-in-command of the stridently sectarian JTJ and the Khomeinist Mahdi Army.

Endgame [186]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The insurgency suffered a significant blow with the fall of Fallujah. Insurgents lost their primary safe haven. Their networks were disrupted and scattered. They were deprived of major weapons caches and IED factories and roughly 4,000 fighters were killed or detained.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ There were many reasons for Coalition success during Operation AL FAJR, which contrast with the experience of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE:

- Coalition forces were three times larger, comprising roughly 15,000 troops.
- With 4,000 estimated insurgent defenders, the Coalition had a 3 to 1 force advantage. This resulted in a far more effective cordon around the city than in April.
- Insurgents underestimated the precision and volume of Coalition firepower at the disposal of the infantry. Some insurgents became extremely frustrated with the power exhibited by Coalition combined-arms attacks.
- The Coalition information campaign prior to the beginning of Operation AL FAJR persuaded most of the civilian population to evacuate the city. PM Ayad Allawi declared a round-the-clock curfew in Fallujah. The small number of civilians who chose to remain stayed off the streets, leaving fewer human shields than previously to complicate targeting. Civilian vehicles were completely banned, depriving insurgents of their ability to use VBIEDs.
- Approval of Coalition operations by the Iraqi Interim Government and participation by Iraqi troops helped defuse potential Sunni Arab backlash against the Coalition. The relatively muted response saw only IIP leaving the Iraqi government and only AMS calling for a boycott of the January elections. This undermined the insurgent plan to use the fighting in Fallujah as a catalyst for stirring up support for the insurgency throughout Iraq.

Approved for Release

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ In Operation Al FAJR, the Coalition destroyed the center of insurgent power in Anbar but did not end the insurgency or eliminate AQI. Still, Operation AL FAJR was a major blow to the insurgents. They would again have to reorganize, recruit, and re-arm. The roughly 4,000 fighters killed or captured included experienced leaders like Hadid, who would take time to replace. These losses, and the ensuing reorganization of insurgent networks, were a major reason that the insurgents could not disrupt the January 2005 Iraqi elections. But, many senior leaders and

[186] [| Military | NGIC | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

their lieutenants fled Fallujah beforehand, and they would resume their activities as soon as they were able.

Aftermath of Operation Al FAJR (December 2004)

Post-Fallujah Effects in Anbar

~~(S/NF)~~ The fall of Fallujah prompted a temporary reevaluation of AMS's support for FRE and SRE insurgent groups. AMS had previously been divided between supporting the January elections and supporting the insurgency. The organization now found that it had lost face because its decision to back Janabi meant that it was tied to his defeat in Fallujah.[187] AMS leader Harith al-Dhari, who had sent $5,000,000 to support Janabi during Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE was even detained and then released by Iraqi Interim Government Ministry of the Interior in November 2004.[188]

~~(S/REL TO AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ On November 30, the Sunni Endowment (*Awqaf*) manager Dr. Adnan Muhammad Salman al-Dulaimi hosted a meeting of imams, scholars, and clerics from across Anbar. He informed them there was no legitimate *jihad* in Iraq and that violence against Coalition forces would not be tolerated.[189] When some attendees dissented, al-Dulaimi pointed out that he had delivered this same warning to Janabi prior to Operation AL FAJR. He noted that because Janabi had not heeded it, Fallujah was now "a ghost town."[190] Warning attendees not to let this happen to their cities and informing them that anyone who continued to preach *jihad* would be removed from their positions, al-Dulaimi secured the majority's support for a proclamation calling for an end to Islamist violence in Anbar.[191]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The apparent (if temporary) shift of the Anbari clergy away from the insurgency soon spread across the province. Moderate Iraqis saw the insurgency losing momentum post-Fallujah.[192] Sunni moderates wanted to retain some measure of power in Iraqi Interim Government at all costs. A number of Sunni elites viewed the waning of the insurgency in Anbar as a sign they could win concessions from Shi'a and Kurdish political blocs in return for an end to violence and Sunni participation in the political process.[193]

Insurgent Dispersal and Reorganization

~~(S/NF)~~ However, the majority of insurgents in Iraq and Anbar were not ready to give up the fight. Many were able to flee Fallujah and relocate as far north as Mosul and across central Iraq. Fighters

Approved for Release

---

[187] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: 1.4c | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[188] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[189] [| b 3 50 USC 3507 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.
[192] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[193] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

escaped by crossing the Euphrates or by avoiding main roads and checkpoints.[194] With the loss of Fallujah as their primary sanctuary, some rank-and-file insurgents retreated to secondary sanctuaries in western Anbar such as al-Qa'im and Hadithah.[195] Others headed east, attempting to export violence to Baghdad in retaliation for Fallujah. Or they sought refuge with other insurgent and tribal figures in northern Babil or along the Fallujah-Abu Ghraib corridor, where weak security environments were perceived to exist.[196]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Criminal and SRE activity surged in Hit, Hadithah, al-Qa'im, and Husaybah as more and more insurgents sought refuge in western parts of the province. They believed these areas vulnerable due to low Coalition and Iraqi Interim Government presence.[197] However, for the remainder of the year the insurgents were unable to compensate for the manpower, leadership, and infrastructure destroyed in Fallujah.

AQI Regroups

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ After the defeat in Fallujah, AQI also relocated its base of operations. With assistance from the Ramadi Shura Council and Albu Ghanem tribe, some leaders traveled to the Sufiah and Huseybah Sharqiah districts of Ramadi.[198] Ramadi Shura Council leader Latif assisted this move. Latif agreed to combine his forces with those previously loyal to Hadid. This allowed him to better dominate activities between Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Fallujah.[199] Many rank-and-file AQI and SRE fighters fled west to al-Qa'im and Hadithah. Others remained in Karmah or Saqlawiyah near Fallujah. Large numbers of foreign fighters headed east to rural Taji and Tarmiya north of Baghdad.[200] Of the leaders who'd been active in Fallujah, Zarqawi is believed to have fled to Mosul, and Janabi used his tribal alliances to seek refuge in northern Babil.[201] With the death of Hadid in Fallujah, Ramadi Shura Council leader Daham was promoted to serve as Zarqawi's top lieutenant in Anbar .[202]

~~(S/NF)~~ The insurgent intimidation and murder campaign between Hit and Hadithah, begun during the summer, deterred local support for the Coalition. Post-Fallujah, the AQI presence in Hadithah surged as fighters displaced from Fallujah fled west.[203] This served as a radicalizing force for

Approved for Release

---

194 [| Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
195 [| Military | CG INTELLIGENCE UPDATE : OPERATION PHANTOM FURY UPDATE, OCTOBER 23-24, 2004 | presumed 20041024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
196 Ibid.
197 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
198 [| Military | AO TOPEKA SIGNIFICANT REPORTING, DECEMBER 4, 2004 | 20041204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
199 Ibid.
200 [| Military | CG INTELLIGENCE UPDATE," OPERATION PHANTOM FURY UPDATE, NOVEMBER 5-6, 2004 | presumed 20041106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
201 [| Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
202 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
203 [| Military | NGIC ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF FALLUJAH II (2004-2005) | 200404xx | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Hadithah insurgents, shifting them towards something of a fusion between the Salafist and criminal mindsets.[204]

~~(S/NF)~~ In Hit, the influx of AQI was not nearly as profound. Local insurgent groups, motivated by a desire for self-rule, continued to dominate the insurgency in the city.[205] These sentiments in Hit predated OIF, and many locals regarded any outside force seeking to control it, insurgent or Coalition, as illegitimate.[206]

Summary

(U) In many ways, 2004 was a turning point for the insurgency in Anbar province. The capture of Saddam in late 2003 changed the insurgency forever, splintering the FRL resistance. Insurgent groups moved away from the secular, socialist, pan-Arab Ba'athist ideology toward an Islamist-based ideology. As a result, in 2004, Al Qaeda and Zarqawi began a rise to prominence, although neither dominated the insurgency. Insurgent activity surged, with increasing levels of sophistication in attacks and greater coordination (frequently facilitated by clerics) between and among groups. Insurgent activities were not nearly as localized as they had been in 2003.

(U) 2004 saw the first major battles in Anbar since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In both Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and Operation AL FAJR, insurgent groups fought protracted battles with Coalition and Iraqi forces. Their goal was not only to resist the Coalition and the Iraqi interim government, but to set up a kind of parallel society that included the imposition of *shari'a* law. The insurgent defeat at the conclusion of Operation AL FAJR was a major blow that forced them to regress from attempts to fight the Coalition in semi-conventional warfare to regrouping and reorganization. Despite the insurgents' defeat, Anbar's Sunni community increasingly objected to and resisted the Iraqi Interim Government, which would have significant consequences for future efforts to enlist Iraqi Sunnis in the political process during 2005. Insurgents undertook efforts to weaken the perceived credibility of the Coalition as well as governance at all levels – local, provincial, and national – as reflected in aggressive targeting of government officials, foreshadowing the contest for legitimacy to be waged in 2005.

(U) 2004 closed with an Anbar insurgency that had been damaged but not destroyed, and was still dangerous. The survival of most of the larger insurgent organizations following Operation AL FAJR demonstrated their resilience and flexibility. This had previously been shown in the insurgent reorganization and reorientation that occurred following the capture of Saddam Hussein as well as both battles in Fallujah. The flexibility of the insurgency allowed it to evolve and adapt to changes in Coalition tactics and strategy, with tactical cooperation even occurring between groups that had markedly different agendas. This was reflected by Coalition intelligence analysis, which showed a constantly changing insurgent landscape as groups allied, merged, or splintered on a regular basis (see Appendix J).

Approved for Release

---

[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) In 2005, the following trends within the insurgency would continue:

- rebuilding, expanding and consolidating the numerous groups into tighter organizational and command and control structures
- preventing the emergence of any effective national governance
- establishing their own parallel governance
- imposing *shari'a* law
- adapting to Coalition changes in strategy and tactics with increased flexibility and resilience

(U) Yet, despite the insurgents' efforts, the 2005 elections would go forward, although most Anbaris would boycott them. While this started the year on a positive note, AQI took advantage of opportunities and continued to grow during the rest of the year.

Snapshot: The Insurgency at the End of 2004

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ While the insurgency had lost momentum as a result of its losses in Operation AL FAJR, they soon began to regroup and reorganize. Many mid- and high-level commanders who had been killed in the fighting were not easily replaced. Those leaders who survived were more focused on staying alive and evading capture than on conducting attacks. Fleeing to areas with less Coalition presence, these insurgent leaders managed to regroup, reequip, and recruit new fighters to replace those captured or killed during the fighting. It took several months for this to occur, however, resulting in attack levels in Anbar that were far lower than those seen prior to Operation AL FAJR. December 2004 insurgent attacks in Anbar fell more than 50% from the pre-Operation AL FAJR numbers. The result was that the insurgents lost too much momentum to prevent or disrupt the January 2005 elections.[207]

Attack Data (September – December 2004)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the last trimester (September to December 2004). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following six charts (small format) show the types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, and IED) arrayed over the 2003-2007 time frame and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. Complex Attack data was not yet available during this period.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was higher than the previous period and featured a significant spike concurrent with Fallujah II. The spike in total counts during the week of 11-17 November represents the highest weekly figure recorded to date, with most activity focused in AO Raleigh but significantly increased levels in AO Topeka as well. The Direct Fire and Indirect Fire attack counts closely mirror the overall counts, while the IED attack counts show a

[207] [| Military | TFC: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 001-05 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

more muted correlation. There is also a smaller spike in activity during the week of 9-15 September, with almost all of the increase coming from activity in AO Topeka.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Insurgent Profile: 2004



Figure 1: 2004 Street-Level Insurgent Profile ~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~

Approved for Release

~~(S/NF)~~ In 2004, the typical street-level insurgent captured in Anbar was an Iraqi male about 28 years old, was more likely to be married than to be unmarried, and was educated at a high-school level or less. Most captured detainees were associated with tribes and also had some military experience. These conclusions are based on an analysis of more than 4,300 tactical interrogation reports gathered from intelligence sources.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Most insurgents captured in 2004 were 30 years old or younger (61.7%), with a significant group (12.2%) under 20 years old. The middle 50% of the population was between 22 and 35 years old. The fact that the median of 28 years is lower than the mean of 30.0 years confirms that the data is skewed younger and also indicates that the age range among older detainees has a large spread. The most common age among detainees was 25 years old.

~~(S/NF)~~ Of all detainees captured in 2004, 92.9% claimed to be Iraqi. However, it is likely that many of the remaining detainees, more than half who described themselves only as Muslim, Sunni, or Shiite, were Iraqis but identified themselves first by their religion. Of the 3.0% claiming to be of foreign origin, the most frequent origins named were Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran.

~~(S/NF)~~ Just over 50% of the detainees were associated with blue collar or other labor occupations. The most common occupation claimed was *shepherd* or *farmer* (18.4%), though the largest grouping of occupations was *blue collar workers* (20.8%), which included jobs like *electrician*, *carpenter*, and *laborer*. Though only 7.2% of detainees claimed to be actively unemployed, it is likely that many more detainees were actually unemployed but provided their previous job or training when asked their occupation. In addition, a noteworthy fraction of detainees (11.8%) were employed in positions of trust such as the Iraqi police or local security forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ More than half of those captured in 2004 claimed to have some military experience (57.6%), while a portion of those that had not served were still students and were too young to participate. This finding indicates that a large segment of the insurgent population had some form of prior military training, had combat experience, and may even have had personal access to weapons.

~~(S/NF)~~ At least three-quarters of those detained had no education beyond high-school, with nearly half (46.1%) having no more than an elementary education (6th grade or less). More than 15% had some post-secondary education or had completed a degree program.

~~(S/NF)~~ The tribe with the most captured members in 2004 was the Fahad tribe. The most captures of Fahad happened in April, coincident with Fallujah I, and in the latter part of the year. In November 2004, coincident with Fallujah II, the Albu Alwan and Albu Khalifah tribes were most captured, while there was a significant dip in Fahad captures from 75 in October to 9 in November. Though these were the most frequent tribes claimed, there were many tribes well-represented, as only 52% of the detainees associated themselves with one of the top 20 tribes.

~~(S/NF)~~ The most frequently claimed residence among detainees in 2004 was the Ramadi area, with nearly a third (33.1%) of detainees, followed by Fallujah with 24.6% of detainees. In particular, the Fallujah-area town of Karmah (7.0%) contained a large concentration of detainees. Habbaniyah and the neighborhood of Khaldiyah was also a source of many detainees, with 12.2% of all detainees. Other detainees came from Al Qa'im/Husaybah (6.5%) or from outside Anbar in Baghdad (5.7%), though this was somewhat limited.

~~(S/NF)~~ Nearly 60% of all detainees (58.3%) in 2004 claimed to be married, engaged, or widowed, though most detainees under 30 (75.8%) were still single. Almost all married detainees (91.5%)

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

claimed to have children, but this data is unreliable. The need to support a family likely was a factor that led those with children to participate in the insurgency to receive larger financial gain than their regular jobs or while unemployed.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Chapter Five

Anbar: Insurgency Grows, Strengthens, Elections (2005)

January to May

Introduction

(U) *The various Sunni insurgent groups suffered a major blow in the second battle of Fallujah* ***Error! Bookmark not defined.*** *(Operation AL FAJR) in November 2004. Thousands of fighters were captured or killed. The insurgent leadership spent several months reorganizing in its aftermath, retreating to their remaining strongholds in western Anbar. This left the insurgents unable to derail the upcoming (January 2005) Iraqi elections.*

(U) Even so, popular Sunni antipathy towards the Coalition led them to boycott the January elections. Coalition diplomatic efforts for the remainder of the year focused on convincing Sunni leaders to engage in the political process. These efforts, combined with the sense of hopelessness among insurgents stemming from Operation AL FAJR, would eventually bear some fruit. There was Sunni participation in the summer's constitutional referendum and the December elections. This also helped create divisions between more nationalist insurgents led by Dr. Mohammed Mahmud Latif and Islamists led by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (Zarqawi).

(U) *From April onwards, the Sunni insurgent groups stepped up their efforts to target the general population of Baghdad* ***Error! Bookmark not defined.****, leading to Coalition military action against their strongholds in Anbar. By the end of the year, the Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR) was increasing its involvement and influence in the political process and the ethno-nationalist motivations for the insurgency were declining. This led to major infighting within the insurgency and paved the way for the emergence of AQI* ***Error! Bookmark not defined.*** *as the dominant group in the province by 2006.*

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The second battle of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (Operation AL FAJR) was generally perceived as an unqualified rout of the various insurgent groups in Anbar. Roughly 4,000 insurgent fighters were captured or killed, including Umar Hadid, who had served as the de facto commander-in-chief for the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura. The insurgent plan to defend Fallujah (see Chapter 4) by sending half of its fighters from Fallujah to Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and northern Babil in the hopes of opening up a second front was a failure. Insurgents who survived the fighting dispersed to the al-Qa'im-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** area, Baghdad, northern Babil, or the Fallujah-Ramadi corridor. The loss of Fallujah had pushed the insurgency back, forcing those that remained to go underground and operate differently in the province than they had in the past. Because of this, insurgent efforts in early 2005 focused on reestablishing their organizations and infrastructure in Anbar.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

The January Elections and Their Aftermath (January – March 2005)

AQIError! Bookmark not defined. **Regroups in the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.-**Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined. **Corridor**

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ With the fall of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, one of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s top priorities was to find a safe area where they could reorganize and continue to operate. The Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor was particularly attractive, as the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign launched in the summer of 2004 had largely suppressed local support for the Coalition.[1] The intimidation campaign had especially affected the Iraqi police (IP) in Haditha. What little law enforcement presence remained was considered ineffective.[2] Prior to Operation AL FAJR, many Haditha residents had welcomed this development, regarding the IP as thuggish and unnecessary, but they now found themselves virtually defenseless in the face of a large insurgent presence in their city. [3] With only an intermittent presence of Coalition troops in the Hit-Haditha corridor, the insurgents saw it as a safe to regroup.

~~(S/NF)~~ Zarqawi himself went to Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.** following his escape from Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. He concentrated on destabilizing that area. A large number of his followers in Anbar either fled to the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor, further to the west in Anbar (even as far as Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on the Syrian border), or sought shelter among Sunni extremists in Zaidon (about 30 km southwest of Fallajah near the Euphrates River) and Nasser Wa Salaam near Abu Ghraib.[4] The influx of Salafist fighters fleeing Fallujah served as a radicalizing force on the local insurgents—who previously had a more criminal mindset. At least one ad-hoc AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** terrorist training camp was set up in Haditha to train replacements for those killed in Fallujah.[5]

~~(S/NF)~~ In a positive development, the religious radicalization of the core jihadist insurgents in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** spurred many residents to provide intelligence to the Coalition despite increased intimidation. A possible explanation is the Haditha residents were willing

Approved for Release

[1] [| Military | NGIC: ASSESSMENT: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: BATTLE OF OPERATION AL FAJR (2004-2005) | | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050109 | 20050109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[2] [|Military | 1ST MARINE DIVISION: IO WEEKLY OPERATIONS SUMMARY | 20050108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[3] Ibid.
[4] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050109 | 20050109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[5] [| Military | I MEF: AO MSR/ASR ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 14-20, 2005 | presumed 20050120 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

to tolerate the presence of the local SARand criminal insurgent forces but not the increasing number of Salafists and foreigners into the city.[6]

(~~S/NF~~) Under the leadership of Abu Abd al-Qadir, a small number of mid-level AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** members remained active in the towns of Karmah and Saqlawiyah (about 10 km northwest of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on the Euphrates River), possibly searching for survivors from Operation AL FAJR.. A wealthy man, al-Qadir also maintained ties to the local criminal element and was connected to a legitimate construction business that he hoped would win a $2,400,000 contract from the Iraqi Ministry of Health to build a dispensary.[7]

(~~S/NF~~) While Zarqawi focused his operations on Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, he recognized the urgent need to rebuild his organization in Anbar. Towards that end, he traveled to Abu Ghraib disguised as a woman with a handful of trusted bodyguards to meet with SARleader and former IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** officer Sabah Khalaf Farhan al-Zobai (Sabah Khalaf) to assess the situation.[8]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Following his meeting in early January 2005 with Sabah Khalaf, Zarqawi held a meeting of the AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Ansar al-Sunna (AS), and Jaysh Mohammed leadership at Abu Ghraib to assess the insurgency's prospects post-Operation AL FAJR and to begin working on a new strategy to prevent the creation of a stable Iraqi government.[9]

MCIA Insert Picture Here Of Khalaf

(~~S/NF~~) **SABAH KHALAF.** A former IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** officer, Sabah had been responsible for overseeing the IIS Assassination Committee. A close associate of both fugitive IIS Director Tahir Jalil Habbush and detained M-14 Director Mohammad Khudair Sabah, Sabah had a sincere interest in Salafism during Saddam Hussein's rule. He allied himself first with SRE groups and then with AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Sabah's close ties to the M-14 leadership give him access to a cadre of experienced M-14 operatives and explosives experts across Anbar, particularly those active in the Karmah-based Green Battalion.

(~~S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, AND NZL~~) At least part of Zarqawi's plan for sabotaging the Iraqi elections called for suicide bombers. Umar Hadid associate Abu Abd al-Rahman ordered foreign fighter facilitator Abu Husayn to increase the number of "grooms" (suicide bombers) for use in targeting polling booths during the Iraqi elections.[10]

Approved for Release

[6] [| Military | MNF-W: STATE OF THE INSURGENCY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2005 | 20050905 (~~S/NF~~) |]
[7] [| Military | 2D RADIO BATTALION: ABU ABD AL QADIR, MARCH 13, 2005 | 20050313 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[8] [| Militar | DIIR IMEF HET08 0174, DOI 7 JAN 05 | 20050113 | (~~S/NF~~) |]; [| Military | 1.4c 1.4c
[9] [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET08 0199 05: DOI 23 JAN 05 | 20050125 | (~~S/REL USA AND MCFI~~) |]
[10] [| Military | 2D RADIO BATTALION: ABU HUSAYN, JANUARY 2, 2005 | 20050102 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ A major asset for AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s rebuilding efforts in Anbar lay in its retention of an external financial network. For instance, Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** AQI financier Abu Khattab al-Ansari, who served as a member of an 82mm mortar team during Operation AL FAJR, maintained contact with Abu Durr (Abu al-Hour), a Saudi-based AQAM[11] financier. Abu Durr was the primary conduit of funding to Zarqawi from Saudi Arabia and Europe via the UAE**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[12] Other Zarqawi lieutenants such as Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** amir Abu Abd al-Aziz continued to easily access funds from Saudi-based clerics and NGOs. These funds added to fund from Iraq provided them with the finances to rebuild AQI.[13]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ An event held at the end of January 2005 was a testimony to AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s recovery. AQI leadership felt secure enough to hold a memorial service for Umar Hadid in Amariyah on January 27. It was even attended by the leadership of AS, Jaysh Mohammed, and some smaller Iraqi Salafist groups. Sabah Khalaf delivered the eulogy, stating that the death of Hadid would impact the insurgency's operational tempo if openly known and for that reason must be kept secret from both the Coalition and rank-and-file insurgents. Even the insurgent leaders were not told the true circumstances of Hadid's death, with Sabah telling them that he had been killed in Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** while shooting down a Coalition helicopter.[14]

The Emergence of the Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR)

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ **Divisions within the Insurgency**: While Zarqawi was looking for means to reinvigorate the insurgency, other insurgents were looking for a way out. The loss of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had deflated the SARinsurgency. Many senior leaders of groups operating under the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council began looking for a way to engage politically to gain a stake in the new government. This led to divisions between SREs and members of the newly emerging Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR). While not crystal clear, these divisions appeared to divide the insurgency from 2005 onwards.[15]

> ~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ **SUNNI ARAB RESISTANCE (SAR).** From 2005 onwards, Coalition forces used the term SAR to refer to those FREs, tribal leaders, and emerging elites active within the insurgency who were open to political engagement and reconciliation with the Iraqi government despite their anti-Coalition activities. SARs rely on the Ba'ath Military Bureau, the former Iraqi security services, IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and tribal networks for organization, with most SAR groups maintaining a Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based political leadership to determine strategy and financing in addition to an Iraq-based military leadership.

Approved for Release

[11] AQAM (Al Qaida and Associated Movements) refers to the global effort by Al Qaida.
[12] [| Military | 2D RADIO BATTALION: ABU KHATTAB AL ANSARI, MARCH 2, 2005 | 20050302 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] AQAM refers to al Qa'ida and Associated Movements, the global network of Sunni Islamist terrorist networks.
[13] [| Military | 1.4c
[14] [| Military | IMEF HET08 0205 05| 20050128 | ~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[15] [|Military | STATE OF THE INSURGENCY MNF-W, SEPTEMBER 5, 2005 | presumed 20050905 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The de facto leader of the SARs in Anbar Province was Muhammad Mahmud Latif (MML), the head of Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council (see Chapter 4 and Appendix J, Index of Insurgent Groups). In early 2005, Latif left Ramadi for Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to convince other insurgent leaders to press for a political solution after their defeat in Operation AL FAJR.[16] Contacting senior leaders of the Dulaymi tribal confederation, MML asked them to serve as intermediaries between the insurgency, the Coalition, and the Iraq Interim Government (IIG).[17] This decision may have been prompted as much by his own perceived weakness as by a desire to negotiate with the Coalition. Like many SARs, MML feared the rise of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Zarqawi's extremist interpretation of Islam.

~~(S/NF)~~ **MUHAMMAD MAHMUD LATIF AL FAHADAWI (ABU JUNAID, MML).** The leader of the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council, MML headed an insurgent network stretching from Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to Ramadi to Saqlawiyah. The former imam of the Abdullah Maktum Mosque in Ramadi, MML had been calling for jihad against the Coalition since 2003 and had impeccable SAR insurgent credentials. He was regarded as a leading religious figure by AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, AI, AS, and 1920 Revolution Brigade as well as an associate of the Kharbit family and tribal leaders supporting the insurgency. While he was a close associate of Ramadi Shura Council deputy leader Mohammed Daham, MML is a devout Sufi with a moderate view of *shari'a*. *He* fell out with Daham following the other man's promotion to a top lieutenant to Zarqawi with the death of Umar Hadid.

MCIA Insert map of tribes and location

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ MML's decision to push for a political solution to the insurgency was controversial within the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council and led to a schism within Jaysh Mohammed. While MML was a powerful insurgent leader in Anbar and too strong to be challenged by any one group, former Anbar Ba'ath Party Secretary Hani Nasser Raja al-Ubaydi refused to accept the leadership of MML's loyalists in Jaysh Mohammed. He formed his own Jaysh al-Haqq (JAH) splinter organization with the help of the brothers General Thurar Henefish al-Mahalawi and General Munir Thurar Henefish al-Mahalawi. Gaining the financial support of the Amman-based Abd al-Latif Humayin al-Kharbit (see Chapter 4), JAH remained active within Ramadi Shura Council but adamantly refused to listen to MML, instead working with AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to try to undermine the Iraqi elections.[18]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The emergence of SARs, and MML's decision to join the political process, illustrate one of the defining characteristics of the Iraqi insurgency: a remarkable fluidity of alliances, motivations and ideologies. Nevertheless, of the 10,000 Sunni insurgents estimated to be active by the Coalition at this time, 30% are believed to have been SREs, 45% SARs, and 25%

[16] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050117 | 20050117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[17] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[18] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050125 | 20050125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

criminal.[19] It is important to note that the attitude of individual groups varied a great deal depending on the local environment. SRE/SAR differences did not rule out mutual collaboration:[20] In many cases, membership within insurgent groups was fluid, with street-level insurgents moving easily between different groups.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ In addition, most of the non-SRE insurgent figures within the Karbuli, Ubaydi, Rawi, Mahalowi, Salmani, Fahd, Khalfawi, Diab, Faraj, Alwan, Zobai, Halbusi, Jumayli, Mohamdi, Janabi, and Dulaymi tribes would likely be classified as SARs.[21]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ While SAR insurgents were open to reconciliation with the IIG in theory, MML urged boycotting or sabotaging the January elections to demonstrate Sunni influence in Iraq. His view was seen by many as extremely radical at the time, but, came to be accepted by other insurgents later in 2005.

~~(S/REL)~~ The SRE/SAR differences were also reflected among the Ba'athist leaders and former Iraqi political actors residing abroad. While some Ba'athists still regarded themselves as loyal to the ideals of Pan-Arab socialism and had delusions about rescuing Saddam Hussein and restoring him to the presidency, most recognized—and exploited—the appeal of extremist rhetoric for soliciting international aid for the insurgency. However, the Ba'athist leaders exercised a limited role in inter-insurgent disputes in Anbar. Their primary role in the province's insurgency lay more in issuing periodic communiqués and providing insurgent groups access to funding through intermediary financiers. They simply did not exercise day-to-day operational control.[22]

~~(S/REL)~~ Despite the emergence of SREs and SARs as the predominant centers of the insurgency in Anbar, the vast majority of the rank and file insurgents in the province was made up of individuals who had served as military and security personnel under Saddam Hussein. However, many of these individuals had adopted Salafist beliefs since the fall of Saddam Hussein and hence were SREs regardless of their former backgrounds.

Anbar Prior to the 2005 Elections

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The situation in Anbar at the opening of 2005, while much improved from the previous year, remained volatile. After Operation AL FAJR, Anbar's provincial

Approved for Release

[19] [| Military | STATE OF THE INSURGENCY MNF-W, SEPTEMBER 5, 2005 | presumed 20050905 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[20] The following organizations can be classified as SRE: Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, Islamic Army of Iraq, Nu'man Brigade, Islamic Movement of Iraq Mujahideen, Saraya al-Jihad. These groups are SAR: Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, Al-Asa'ab al-Iraqi, Al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal, Green Brigade, Jaysh Mohammed, 1920 Revolution Brigade. Jaysh al-Haq, Abu Sheba Group, Isa al-Handi Group, Mohammed Suleman Group. Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050117 | 20050117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

government in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** started to move again, but was severely compromised by the insurgents murder and intimidation campaigns.[23]

~~(S/NF)~~ Anbar Governor Fasal Gaoud remained a weak authority figure. During his first week in office in November 2004, he had been forced to meet with representatives of Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council who gave him one month to remove Coalition forces from Ramadi or face the consequences.[24] Regarded by many Anbaris as incapable of governing the province, he had already lost several key officials to kidnapping or resignation and made little effort to replace them.[25]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The most improved area of Anbar was Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. The city's residents were grateful to the Coalition for launching Operation AL FAJR and blamed the insurgency for their current state of affairs.[26] Having seen a glimpse of what Iraq would be like under Salafists, many Fallujah residents reduced their support to the insurgency despite their dislike of the Coalition presence and antipathy towards the IIG. Aversion to the insurgency rose to the point that a majority of Fallujahns expressed a desire for a permanent Coalition military force stationed in the city.[27]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The Coalition and the IIG also sought to engage Sunnis in the political process by encouraging participation in the elections. This was no easy feat, as the elections were opposed not only by insurgents and Anbaris angry over Operation AL FAJR, but also by local Sunni leaders and incumbent officials at nearly every level. There were two main reasons for this opposition from local leaders: 1) fear they would lose their current standing and influence, and 2) concerns about insurgent violence.[28] As a result, the individuals who should have supported the political process (the incumbents) were instead trying to depress turnout in the belief that it would protect their jobs.[29]

~~(S/NF)~~ Individual cities had additional issues that would keep participation in the elections low. Many Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** residents were completely ignorant of which parties and candidates were running for office, believing that their only option was to pray that the right people were elected. In Khalidiyah as in much of Anbar, residents regarded basic necessities like electricity and water as more important to them than abstract concepts like elections. There was

Approved for Release

---

[23] [| Military | 1ST MARINE DIVISION: IO WEEKLY OPERATIONS SUMMARY, January 8, 2005 | 20050108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[24] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050115 | 20050115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[25] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050110 | 20050110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[26] [|Military | 1ST MARINE DIVISION: IO WEEKLY OPERATIONS SUMMARY, JANUARY 8, 2005 | 20050108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[27] [| Military | 1ST MARINE DIVISION: IO WEEKLY OPERATIONS SUMMARY, JANUARY 29, 2005 | 20050129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[28] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050115 | 20050115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[29] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

serious concern that if they voted under their real names, the insurgents would get the voting registers and target them for supporting the elections. A further concern was that the Shi'a would impose their "distorted" views of Islam on the country. [30]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ While Iraqi election workers publicly claimed that up to 750,000 votes were expected in Anbar, in private they conceded that only a few thousand residents were likely to vote. In an effort to keep expectations low, Iraq's Sunni president Ghazi al-Yawar stated that many Iraqis were unlikely to vote out of fears of bloodshed. He attempted to reassure the Sunni community that those who didn't vote would could still participate in talks for the new constitution.[31]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ With Anbar incumbents failing to support the elections, the Coalition turned to motivating other leaders in the province. In early January 2005 three meetings were organized between the IIG and local tribal leaders. The first meeting, held in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** included eight respected Anbari sheikhs from the Jumayli, Albu Issa, Mohamdi, Zobai, Aluwani, Rawi, and Anni tribes. This meeting actively played to the Sunni fear of Shi'a power in Iraq, with Fallujah's Shi'a police commander noting that Sunnis should vote if they were so fearful of Shi'a power in Iraq. Somewhat surprisingly, the sheikhs were all supportive of incumbent Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, regarding him as a "strong leader" and an acceptable Shi'a candidate because of his secular nature.[32]

~~(S/NF)~~ The second meeting, attended by fifteen sheikhs, took place in mid-January 2005 at the office of Interior Minister Falah Hassan al-Naqib. Al-Naqib was direct but non-confrontational, noting that the only way for Sunnis to regain any political power was to participate in the elections. All of the leaders that attended, however, were from areas with a heavy insurgent presence. Intimidation was a more pressing concern than tribal allegiance.[33] Moreover, the senior members of the Dulaymi confederation that attended had already lost considerable credibility among their own tribesmen. They were perceived as corrupt and neglectful of their people and too close to the Coalition.[34] A number of the Dulaymi sheikhs feared assassination if they returned to Anbar.

~~(S/NF)~~ A third and final meeting occurred as a result of the efforts of United Iraqi Alliance candidate and future Iraqi National Security Advisor Dr. Muffawaq al-Ruba'i Khalil Ibrahim al-Jabara. He wanted to enlist Sunni tribal leaders to support the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) despite its overwhelming Shi'a majority. Even so, al-Ruba'i's meeting was not without some positive results as many of those Anbaris that did vote relied on their tribal leaders to tell them which parties and candidates to support.[35]

Approved for Release

---

[30] [| Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050129 | 20050129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] [| 1.4c | 20050130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[34] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[35] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050130 | 20050130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ National Iraqi political maneuvering also had consequences for the situation in Anbar. A considerable Shi'a bloc formed under the banner of the United Iraqi Alliance. Within the UIA, both the Da'wa Party and the Islamic Da'wa Party (IDP) began vying with the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) to serve as the public face of the Iraqi Shi'a. Leaders from both Da'wa parties had already endorsed Ibrahim Jaffari as prime minister, with SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz Hakim serving as his top rival. A major obstacle for the UIA in the early negotiations to select a prime minister lay in the fact that the alliance had poor internal discipline. The UIA was more an amalgamation of Iraqi Shi'a politics than it was a united parliamentary bloc. Because a 2/3 majority was required in parliament to form a government, the UIA's need to form a coalition with Kurdish and Sunni politicians removed more divisive candidates like finance minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi or Hussain Shahristani. Incumbent president Ghazi al-Yawr and Adnan Pachachi also sought to obtain the presidency.[36] For many Anbaris, the absence of any major Sunni candidates appeared to confirm insurgent claims that the elections were an American plot to install a Shi'a dictatorship in Iraq, further contributing to the boycott.

Approved for Release

The January 2005 Elections

(U) While insurgent preparations to attack the elections had been underway for some time, the first public declaration to that effect was a January 23 audiotape by Zarqawi. In it, he denounced the elections, referring to the candidates as "demi-idols" and declaring those who voted as *kuffar* (unbelievers)—a clear threat to the security of those who took part in the election.[37] In keeping with insurgent propaganda themes, Zarqawi stated that the Coalition was holding the elections in order to bring the Shi'a to power in Iraq. As a demonstration of his power, Zarqawi released a video of Salem Jaafar al-Kanani, Prime Minister Allawi's political director, who was forced to read a statement urging Iraqis not to cooperate with the Coalition before being killed.[38]

> (U) **TAKFIR.** The act of declaring a Muslim to be an unbeliever (kafir, pl. kuffar or kafirun) is called *takfir*. Those people who engage in this act are called "takfiris." Takfir involves far more than a religious declaration, however. Traditionally, once a Muslim is declared an unbeliever or an apostate, he loses all right to property (including the right to inherit or pass on through inheritance any property), he is automatically divorced from his wife, and his blood becomes licit (i.e., he can be killed without any penalty). In the past, only the state could declare a Muslim to be an apostate or unbeliever, and takfir was a rare event. Today, most jihadis believe that they have the right to declare takfir and then to kill the apostates and take their property.

[36] [| 1.4c, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 20050125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[37] [| Open Source | ASSOCIATED PRESS/ ROBERT H. REID: OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES ELECTION WOES | 20050123 | (U) |]
[38] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050127 | 20050127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Voter Intimidation

(~~S/NF~~) Zarqawi's attack on the elections coincided with a major information campaign spearheaded by his UAE**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based propaganda chief Abu Maysarah al-Iraqi. Operating primarily through the internet, Abu Maysarah posted hundreds of online messages denouncing the elections. To maximize his appeal internationally, he quoted from the writings of the late JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.** spiritual leader Sheikh Abu Anas al-Shami and posted rare photos of 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta.[39]

(~~S/NF~~) Zarqawi's threat to kill those who took part in the Iraqi elections, as well as his continued massacres of ordinary Shi'a, led to a trend that would have tragic consequences for the people of Iraq. Frustrated with what they saw as inaction on the part of the Iraqi government towards Zarqawi and his attacks on Shi'a, in mid-January 2005 members of the Da'wa Party and SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s Badr Brigade paramilitary wing formed the al-Mukhtar Battalion, a death squad designed to hunt down and kill suspected Salafists, Wahhabis, and Ba'athists.[40]

(~~S/NF~~) The insurgent push to counter the elections in Anbar began on January 27 with a major spike in attacks throughout the eastern part of the province, such as the Abu Harun Group's attacks on polling sites in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[41] That same day, the IIG implemented a national curfew until February 1, attempting to empower local Iraqi leaders and the security forces to provide security for elections.[42]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) The national curfew appears to have blunted a number of planned insurgent attacks in Anbar. In Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Mohammed Daham's followers in the Ramadi Shura Council and the Abu Harun Group had planned to send fighters from Ramadi to Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to carry out attacks on polling stations but were prevented from doing so by the traffic ban.[43] Their objectives were to:

- Attack U.S. forces to create chaos and mayhem and divert security from polling places
- Attack polling places and Shi'a to prevent them from voting
- Not harm Sunnis, but intimidate them so that they will not vote

(~~S/NF~~) Plans to carry out attacks within Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** itself were organized by Colonel Ayad (Abu Omar), a former member of Qusay Hussein's Security Service and deputy to Umar Hadid. He oversaw the murder and intimidation campaign in the city during the run-up to the election. Colonel Ayad, however, was unprepared for the IIG's use of multiple polling

Approved for Release

[39] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050129 | 20050129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[40] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[41] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050127 | 20050127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[42] Ibid.
[43] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

stations, believing that only Government Centers or local high schools would be used. The insurgent plan also failed to take into account the large number of Coalition and Iraqi National Guard forces active on the streets during the elections.[44]

~~(S/NF)~~ Other groups conspiring to disrupt or prevent the lections included:

- AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**
- Nationalistic groups such as Jaysh al-Haqq
- Smaller AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** associate groups such as the Umar Hadid Battalion

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Plans to attack voters in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** by local SARleaders Karim Karkaz and Zaydan Khalaf were similarly called off when it became clear that they would be unable to get VBIEDs within range of the polling sites.[45]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite its failure to carry out attacks in Anbar during the election, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** did successfully attack voters and polling sites in both Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[46] Even with the insurgent failure to carry out major attacks against polling sites in Anbar, however, the combination of the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign, a lack of Anbari political support, and Sunni popular antipathy towards the IIG created an effective boycott in Anbar. Total voter turnout for the province was 16,588, with only 2,300 voting in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. The largest single turnout was nearly 5,000 in the majority Shi'a city of Nasser Wa Salaam and lowest was in Karmah where there was no voting at all due to widespread fear of retaliation.[47]

Political Results from the Elections

(U) Unofficial national election results for all of Iraq had the Shi'a UIA winning 47.6% of vote, with the Kurdish Alliance coming in second at 25.4%. Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's Iraq List, which would have been the most acceptable of the three to Anbaris, only received 13.6%.

~~(S/NF)~~ In provincial elections, the IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** won thirty-four of forty-one seats in Anbar running on a platform of freeing Iraq from the Coalition, resisting foreign influence, building national unity, empathizing with the Iraqi people, and creating a good life for every Iraqi, based on Islamic principles.[48] Regarding Governor Gaoud's personality as the source of many of the problems in Anbar, the IIP pressed for former deputy provincial council chairman Mamoun Sami

[44] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050129 | 20050129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[45] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050126 | 20050126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[46] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050130 | 20050130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[47] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050130 | 20050130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[48] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050219 | 20050219 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Rasheed to be the new governor of Anbar. A consummate politician, Mamoun had a good relationship with the Coalition but appears to have committed electoral "improprieties" in order to ensure the IIP's political dominance in Anbar.[49]

(~~S/REL~~) Despite the widespread Sunni boycott in Anbar, many Anbari political parties adopted a "wait and see" approach toward the new national government. Moderating their earlier rhetoric and minimizing challenges to the election's legitimacy, many Sunni political leaders announced that they were willing to accept secular Shi'a control of the government as long as it did not result in an Iranian-style theocracy.[50] While this was not likely since none of the prominent Iraqi Shi'a political parties advocated a Khomeinist system of governance, it was a major concern in Anbar and other parts of Iraq. Hence the statements by Sunni political leaders helped to encourage some Sunnis to work with the new government.

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Sunni politicians Adnan Pachachi and Muhsin Abd al-Hamid expressed despondency about the Sunni marginalization resulting from the boycott.[51] Many Iraqi Sunnis who had previously supported the boycott of the national elections now realized that the party would have little influence in the new government. The IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s threat to boycott had been intended to postpone the elections or lead to a reform in the electoral process.[52] Now, however, IIP leaders recognized that they had to work together with other Sunni parties to preserve their influence over the constitutional ratification process and over the establishment of a permanent Iraqi government. The table below shows the evolution of governance of Iraq from 2003 to 2006.

(U) Governance Organization	Leader	Dates	Religion
ORHA**Error! Bookmark not defined.**	Jay Garner	4/21/03-5/16/03	
CPA**Error! Bookmark not defined.** / Iraqi Governance Council (IGC)	L. Paul Bremer	5/03-6/04	
Iraqi Interim Government	Ayad [Iyad] Alawi - Prime Minister	6/04-4/05	Shi'a
	Ibrahim Jaafari - Prime Minister	4/7/05-4/22/06	Shi'a
Government of Iraq (Sovereign)	Nouri (Jawad) Maliki - Prime Minister	4/22/06 - present	Shi'a

[49] Ibid.
[50] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050201 | 20050201 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[51] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050215 | 20050215 | (~~S/ REL MCFI~~) |]
[52] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) **Figure 1. Governance in Iraq, 2003 to 2006**

~~(S/NF)~~ One reason for the temporary accommodation by the new Sunni elites lay in their realization that, far from being a monolith, the Shi'a were just as internally divided as the Sunni. Secular Shi'a leader Ahmed Chalabi initially sought backing from UIA supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, only to be deserted when Ali Sumasem, his main contact in the Sadr camp, lost favor with Muqtada al-Sadr.[53] With Chalabi defeated, the Islamic Da'wa Party (IDP) candidate Ibrahim al-Jaafari was able to win the support of SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** from former finance minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi, ensuring his nomination as the UIA's candidate for prime minister.[54]

~~(S/REL)~~ The Sunni calculations about their new political situation were thus complicated by a number of factors. On the one hand, the Sunnis leadership thought the new Iraqi National Assembly unlikely to settle important issues, instead drafting a broad and diluted constitution in order to secure minority support and defer a potential veto.[55] Thus most of the major concerns that ad sparked the Sunni boycott would be deferred until a new government was elected and installed in 2006, giving Sunni political figures another year to maneuver.[56]

~~(S/NF)~~ On the other hand, when SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** began holding meetings in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in February to advocate the creation of a federalist system that promised the southern Shi'a regions of Iraq some degree of local autonomy, fears of the new government were rekindled in Anbar. [57] While SCIRI did not command a majority within the UIA, its success in elections allowed it to wield a disproportionate amount of influence.[58]

~~(S/NF)~~ Efforts to achieve Sunni political participation in Anbar in early 2005 were also deeply affected by the machinations of AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leaders Harith al-Dhari and Mohammed Hardan Hashim.[59] Harith al-Dhari in particular continued to demand Coalition withdrawal, painting the Iraqi elections as fraudulent and inflaming tensions by claiming that al-Najaf**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was rebuilt after the Coalition fought al-Sadr while Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** continued to stagnate.[60]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ To win Anbari support for the new government, the Coalition and IIG began a "hearts and minds" campaign. Governor Gaoud met with Albu Dhiyab, Albu Nimr, and Albu Issa tribal leaders to discuss the special release of the prominent Albu Dhiyab tribal leader

[53] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050215 | 20050215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[54] Ibid.
[55] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050206 | 20050206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[56] Ibid.
[57] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050205 | 20050205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[58] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050208 | 20050208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[59] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050203 | 20050203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[60] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050215 | 20050215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Sheikh Hamid Turki Zurbin, who had been detained by the Coalition.[61] The release of Sheikh Hamid generated a considerable amount of goodwill among Anbari tribal leaders, particularly when it became known that Sheikh Hamid had now adopted a pro-Coalition outlook and issued public statements stating that the Coalition was in Iraq to help the Iraqi people, that they treated the local population with respect, and that cooperation with the Coalition was necessary to make Iraq peaceful again.[62] Yet the Abu Ghraib scandal continued to persuade many Anbaris that they would be treated inhumanely if they were detained by the Coalition.[63]

Post-Election Realizations (February 2005)

~~(S/REL)~~ The result of these pressures was that Sunni political parties in Anbar were hesitant to support the new Iraqi government. While apprehensive about likely Shi'a control of the government, many Sunni political leaders were willing to accept Shi'a political dominance as lon as the did not install an Iranian-style system of government.[64] In an effort to counter 1.4b secular Anbari Sunnis formed the Sunni Movement to Protect Iraq.[65]

~~(S/NF)~~ Interestingly, the insurgency as a whole also adopted a "wait and see" approach, some because of logistical difficulties and others due to a desire to participate in the political process. Those who wished to continue the fight had the necessary manpower and munitions to surge attacks but now lacked the necessary planners and expertise because of losses suffered during Operation AL FAJR. The result was a lull in fighting across Anbar, suggesting that insurgent capabilities had temporarily peaked during the period of attacks in the run-up to the elections.[66]

City Stories – Early 2005

General Observations

~~(PRE-DECISIONAL SECRET)~~ Much of western Anbar served as insurgent bases after the defeat in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. MML maintained his base in the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** region, while other major centers of insurgent activity were along the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Bayji and Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridors, with the insurgent leaders based in Rawah overseeing much of the insurgency in western Anbar.[67] In addition to MML, the major insurgent leader in the region was Ghassan

Approved for Release

[61] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050203 | 20050203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[62] Ibid.
[63] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050304 | 20050304 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[64] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050201 | 20050201 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[65] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050222 | 20050222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[66] Ibid.
[67] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050208 | 20050208 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Amean, who was the overall AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader for far western Anbar.[68] Ghassan Amean had ties to a Saudi AQAM leader who was alleged to be the nephew of 'Usama bin Laden.[69]

HadithaError! Bookmark not defined. **and Vicinity**

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s poor security conditions and the prevalence of Islamist ideology helped the city to largely replace Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as a final waypoint for foreign fighters bound for Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[70, 71] Near Haditha, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Aqaba Nafah al-Hayani controlled many of the mosques in Haqlaniyah and Barwanah, conducting armed patrols in the city whenever Coalition forces were not present.[72] Prior to Operation RIVER BLITZ (February-March 2005), Aqaba Nafah al-Hayani, Hamed Dawoud Azawi, and Abu Taha were the major insurgent leaders in Haditha.[73]

Al-Qa'im and Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, a successor group to the earlier Al Theeb, served as the major insurgent group in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Motivated as much by anger and criminality as by religion, the group was led by Bassim Mohammad Fayad and Ra'ad Salah Mutar. Mutar in particular was an infamous figure in Husaybah. He was reputed to have kidnapped as many as 50 Iraqis for working for the police, the national guard, or the Coalition during the previous year. The group was supported by wealthy Iraqis living in Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Lebanon**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[74]

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) With the aid of Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** insurgents facilitated the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq, with Husaybah serving as a last stop for foreign fighters bound for Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Bayji, Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[75]

HitError! Bookmark not defined.

Approved for Release

[68] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[69] [| Military | IMPACTS ON THE LOCAL INSURGENCY FOLLOWING THE DETAINMENT OF GHASSAN AMEAN -- AO DENVER SIGNIFICANT REPORTING | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[70] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050218 | 20050218 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]
[71] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[72] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050201 | 20050201 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[73] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[74] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050204 | 20050204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[75] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050218 | 20050218 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Some of the insurgents in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had relocated from Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** with some led by MML. They successfully exploited the city's tribal dynamics and long tradition of opposition to outside authority.[76] Local leaders of the insurgency in Hit were Wayeib Hamoud Albu Aber and Khalid Abdul Rahman.[77]

(~~S/NF~~) The situation in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was complicated by the presence of a major ally of Ba'athist leader Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri (see Chapter 3). Now an ally of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, al-Duri continued to support the insurgency from Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, using arms received from his contacts in 1.4b, 1.4c and sending them into Iraq through an elaborate network of professional arms smugglers headed up by Aleppo-based former IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** officer Mahdi 'Inad Latif al-Dulaymi. Coordinating with his remaining loyalists in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.** under the banner of the New Ba'ath Party and supported by money smuggled to Syria after the fall of the former regime, al-Duri promised his Ba'athist followers that they would be reinstated to high-level government positions when the Ba'athist came back to power.[78] Among al-Duri's followers was Hit-based Green Battalion leader Nu'man Janabi (Abu Abdal al-Rahman), who had been protected by al-Duri after the fall of the regime and fled to the Ghazalyah district of Baghdad during Operation AL FAJR. Indicative of the tactical cooperation between al-Duri and AQI was the fact Nu'man's top deputy was Essa Hani Abood Albu Issa (Major Haydr, Essa al-Afghani), an al Qa'ida-trained Iraqi who had been among Zarqawi's first recruits into JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.** when he arrived in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in 2002-2003.[79]

RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) **Insurgent Infighting**: In early February 2005, infighting broke out in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** between members of Jaysh Mohammed loyal to MML and AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters led by Haikal Khalid loyal to Zarqawi.[80] This conflict may have been caused by MML's efforts to establish order within the insurgency. In early February 2005, MML ordered Jaysh Mohammed leader Turki Athawri, a member of the Albu Issa tribe, to cease targeting Coalition forces and instead kill the "criminals" who had dishonored the insurgency by killing Iraqis when they were supposedly attacking the Coalition.[81] Echoing MML's sentiments, religious and tribal leaders in the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Ramadi corridor began condemning violence perpetrated by the "criminal" mujahideen.[82]

---

[76] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050218 | 20050218 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]
[77] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[78] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[79] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050327 | 20050327 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |];
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050327 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[80] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050208 | 20050208 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]
[81] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050208 | 20050208 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]
[82] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050213 | 20050213 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The infighting soon spread to other cities such as Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Karmah and encompassed other groups like the Green Battalion.[83] Jaysh al-Haq and the Ba'ath Party in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** assisted Jaysh Mohammed in its efforts to push AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** out of the city, forming a new organization known by the acronymn MHB and vowing to destroy any insurgent group that engaged in *takfir*.[84] In response, AQI assassinated associates of Mohammed Daham (the *de facto* leader of Ramadi Shura Council while MML was away from the Ramadi), while refraining from attacks on Daham himself, to force him to end the infighting.[85] Saraya al-Jihad leader Muayyad Shami (Abu Hawra) became so frustrated with inter-insurgent fighting in Ramadi (as well as being targeted by the Coalition) that he relocated to Diwaniyah with his associates.[86] At the same time, Daham was being attacked by the Coalition because he continued to attack their forces even while supposedly engaged in a war with AQI.

~~(S/NF)~~ Daham used the notoriety he had received from being targeted by the Coalition to leverage a truce between Jaysh Mohammed and AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[87] The infighting between Daham and AQI came to an end about the time Operation RIVER BLITZ began.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** General Hospital was one of his key strongholds and his main command and control HQ, exploiting Coalition restrictions on searching hospitals and mosques. Additionally, the emergency room doctors were unwilling to cooperate with the Coalition due to intimidation.[88] The bodies of dead insurgent fighters were dropped off at the morgue after the Ramadi Shura Council had informed their families of their death.

Approved for Release

[83] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050207 | 20050207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050215 20050215 ~~S/ REL MCFI~~
(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i) **Bookmark not defined.** | 1.4c, b 3 50 USC 3507 ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[85] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050222 | 20050222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[86] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050206 | 20050206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[87] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050203 | 20050203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[88] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050215 | 20050215 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Fallujah

Error! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ Foreign fighter movement in the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** area was controlled by Abu Muhannad in the Qaryat al-Fuhaylat area. A deputy to AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Abu Sayf, Abu Muhannad answered to Syrian Zarqawi lieutenant Abu Jafar and had ties to the Abu Rashid network in Amariyah.[89]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Additional financial support was provided to the insurgency by the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** resident Sheikh Ghazi Sami Abbas, an international businessman and one of the five richest men in Iraq. Sheikh Ghazi had close ties to Saddam, Uday, Qusay, and Barzan al-Rashid and helped to protect Saddam's wife and daughters after the fall of Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. The primary recipients of Sheikh Ghazi's largesse in Anbar were Sahad al-Fahad and Umar Hadid associate Abu Sayf.[90]

RutbahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ In Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Iraqi border police chief Hareth Tariq Sirheed stole money from the Iraqi government and used it to fund the insurgency in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** at the direction of his father, FRE General Tariq Sirheed Hareth 1.4b **rror! Bookmark not defined.** after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Hareth used his position to facilitate smuggling operations in Rutbah and Akashat, coordinating smuggling networks from Syria all the way to Baghdad. His activities were exposed and he was forced to flee Rutbah for the Iraqi capital.[91] No official police chief existed in Rutbah but a man named Mr. Hussein ran the department. The Iraqi National Guard stationed in the city noticed that their paychecks were shrinking, further increasing their inclination towards criminality.[92]

Zaidon, Amariyah and Karmah

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ During February 2005, groups of Salafists and SARs began regrouping in Khalidiyah, Amariyah, Karmah, and Zaidon, using the villages as areas from which to mount attacks in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Exploiting local shortages of fuel and electricity, insurgents used the slow progress and poor services in Anbar as reasons for residents of these towns to join them.[93] Other insurgent fighters gathered on the southern end of Lake Thar Thar as well as the Jazira area and the Sufia district of Ramadi.[94]

Approved for Release

[89] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050306 | 20050306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[90] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[91] [| Military | TIR IMEF HET10 0309 05| 20050309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[92] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[93] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050202 | 20050202 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]
[94] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050203 | 20050203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Local conditions allowed the insurgency to operate in the small towns. In Khalidiyah, Muhamed Shalal Hamadi, the commander of the 502nd Iraqi National Guard Battalion, was forced to provide Iraqi military funding to the insurgents in order to prevent his unit from being targeted.[95] In Karmah only thirty of 117 Iraqi police officers showed up for work due to insurgent intimidation, though all of Karmah police continued to receive pay.[96] Of those still working in the city to guard the bank and city, most were passive supporters of the insurgency. Majid Hamid Modhe Halbusi, the head of the Karmah city council, was reduced to meeting with the Green Battalion to improve his stature in the city.[97]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Zaidon, a small town of about 7,000 populated by farmers, fishermen and day laborers from the Zoba tribe, became extremely important for AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Since the 1980s, the Zoba had been at the center of Wahhabi missionary activity in the region, activity sanctioned by Saddam and supported by local resident IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** officer and later Zarqawi associate, Sabah Khalaf. Zobai tribal leaders Nafia Aswad Khafil, General Mohammed Aswad Khafil, General Zbar Hadi Yousif Irsan, and Ahmed Madlul Fiza Shnatir all supported the insur enc , allowin mone and wea ons to be brou ht into the area using smuggling networks 1.4b [98]

~~(S/NF)~~ Zarqawi believed Zaidon secure enough to hold a meeting with AQAM leaders from Sudan and Saudi Arabia at Sabah Khalaf's home.[99] The details of what was discussed is unknown, but since mid-January 2005 'Usama bin Laden had been requesting Zarqawi undertake preparations to attack the continental U.S. This was likely the subject of the meeting. In response to bin Laden's request, Zarqawi sent a number of non-Arab operatives to an unknown location to prepare to carry out the attacks. While Zarqawi had some ideas concerning targets in the U.S., he was preoccupied with the insurgency in Iraq and left the operation in the hands of senior AQAM leaders.[100]

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ In Amariyah, Salafist insurgent leader Fasil Hussein Jabar (called "Sheikh Fasil" by residents because of his power and influence despite not actually being a sheikh) was chairman of the city council, and used the Muslim Brotherhood as a cover for his activities. Lieutenant Colonel Nuri, the commander of the Iraqi National Guard in Ferris Town (a housing area in Amariyah), was a follower of Jabar and until his February 28 arrest abused his authority to support the insurgency. He ordered his troops to display their weapons without wearing their uniforms so the people could not distinguish the insurgents from National Guard Forces out of uniform.[101] Together, Jabar and Nuri were able to subvert the Iraqi National Guard and police in Amariyah and Ferris Town,

---

[95] [| Military | 1.4c | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[96] [| Military | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[97] [| Military | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[98] Ibid.
[99] [| Military | ~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[100] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050224 | 20050224 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[101] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

making them work with local insurgent leaders to counter any attacks by the Coalition.[102] The chief bomb maker in the city was Emad Diechi, an Iraqi national who had trained with al Qa'ida in Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** but had been ordered by bin Laden to return to Iraq to join the insurgency at some point after May 2003.[103]

Operations RIVER BLITZ (February 2005) and RIVER BRIDGE (March 2005)

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) To mask the relief-in-place of I MEF by II MEF, the Coalition launched two consecutive operations, RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE. Preceded by raids in Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Karmah, Nasser Wa Salaam, and Shahabi at both ends of the Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor, RIVER BLITZ was designed to disrupt insurgent groups during the changeover.[104] Coalition forces launched twelve raids in the first eight days of the operation, capturing 117 detainees including mid-level AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leaders Hamed Dawoud Azawi (AKA Saud Mohammed Jassim), Raad Daham Noseyef, Abu Othman, and Abu Harun Group leader Mohammed Nassir Ali al-Faraj.[105]

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) RIVER BLITZ forced fighters into flight throughout the region and disrupted insurgent networks. Thus, Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council members were forced to flee towards Akashat and the southern end of Lake Thar Thar,[106] (where they were joined by insurgents from Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**);[107] MML and Daham both fled to Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**,[108] Ansar al-Sunna relocated from Ramadi to Hit[109] - along with many other fighters from Ramadi.[110] Other leaders dispersed to remote areas of Anbar, Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Diyala**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Nineveh, and elsewhere throughout Iraq.[111]

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) Immediately after RIVER BLITZ the Coalition launched RIVER BRIDGE to specifically target key leaders and facilitators. The operation established an aggressive military presence from Iskandariyah in the south to Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in the north. Insurgent facilitators Abu Husayn, Abu Umar, and Abu Muhammed were all captured, as were al-Asa'ab al-Iraq leadership in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (including founder Abdel Mekhlif Abdel Hadi) and the AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leadership in Haditha, causing

[102] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[103] Ibid. The reporting does not specify the nature of bin Laden's order.
[104] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050220 | 20050220 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[105] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050317 | 20050317 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]
[106] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050220 | 20050220 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[107] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050223 | 20050223 | ~~(S/ REL MCFI)~~ |]
[108] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050221 | 20050221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[109] Ibid. Mohammed Messenger of God Forces is a SAR insurgent group made up former military and IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** personnel that was part of the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Mujahideen Shura.
[110] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050221 | 20050221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[111] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050222 | 20050222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

widespread disruption to insurgent networks and forcing them to revise or cancel planned attacks. Local insurgents in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Haditha were told to remain underground or flee west towards Husaybah and al-Qa'im. Those fighters who had taken refuge around Lake Thar Thar were forced to flee southeast.[112]

(~~S/NF~~) To escape being targeted by RIVER BRIDGE, insurgent leaders who had previously been hiding in the remote areas of Anbar fled to Diyala**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Salahaddin, and Nineveh to seek refuge with allied tribes. Among them was Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, who appointed Sheikh Kassim al-Abaidy as his temporary successor while he left the province. While many insurgent leaders were divided as to whether or not to regroup in Ramana (near Al Qa'im), none intended to give up the fight against the Coalition.[113]

Consequences of RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE

Positive Achievements of the Operations

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) The purpose of the two operations was never to hold territory, only to keep insurgent groups occupied until II MEF was firmly in place. The actual results of the operations were ambiguous. On the one hand certain areas were cleared of fighters and their leadership, local supporters of the Iraqi government were reassured, and attacks were disrupted, improving the security environment. In towns as remote as Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, for instance, 200 police agreed to return to work, keeping the city safe and responding to resident reports about insurgent activity as long as they continued to receive Coalition support.[114]

(~~S/NF~~) The most notable improvement was in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, where residents became far more pro-Iraqi government and pro-MNF after the operations.[115] This may have been because the situation in the two cities had deteriorated so severely due to intermittent troop presence before RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE. Insurgents had enforced on both cities all the trappings of an Islamist totalitarian theocracy: secret police, *shari'a* courts, *hadd* punishments, intense propaganda, concentrations of foreign fighters, and an oppressive murder and intimidation campaign to deter local resistance.[116]

(~~S/NF~~) Coalition and local governments took other steps to create greater stability and security throughout the province. The Shi'a Public Order Brigade in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, accused by the largely Sunni population of heavy-handed tactics and disrespect for local

Approved for Release

[112] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050315 | 20050315 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050321 | 20050321 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[113] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050319 | 20050319 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[114] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050317 | 20050317 | (~~S/REL MCFI~~) |]
[115] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[116] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

women, purged several members in an effort to address these concerns.[117] In an attempt to improve the regular police, Governor Gaoud fired Deputy Provincial Police Chief (Acting Provincial Police Chief) Jassim Mohammed Bad'a. However, he was forced by the Interior Ministry to rehire him for lack of a suitable replacement.[118]

(U) **PUBLIC ORDER BRIGADES: 2005:** In January 2005, after the election, the new government led by Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, the Ministry of Interior (the Ministry responsible for national-level police forces) came under the control of SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and its Badr Corps when former SCIRI and Badr Corps (Organization) commander Bayan Jabr became Minister.[119] Using a purge of officers, SCIRI increased its control. In early May 2005, three brigades of counter-insurgency commandos (the Wolf and Volcano Brigades – paramilitary commandos) and the Scorpion Brigade (intelligence search and destroy forces) operated in a number of areas. Allegations exist that as a Shi'a dominated (and Muqtada al-Sadr controlled) force these commandos operated as death squads. Most of the commandos were trained in 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[120]

~~(S/NF)~~ To counter the burgeoning AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna IO campaign, the Iraqi Interior Ministry began two new television series, "Confessions," and the "Terrorists in the Grip of Justice," designed to expose the reality behind insurgent propaganda. Both shows featured videos of insurgent confessions and were aired on national stations. The confessions demonstrated that the insurgents were responsible for death and destruction across Iraq, pointed out that many insurgents were motivated by money rather than nationalism or religion, and showed that at least some fighters used drugs to embolden themselves for attacks. Because of intimidation and threats, the Coalition at first had trouble finding Anbar stations willing to broadcast the two series. Once they succeeded, both programs had some impact in discouraging attacks and in encouraging Anbaris to see the insurgents as responsible for problems with security in their communities.[121]

~~(S/NF)~~ Zarqawi recognized the problems his operations faced and held a meeting with surviving leaders of the former Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Mujahideen Shura Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, Sheikh Dhafir, Khalid Hamud al-Jumayli, and Ismail al-Jumayli to assess the situation.[122] Following the meeting, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** implemented new OPSEC measures across Anbar, issuing three different "warrior" *kuniyat* (nicknames or aliases) to each member. An effort was made to put the aliases as well as the birth names of every member on forged or valid Iraqi identification cards. AQI members were instructed only to use their "warrior" name with other members of their immediate cell and to discard it after completing a major attack. Street-level

Approved for Release

[117] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050326 | 20050326 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[118] [| Military | TACREP/OCAC2-0314-05| 20050310 | ~~(S//REL TO USA, CAN, AUS and GBR)~~ |]
[119] [| Military | U.K., DEFENSE ACADEMY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, CONFLICT STUDIES RESEARCH GROUP/ JAKUB CERNY: DEATH SQUAD OPERATIONS IN IRAQ | 200606 | (U) | p. 7. | http://www.da.mod.uk/csrc]
[120] Ibid., p. 3, 7.
[121] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050311 | 20050311 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050421 | 20050421 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050401 | 20050401 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[122] [| Military | 1.4c 20050224 | ~~(SECRET//REL GBR, CAN, AUS)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

members were not to be told the identity of mid-level leaders and mid-level leaders were routinely rotated from positions ranging from cell leader to commander to planner to supervisor to facilitator to ensure operational security.[123]

> (U) **KUNYA (pl. KUNIYAT).** It is sunna (accepted Islamic practice) for Muslims to have a nickname or *kunya*. Generally, *kuniyat* are in the form "Abu" (father) or "Umm" (mother) plus the name of the bearer's child. It is also permissible to have a *kunya* that honors a pious predecessor, shows tribal or national affiliation, or that indicates something significant about the bearer (i.e. height, courage, devotion to God). Anyone trained in al-Qa'ida camps have *kuniyat* that are used as *noms de guerre* (warrior names), as do most of the mujahideen in places like Iraq.

Unintended Consequences of the Operations

The Insurgency Re-establishes Itself

~~(S/NF)~~ Because neither RIVER BLITZ nor RIVER BRIDGE was designed to permanently clear, hold, or build Anbar province, they had three unintended consequences. First, some insurgents simply kept quiet or fled only until Coalition forces left. They then resumed their murder and intimidation campaigns. Second, the displacement of insurgents into previously untouched territory gave them the opportunity to build new terrorist networks. And third, the disruption of financial networks led to a considerable rise in criminality throughout the region, as insurgents scrambled to find alternative funding for their activities.

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ The examples of Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** demonstrate what happened when insurgents went undercover until the operations ended. In Haditha, local insurgents remained in the city even though their leaders took flight west or north to avoid being targeted. In Hit, the insurgents fled the city briefly, but then returned when Coalition forces left, vowing retaliation against those who cooperated with the Coalition. Among them was a particularly infamous group of Syrian foreign fighters who, after the operations ended, beat and threatened to kill residents who had allowed the Coalition to use their homes and shops.[124] There was a "carrot" side to the Syrian "stick," however: they offered $5,000 to anyone who agreed to join the insurgency with a regular salary of $500 a month. In short, the insurgent's salaries were twice what a government soldier or police officer received.

~~(S/NF)~~ In Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, many insurgents, like MML, leaders from AS, and other prominent members of the Ramadi Shura Council temporarily fled the city while others laid low until Coalition operations subsided.[125] In the absence of its leaders, the Ramadi Shura Council came under the control of Abu Harun, Abu Hawra, and AQI**Error! Bookmark not**

[123] [| Military | 1.4c | ~~(SECRET//REL USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[124] [| Military | 1.4c | ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~ |]
[125] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050317 | 20050317 | ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

defined. leader Sheikh Rafa al-Rawi, who were able to reconstitute the insurgent networks in the Ma'laab, Sufia, and Jazira districts before the operation was concluded.[126] AQI, under the leadership of Haikal Khalid, even strengthened its presence in the Sufia district, although it was now forced to create kidnapping rings to generate badly-needed funding.[127] AQI and others used the Al Haq mosque and the Ramadi General Hospital in Sufia as their primary staging areas.[128] The Ramadi Women and Children's Hospital was also used to treat wounded fighters and to conduct surveillance of Coalition forces.[129] Several doctors at the hospital treated insurgents in rooms not used by regular patients, registering them under false names to keep them from being tracked by the Coalition.[130]

The Insurgency is Displaced (March 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ The displacement of insurgents westward created new opportunities for the insurgency. The increasing concentration of insurgents in western Anbar led AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Ghassan Amean to coordinate with Quwwat Allah al-Tharib to regain influence in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and then expand their operations to a larger area.[131] In addition to Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, AQI also enlisted al-Asa'ab al-Iraq and Salafia Takfiria to assist in these efforts, leading to increased coordination between insurgents in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Haditha, and Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[132] As many as 1,000 AQI fighters were reportedly active in Husaybah, armed with mortars, RPGs, and AK-47s. This led to fighting between AQI and local insurgents who were tired of fighting the Coalition and resented the presence of the displaced foreign fighters.[133] As a result, AQI began targeting civilians inside the city and pressuring sheikhs to stop using the mosque loudspeakers for preaching unless they were willing to preach jihad.[134]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite the predominance of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in western Anbar, MML would also develop considerable influence among insurgents in the area, using his connections with Sheikh Abdullah Janabi to control a new network of insurgent cells between Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Saqlawiyah.[135] The tensions between AQI and MML, created by MML's decision to consider political engagement, was further exacerbated when the AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** issued a fatwa forbidding the targeting of Iraqi National Guard members. In response, AQI increased dramatically their kidnapping and murders of ING soldiers.[136] The Special Police

---

[126] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[127] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050225 | 20050225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[128] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050304 | 20050304 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[129] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050307 | 20050307 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[130] Ibid.
[131] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050321 | 20050321 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[132] Ibid.
[133] [| Military | 1.4c
[134] Ibid.
[135] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050330 | 20050330 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[136] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050315 | 20050315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Commandos in particular were targeted with car bombs and all but one company deserted the unit.[137]

(~~S/REL~~) One insurgent who benefited from the displacement of larger, more established groups was Atheer Nassif Turki. Turki's FRE organization Right Party, a pro-Ba'athist group that had once been very influential, was able—with the dispersal of other organizations from Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**—to reemerge as a major source of IEDs in the Hit-Haditha corridor.[138] Backed by Syrian FRE Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmed, the Right Party was made up of former military, Saddam Fedayeen, and Ba'ath Party members from al-Saboga, Abu Wherda, Hysekani, and Jubbah who wanted to reestablish the Ba'ath Party without Saddam.[139] Turki's capture in June -- and the subsequent disbanding of his group -- would spell the end to much of the formal FRE insurgent organizations in Iraq.

The Insurgency becomes more Criminal (March 2005)

(~~S/NF~~) The most significant shift in the insurgency was a general turn toward criminal activity to finance attacks on the Coalition. From the very beginning, the two activities had been linked. Smugglers, for instance, facilitated the entry of foreign fighters and weapons as well as more traditional goods that could be sold to finance insurgent groups. RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE, by disrupting established financial networks throughout the province, pushed insurgents to find other means for funding their movements, generally through kidnapping, extortion and robbery.

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) A small group of [redacted] 1.4b active in the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor were already engaged in kidnapping to replenish finances even before the operations.[140] In Amariyah Jaysh Mohammed leader Ahmed Tohman (a former Ba'athist granted the rank of captain by Saddam Hussein)[141] began robbing residents to raise money.[142] Meanwhile SARs infiltrated the Trebil customs checkpoint in far western Anbar, extorting bribes from travelers to support their groups.[143]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Ordinary corruption—as at the Syrian border crossings—benefited the insurgency elsewhere. In Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, insurgent leader Sheikh Abdul Hamid was able to bribe the police in order to lure the Coalition into a false sense of security, ordering Iraqi National Guard commanders to use "more force" in clearing out the streets to

Approved for Release

[137] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050329 | 20050329 | ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ |]
[138] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050410 | 20050410 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[139] Ibid.
[140] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050304 | 20050304 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[141] [| Military | DIIR MNFW HET08 0294 05| 20050309 | (S/REL MCFI) |]
[142] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[143] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

prevent the Coalition from returning to the area.[144] And, when insurgents attempted to ambush Iraqi National Guard troops that were transporting their monthly payroll from Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in March, the lieutenant in charge reported the money stolen and then kept it for himself.[145] Mohammed Daham's brother Issa found one of the more ingenious quasi-criminal methods for raising funds. His Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** gas stations inflated gas prices and used the proceeds to fund his groups' activities. Some Ramadi residents were willing to pay for the higher prices at insurgent gas stations rather than waiting in longer lines for the cheaper government fuel, either out of sincere support for the insurgency or in order to escape intimidation. This led to conflict between 1920 Revolution Brigade and a small group of Syrian, Egyptian, and Sudanese AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters over which group would control the gas station money.[146]

New Criminality and Displacement Provoke Tribal Conflict

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ This conflict was not the only one provoked by the new criminality. It also led to an outbreak of tribal infighting in the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** area in March 2005. The Albu Diab tribe sought revenge against the Albu Aetha and Albu Faraj for kidnapping and killing its tribesmen.[147]

MCIA Insert Map of Iraqi Tribes Here

~~(S/NF)~~ The flashpoint that sparked the fighting lay in the Albu Diab's desire to hunt down members of the Albu Faraj who had kidnapped Ghemy Ahmed Zebin al-Shokha because he built shops in the Jazira area that the Albu Faraj believed were being used by the Coalition. However, this was merely the culmination of a series of kidnappings of Albu Diab tribesmen by the Albu Faraj in an effort to solicit money from the families of the kidnapped to support the insurgency. In response, the Albu Diab began actively thwarting efforts by the Albu Faraj to plant IEDs and threatened to inform on them to the Coalition if they refused to return al-Shokha.[148]

~~(S/NF)~~ The displacement and increased criminality of the insurgency led to further tribal fighting. There had always been tension between the Albu Mahal and the Albu Salman. The Mahalwis resented the fact that the Salmanis were the "princely" section of the Dulaymi confederation and therefore given a cut from the proceeds of all illegal tribal smuggling. The leader of the Mahalwis (and an SAR insurgent), Sheikh Sabah Sattam, with the help of his brother-in-law Raja Farhan, the mayor of al-Qa'im, hired displaced insurgents into the al-Qa'im police and used it as his personal

Approved for Release

---

[144] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050309 | 20050309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050310 | 20050310 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[145] [| Military | 1.4c
[146] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050306 | 20050306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[147] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050308 | 20050308 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[148] [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET12 0275 05| 20050303 | ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

security force. He placed Mahalwis in the local Iraqi National Guard. He also attempted to take over the Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** police force, but found himself blocked by the rival Salmanis, who resented this intrusion into their area of influence.[149] The result was an outbreak of low-level fighting between the two tribes that would intensify throughout the spring and result, in the summer of 2005, in a full-blown tribal war.

Other effects of RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE

Insurgent Financing

1.4b, 1.4c

Approved for Release

Insurgent Information Operations

~~(S//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ During 2005, various elements of the insurgency, particularly AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, continued to refine their information operations capabilities. AQI and AS information campaigns were comprised of:

[149] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050315 | 20050315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[150] [| Militar | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050410 | 20050410 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[151] [| 1.4c, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 20050420 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[152] [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET02 0245 05| 20050303 | ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[153] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050326 | 20050326 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

- recruitment efforts
- "winning hearts and minds"
- anti-Coalition propaganda
- published speeches and statements by insurgent leaders like Zarqawi
- claims of responsibility for attacks to include releasing videos of the attacks
- explainations of the goals and strategies of the groups

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) During RIVER BRIDGE and RIVER BLITZ, some media capabilities were disrupted. For instance, insurgents were unable to mount an effective propaganda response to the operations because they lacked the money to hire reporters.[154]

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) Recruitment was a top priority of both SARs and SREs, since both had lost hundreds of fighters during the operations. The focus of these efforts varied, however. SAR groups worked to persuade poor, uneducated Iraqis to join their supposed fight for Sunni survival, while SREs argued that the failure of the insurgency would mean the destruction of Islam in Iraq.[155] With roughly 50% unemployed and about 20% of them young men, there were roughly 200,000 potential recruits in Anbar Province. This gave the insurgents a large pool from which insurgents could replenish their depleted ranks.

(~~S/REL TO MCFI~~) An important source of frustration for Anbaris were power outages, which provided another issue that insurgents both exacerbated and exploited.[156] The rehabilitation of the Iraqi electrical sector proceeded at a slow pace due to fuel, financing, maintenance and, especially, security issues. Common sense solutions, such as making better use of available fuel resources or making it a priority to repair pipelines that fed power stations, were not implemented because of a lack of coordination between the ministries of Electricity and Oil and Iraqi security forces.[157] Insurgents realized the importance that Anbaris placed on this issue and made targeting power lines and pipelines a priority.

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) The other focus of insurgent IO was inciting anti-Coalition sentiment. A debate at the time within both provincial and national governing bodies over whether the weekend should consist of Thursday-Friday (as it had under the former regime) or Friday-Saturday (as in most of the Middle East) provided a perfect opportunity for insurgent media exploitation.[158] For SREs the final decision to make Saturday (the Jewish Sabbath) part of the weekend was "proof" that the

Approved for Release

[154] [| | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[155] [| | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050301 | 20050301 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[156] [| | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050404 | 20050404 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[157] [| | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050405 | 20050405 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[158] [| | Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050311 | 20050311 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

central government wanted to "Judaize" Islam in Iraq. After the decision was made, insurgents used intimidation to prevent Anbaris from attending work or school on Thursdays.[159]

Smaller City Stories (March 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ The dispersion of insurgents meant that a number of small towns and villages throughout Anbar became more significant for the maturation of the insurgency. Once by-passed by insurgents as well as Coalition forces, these villages became hot-beds of insurgent influence, activity and growth.

Ramana

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and other towns around al-Qa'im had always been the transit points for foreign fighters intending to move further north or eastward.[160] The displacement of large numbers of insurgents westward gave the area an added significance. Because Husaybah was under the control of local insurgents/criminal groups (such as al-Theeb), Zarqawi decided to make Ramana his primary transit point for fighters going to Tall Afar and Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, reportedly housing large numbers of fighters in the cities and meeting with Ghassan Amean at al-Qa'im and Ramana to coordinate his operations in the area.[161]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The result was an upsurge in violence in this once placid village. To intimidate locals into compliance, on March 11 AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leaders Hussein Shehab Hammed and Ra'ad Salah Mutar murdered nineteen individuals in Ramana suspected of being Coalition supporters or part of the Iraqi National Guard.[162]

Dulab and Albu Hayat

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Following their flight from the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor during RIVER BLITZ, insurgents regrouped in more isolated towns like Dulab or Albu Hayat. They stole weapons and ammunitions from former regime weapons caches and used the area as a staging area for attacks on Al Asad Airbase in an effort to regain influence in the region.[163] Rural towns like Dulab were vulnerable to insurgents efforts to influence and recruit as well as murder and intimidate the population. AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters in Haditha relocated to the Albu Hayat area, taking vehicles from there and sending them to Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or Bayji to be transformed into

Approved for Release

[159] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050313 | 20050313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[160] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050310 | 20050310 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[161] Ibid. The number of fighters in the city was reportedly in excess of 1,200-1,500.
[162] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050311 | 20050311 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[163] [| Military | DIIR IMEF 2DMAW 0004 05 | 20050307 | ~~(SECRET//REL USA AND MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

car bombs.[164] Their ability to operate in Albu Hayat was facilitated by the fact that Coalition operations in the area had caused the death of a young girl in March 2004, a fact that was bitterly remembered by locals.[165]

Amariyah, Karmah, and Saqlawiyah

~~(S/NF)~~ These small towns attained significance beyond their size during and after AL FAJR, when important insurgents, including mid-level JM leaders Karim Karkaz and Nori Zbar, as well as foreign fighter facilitator Abud Jadoah, fled to the area.[166] RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE would only add to their importance. Mohammed Daham, for instance, moved from Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to Amariyah.[167] His reluctance to return to Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was due not to fear of the Coalition but rather because of a handwritten note purportedly from Zarqawi declared him an infidel and stated that he should be put to death for allowing infighting to take place in the city.[168] Mohammad Abdul Aziz, imam of the Abu Thar Mosque, also led a group of 50-60 insurgents into the area and was involved in distributing their propaganda throughout the region.[169]

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ Daham and Abdul Aziz joined a large and growing number of insurgent groups in the three towns. Jaysh Mohammed leaders like Karim Karkaz and Ahmed Tohman used Ferris Town to meet, plan attacks, buy and sell weapons, screen recruits for Coalition informants, confiscate Iraqi ID cards, and obtain fraudulent documents to enter controlled areas such as Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[170] Jaysh al-Sunna, a subsidiary of JM, was also active under the leadership of Ibrahim Flaya Hassan Issawi.[171]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The ease with which JM was able to operate in Ferris Town lay in the fact that it was in large part controlled by their former Ba'athist allies.[172] (b)(6) (b)(6) were all former Ba'athists who collaborated with the insurgency, facilitating attacks or allowing them to take place.[173] Even so, the arrest of b_6 served to limit the freedom of movement for (b)(6) and Sheikh Fasil.[174]

Akashat

---

[164] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050326 | 20050326 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[165] Ibid.
[166] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050313 | 20050313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[167] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050309 | 20050309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.
[170] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050313 | 20050313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[171] Ibid.
[172] [| Military 1.4c
[173][| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050315 | 20050315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[174] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The small mining and smuggling town of Akashat, located in a desolate area between al-Qa'im and Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, became an important staging ground for several insurgent groups. Members of the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council fled there after RIVER BLITZ[175] while AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** set up VBIED production in the town (as well as in Karabilah and Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**).[176] Because of its anti-Coalition environment and remoteness, Akashat served as the meeting place for insurgents from al-Qa'im. Local leaders tried to prevent the Coalition from entering the city and Iraqi security forces representative Commander Nuri actively collaborated with the insurgency there.[177] After MATADOR in May 2005, Akashat would briefly attract even more fighters and become a major center of insurgent activity until the insurgents were driven out by anti-AQI members of the Albu Mahal tribe.

Al-Tash Kurdish Refugee Camp

~~(S/REL TO MCFI)~~ Another area where insurgents gathered in eastern Anbar was the al-Tash Kurdish refugee camp, where Zarqawi's military chief Ibrahim Ahmed Mustafa and former AI leader Hayder Qa'Qa'-Bira 'Abd al-Qadir were based followin RIVER BLITZ.[178] 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s 1.4b were reportedly also active in the camp, using its mixed ethnic make-up to avoid detection while they collected intelligence on SARs in Anbar and tried to undermine Coalition relations with the civilian population of the camp.[179]

Political Developments and Sunni Engagement (March – May 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ While the insurgency was being reshaped by this series of operations, the first meeting of the Anbar Provincial Council was delayed until March 17, 2005. Only twenty-seven of the forty-one elected members were present, including six women. The Council elected Mamoun Sami Rasheed as president, Khudair Abd al-Jabar as vice president, and Sheikh Hussein Zubair Mukhlif as secretary. While the seating of the Council served as a positive step, it prompted tension between Mamoun and incumbent Governor Gaoud. Gaoud attempted to retain his power by establishing his own security forces, marginalizing Mamoun, and claiming legitimacy for his position because of his ties to the government in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Mamoun, by contrast, sought to legitimize himself throughout the province and gain influence by challenging Gaoud.[180]

Approved for Release

---

[175] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050220 | 20050220 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[176] [| Military | DIIR MNFW HET02 0310 05 | 20050401 | ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[177] [| Militar TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050410 | 20050410 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[178] [| 1.4c, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | 20050310 | ~~(S/NF)~~]
[179] [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET02 0239 05 | 20050310 | ~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[180] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050319 | 20050319 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ On the national political level the Shi'a UIA pursued a policy of rejecting former Ba'athists like Mish'an al-Jaburi and Adnan al-Janabi in favor of Sunnis like Industry Minister Hajim al-Hassani, an ally of Ayad Allawi.[181] The Iraqi National Assembly overwhelmingly elected al-Hassani to serve as its new speaker. UIA leader Husayn Shahristani and Kurdish lawyer Arif Taylor were elected to serve as deputy speakers with 157 and 96 votes respectively.[182] With al-Hassani as speaker, the UIA was forced to moderate its plan to de-Ba'athify the National Assembly but instead implemented its policies at a ministerial level, preventing Sunni inclusion into the leadership of the Defense and Interior ministries.[183]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the same time, the election of Jalal Talabani as president, Ghazi al-Yawar as vice president, and Hajim al-Hassani as speaker demonstrated to some Sunnis that the Shi'a and Kurds wanted to give the Sunnis a voice in the new Iraqi government.[184] The later decision to give Sunnis control of six ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, served to ease some Sunni fears of marginalization.[185]

~~(C)~~ The long delay in the formation of Iraq's new government, and in the creation of a drafting committee to write the new constitution, left only four months to create this seminal document. This time constraint severely hampered the Transitional National Assembly's ability to forge a constitution acceptable to all of Iraq's major political groups.[186] Contentious issues that had to be addressed included the role of Islam as "a" source rather than "the" source of legislation; a delineation of Iraqi federalism; the role of women in Iraqi society and their rights; the limits of de-Ba'athification; the status of Kirkuk**Error! Bookmark not defined.**; minority group rights; the allocation of income from hydrocarbons; and the status of Coalition forces.[187]

"Negotiations" with the Insurgency (March – April 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ The creation of a federal government, however delayed, was a hopeful sign for the future of Iraq. Another positive development was the decision by some parts of the insurgency to seek a political settlement. As noted, the loss of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as an insurgent sanctuary in Operation AL FAJR along with the Shi'a electoral victories in the Iraqi elections and the combined operations of RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE, left many insurgent groups with constrained resources, decreased political leverage, and less relevant propaganda. This left many Sunnis in search of means of political expression. In Anbar, the two most influential Sunni organizations were the IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, with IIP favoring political engagement and AMS opposing it. However, fear of political

[181] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050406 | 20050406 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[182] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050405 | 20050405 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[183] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050406 | 20050406 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[184] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050410 | 20050410 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[185] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050508 | 20050508 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[186] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050331 | 20050331 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[187] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

marginalization and pressure from Sunni followers pushed AMS to begin discussing the development of a new post-regime Sunni political identity.[188]

~~(S/NF)~~ Towards this end, near the end of March 2005, Harith al-Dhari, MML, and Mohammed Daham formed the Sunni Shura Council, a committee designed to represent Sunni concerns in Anbar while maintaining and advancing AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** interests in the province. The Council enlisted the support of prominent former Ba'athists and Sunni tribal leaders and initiated a series of talks that signaled their willingness for political engagement.[189]

MCIA Insert Picture Here

~~(S/NF)~~ The first official contact between the Sunni Shura Council and the Iraqi government took place between Harith al-Dhari, MML, Mohammed Daham, and Anbar police chief Brigadier General Shakir Mohammed Salih in the Amariyah district of Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in late March. During the meeting, MML requested the dismissal of 1,000 Iraqi police that he claimed were not properly trained or regularly attending work, the integration of the police with security efforts to address public concerns, and the reinstatement of the majority of Iraqi police officers from the former regime that he claimed had been unfairly dismissed from their positions. To demonstrate his bonafides, MML provided the names of thirty-two gang leaders and 300 police officers with false identification or credentials.[190]

~~(S/NF)~~ Soon afterward the Sunni Shura Council entered into preliminary talks for negotiations with the Iraqi government and the Coalition.[191] They were shortly joined by the followers of SAR Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Alwan al-Khaldia of the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Abdul Qadir Thakir al-Damook (Qaduri Abu Saleh, who was later detained at Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** International while attempting to flee the country after AQI learned of his initiative and targeted him for assassination), and the Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based Khalid Hasan Ahmad Shirabi. Al-Khaldia had already negotiated an agreement with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi to support his Iraq List in future Iraqi politics. Some [1.4b] backed this initiative, believing that Sunnis shoul push for political engagement, an en to insurgent attacks, and integration into the new government so that they could once again subjugate the Shi'a following the Coalition withdrawal. Even some followers of Sheikh Abdullah Janabi were open to negotiations and a cessation of hostilities so that the Coalition could finish rebuilding Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[192]

Approved for Release

[188] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050325 | 20050325 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[189] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050331 | 20050331 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[190] [| 1.4c | (S/NF) |]
[191] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050401 | 20050401 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[192] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050402 | 20050402 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/REL~~) The common goal of many of these insurgents was the creation of Sunni Iraqi security forces in Anbar that would not only provide security and stability but also act as a bulwark against the rise of Shi'a power in the province. Members of the Sunni Shura Council thus continued to meet with senior Anbari police officials, suggesting that Anbaris be hired by the Iraqi government to fill the gaps in the police and security forces.[193]

(~~S/NF~~) To support this position, AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour as-Samarrai issued a *fatwa* si ned b sixt -four clerics and scholars including 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.** (b)(6)

(b)(6), 1.4b

Approved for Release

[193] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050401 | 20050401 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[194] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050406 | 20050406 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[195] [| Military | 1.4c |]
[196] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050415 | 20050415 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[197] [| 1.4c

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6), 1.4b

~~(S/NF)~~ Non-insurgent Sunnis were also expanding their political engagement. In March 2005, 'Abd Mutlaq al-Jaburi formed the National Power Alliance for Iraqi Unity (NPA) to mount a strong Sunni opposition to the Shi'a UIA in the December elections. Vice President al-Yawr was in direct contact with the NPA during its formation and requested that it nominate a list of choices for defense minister, only to have the party nominate FRE Major General 'Abd Mutliq Hamud al-Jaburi. In an effort to keep from being targeted by the insurgency, the NPA insisted that all meetings take place in Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and reached out to neighboring Sunni Arab governments for political, moral, and financial support. After (b)(6) refused to join the NPA, *Awqaf* Director al-'Ithawi agreed to sign on with the party in an effort to establish a broad-based political organization to participate in drafting the constitution and the upcoming national elections.[201]

~~(S/NF)~~ In the face of this shift in the agenda of Sunni leaders, including many former insurgents, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** became even more extreme, expanding its targeting to encompass its former allies in the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council.[202]

Snapshot of the Insurgency (April 2005)

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The Coalition saw a clear downward trend in the number of attacks for three weeks following Operation RIVER BLITZ, leading some analysts to conclude that insurgent capabilities had been seriously degraded.[203] There were, in fact, significant improvements in the

Approved for Release

198 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050413 | 20050413 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
199 Ibid.
200 [| 1.4c ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
201 [| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
202 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050403 | 20050403 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
203 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050401 | 20050401 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

security situation brought about by the three major operations in combination with the January elections. Towns such as Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, all major centers of insurgent activity, became much quieter and more secure while the operations were on-going. The political engagement of Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders, prompted by fears of Shi'a domination and by the example of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** II, also held promise for a better future.

Attack Data (January – April 2005)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (January to April 2005). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic. Note that the Complex Attacks data was not available until the last few weeks of this period, and the graphs are truncated accordingly.

~~(S)~~ Early 2005 was highlighted by a dramatic spike in attacks during the week of 27 January – 2 February, across all three AOs but focused on Indirect Fire and IED attacks. This spike was concurrent with the national elections and consistented of many attacks on polling places. On average, however, the attack levels in early 2005 were lower than previous two periods and did not show any obvious trends. Activity was relatively balanced between the three AOs, as no single AO dominated for any of the attack types or overall, though AO Denver was slightly less active.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506





Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Complex Attacks

~~(S/NF)~~ Yet the insurgency had only been transformed by the series of operations, not destroyed. Insurgent groups were now dispersed throughout Anbar, including many areas –like Ramana and Amariyah – which had once been relatively quiet. The line between criminals and insurgents became far more blurred since insurgents became more involved in criminal activity to fund their struggles while criminals were just as involved in insurgent activity. Then there was the tension between various insurgent/criminal groups that was leading to tribal conflict, an issue that would come to a head during the summer of 2005.

~~(S/NF)~~ Two other trends had begun long before 2005, but would strengthen throughout the early part of the year: a more religious orientation to the insurgency and less distinction between SARs and SREs. Religious rhetoric was used by all groups, but more significantly AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had successfully recruited a large number of mid- to upper-level former military, security, and IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** officers to join the organization.[204] SARs that remained independent increasingly put their expertise indiscriminately at the service of any insurgent group.[205] The example of Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad Mya, the de facto head of the New Ba'ath Party, shows the convergence of the once distinct groups of insurgents quite clearly. Al-Ahmad remained in Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** after fleeing to Damascus**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in April 2003, and could not establish an insurgent group of his own. He thus set up several ad-hoc training facilities in the Jazira Desert that were staffed by Salafists and Wahhabis as well as former IIS members, and funded by 1.4b [206]

The Insurgency Strikes Back (April – May 2005)

Recovery from AL-FAJR, RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE (April 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ By April 2005, the insurgency as a whole was recovering from the damage caused by Coalition operations. The resilience of the SRE insurgency lay in its continued ability to exert ideological and financial influence in Anbar, with the survival of larger groups dependent upon the

[204] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050411 | 20050411 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[205] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050402 | 20050402 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[206] [| Military | 1.4c | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

ability of their leadership to issue broad operating guidelines to far-flung autonomous cells, enabling them to conduct attacks over an extended time period. Because of security concerns, insurgent leaders relied more on couriers and personal meetings to communicate with lieutenants, generally only relying on limited electronic communications as a last resort.[207]

(~~S/NF~~) The ability of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to regenerate and recreate itself was especially remarkable. Immediately after the operations, a new AQI training facility was set up at al-Biar village south of Amariyah by the Umar Hadid Battalion and used to train the insurgents that would later attack Abu Ghraib.[208] Ghassan Amean also survived RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE and began to rebuild his organization's capacity for attacks. He used his cells to hijack cars traveling to Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and then employed the cars in suicide bombings in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Samarra**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Bayji.[209] Amean also stole munitions from a Coalition supply point in Dulab, and intensified attacks throughout the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor.[210] One of his main responsibilities—facilitating the entry and housing of foreign fighters in western Iraq—was helped by his creation of a supply depot between Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and the use of the area north of the two cities to house foreign fighters.[211]

(~~S/NF~~) The regeneration of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was announced most starkly by a surge in suicide bombings at the end of March continuing through April. Most suicide bombers during this period were Saudi or Kuwaiti nationals chosen by Zarqawi on a first come, first serve basis. There were no more than four-five suicide bombers per safe house and they were kept in an isolated environment reading the Qur'an and other religious texts all day long.[212] This isolation from outside sources allowed AQI to reinforce their resolve as well as provide an opportunity to tape each person's suicide "statement" as added insurance the individual would go through with the attack.

(~~S/NF~~) Local groups like al-Asa'ab al-Iraq in western Iraq were drawn more and more into AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s orbit, attracted by the notoriety of Zarqawi and access to external financial support as well as local concerns - in this case a desire to limit infrastructure damage to their area.[213] Al-Asa'ab al-Iraq served as an AQI support organization, facilitating the smuggling of foreign fighters and helping AQI to operate in Ramana, Rawah**Error! Bookmark not**

Approved for Release

---

[207] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050404 | 20050404 | (~~S/NF~~) |].
[208] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050405 | 20050405 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[209] [| Military | 1.4c (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) |]
[210] [| Militar (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) |]
[211] [| 1.4c (~~S/NF~~) |]
[212] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050405 | 20050405 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[213] [| Military | 1.4c (~~S E C R E T REL USA AUS CAN GBR NZL~~) |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050406 | 20050406 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

defined., and Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** thanks to its SAR members from the al-Rawi tribe as well as local tribesmen and criminals with close ties to many local communities.[214]

(~~S/REL~~) Another local group now affiliated with AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, the Abu Harun Group in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, emerged as the primary threat to the Coalition in the city after RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE. IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and VBIED attacks by Sheikh Abu Abdullah Abdul Nassir's cell of the Group spiked during RIVER BLITZ in response to the Coalition disrupting their activities and they then began employing suicide bombers during RIVER BRIDGE.[215] The radicalization of the Abu Harun Group was due in part to the influence of their close ally AQI leader Sheikh Rafa al-Rawi.[216]

(~~S/REL~~) Insurgents who had once terrorized Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** also attempted to reconstitute themselves once the operations had ended. Several insurgent leaders loyal to Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, including Fadel Mensi al-Aswai, a mid-level leader of Thawrat al-Ishreen, were able to infiltrate back into the city. Al-Aswai brought with him fighters equipped with night vision goggles and sniper rifles, positioning them to shoot at Coalition forces from the minaret at the al-Kulfah Mosque and planting IEDs in the city's drainage system.[217] They were joined by SAR military and IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** officers loyal to former Fallujah Brigade commander General Ahmed Obaid Jassim, his brother Maymoon, and his son Moyhamam.[218]

(~~S/NF~~) Ansar al-Sunna, which had moved its headquarters from Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** during Operation RIVER BLITZ, also began to rebuild its strength. By mid-April, AS controlled a majority of insurgents in the latter city under Haj Abu Ayad. Abu Ayad was concerned by the polarization in Hit between "local" and "foreign" (non-Hiti) insurgents following RIVER BRIDGE and increased attacks on Camp Hit out of fear of losing control of the Hit-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor.[219]

The Abu Ghraib Attack (April 2005)

(~~S/NF~~) On April 2, the Abu Ghraib prison was attacked at multiple points in a sophisticated operation. One hundred fifty fighters led by Sheikh Abbas Khalifa Thumil al-Essawi combined indirect fire, small arms fire, IEDs, and VBIEDs in a complex attack. The purported goal of the attack was to execute *tha'r* (blood vengeance) against the Coalition for killing several of Sheikh Abbas's family members and to liberate those of his followers who were being held at the prison.

---

[214] [| Military | 1.4c | 20050300 | ~~(S E C R E T REL USA AUS CAN GBR NZL)~~ |]
[215] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050401 | 20050401 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050402 | 20050402 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050403 | 20050403 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[216] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050403 | 20050403 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[217] [| Military | 1.4c | ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[218] [| Military | | ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[219] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050414 | 20050414 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Zarqawi is believed to have been personally involved in planning the attack from Amariyah and those 1.4b who took part in it fled towards Zaidon in its aftermath.[220]

MCIA Insert Picture here

(U) AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** posted four propaganda statements claiming responsibility for the attack on the Al Eklas jihad website.[221] The first message stated that the group carried out the attack in order to avenge the death of Zarqawi's spiritual advisor Sheikh Abu Anas al-Shami. The second message described the reconnaissance, planning, and execution of the attack, while the third vowed that AQI would continue the fight and the fourth claimed a credit for the car bomb attacks on the prison. AQI also released a video of rockets being fired at the prison to demonstrate its role in the attack.

~~(S/REL)~~ Following reports of the Abu Ghraib attack, insurgent propaganda led to an increase in donations, morale and momentum for Anbari insurgent groups, particularly for those that cited minimal insurgent casualties and numerous Coalition soldiers killed. The target audience for this propaganda was Iraqis already disposed towards the insurgency in order to embolden them to conduct similar attacks. Even though the attack was repulsed, insurgents were killed and detained, and their objective not achieved, the Arab satellite media portrayed it as a brave attempt to free abused prisoners, which only added to the propaganda value of the attack.[222]

~~(S/REL)~~ A similar—although much smaller—attack was mounted on April 11 against Camp Gannon by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** supported by al-Asa'ab al-Iraq and Quwwat Allah al-Tharib.[223] Three VBIEDs built at a Karabilah garage used by Jaysh Mohammed and the Abu Harun Group were used in the attack, indicating the degree of cross-coordination that was now taking place within the insurgency.[224]

Zarqawi's Blitz (April 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ Following the Abu Ghraib attack, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and its allies mounted a series of mass casualty terrorist attacks throughout Iraq in an effort to sabotage SAR efforts to negotiate a political solution to the insurgency and to prove to Anbaris that the insurgency was still alive and well despite the Coalition operations.[225]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s ability to sustain a prolonged offensive against the Coalition following AL FAJR, RIVER BLITZ, and RIVER BRIDGE served as a major boost to the

[220] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050404 | 20050404 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[221] [| Military | GMP20050403000128 (Internet) | 20050403 | ~~(FOUO)~~ |]
[222] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050407 | 20050407 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[223] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050411 | 20050411 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[224] [| Military | 1.4c | ~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~ |]
[225] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050412 | 20050412 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

group in its bid to eclipse the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council in the insurgent leadership. The more nationalistic SARs continued to have recruiting and retention problems, now exacerbated by a widespread perception, shared by foreign fighters, that the decision to negotiate with the Coalition indicated SAR groups were losing the battle and no longer possessed the necessary money, power, and resolve to continue the fight. Popular Iraqi shows like *Confessions* and *Terrorists* only served to further undermine their efforts, since they seemed to demonstrate that these insurgents were mostly inspired by money or other base motives.[226]

(~~S/NF~~) AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, by contrast, had ample external financing, good logistics and an ability to attract foreign fighters and appeared willing to take greater risks and expend its resources to conduct larger and larger attacks.[227] To help AQI regain the initiative, AQAM had also directed additional resources (primarily money and foreign fighters) to Iraq, enabling the group to defy previous estimates of its operational cycle and surge capability. In addition, for AQI and its SRE allies, April 2005 was viewed as a "now or never" moment to prevent Sunni political participation and the creation of Sunni Iraqi security forces. In such an environment, many rank-and-file SAR insurgents deserted to more radical groups like AQI or AS, even while the leadership of groups like the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council continued to believe that they could seize power in Anbar through a combination of intimidation, infiltration, negotiation, and political participation.[228]

(~~S/REL USA, CAN, GBR, AUS AND NZL~~) As part of this offensive, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** sent a large number of fighters into Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to mount a stepped-up intimidation and coercion campaign that culminated in the assassination of Haditha police chief, Colonel Hassan.[229] Interior Ministry employee Captain Ziyad was also assassinated and all radio and television broadcasts were censored.[230] Nineteen fishermen were subsequently killed north of the Haditha Dam as suspected collaborators.[231] AQI also targeted the workers necessary for moving critical reconstruction supplies, threatened government workers, and kidnapped, then murdered, several Iraqis working at Al Asad. This strategy was not without consequences, however, as at least one tribe in Haditha expressed a desire to take up arms and exact *tha'r* against AQI.[232]

(~~S/NF~~) AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** logistician Jamal Khairi (Abu Umar), who oversaw the group's operations in the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Annah corridor for Zarqawi, was able to reestablish AQI presence in Hit with the assistance of Ansar al-Sunna.[233] Abu Umar was aided by

[226] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050421 | 20050421 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[227] Ibid.
[228] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050415 | 20050415 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[229] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050417 | 20050417 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[230] [| Military | 3/25 INTSUM 20050419 | 20050419 | (~~SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI~~) |]
[231] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050421 | 20050421 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[232] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050502 | 20050502 | (~~S/REL MCFI~~) |]
[233] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050502 | 20050418 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050419 | 20050419 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the departure, without explanation, of Brigadier General Fahad Abd al-Aziz of the 503rd Iraqi National Guard Battalion from his post.[234] Fahad had improved security in the Hit-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor but was accused of corruption and embezzlement by his own men and had been attempting to leave on a high note.[235] Before leaving, he made arrangements with Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council representative Mohammed Ibrahim al-Dhahi to pass on earlier agreements for his own safety and financial gain to his successor Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Rasheed, but AQI foreign fighters were able to intimidate Rasheed into colluding with them for his personal security.[236]

(~~S/NF~~) After Fahad left Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** set up their own amirs as rulers of the city and created *shari'a* courts while retaliating against residents suspected of cooperating with Coalition forces. This assertion of control enabled AQI to take control of key government offices and two gas stations, even confiscating the ID cards of some city employees.[237]

(~~S/NF~~) Zarqawi took other actions to create greater cooperation between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and remaining FRE/SAR groups in Anbar. On April 14, 2005, he met in Zaidon with the 1920 Revolution Brigade's leader Abu Allah to plan and coordinate their future attacks. They planned to use Zobai tribesmen loyal to them to operate in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Abu Ghraib. Among these was the Abu Suhaib Group, a small group of 10-20 Wahhabis who worked for Abu Allah as couriers.[238] AQI also began to work more directly with the Green Battalion, funding their "amir of amirs" Haji Turgi Ibrahim Alowi Fayadh al-Halbusi and giving instructions about the fate of Coalition sympathizers kidnapped by the Battalion through Abu Sarmet, the AQI leader in Karmah.[239] Meanwhile, SARs Karim Karkaz and Nori Zubair were paid by AQI to carry out attacks in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. The two insurgents were able to use their earlier ties to Khamis Sirhan's organization to rally surviving members of that group in an attempt to re-establish their position in the city.[240]

(~~S/NF~~) Zarqawi reintroduced his own insurgent cells into Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as well, exploiting the conflict between the native Fallujahns and the Public Order Brigade to win

---

[234] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050319 | 20050319 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050412 | 20050412 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[235] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050319 | 20050319 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[236] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050519 | 20050519 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[237] [| Military | 1.4c (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) |]
[238] [| Military | (~~SECRET//REL USA AND MCFI~~) |]
[239] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050506 | 20050506 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM | 20050513 | (~~S/REL MCFI~~) |] The rest of the Green Battalion leadership centered around the family of the group's leader Khalid Obeid Khodier, who had strong tribal ties in both Karmah and Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. See [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050508 | 20050508 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[240] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050428 | 20050428 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050429 | 20050429 | (~~S/REL MCFI~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

support. He also hoped to prove that the Coalition had not been able to force him out of the city through their offensives.[241] The historic Furqan Mosque served as the main AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** planning and recruitment center in Fallujah.[242] As usual, however, the primary bases for assaults into Fallujah were in fact outside the city in Saqlawiyah and Amariyah. There, AQI leader Haytem Mohammed Anfous coordinated more than 200 insurgents to carry out attacks, kidnappings, and smuggling operations.[243]

~~(S/REL)~~ As part of Zarqawi's new strategy, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** began to refrain from conducting attacks that would cause death or injury to Sunni civilians (or damage to their property). The inverse, however, held true concerning the Shi'a and any members of the Iraqi security forces that refused to collaborate. When combined with mass casualty terrorist attacks targeting the central government in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, this helped the insurgency regain its lost momentum.[244]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ These efforts were not limited to Ramana and Rabit. Residents in Barwanah were heavily intimidated by insurgents who had safe houses in Haqlaniyah.[245] Regardless of the locals' desire to help the Coalition, their desire was overshadowed by the high degree of insurgent intimidation.

~~(S/NF)~~ In western Anbar, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna showed a level of cooperation not seen elsewhere in Iraq extending down to street level joint operations in the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor. Together, the two groups provided one another with enhanced early warning against Coalition raids, assisted in the movement of fighters and material, and contributed to the other's ability to mass. Elements of the al-Ahwal Group based in Hit (see Chapter 3) also played a role in assisting AQI. Led by Sinan Metib following Operation AL FAJR, the al-Ahwal Group split between those favoring MML's strategy of negotiation and hardliners led by Mohammed Sent that sided with AQI. Together with Ansar al-Sunna and al-Jama'a al-Salafia in addition to its historic western Anbari allies Quwwat Allah al-Tharib and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, AQI was able to incite all of these groups against the Coalition in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[246]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council remained at odds over the former's relentless targeting of Iraqi security forces and resulting civilian casualties. The Abu Harun Group attempted to side with AQI but was

Approved for Release

---

241 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050420 | 20050420 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
242 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050514 | 20050514 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
243 [| Military | 1.4c ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
244 [| Military | TACTIC U ON CENTER: GRINTSUM 050424 | 20050424 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
245 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050425 | 20050425 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
246 [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050428 | 20050428 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

still suffering from setbacks in material and was attempting to reunify its decentralized command structure before any decision could be made.[247]

Anbari Reactions to Zarqawi's Blitz (April 2005)

(~~S/REL~~) Anbari perceptions of security varied dramatically throughout the province during the course of Zarqawi's offensive. The intermittent Coalition presence in towns like Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** led to some communities being trapped in a vicious cycle of insurgent domination through murder and intimidation, the Coalition asserting presence, and insurgents reentering the community to reassert influence following Coalition departure. In extreme cases, insurgent domination meant the seizure of government buildings, the creation of *shari'a courts*, and the implementation of *hadd* punishments. Parties sympathetic to the Coalition were put at risk, purges were conducted by the insurgency, and fewer residents were willing to cooperate with the Coalition during its next operation in the area. As a result, Coalition departure bred resentment and the mood in many communities worsened with each cycle.[248]

(~~S/NF~~) The Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council tried to help the security situation by declaring a cease-fire from April 15 to April 17, but this move failed to produce any significant lessening in the number of attacks between Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi. This was due to a number of factors, including pressure from AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, but more importantly because the groups represented in the Ramadi Shura Council had always been a volatile coalition, as can be seen from its earlier feuding in February 2005. In some cases, the only thing that united member groups was their shared opposition to the Coalition. As a result, when MML and Daham attempted to develop political options as part of the emerging Sunni elite they found themselves becoming targets of their former allies.[249]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) In Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s Tamim district, one of the centers of violence in the city, the failure of the ceasefire led to a worsening perception of security, which dissuaded the population from supporting the Coalition. This allowed insurgents loyal to Nazir Abu Musab and the 1920 Revolution Brigades, based in the Haji Dahar Mosque, to gain influence.[250] Even so, Ramadi residents were just as unhappy with the insurgents, leading to an incident in which residents took up arms against insurgents who had been planning an ambush against Coalition forces.

MCIA Insert map of these points

Approved for Release

[247] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050429 | 20050429 | (~~S/REL MCFI~~) |]
[248] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050421 | 20050421 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[249] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050417 | 20050417 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[250] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050502 | 20050502 | (~~S/REL MCFI~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/NF~~) The behavior of local police and interior ministry forces did not help the security situation. In Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** local support for the Public Order Brigade continued to decline because of mistreatment of detainees and religious differences. Two members of the Brigade were even killed after a woman claimed that she was sexually harassed by the unit.[251] As described earlier in this Chapter, the Public Order Brigades were mostly Shi'a. However, various Shi'a and Sunni Iraqi security forces units were plagued by problems similar to those of the Public Order Brigade. These units beat and tortured detainees during interrogation and used excessive force against civilians, exacerbating sectarian tensions. Both Coalition and Iraqi commanders were frustrated over Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s inability to control its own security forces, complaining that some Iraqi security forces routinely defied the central government and conducted independent operations.[252]

Al-Qa'im, AQI Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s "Capital" of Iraq (April 2005)**

(~~S/NF~~) With AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s offensive underway in Anbar, Zarqawi set up his non-military base of operations in al-Qa'im under Thabit Khalifa Jalut, declaring it the new capital of Iraq.[253] Jalut had served as Zarqawi's top lieutenant in al-Qa'im since December 2004, setting up AQI's internal security wing in the city following the reduction of Coalition forces in the area and establishing safe houses for foreign fighters from Afghanistan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Saudi Arabia, and Europe in al-Qa'im and Ramana.[254] AQI believed its situation in al-Qa'im to be sufficiently secure to use the city to plan operations, train new recruits, and lay the groundwork for mass casualty terrorist attacks aimed at Kuwait**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Europe.[255]

(~~S/NF~~) The form of governance that Zarqawi instituted in al-Qa'im is important, because it served as a template for later "shadow governments" set up by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** throughout Iraq. Zarqawi set up *shari'a* courts in town, began implementing Islamic law and the *hadd* punishments, took over all the mosques, and killed anyone suspected of collaborating with the Coalition or central Iraqi government. AQI operatives drove around the city and its environs in trucks making certain that young men were cutting their hair and growing beards. They set up green Islamic flags on the government buildings that they controlled, publicly whipped a woman who was accused of prostitution, and created a system of volunteers to monitor violations of *shari'a*.[256]

Anbar Fights Back

[251] [| Military | 1.4c | ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[252] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050417 | 20050417 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[253] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050424 | 20050424 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[254] [| Militar TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050425 20050425 ~~S/NF~~

1.4c

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Zarqawi's strategy for reinvigorating the insur enc in Iraq was at least partially successful. His successes were reflected in a May 2 report by the 1.4c Iraqi Working Group which suggested that progress towards stability in Iraq had slowed by mid-April due to the security situation, concerns over de-Ba'athification, and rising sectarian tensions. Anbar was listed as one of two provinces that served as centers of instability for the country. Even Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was starting to backslide with increased insurgent activity, a deteriorating security situation, and Sunni marginalization within the security services.[257] While Zarqawi's role in creating these conditions should not be overstated (as noted, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was operating in tandem with a number of insurgent groups during its April offensive and many of the internal Iraqi political problems such as de-Ba'athification would likely have existed regardless), AQI was able to exploit the situation for its own purposes. In so doing, however, Zarqawi would provoke a backlash from tribes in western Anbar.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ In many cases, the reasons for this backlash were local. When insurgents withdrew their weapons and propaganda from a school in the Jazira district of Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, teachers pointed to earlier collateral damage from attacks and began actively discouraging students from joining or supporting the insurgency. This forced insurgents to impose a curfew and begin warning residents prior to carrying out attacks.[258]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The major trigger for fighting between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and local tribes in Anbar, however, was the killing of a Coalition contractor belonging to the Mahalawi tribe by a member of AQI's ally al-Jama'a al-Salafia in al-Qa'im. While AQI likely considered this just another killing of a Coalition collaborator, the Mahalawi tribe was furious and mounted a reprisal, culminating in a major clash in al-Qa'im between AQI and the thousand member Hamza Battalion. This unit, under the leadership of Sheikh Saba, consisted primarily of Mahalawi tribesmen, joined by parts of the Salmani and Ubaydi tribes.[259]

~~(S/NF)~~ The roots of the conflict between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and the Hamza Battalion dated back far earlier. In October 2004 sheikhs from the Karbuli and Ramana tribes had considered the idea of a vigilante force that would oppose the rise of foreign fighters (FF). Jumah Hamid Khalef (Abu Umar) founded the group in October 2004 from Albu Mahal tribesmen in al-Qa'im, Anah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Hadtha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Sadah, Ubaydi, and Karabilah to drive out FF in order to more effectively fight the Coalition. The Albu Nimr also tried in November 2004 to form a paramilitary group that would fight the insurgents without sanction from the Coalition. The argument was that FF such as Zarqawi, by indiscriminately targeting non-combatants, were discrediting the indigenous insurgency. Native fighters were also upset that FF were damaging Sunni

Approved for Release

[257] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050506 | 20050506 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[258] Ibid.
[259] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

infrastructure, drawing the attention of the Coalition, competing for important smuggling routes, and spreading Salafist ideology.[260]

~~(S/NF)~~ Neither of these efforts, however, met with much success until March 2005 when MML met with a group of AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and tribal leaders to draft a *fatwa* calling on the tribes in western Al Anbar to fight AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s foreign fighters. Thanks to MML's support, by May 2005 the Hamza Battalion included fighters from 1920 Revolution Brigades, Umar al-Mukhtar, and the Nu'man Brigade[261] in addition to Albu Mahal and Albu Nimr tribesmen and former Iraqi police and National Guard soldiers.[262]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Unlike Zarqawi's previous enemies in Anbar, Sheikh Sabah was a force to be reckoned with. The brother-in-law of the newly-elected Anbar governor and former al-Qa'im mayor Raja Nawaf Farhan, Sheikh Sabah was the head of the Mahalawi tribe and a former member of the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Mujahideen Shura (see Chapter 4).[263] As such, he had ties of his own to both the insurgency and local tribes that he was able to use as a force amplifier in his fight against AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Exploiting these connections, he was able to convince al-Asa'ab al-Iraq to turn against AQI in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and begin capturing their fighters traveling between Husaybah and Barwanah.[264] Exploiting tensions between AQI and the Jughayfah tribe in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Sheikh Sabah persuaded the Jughayfah tribe to begin training 200 tribesmen to fight AQI in Albu Hayat and Dulab (the Jughayfah tribe later declined to carry out any attacks due to a lack of leadership) and enlisted the Albu Alwan tribe to begin attacking the group in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[265] Taking advantage of the differences between AQI and the Ramadi Shura Council leadership, Sheikh Sabah requested that they send fighters to al-Qa'im to reinforce his tribesmen.[266]

Operation MATADOR (May 2005)

(U) In response to the rise of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** activity in western Anbar, on May 7, 2005 forces from the 2nd RCT, 2nd Marine Division launched Operation MATADOR in the Jazira desert north of the Euphrates River to eliminate insurgents and foreign fighters, believing that the region had replaced the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor as the center of insurgent activity since the fall of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in 2004. MATADOR involved over 1,000 Coalition troops in addition to tanks and other armored vehicles and both manned and unmanned aircraft including F-15Es, Predators, and Marine Corps F/A-18s. The operation was primarily focused in the vicinity of al-Qa'im.

---

[260] [| Military | DIIR IMEF HET01 0014 05 | 20041023 | ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[261] Nu'man means "Blood."
[262] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050701 | 20050701 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[263] [| 1.4c | 20050506 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[264] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050505 | 20050505 | ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ |]
[265] [| Militar TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050503 | 20050503 | ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ |]
[266] [| 1.4c | 20050506 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) At the beginning of MATADOR, troops from the Army's 814th Multi-Role Bridge Company constructed a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates River where 1.4c indicated the insurgents were located. Marines crossed the southern banks of the Euphrates at Ubaydi and headed into the Jazira desert, establishing a blocking position at Ramana and flushing out a large group of insurgents after a decisive battle using combined arms and close air support. Insurgents attempted to launch a counter-attack against a Marine convoy at Camp Gannon using small arms fire, RPGs, IEDs, and two suicide car bombers. One car bomb damaged an armored HUMVEE, while the other was destroyed by a Marine M1A1 Abrams.[267]

(U) In both the Jazira desert and the Camp Gannon fighting, insurgents encountered by the Coalition were wearing paramilitary fatigues and in some cases wearing protective vests while demonstrating TTPs that exceeded those demonstrated by their counterparts in other parts of Iraq.[268] The organization, training, and discipline of these fighters, as well as the depth of insurgent penetration in this part of Iraq, came as a surprise to the Coalition and demonstrated the need to carry out major operations in order to deprive the insurgency of this staging ground.

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Ghassan Amaean was captured by the Coalition during MATADOR, causing the group to become demoralized in al-Qa'im and to lose popular support. While the group remained active in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, its fighters in the al-Qa'im area dispersed to Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to escape both MATADOR and attacks by Sheikh Sabah's followers. Some would flee back into the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha corridor, regarding the area as a safe haven.[269]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ As part of MATADOR the Coalition carried out a diversionary operation in Zaidon. Once again, the depth of insurgent penetration in this small town came as a surprise to the Coalition, pointing out once again the need to do something to disrupt insurgent operations in the area.[270]

City Stories

General Situation

~~(S/REL)~~ Many Anbaris continued to struggle in their daily lives and lacked basic services, publicly comparing life to how it had been under Saddam Hussein. The absence of utilities, economic growth, and security were all major aspects of public life whose absence or destruction was blamed

Approved for Release

[267] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050514 | 20050514 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[268] Ibid.
[269] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050508 | 20050508 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[270] [| Military| TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050523 | 20050523 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

on the Coalition. Several water and electricity-related problems arose in the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor, where residents needed an adequate water supply for crops in order to make money and survive. The general population was most supportive of the Coalition in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and least supportive in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Several peaceful protests occurred regarding allegations that the United States desecrated the Qu'ran at Guantanamo Bay and calls for local government officials to take a stronger stand against former Ba'athists. While insurgent intimidation, kidnapping, and assassination were high, the relatively small Iraqi security forces continued to hold up.[271]

Al-Qa'im, Akashat and Ga'aara

~~(S/NF)~~ With many fighters dispersed from al-Qa'im by the Coalition and fighting with Sheikh Sabah, the insurgents began shifting their primary rallying area to Akashat, using the village of Ga'aara as their new headquarters. A small group of houses outside of Akashat disguised as a Bedouin village, Ga'aara served as a planning center for the insurgents after they had been pushed out of al-Wa'im in Operation MATADOR. The insurgency had already possessed a logistics and smuggling network in the Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor at least as far back as January 2005 and the villages of Maqir al-Thib, al-Baqhuz, and al-Karish were insurgent hubs to smuggle foreign fighters and supplies into Iraq due to their rural arrangement and the nomadic character of the inhabitants.[272]

~~(S/NF)~~ Unfortunately, the security situation in al-Qa'im remained grave at the conclusion of Operation MATADOR, with large numbers of Iraqi fighters who had fled to Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** now returning to al-Qa'im to resume their intimidation of the population. Some were 1.4b who were now**Error! Bookmark not defined.** loyal to Zarqawi.[273]

HitError! Bookmark not defined. **and Haditha**

~~(S/NF)~~ Al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal fighters drawn from AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna served the dominant group in the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Hadith**Error!**

[271] [| Militar TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050522 | 20050522 | ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ |]
[272] [| 1.4c | 20050308 | (S/NF) |]
[273] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050519 | 20050519 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Bookmark not defined. corridor due to its large supply of munitions and the frequent movement of its supply caches.[274]

(~~S/REL~~) In general, insurgents in western Anbar were able to endure MATADOR by either withdrawing to urban areas while the Coalition was conducting operations in outlying villages or by assimilating into the rural population. Either way, they quickly reestablished influence once Coalition forces are no longer active in the area. Membership in individual insurgent groups remained fluid, with local groups operating under the umbrella of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or Ansar al-Sunna being the most common. Friction continued in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** between residents and SREs, while Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was subjected to an intense murder and intimidation campaign by Ansar al-Sunna. Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Annah served as secondary staging areas for AQI while the group relocated to Akashat and Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** following Operation MATADOR.[275]

Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah Error! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/REL~~) Unfortunately, the end of Operation MATADOR coincided with another period of insurgent reconstitution in eastern Anbar. There were a number of factors behind this insurgent resurgence. These factors included the Albu Diab tribe beginning to relax its opposition to the insurgency in the Jazira area near Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, the continued lack of employment, and irrigation problems that led to a low-yield harvest among the tribesmen.[276] Thanks to this ease in pressure, the Abu Harun Group and the followers of Nuhaad Abu Abdullah were able to organize 250-300 insurgents to carry out attacks in Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters were able to move through the area, bribing Iraqi security forces into allowing them to move uninhibited through the area, attacking Coalition and Iraqi convoys in coordination with the Islamic Army of Iraq.[277]

RamadiError! Bookmark not defined. **and Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/REL~~) The insurgent leadership in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** continued to be divided between the Ramadi Shura Council, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Ansar al-Sunna despite efforts to form a united front.[278] Insurgents near Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, by contrast, were far better organized and willing to coordinate attacks towards Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Abu Ghraib while supporting infiltration back into

Approved for Release

[274] [| Military | 1.4c]
[275] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050522 _ 20050522 _ ~~S REL MCFI~~]
[276] [| Military | 1.4c]
[277] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050520 | 20050520 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[278] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050522 | 20050522 | ~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Fallujah. Insurgents north of Fallujah were largely drawn from Jaysh Mohammed and the Islamic Army of Iraq, while those to the south are AQI or Ansar al-Sunna.[279]

Iraqi Politics and the Constitution

~~(S/NF)~~ Following the May 10 announcement of the Transitional National Assembly Constitution Drafting Committee, several prominent Sunni leaders expressed deep disappointment over what they saw as inadequate Sunni representation. While UIA MPs publicly acknowledged the need for greater Sunni inclusion, in practice they rejected all Sunni proposals. Even so, representatives from the prime minister, SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and UIA independents assured the U.S. embassy in mid-May that they were in close contact with Sunni groups and leaders in order to work out a compromise.[280]

~~(C)~~ Of the fifty-five members of the committee drafting the constitution, twenty-one were from the UIA, fifteen were from the Kurdish Alliance, eight were secular Shi'a from Allawi's Iraq list, and two were Sunni Arabs. IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leaders Tareq Hashemi and Naseer al-Ani told the Coalition that efforts to include Sunnis in the Iraqi government were superficial and that this treatment of the Sunnis was counter-productive to IIP efforts to put pressure on extremists. Dr. Adnan Pachachi rejected as well the idea that Sunnis should only have "consultative options" when it came to drafting the constitution. In an effort to address these criticisms, Awqaf Director al-'Ithawi told the Arab press that he was drawing up a list of Sunni candidates for inclusion on the Committee.[281]

The Kidnapping and Death of Governor Farhan (May-June 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ While the negotiations over the constitution continued, two significant developments in Anbar would profoundly affect the insurgency in mid-2005: the kidnapping and murder of the provincial governor and the capture of Mohammed Daham. The growing strength and effective action of the Hamza Battalion was the main impetus for AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s decision to kidnap Governor Farhan. After a brief lull following Operation MATADOR, the Hamza Battalion resumed its attacks on AQI, seeking to prove itself to the new Iraqi government in order to be incorporated into the police and Iraqi National Guard in the al-Qa'im area.[282] Among those they attacked were AQI foreign fighters in Karabilah under Hussein Shehab and Ra'ad Saleh Mutar, who had been planning another attack on Camp Gannon.[283]

~~(S/NF)~~ In an effort to reduce attacks by the Hamza Battalion, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had Ansar al-Sunna kidnap Sheikh Sabah's brother-in-law Governor Farhan and his son while they

Approved for Release

[279] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050520 | 20050520 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[280] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050520 | 20050520 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[281] Ibid.
[282] [| Military | 1.4c
[283] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050524 | 20050524 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

were traveling from Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to al-Qa'im.[284] This forced the Hamza Battalion, which had rejected two earlier truce offers, to halt its attacks against AQI in order to negotiate for the governor's release.[285] Sheikh Sabah of the Mahalawi and Sheikh Hatim Abd al-Razzak of the Albu Nimr oversaw the negotiations with the AQI leadership in Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. The first demand from AQI was that the Mahalawi tribe leave the group alone and that Sheikh Sabah and 10-12 of his top subordinates leave the area. On May 16, AQI agreed to release the governor's son in return for weapons and vehicles. The negotiations would continue until May 29, when AQI killed the governor during a Coalition raid northwest of Rawah that also resulted in the death of four foreign fighters and the capture of four more.[286]

~~(S/NF)~~ Local reactions to the death of Governor Farhan were decidedly mixed. AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** mounted an aggressive propaganda campaign to convince locals and members of the Hamza Battalion that the Coalition had deliberately killed Farhan. While Farhan's son and nephew blamed AQI for the governor's death, many in the Mahalawi tribe believed that threats by the Nawaf family served to exacerbate the situation. Many of the Mahalawi tribesmen who made up the bulk of the Hamza Battalion were demoralized and tired of fighting, not wishing to return to Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[287]

~~(S/NF)~~ In late May and early June, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Hamza Battalion representatives attended talks in Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** mediated by Dulaymi tribal leaders in the hopes of settling their dispute but no resolution occurred.[288]

The Capture of Mohammed Daham

~~(S/NF)~~ Coalition forces also managed to capture Mohammed Daham in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** when he made the mistake of attempting to turn a peaceful protest into a riot. At the time of his capture, Daham controlled multiple cells of the Nu'man Brigade and had recently reorganized his fighters to carry out multiple attacks.[289] MML ordered Sheikh Mohammed Sadaq, one of six representatives that he had named to negotiate with the government on behalf of the insurgency, to get Daham out of prison.[290] Sadaq organized a demonstration in Ramadi to petition for Daham's release, but this protest failed to generate large numbers since many Ramadi residents regarded Daham as a thug and were unconcerned by his detention.[291]

Approved for Release

---

[284] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050601 | 20050601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[285] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050524 | 20050524 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[286] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050601 | 20050601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[287] Ibid.
[288] [1.4c
[289] [| Military | IMEF HET02 0214 04 | 20040815 | ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[290] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050529 | 20050529 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[291] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050530 | 20050530 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The detention of Daham led to a splintering of the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council, with additional leaders fleeing to Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Leadership and membership in insurgent cells became fluid, with low-level cells holding no clear allegiance except being willing to fight for whoever was willing to pay.[292] Even so, Daham's followers continued to conduct retaliatory attacks in Ramadi.[293]

~~(S/NF)~~ AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** sought to head off the potential for chaos among the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters by uniting all the insurgent groups in the city into a single organization. This particular project was the provenance of Harith al-Dhari, who was under pressure within AMS because of his failure to secure Sunni power in the last election. Towards that end, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** agreed to share funds and weapons with the Nu'man Brigade and other member groups of the Ramadi Shura Council.[294]

Snapshot of the Insurgency

(U) By the end of May 2005, the insurgency had recovered from earlier Coalition operations and was now firmly embedded in certain areas of Anbar. Al-Qa'im was the new capital of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and parts of the Jazira as well as a section of territory around Zaidon were hotbeds of insurgent activity. The example of al-Qa'im and nearby villages showed the sort of society that AQI hoped to create in Iraq: ruled by a strict version of shari'a and enforced by groups of "volunteers" who meted out medieval punishments for the least violation of these codes.

(U) The dispersion of insurgents after AL-FAJR and later Coalition operations had pushed AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, AS and other groups into smaller towns and villages of the province. Localities like Akashat, Ga'aara, Ramana, Saqlawiyah and Amariyah now became important staging grounds for attacks. Insurgent groups—FRE, SRE, and SAR—also turned to criminal activities, since their regular financial networks were disrupted. At the same time, AQI and other groups had quickly reconstituted and were capable of sophisticated and complex attacks, like the one mounted against Abu Ghraib.

(U) There were, at the same time, several positive changes brought about by AL FAJR and the January elections. The serious split between SARs and SREs—and between MML and AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in particular—was creating a space for insurgents to find a peaceful way out of the fighting. This political engagement was at an early stage in May 2005, but held great promise. A related problem for AQI was the decision by MML to encourage attacks on foreign fighters by native Iraqi tribesmen. Sheikh Sabah's tribal force created a serious threat to Zarqawi, one that he felt compelled to answer with more violence.

Approved for Release

[292] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050529 | 20050529 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[293] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050702 | 20050702 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[294] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) Finally, the example of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** after AL FAJR showed that, once free of overwhelming insurgent influence, ordinary Anbaris were relatively resistant to the appeal of the insurgency, and willing to find ways to work within the system to improve their lives.

(U) **Summary:**

~~(S/NF)~~ Early 2005 was a key period for AQI's efforts to reorganize its Anbar networks following Operation AL FAJR, setting the group up to become the preeminent insurgent force in Anbar the following year. Despite aggressive Coalition operations intended to defeat or degrade the insurgency, the decline of FRE insurgent groups inadvertently served to fuel the rise of AQI as many FREs continued to join or ally with AMZ in order to continue their fight against the Coalition. Coalition operations in major cities forced local insurgent cells to operate in a more clandestine manner, leading to a rise in criminality, murder, and intimidation as insurgents sought to raise money and retain influence over the general population.

June to August

Introduction

(U) *If the first half of 2005 was dominated by the aftermath of AL FAJR and the January elections, the second half of the year was defined by two entirely different processes. The Coalition carried out a series of operations designed to accomplish two tasks. First, it disrupted insurgent activities provide the stability necessary for the political development of Iraq. Second, it secured the western borders by clearing territory occupied by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and affiliated groups. Meanwhile, the summer of 2005 saw the continuation and deepening of tribal warfare, much of it aimed at AQI. This development culminated in a blood feud between AQI and members of the Albu Mahal tribe's Hamza Battalion. The battalion was decimated by AQI.*

(U) *2005 ended on an uncertain note. On the one hand, there was significant progress in the political development of Iraq, including the October constitutional referendum and the December national elections. Yet the insurgency remained strong and was evolving into a more professional and integrated movement, dominated as never before by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and its affiliated groups.*

Operation NEW MARKET (SUK JADID) (May 25-29, 2005)

(U) To end insurgent intimidation in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and maintain pressure on fighters dispersed by MATADOR, the Coalition carried out Operation NEW MARKET (Arabic: *Suk Jadid*). A total of 1,000 personnel from RCT-2 and the Iraqi security forces took part in the operation. They first established checkpoints around the city to interdict insurgents fleeing the area. Then, Marines and Iraqi security forces searched targeted areas, buildings, and businesses in an effort to locate insurgents, weapons, and ammunition caches. They detained dozens of suspected insurgents while seizing numerous weapons caches.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The insurgent reaction to NEW MARKET showed both the resilience of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and their growing problem with tribal warfare. Sheikh Rafa al-Rawi, who had taken command of AQI in western Anbar after Ghassan Amean's capture, attempted to coordinate an insurgent response to the Coalition offensive.[295] At the same time members of Jaysh Mohammed in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, supported by the Albu Nimr, turned their guns on AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and AQI ally al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal to avenge the killing of a Jaysh Mohammed fighter by AQI.[296] This fighting soon spread north to Husayniyah, where AQI attacked a suspected Jaysh Mohammed facility north of the town with car bombs.[297] The Mahalawi, seizing the opportunity, attacked an AQI-occupied police station in Ramana, ending the informal truce that had existed between the two since the death of Governor Farhan. This action led to a series of kidnappings by both sides.[298] More than thirty-two bodies of AQI and Hamza Battalion fighters from Akashat, Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, 'Ubaydi, and al-Qaim were discovered by Coalition forces in the al-Thalaja Desert.[299] There are some indications that these developments alarmed the al Qaida senior leadership (AQSL). Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (Nashwan Abdul Razzaq) instructed the Ansar al-Sunna insurgent group facilitator Haji Said in Iran**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s Kermanshah province, to make arrangements for him to enter Iraq[300]

Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN AND GBR)~~ The story of Abd al-Hadi's entry into Iraq illustrates several important lessons about AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and the insurgency in general. Abd al-Hadi requested transfer to Iraq twice. Zarqawi had denied both requests on security grounds. AQSL pushed Abd al-Hadi to get into the country despite Zarqawi's objections because they felt Zarqawi's strategy and supporting tactics were hurting AQI. However, to even get into Iraq, Abd al-Hadi had to overcome the bureaucratic infighting between Ansar al-Sunna and AQI. Each group believed it should be in charge of all elements of AQ operating in Iraq. Due to infighting between the groups, it took almost seven months for al-Hadi to actually arrive in Iraq. This infighting prevented coordinated actions against the Coalition by Ansar al-Sunna and AQI.

After-effects of Operation NEW MARKET (May-June 2005)

~~(S)~~ If the renewed fighting in late 2004-early 2005 between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and both JM and the Hamza Battalion was the reason for Abd al-Hadi's entry into Iraq, AQSL was right to be concerned. The feud between the AQI and the Hamza Battalion had led to the de facto partition of Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** between the two groups, with AQI holding Karabilah and the area east of the Husaybah hospital and the Hamza Battalion holding everything to

[295] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050602 | 20050602 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[296] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050605 | 20050605 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[297] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050606 | 20050606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[298] Ibid.
[299] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050610 | 20050610 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[300] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050603 | 20050603 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the west.[301] A number of fighters from the Hamza Battalion were arrayed near Camp Gannon, deterring AQI from mounting further attacks on the Coalition base.[302]

MCIA Insert Map Here

~~(S/NF)~~ Elsewhere in the region, fighters loyal to AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq retook control of the territory near the Ramana Bridge from the Hamza Battalion. AQI convinced al-Asa'ab al-Iraq that the Coalition was planning to attack its bases north of the Euphrates River and therefore it was necessary to secure their rear from the Hamza Battalion before this offensive began.[303]

~~(S/REL)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was also fighting with Jaysh Mohammed in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. AQI used its control of the Ahmad al-Rafai, Abdel Rahim, and al-Haj Hussein Ali Sultan mosques in neighboring Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (and the support of leading clerics Sheikh Abu Doua'a, Sheikh Tahseen Zarnan, and Sheikh Hamood al-Muadidi) to carry out attacks against the Coalition, local police, Iraqi National Guard, and rival insurgent groups like JM in Hit and Haditha.[304] Sheikh Abu Bahn of the Aziz Mosque in the Haditha Dam village even allowed AQI to use his mosque to launch mortars against the Coalition on June 11.[305] Although some religious and tribal leaders wanted to move against foreign fighters, they were unable to create an organized resistance movement. Quite simply, they lacked a leader like Sheikh Sabah, who could focus their resolve against SRE groups like AQI.

~~(S)~~ Despite the strength of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Jaysh Mohammed was able to exploit the temporary disruption of the AQI foreign fighter network in western Anbar to divert foreign fighters into their own rou . Sheikh Khamis al-Rashad of the group's Albu Hatim cell thus used his religious and 1.4c, 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.** to facilitate the entry of foreign fighters into Jaysh Mohammed.[306] Among his followers were former IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** agents Mohammed Khodier Sabah and Jassim Hammadi Hathel, both of whom served as key leaders with JM.[307]

~~(S/REL TO USA GBR AND AUS)~~ Other insurgents, not wanting to take part in the infighting and fearful of Coalition efforts in western Anbar, fled south to regroup at Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[308] While the insurgent presence in Rutbah had traditionally been roughly 100-150 fighters,

Approved for Release

[301] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050605 | 20050605 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[302] Ibid.
[303] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050618 20050618 ~~S/NF~~
[304] [| Military | 1.4c
[305] [| Military TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050613 20050613 ~~S/NF~~
[306] [| Military 1.4c
[307] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050602 | 20050602 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[308] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050606 | 20050606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

it now expanded rapidly.[309] Rutbah was an ideal sanctuary for these insurgents because the mayor and other key officials in the city were still the same former Ba'athists. They supported the insurgency by providing it with money given to them by the U.S. Civil Affairs Group.[310] The insurgents exercised strong control over residents, with anti-Coalition propaganda preached openly from the mosques while videos and CDs of insurgent attacks actively sold in markets.[311] No respected local authority existed to prevent ordinary criminal activity, let alone the insurgency, and checkpoints outside the city were not effective unless manned by Coalition troops.[312]

AQIError! Bookmark not defined. **Creates New Training Camps**

~~(S/REL)~~ The need to relocate AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** personnel and infrastructure away from the Syrian border to escape Coalition operations may have coincided with the creation twenty miles east of from the Iraqi-Jordanian border of an AQI terrorist training camp capable of housing 200-250 recruits. Run by former Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Mujahideen Shura fighters, the camp had personnel in al-Kasra, al-Nukhayb, and Ain al-Tamur that included an intelligence collection cell, an assassination cell that targeted Shi'a leaders, and a suicide bombing cell. The command node for these cells was located in a sand factory in Zigherat. This is the same factory where Zarqawi reportedly received medical attention following Operation AL FAJR. When Karbala**Error! Bookmark not defined.** police successfully infiltrated the camp during the summer of 2005, they discovered a group of fifty Saudis, Sudanese, Syrians, and Iraqis being indoctrinated to serve as suicide bombers.[313] Three additional training camps, each capable of housing 50-75 fighters, were located at Zweia, Khabat al-Habbariyah, and al-Habbariyah south of Ramadi, focusing on preparing fighters to conduct suicide bombings, complex attacks, IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and VBIED attacks. These camps were reportedly under the supervision of a former 1.4b

The Capture of the Military Housing Complex in Baghdadi (May 2005)

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS AND GBR)~~ Despite being weakened in western Anbar during MATADOR and NEW MARKET, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and its allies remained active in other parts of the province. As before, the key to AQI's survival lay in the absorption of individuals from other groups to help sustain and regenerate its networks. In Baghdadi, for instance, AQI took in fighters from the Islamic Army of Iraq. Led by Abd al-Rahman al-Afghani, the group carried out a successful operation that captured the Military Housing Complex of the 503rd Iraqi National Guard

[309] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050610 | 20050610 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[310] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050606 | 20050606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[311] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050610 | 20050610 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[312] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050606 | 20050606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[313] [| Military | INTREP # 0612-2 | 20050612 | ~~(SECRET//MCFI)~~ |]
[314] [| Military | 1.4c

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Battalion in early May 2005.[315] The unit's commander, (b)(6) was so intimidated by the insurgency that he fired any of his men who worked with the Coalition. By May 30, the situation had grown so dire that the 503rd completely abandoned their base. The insurgents destroyed the gate the following day. This led to a June 2 Coalition raid on the Military Housing Complex that resulted in the capture of Atheer Nassif Turki, the last remaining significant FRE insurgent leader in Iraq.[316] The capture of Turki in fact signaled the ending of an era in the history of the Iraq insurgency. From this time on, there existed no serious FRE or FRL challengers to the SAR and SRE dominated insurgency.

Operation SPEAR (Operation RUMAH) (June 17, 2005)

(U) Operation SPEAR was launched on June 17 by 1,000 Marines from RCT 2, 2nd Marine Division and Iraqi forces from the 1st Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade against AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters active in Karabilah. The operation lasted until June 22 and involved direct attacks against locations in Karabilah affiliated with AQI. These included a training compound that contained weapons, propaganda, and documentation for foreign fighters and a detention facility that housed Iraqi and foreign hostages. During the operation forty-seven Saudi and Sudanese AQI fighters were killed and one was detained.[317]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ It is difficult to say what effect Operation SPEAR had on the overall security situation in western Anbar. For instance, a new murder and intimidation campaign targeted base workers and Coalition interpreters in the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor,[318] yet, because AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was focused on reorganizing and on carrying out attacks on JM and the Hamza Battalion, there ensued a period of relatively few attacks on the Coalition in the area.[319]

~~(S/NF)~~ There are some indications that Zarqawi was directly involved in AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s reorganization in western Anbar, as he was sighted in Anah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Ma'adid, and Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** during this period along with the amir of al-Qaim Husayn Shihab al-Karbuli.[320] They were able to move about the area freely using established local support networks that provided knowledge of the terrain and early warning of Coalition operations.

City Stories (Mid-2005)

Approved for Release

[315] This occurred after the group had spent a lengthy period stealing vehicles and weapons from site.
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050603 | 20050603 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[316] Ibid.
[317] [| Open Source | www.globalsecurity.org/Operation Spear (U) |]
[318] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050701 | 20050701 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[319] Ibid.
[320] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050703 | 20050703 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

FallujahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ The evolution of the insurgency in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** demonstrates the complex relationship between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and local insurgents who began join AQI as affiliated groups. AQI cells in Fallujah now somewhat united under the leadership of Sheikh Abd al-Munam Shakir Hamdan Faith al-Kubaisi of the Furqan Mosque, who hoped to facilitate Sheikh Abdullah Janabi's return to power in the city.[321] Janabi had sworn allegiance (*bay'at*) to Zarqawi in 2004. Yet his local fighters in Fallujah had sworn allegiance to Janabi, not to AQI itself.[322] However, there was only a surface distinction between the two groups without ideological, motivational, or operational significance. The double *bay'at* meant that the individual insurgents were bound to obey Janabi who was bound to obey Zarqawi, making them AQI affiliates through their leader. This was apparently a common phenomenon affecting the insurgency throughout 2005 and would culminate in early 2006 with the nearly complete al-Qaedization of the Sunni anti-Coalition Iraq insurgency.

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR AND NZL)~~ Sheikh Abd al-Munam received funding from Janabi's backers in 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.**, 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.**. He used it to provide some 500,000 dinars to select locals in order to win their trust and to call them to a revived jihad in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. His position at the al-Furqan mosque made it very convenient to deliver anti-Coalition and pro-jihad sermons while passing out money to perspective mujahidin.[323]

~~(S/REL MCFI)~~ During the summer of 2005, a group of Syrian, Yemeni, and Moroccan AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters led by Hamid Khamis Saleh used Sheikh Abd al-Munam's influence to target Aifan, a popular city council member and Albu Issa tribal leader who openly supported the Coalition.[324] An SVBIED attack on June 23 convinced Aifan to flee the country for 1.4b **rror! Bookmark not defined.** where he was soon joined by other members of his family. Prominent pro-Coalition members of the Albu Issa, including Sheikh Hamed Togan and Sheikh Abd Allawi Salih were also assassinated, leaving Khamis Hasnawi as the leader of the Albu Issa.[325]

~~(S/NF)~~ Jaysh Muhammad in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, greatly reduced by defections to AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Coalition efforts, was led by Sheikh Hassan Jassim al-Zuwad and his son Hassan Tohman.[326] They were supported by Sheikh Ismahial Saram Hussein

Approved for Release

[321] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050603 | 20050603 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[322] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: TFC INTREP #05-008 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[323] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050603 | 20050603 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[324] To complicate matters further, Aifan had also received a $10,000 bribe from Jaysh Mohammed leader Ahmed Tohman to keep the Coalition from targeting him.
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050628 | 20050628 | ~~(S/MCFI)~~ |]
[325] [| MNF-W | Tribal Engagement Assessment ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[326] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050618 | 20050618 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Muslim al-Jumayli, the spiritual leader of the Fallujah insurgents, who fled to Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** during Operation AL FAJR.[327]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS AND GBR)~~ **Fatwas Calling for Support for the Coalition**: Not all Sunni clerics supported the insurgents. The *Awqaf* issued *fatwas* calling for increased cooperation between locals and the Coalition, an end to violence, and increased Sunni participation in the Iraqi security forces and the political process.[328] These calls were taken up in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** by Sadun al-Halbusi of the al-Khulafa Rashid Mosque and Fawzi Namiq Mustafa of the Hamud al-Mahmud Mosque.[329] Fallujah residents generally agreed with these sentiments, influenced in part by local anti-insurgent broadcasts that blamed the insurgency for an IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** attack that resulted in the death of a young girl.[330] Many former mujahidin had given up the fight and were returning to the city to take up normal jobs despite efforts by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and others to incite them to return to jihad.[331] Even so, government activities and improved civil administration in the city went largely unrecognized by many residents.[332] In fact, the mostly Shi'a Public Order Brigade justified the residents continued distrust. After a June 17 VBIED attack on a local marketplace, members of the Brigade looted merchandise, leading to a substantial decline in public support for the police.[333]

RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ The insurgent dynamics in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** changed significantly following the capture of Daham in May 2005. MML sought to rekindle his earlier alliance with Zarqawi in order to exact retribution against the Coalition for the capture of his lieutenant.[334] To do this, he opened a dialogue with AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** at the behest of Harith al-Dhari, to discuss the unification of AQI forces with those of his own Ramadi Shura Council.[335] This led to a temporary alliance between the two, and Latif facilitated the entry of as many as 183 foreign fighters under Ismael Hamad into Ramadi, using the ratlines around the inactive railroad south of the city to smuggle in fighters, weapons and explosives.[336] In addition, river routes were also reestablished to get around Coalition entry points into the city.[337]

Approved for Release

[327] Ibid.
[328] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050614 | 20050614 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[329] Ibid.
[330] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050605 | 20050605 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[331] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050618 | 20050618 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[332] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050605 | 20050605 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[333] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050622 | 20050622 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[334] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050623 | 20050623 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[335] Ibid.
[336] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050630 | 20050630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[337] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050623 | 20050623 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The Islamic Army of Iraq meanwhile established a presence in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as part of a broader campaign by Iraqi SREs to establish a greater presence in the provincial capital in order to counter the rise of Governor Mamoun.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The influx of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and other SRE insurgents led to an increased harassment campaign against residents, leading some to leave the city.[338] Alcohol salesmen in particular were targeted for intimidation and kidnapping, showing the religious motivation for many of these actions.

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR AND NZL)~~ Insurgents increased attacks on "soft" civilian convoys outside the city, stealing their merchandise both for profit and to intimidate locals.[339] During one such convoy ambush on June 7, a number of Iraqi civilians were taken hostage by Ansar al-Sunna, who separated them into different groups and took them to the Amariyah area.[340]

Al-Qaim

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite renewed fighting in the city, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** maintained their influence in al-Qaim. Not only was it their new capital, but because they relied heavily on foreign support they needed access to Ramana and Karabilah to facilitate smuggling personnel and material throughout Iraq.[341]

Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah Error! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR AND NZL)~~ In Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, the insurgents stepped up their intimidation campaign to limit local cooperation with the Coalition and Iraqi security forces.[342] Sentiment in both cities had been neutral, neither favoring the Coalition nor the insurgency, but this began to change as the insurgents assassinated or intimidated residents suspected of being associated with the Coalition.[343] These operations were financed by Amir Mubarak Atrouz, the brother of Zarqawi lieutenant Thamir Mubarak Atrouz (see Chapter 3).[344] In part, the intimidation and murder campaign was made possible through the work of Iraqi police captain Khalid Chaid Hayaf, who was the leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades in this

Approved for Release

[338] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050704 | 20050704 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[339] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050613 | 20050613 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[340] [Militar | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050618 | 20050618 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[341] [1.4c]
[342] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050603 | 20050603 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[343] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050618 | 20050618 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[344] [| Military | 1.4c

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

city.[345] Through his lieutenant Abu Ayu, Hayaf was able to monitor residents entering and leaving Coalition bases.[346] This intimidation gradually created a favorable environment towards the insurgency in the town, enabling insurgents to step up attacks on civilian convoys in the area, and delaying the deployment of the 1st Iraqi Division.[347]

RawahError! Bookmark not defined. **and Anah**Error! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ A number of Zarqawi associates including Qasim Ali al-Mahmud fled to Anah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** during Operations MATADOR and SPEAR, seeking refuge with Umar Ramadan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** al-Hadu, a local insurgent leader. Umar Ramadan claimed to have personally beheaded forty Albu Mahal and Salmani tribesmen in al-Qaim at AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s behest. The Rawah-Anah corridor was heavily influenced by AQI and had previously been used as a base to supply training camps in the Jazira desert. Because both Rawah and Anah were Ba'athist retirement communities under the former regime, the predominantly Sunni planned communities were home to large numbers of insurgent supporters. The Euphrates River that surrounded 50% of Rawah provided a natural barrier against ground forces entering the city and both bridges were under constant AQI surveillance to provide early warning of any Coalition movement south.[348] The influx of AQI fighters into the city led to the June 30 evacuation of residents, who feared that a Coalition attack on the town was imminent.[349]

Karmah

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ After a short lull, the insurgency returned to previous levels in Karmah. Insurgent leaders were, however, frustrated by the effectiveness of the Coalition in the area and their inability to mount attacks. As a result, local insurgent leaders Salaam Dera Abdullah Thamer, FRE General Falah al-Awaeri, and Salah Hitalla held a series of meetings in which they argued over the reasons for the ineffectiveness of their attacks against the Coalition to date.[350]

~~(S/NF)~~ Among the issues facing the Karmah insurgents was a dispute between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Sheikh Nawar Ali Musarbat and Turgi Ibrahim Allowi Fayad al-Halbusi (the head of the Green Battalion) over resorting to criminality. Turgi supported it but Nawar decried it.[351] Turgi was later detained by the Coalition at the end of June.[352] He was replaced

[345] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050630 | 20050630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[346] Ibid.
[347] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050618 | 20050618 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[348] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050702 | 20050702 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[349] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050705 | 20050705 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[350] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050610 | 20050610 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[351] [| Military | 1.4c
[352] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050630 | 20050630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

as leader of the Green Battalion by Ahmed Migbas (Haji Waleed), who had his own ties to IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and other FRE groups.[353]

(~~S/REL~~) The story behind the capture of Turgi points up the continuing intertwining between tribal issues and the insurgency. Turgi was kidnapped by local Jumayli tribesmen, who had hoped to use him as leverage to secure the release of one of their own tribesmen who was being held by the Green Battalion. The Jumaylis subsequently turned Turgi, who was also a member of a rival tribe (the Halbusi), over to the Coalition.[354] In retaliation for their role in Turgi's capture, Halbusis in the Green Battalion kidnapped the Jumayli tribal leader's son Arkan Mushhan Abbas al-Jumayli.[355] They would subsequently kill Arkan and then his uncle (Talib Abbas al-Jumayli) forcing the head of the Jumaylis (Mehsin Abbas al-Jumayli) into exile in Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. This would leave the Jumaylis without a sheikh, a fact which would be a significant factor in later tribal developments in Anbar.[356]

Zaidon

(~~S/NF~~) In Zaidon, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters were under the command of Zarqawi's cousin and AQI Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** amir Abu Harith. He had masterminded the February 28, 2005 bombing in Hillah that had killed 166 Iraqi police recruits and injured 146.[357] Together with Zaidon-based Essa Handi Abood, Abu Harith met with AQI leaders in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and distributed funds and instructions to cells in the region. He also supervised the kidnapping of Jeffery Ake, who was held captive by Essa in Zaidon.[358]

(~~S/REL TO USA, AUS AND GBR~~) Recognizing the threat posed by local smugglers and Salafists tied to AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in Zaidon, the Coalition carried out Operation VITAL GROUND, causing some insurgents to flee towards Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Abu Ghraib to regroup.[359] Others remained in the town, holed up in areas such as mosques, which they believed would not be targeted by the Coalition.[360]

Ubaydi

Approved for Release

[353] [| Military | TACTICAL DIIR MNFW HET07 0481 05 | 20050620 | ~~(S/REL USA AND MCFI)~~ |]
[354] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050708 | 20050708 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[355] Ibid.
[356] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050805 | 20050805 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ;
[| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050814 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[357] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050705 | 20050705 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[358] Ibid.
[359] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050605 | 20050605 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[360] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s intimidation of the population in 'Ubaydi enabled the group some freedom of movement across the Euphrates River.[361] The major insurgent facilitator in the city was local pharmacist Salah Barakat Asideen, who joined AQI after his son was shot and killed by Coalition forces on May 16. He used his pharmacy as a front for the insurgency. Adnan Abdul Kareem, the imam of the Mustafa Mosque, led a group of local Salafists allied with AQI in the city.[362]

Snapshot of the insurgency

~~(S/NF)~~ The series of operations carried out in early summer 2005 only briefly disrupted insurgent activities, forcing fighters and their leadership to hide or disperse once again to smaller towns and villages throughout Anbar. Certain towns were, however, relatively untouched by Coalition operations and these cities (including the al-Qaim area, the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor, and Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) would later permit the evolution of the insurgency into a more formalized structure with some of the characteristics of a state.

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, meanwhile, continued to attract fighters from other insurgent groups, but also faced serious resistance from certain tribes. These problems, in particular with the Albu Issa and the Albu Mahal tribes, would soon come to a head as open conflict with the Mahalawi and a murder and intimidation campaign against the Albu Issa.

Attack Data (May – August 2005)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the middle trimester (May to August 2005). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was slightly higher than the previous period, and generally increased slightly during the four months. In particular, the number of Direct Fire and IED incidents showed a definite increase during the four months. The majority of activity in the period was concentrated in AO Topeka. The Indirect Fire and Complex Attacks data showed no strong trends. There were no particular weeks during the period that varied significantly from the overall trends and averages.

Approved for Release

[361] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER:GRINTSUM 050614 | 20050614 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[362] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506





Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Complex Attacks





Political Developments: The Rise of Governor Mamoun

~~(S/NF)~~ With the death of Farhan, former provincial council chairman Mamoun Sami Rashid was chosen as the new governor of Anbar by a vote of 27-0 on June 1, 2005.[363] His success as the provincial council chairman had demonstrated his ability to work well with the other council members, leading to their confidence in him to serve as governor.[364] His political aptitude, however, made him a frequent target for insurgent groups seeking to prevent political progress in Anbar. Deputy Governor Taleb Ibrahim Sameer, who had temporarily served as governor in Farhan's absence, returned to his former position with Mamoun's ascension.[365] Sheikh Nasser Abdul Karim, an individual with a history of corruption and former regime ties that brought him considerable influence and "tribal legitimacy," was favored as Mamoun's replacement as provincial council chairman.[366] However, Sheikh Nasser was out maneuvered by deputy provincial chairman Khedier Abd al-Jabar Abbas, a teacher and school administrator.[367]

Approved for Release

(S/NF) GOVERNOR	TERM IN OFFICE	REASON FOR LEAVING

[363] [| Military | Provincial Council Meeting Notes; 061200MAY05 CMO Daily Brief | 20050601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[364] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER:GRINTSUM 050601| 20050601| ~~(S/NF)~~ |
[365] Ibid.
[366] Ibid.
[367] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER:GRINTSUM 050614 | 20050614 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Fasal Raikan Najris al Gaoud[368]	November 8, 2004—February 2005[369]	Forced out of office by local tribal leaders.[370]
Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi	February — May 9, 2005	Kidnapped by insurgents in May 2005 and later killed in captivity.[371]
Maamoon Sami Rasheed al-Awani	June 1, 2005—Present	Incumbent

~~(S/NF)~~ Table 1. Governors of Anbar Province 2004-2006

Infiltration of the Iraqi Security Forces by Insurgents

~~(S/NF)~~ This positive development in the political sphere was undercut by infiltration of insurgents into the ISF. This infiltration caused many Anbaris to hesitate to approach the Coalition for fear of being identified by insurgents who held senior positions in the new Iraqi security forces. One of the most successful examples of insurgent infiltration was (b)(6) (b)(6) who worked both for MML to spy on top-level Iraqi military meetings as a bodyguard for a commanding officer in the Iraqi armed forces in Anbar.[372] Other more common examples of insurgent infiltration took place in Karmah, where insurgents routinely sabotaged the weaponry of the local Iraqi security forces.[373]

~~(S/NF)~~ MML was able to successfully coerce Anbar police chief Brigadier General Shakr Salih to support him, meeting regularly to receive intelligence on how to infiltrate the local police forces with fighters loyal to the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council.[374] Meanwhile Deputy Assistant Minister for Security Coordination of Police Affairs Ali Ghalib Khydaer was intimidated into providing intelligence to MML in return for his own security.[375] (b)(6) (b)(6) also worked for MML, attempting to reduce the Coalition presence in Ramadi in order to allow the Ramadi Shura Council to operate more freely in the city.[376]

~~(S/REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)~~ In addition to intelligence, MML used his agents within the security forces to provide himself with a steady income.[377] Foremost among his agents was Assistant to the Interior Ministry General Al Ghalib, who worked with General Shakir to "tax" 7,000 dinars

[368] Ibid.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.
[371] [| Open Source | SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE/AAMER MADHANI: U.S. TROOPS FIND BODY OF ANBAR GOVERNOR | 20050601 | (U) |]
[372] [| Military | 1.4c
[373] Ibid.
[374] [| Military |
[375] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050606 | 20050606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[376] Ibid.
[377] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050727 | 20050727 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

from officers and 5,000 dinars from enlisted men to support MML in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[378]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Access to funding, coupled with the inability of many Anbaris to support their families, was a major factor in the success of insurgent infiltration.[379] The starting salary of an Iraqi police officer, facilities protection worker, or soldier was $150 a month, whereas insurgents were paid $100-200 per small arms, IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, mortar, or RPG attack. Civilians were paid $10 a day to spy on Coalition bases and checkpoints. Much of the day-to-day funding for these payments were collected or extorted from local Iraqis, though some chose to donate funding to support the insurgency at mosques, relying on anonymity to let them provide money without fear of detention.[380]

Operation SWORD (Operation SAIF) (June-July 2006)

~~(S/REL)~~ Operation SWORD was the strategic successor to Operation SPEAR. It was launched to pursue fleeing AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters in the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor using 1,000 Marines from RCT-2 along with a hundred Iraqi infantry. The influx of Coalition and Iraqi security patrols forced more AQI fighters to flee towards Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, which led in turn to a major insurgent intimidation and coercion campaign against residents in Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[381] In Hit, Operation SWORD encountered surprisingly light resistance because corrupt members of the Hit city council warned insurgents of the impending attack. Most insurgents escaped to Baghdadi or Jubbah while others simply went underground.[382]

~~(S/NF)~~ **AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined. **Fights the Jaghayfi Tribe**: Possibly prompted by Coalition operations, fighting broke out in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** between AQI fighters under Husayn Shihab and members of the Jaghayfi tribe during May 2005. There had earlier been tensions and some outright violence between the two, but the proximate cause of the renewed fighting was AQI's decision to burn down houses in the Ahmed neighborhood and beat the inhabitants.[383] Sixty AQI fighters under Mohammed Cent (likely members of the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-based Asa'ab al-Ahwal) managed to remain above the fray, hiding out in the Haditha water treatment plant.[384] Dissatisfied by what he regarded as insufficient zeal on the part of Iraqi SREs, Zarqawi appointed Yemeni AQI leader Abu Ayman as his new amir for Haditha to free up Shihab to operate in other parts of western Anbar.[385]

---

[378] Ibid.
[379] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050601 | 20050601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[380] Ibid.
[381] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050703 | 20050703 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[382] Ibid., [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050705 | 20050705 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[383] Ibid.
[384] Ibid.
[385] [| 1.4c

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/NF~~) With AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** now actively fighting local tribes in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in addition to the Coalition and the Iraqi government, AQI leader Husayn Shihab was forced to keep moving between Karabilah, Um Tina, and Haditha to evade capture.[386] Even so, Shihab continued to exert considerable influence in Karabilah, Sadah, and New 'Ubaydi despite the continued efforts of the Hamza Battalion, which was now holding foreign AQI fighters prisoner in Husaybah rather than killing them outright.[387]

(~~S/REL~~) The Coalition also moved into Zaidon, preventing insurgent groups in the city from recruiting openly for six weeks and forcing insurgents led by Mohammed Suleiman Fizza, Ahmed Ali Waelis, Sheikh Abdel Salaam Jameel, and Essa Abood al-Handi (largely Iraqi AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters with ties to the Jaysh al-Haqq and 1920 Revolution Brigades insurgent groups) to limit their recruiting efforts to offering money and support for the families of insurgent fighters.[388]

> (~~S/NF~~) **AHMAD ALI WAELIS.** Chief of Staff of the IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** for twenty-two years under Saddam, Waelis speaks Spanish and English fluently. In 2003 and 2004 he was a Jaysh Mohammed facilitator. In early 2005, Waelis was one of the Jaysh Mohammed members who split with the main body of JM to form Jaysh al-Haqq in opposition to MML's attempt at political engagement. Jaysh al-Haqq would then become a satellite group of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.

A Fight for Influence within the Insurgency?

(~~S/NF~~) **The New Ba'ath Party**: With AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** under attack from the Coalition and local tribes, the 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.** 1.4b leadership thought that this would be an opportune time to reestablish their influence in Anbar. Spearheading this effort was New Ba'ath Party leader Mohammad Yunis al-Ahmad, who had reformed and reorganized his FRE followers into eleven "battalions" under the leadership of the New Ba'ath Party Military Command. He planned for them to operate in and around the Sunni Triangle. Al-Ahmad directed many of the high-ranking Ba'athists based in Syria to return to Iraq to lead this new Ba'athist insurgent group. None of his plans were implemented to any serious degree.[389] The FRL portion of the insurgency in Iraq remained unable to influence events on the ground in Iraq.

(~~S/REL~~) **Zarqawi's Influence Challenged**: Zarqawi's influence was threatened internationally when his own mentor Sheikh Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi denounced the killing of innocent Iraqis. Despite al-Maqdisi's later assertions that his words were taken out of context by the Arab media, he

Approved for Release

[386] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050707 | 20050707 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[387] Ibid.
[388] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050705 | 20050705 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[389] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050707 | 20050707 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

was not the only prominent Sunni cleric to take exception to Zarqawi's tactics; the prominent Egyptian cleric Tantawi and the Saudi cleric al-Awji also denounced him.[390]

(~~S/REL~~) **Zarqawi's Competing Objectives**: It would be a mistake, however, to see AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as deeply damaged by the on-going Coalition operations, tribal infighting or international challenges. Yet Zarqawi may have felt that his reputation as a mujahidin had been damaged because he began to shift his publicized operations from western Anbar to Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to reassert his presence in the provincial capital. Combined with increased threats and attacks against the province's Sunni leadership (particularly the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** *mukhtar*s and the Karmah city council), Zarqawi sought to prevent Sunni leaders from distancing themselves from his jihad and to keep them from any further political participation.[391]

Political Negotiations Resume

(~~S/NF~~) In one important way Zarqawi was correct: his perceived weaknesses were pushing Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** tribal and religious leaders loyal to MML to discuss security and political issues in the city with the Coalition and the Iraqi government.[392] MML also seems to have realized that his anger over the arrest of Daham was counterproductive and that it was in his best interest to negotiate. These negotiations led to the creation of the Independent Popular Front for Anbar, an apolitical Sunni group designed to educate locals about the political process and prepare them for the upcoming elections.[393] Unfortunately, a June 16 planned meeting for political and religious leaders from throughout the province at the Saddam Mosque was prevented by a group of SREs. These same SREs had previously stopped Iraqi security forces from recruiting at the same mosque.[394]

(~~S/NF~~) **MML'S Strategy to Enter the Elections**: MML's strategy was to negotiate a ceasefire in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** that would allow him to run in the December 2005 elections.[395] MML's renewed drive to transform himself from Sunni insurgent leader to aspiring politician led a number of his former followers in the Ramadi Shura Council to break ranks with him. In their search for an alternate leader for the insurgency, many rank and file fighters from the Islamic Army of Iraq, the al-Nu'man Brigade, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and Jaysh al-Haqq joined AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[396]

Approved for Release

[390] Ibid.
[391] Ibid.
[392] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050708 | 2005-7-8 | ~~(S/NF) | ~~]
[393] Ibid.
[394] Ibid.
[395] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050718 | 20050718 | ~~(S/NF) |~~]
[396] Ibid. ; [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050714 | 20050714 | ~~(S/NF) | ~~]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/NF~~) Together with their allies in Ansar al-Sunna, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** reacted to MML's change of mind, by asking their new fighters from the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Shura Council member groups to carry out attacks in Ramadi.[397] The Al-Nu'man Brigades had already been partially assimilated into AQI. The Brigades' leader Issa Daham, although he supported MML, had also been taking funding and direction from AQI leader Abu 'Ubayda al-Kubaysi ever since the capture of his brother.[398] Mid-level Ramadi Shura Council leaders were paid $300 by AQI to organize and conduct attacks, while low-level leaders were paid $100.[399] These attacks undermined MML's position in the negotiations by making him unable to control his own subordinates. They also kept the Coalition focused on the member groups of the Ramadi Shura Council while AQI was reestablishing its own network in the city.

(~~S/NF~~) **Fault Lines**: AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s actions in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** created a public fault-line in the city. On the one side were the leaders of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, al-Nu'man Brigade, Jaysh al-Haqq, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Islamic Movement of Iraqi Mujahideen (men such as Mukhlif al-Fahdawi, Ali Zaydon al-Milawi and even Issa Daham) who followed MML in pushing for negotiations with the Coalition. On the other side were many rank-and-file members of these groups who joined AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and Saraya al-Jihad in following AQI leader Muhammad Khalaf Ulyan al-Khalifawi (Abu Riam) in his push for continued attacks.[400] There were also certain leaders of the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the al-Nu'man Brigade who broke publicly with MML's view on negotiations and joined AQI and Ansar al-Sunna fighters under Ghassan Kazim Husayn al-Azzawi.[401] Betrayed by his own subordinates and targeted for death by AQI, MML abandoned his negotiations with the Coalition by the end of July.[402]

(~~S/NF~~) AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Ansar al-Sunna, and the Islamic Army of Iraq quickly became the most active insurgent groups in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (though Islamic Army of Iraq soon began suffering mass defections to AQI). As before, they based their operations in the Jazira and Sufia districts of the city. These districts afforded them a measure of safety from Coalition and Iraqi security forces as they conducted limited training, and intimidated the local population.[403] While fighters rapidly shifted back and forth between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, both groups in Ramadi answered to Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** native Abu Salam (a representative of Zarqawi's Anbar amir Abu Yahya) following the capture of Ansar al-Sunna's

Approved for Release

[397] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050714 | 20050714 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[398] Ibid.
[399] Ibid.
[400] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050717 | 20050707 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[401] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050718 | 20050718 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[402] Ibid.
[403] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050721 | 20050721 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Ramadi leader Mussab Jasim.[404] Abu 'Ubayda al-Kubaysi, meanwhile, took over the al-Nu'man Brigade rejectionists who opposed MML's negotiations.[405]

Zarqawi's anti-Shi'a 'Umar Brigade

~~(S/REL)~~ In an effort to inflame civil war across Iraq, Zarqawi announced the creation of the exclusively anti-Shi'a 'Umar Brigade on July 5, named after Caliph 'Umar. The fact that Umar conquered Persia and spread the Islamic empire to South Asia[406] was a constant reminder anti-Shi'a and anti-Iranian nature of the force. Soon after its creation, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** began publicizing the Umar Brigades attacks against the Shi'a "Ghadr Corps" (a sectarian pejorative used by Zarqawi to refer to SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s Badr Corps), including the assassination of Badr commanders Kharyy al-Ameri and Adel Koshk Khabar.[407] Many Anbaris quietly supported the creation of the 'Umar Brigade as a means to protect Iraq from Shi'a domination, enabling Zarqawi to further develop his image as "Defender of the Sunnis" inside Anbar without putting his supporters there at any immediate risk, since most of the 'Umar Brigade's actions took place in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or southern Iraq.[408]

~~(S/NF)~~ In Anbar, the 'Umar Brigade was made up of Iraqi, Saudi, and Syrian AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters and required strict Salafist and Wahhabi beliefs as a criterion for membership.[409] It primarily focused on targeting the Shi'a in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in order to gain local Sunni support and foment instability in the population.[410]

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ The creation of the 'Umar Brigade coincided with a major effort by the AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** media committee headed up by Abu Maysarah al-Iraqi and Khattab al-Iraqi to create an AQI propaganda campaign specifically tailored to Anbar. Working with Muhammad al-Anbari, they established a media committee for every major city in Anbar, providing the necessary funding to hire media-savvy staff.[411]

Targeting the Albu Issa Tribe (July 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ The Shi'a were not the only targets of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s renewed murder and intimidation campaign. Among the top targets on their list was Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** city council member and Albu Issa tribal leader Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi. A one-time supporter of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, Sheikh Khamis had shifted his views

[404] Ibid.
[405] Ibid.
[406] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050716 | 20050716 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[407] Ibid.
[408] Ibid.
[409] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050806 | 20050806 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[410] Ibid.
[411] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050723 | 20050723 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

following Operation AL FAJR because he blamed the insurgents for the destruction in the city.[412] AQI attempted to kidnap him in January, but the plot failed and his tribe retaliated by killing two insurgents.[413]

(~~S/NF~~) **Tribal Vendettas**: Sheikh Khamis was a target for AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** assassination from then on, both because his presence on the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** city council kept the Albu Issa tribal members from participating in large-scale insurgent activity and because the Zobai tribesmen who now made up many of the AQI in the Fallujah area saw his assassination as a way to settle a tribal vendetta against the Albu Issa.[414] Faced with continued threats to his life by AQI leader Essa Handi al-Essawi (a fellow Albu Issa tribesman), Sheikh Khamis fled to Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** with several prominent members of the Albu Issa tribe, paving the way for wholesale participation by the Albu Issa in AQI.[415]

AQIError! Bookmark not defined.**'s attempted merger with Ansar al-Sunna (Mid-2005)**

(~~S/NF~~) **A Love-Hate Relationship**: At the same time, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was making a robust effort to merge its organization with that of Ansar al-Sunna. While they shared the Salafist global jihad ideology and allegiance to 'Usama bin Laden, they were divided by local and personality-driven tensions throughout Anbar, Nineveh, and Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** provinces.[416] As we have already seen, some of the dispute between the two groups originated in claims over who truly represented al-Qaeda in Iraq. There were, however, other reasons for the tension, including Ansar al-Sunna's belief that Zarqawi was responsible for the destruction of their parent organization's base in northern Iraq, the Ansar al-Sunna belief that AQI did not respect it, resentment towards AQI for claiming AS attacks as their own, AQI recruitment of AS fighters, and Zarqawi's carefree attitude towards killing large numbers of Iraqis regardless of whether they were Shi'a or Sunni.[417] The attempted negotiations between Zarqawi and AS leader Abu Talha (see Chapter 3) were terminated by the latter's capture. Still, the negotiations fostered a closer degree of cooperation between the two groups as Abu Talha's lieutenants Abu Barra and Abu Saad sought to maintain a high operational tempo focused around Zarqawi's then-staging point of Tal Afar in an effort to assert leadership over AS across Iraq.[418]

Approved for Release

---

[412] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 | 20050720 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[413] Ibid.
[414] Ibid.
[415] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050725 | 20050725 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[416] [| Military | CIOC REPORT: EXPLOITING CONTINUED DISCORD BETWEEN ANSAR AL-SUNNA AND AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ | 200511 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[417] Ibid.
[418] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050715 | 20050715 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/NF~~) Other roots for the dispute between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and AS were the personal grudges between the leaders of the two groups. As far back as 2002, Zarqawi had told future AS leader Abu Abdullah al-Shafi'i that his organization was weak, poorly organized, and in need of experience. His view was reinforced over the years by the steady stream of mid and senior-level Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna defectors who had joined first JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and then moved on to join AQI.[419] While their lieutenants had discussed the need for operational coordination between the two groups prior to Operation AL FAJR, there was little love lost between the leadership of the two groups.[420]

(~~S/NF~~) These same views had already been expressed to Ansar al-Sunna commander in Kirkuk**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Yahya al-Kurdi. He had been ordered (through a courier) by Ansar al-Sunna leader Abu Abdullah al-Shafi'i not to support AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** during Operation AL FAJR. Abu Abdullah felt Zarqawi was inexperienced and his plan to defend the city against the Coalition was doomed to failure.[421]

(~~S/REL TO USA, GBR, AUS, CAN AND NZL~~) **Intrigue within AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.: After JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.** became AQI in October 2004, the 1.4c, 1.4b 1.4c, 1.4b Abd al-Ghaffar al-Libi, a Zahedan-based leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting.[422] During the meeting with al-Libi, the Ansar al-Sunna representative asked the following concerns be relayed to AQSL:[423]

- The Ansar al-Sunna leadership was concerned that AQSL had abandoned it after the defeat of its predecessor organization Ansar al-Islam in Beyara during the initial stages of OIF**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.
- AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had both committed and publicized the "brutal and barbaric" act of beheading hostages, which the Ansar al-Sunna leadership opposed.
- AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had a poor to non-existent political strategy for their movement.
- AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had no established avenue of negotiation or communication with the Iraqi government or the Coalition.
- AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had no established public relations effort apart from intimidation and fear.
- Because Zarqawi was a Jordanian, he lent no legitimacy to the Iraqi resistance, which should be led by an Iraqi.

1.4c

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, GBR, AUS AND CAN)~~ Al-Libi relayed these concerns to his superior Abu Munther, who intended to relay it by courier to 'Usama bin Laden.[424] When these concerns were not addressed by mid-February 2005, Ansar al-Sunna leader Abu Layth made arrangements for a representative of the group to make its concerns known to AQAM global operations chief Abu Faraj al-Libi and to 'Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in person if time and security allowed. Among the concerns expressed by Ansar al-Sunna leaders (including those of chemical weapons expert Abbas bin Farnas bin Qafqas) was that Zarqawi forcibly conscripted fighters into his organization and that there was the potential for dangerous situations to develop due to Zarqawi's mismanagement and lack of leadership. Abbas also provided a written critique of Zarqawi's performance during the defense of Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (VIGILANT RESOLVE), noting that he failed to establish even basic defensive measures such as barbed wire, trenches, berms, and mine fields despite having months of advance notice that the Coalition was going to attack the city.[425]

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ Other Ansar al-Sunna leaders in Anbar and throughout Iraq were equally disparaging of Zarqawi to the AQSL during the spring and summer of 2005, claiming that discord between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and other Iraqi Salafist groups had reached the point where armed conflict could erupt. Moreover, they claimed that Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Salafists were so weary of killing innocent civilians that they now planned to aid the returning police and civil defense forces. Ansar al-Sunna leaders in northern Iraq had similar criticisms, with the Tulul al-Baqq-based Abu Sufiyan reporting that formerly sympathetic tribal leaders were now supporting the Iraqi military and police forces due to Zarqawi's violent tactics.[426]

The Letter to Zarqawi from Ayman al-Zawahiri

(U) Much of the Ansar al-Sunna criticism of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** would later surface in a July 9, 2005 letter to Zarqawi from AQSL second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. The letter, while written in a patronizing tone, nevertheless contained a comprehensive critique of Zarqawi's strategy to date, including his practice of televising beheadings, engaging in sectarian warfare against the Shi'a, and alienating other insurgent groups. In particular, al-Zawahiri emphasized the importance of popular support in jihad and urged Zarqawi to begin uniting as many other insurgent groups as possible behind him in preparation for the Coalition withdrawal. Zarqawi's focus, according to al-Zawahiri, should be on the creation of an Islamist amirate following the Coalition withdrawal that could spread jihad to other parts of the Middle East before more moderate or secular factions within the Iraqi Sunni community could emerge.

Approved for Release

---

[424] Ibid.
[425] [| ASSESSMENT OF AL-ZARQAWI'S GROUP MERGER WITH AL-QAIDA, SIX MONTHS LATER | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[426] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) Al-Zawahiri's letter reveals just how closely AQSL was following both Zarqawi's campaign in Iraq and global jihad in general. In particular, in his closing statements al-Zawahiri says "By God, if by chance you're going to Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, send greetings to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." This phrase, which initially made some Western analysts suspicious of the letter, is in fact a paraphase from a jihadist poem that was widely circulated online following Operation AL FAJR:

(U) *You who rule countries by his infidels*
You who can kill flies with chemicals
You who are riding the fast thing
By God, where are you going to?
*If you are going to Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.***
Send my regards to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
And all the jihadis in his group ...

(U) **Friction**: For reasons that are unclear, Zarqawi did not act upon al-Zawahiri's recommendations, and in fact declared publicly that the letter was a fraud. This led to further friction between Zarqawi and AQSL that would cause Attiyah al-Jaziri, another member of AQSL, in November 2005 to issue his own far more direct letter to Zarqawi informing him of their displeasure.

Summary of First Half of 2005

During the first six months of 2005, the Coalition conducted a series of offensive operations to clear the insurgents from cities throughout the province. Unfortunately, as soon as the operation was completed, the Coalition forces moved on and the insurgents returned. While the operations caused some damage, the insurgents were hurt just as badly by infighting between Ansar al-Sunni, Jaysh Mohammed and AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Despite the offensives and the infighting, by mid-year the insurgents were recovering from AL FAJR and gaining strength in large parts of the province.

City Stories (Mid-2005)

FallujahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/REL)~~ By mid-July most of the insurgents in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** were members of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Mohammed, and the Green Battalion, with unemployment the most common motivator to join the insurgency.[427] However, because the main focus of the Fallujah branches of Jaysh Mohammed and Green Battalion (made up primarily of FREs and IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** officers led by

[427] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050717 | 20050717 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Waleed Khalid Obied Khodier and Mohammed Suleyman Fizza Shenather) was criminal activity rather than fighting, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna dominated the insurgency.[428]

(~~S/REL~~) Munam Abu Sheba served as AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s primary organizer for SVBIED attacks in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[429] Formerly the second-in-command under Umar Hadid, Abu Sheba had fought alongside him during both VIGILANT RESOLVE and AL FAJR, overseeing the execution of Iraqi National Guard soldiers and suspected Coalition collaborators during the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura's reign of Fallujah.[430] Despite being captured during AL FAJR, he was later released, at which time he resumed his former position within the insurgency.[431]

(~~S/NF~~) **Fallujahns Urged to Vote this Time**: There were also signs of progress in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, with many *mukhtar*s (neighborhood chiefs) stating their intention to convince residents to participate in the upcoming elections during weekly meetings with the Coalition and Iraqi officials.[432] A number of Fallujah officials regretted not voting in the previous year and now saw an opportunity to regain Sunni political power by participating in the elections.[433] This was reflected in a *fatwa* issued on July 15 by 15 leading Fallujah clerics, including prominent imam Sheikh Kamal Shakir Mahmud, that urged residents to participate in both the constitutional referendum and the December elections.[434]

RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) The ongoing negotiations between MNF and the Iraqi government dominated the situation in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** during the summer of 2005. Attack levels remained high throughout the city, intimidating residents but generally proving ineffective against Coalition forces. The continued subsuming of FREs into AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was illustrated by men like former Republican Guard lieutenant Nazim Hamid Rashid Abu Othman (al-Amir), who now took command of AQI fighters in the Zangora district of the city.[435]

Amariyah

(~~S/NF~~) SREs continued to grow in strength in eastern Anbar as the Jaysh Mohammed in the Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Amariyah corridor led by Ahmed Tohman began

[428] Ibid.
[429] [| Military | 1.4c
[430] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050716 | 20050716 | ~~S/NF~~ |]
[431] Ibid.
[432] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050731 | 20050731 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[433] Ibid.
[434] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050807 | 20050807 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[435] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050712 | 20050712 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

defecting to join AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[436] In Amariyah itself, the well-organized Black Flags was an SRE group that specialized in contract kidnapping for AQI and Ansar al-Sunna. Among their most infamous achievements was the kidnapping of the Algerian ambassador, whom they delivered to Ferris Town before moving him to the village of al-Libyar (al-Biar).[437] Led by an individual known as "Diya," ("Blood Money") the group was based in Saddamiyah because of the region's relative isolation and low population.[438]

RawahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** continued to serve as the primary AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** logistics node and staging area for foreign fighters from Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, with foreign fighters waiting in the city to receive further instructions from cells in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[439] Fearing a Coalition attack because of the foreign fighters, many Rawah residents began fleeing the city on July 17, and there was widespread looting of property in the western part of the city as a result.[440] The one hundred insurgents who remained in the city under the leadership of AQI amir Abu Abdullah, Waidi Wahab Jassim, and Hoqar Jumal used the water treatment plant as a headquarters.[441]

Haqlaniyah

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** also seized the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** Project for Power Generation south of Haqlaniyah, forcing workers and contractors to abandon the site and turning it into a bomb factory and a safe house for foreign fighters.[442]

HitError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** continued to use Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as a logistics node despite Coalition and Iraqi forces in the city. One of the major AQI leaders in Hit was Husayn 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Hitawi, who used it as a base from which to disperse suicide bombers to safe houses from which they could be transported to other parts of Iraq.[443] Tribal infighting, possibly related to AQI's problems with MML in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, led to fighting between the group and the Albu Fahad tribe. It started with AQI's attempted kidnapping

[436] [| Military | 1.4c]
[437] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050726 | 20050726 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[438] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050819 | 20050819 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[439] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 | 20050720 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[440] Ibid.
[441] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: MNF-W OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT BRIEF | 20051024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[442] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050728 | 20050728 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[443] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050730 | 20050730 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

of an Albu Fahad tribesman that local amir Mohammed Ibrahim Jadiyah believed to be working for the Coalition. The intended victim escaped, but the Albu Fahad killed the amir in retaliation.[444]

Fighting Resumes with the Hamza Battalion (June-July 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ The trouble between the Albu Fahad and AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was symptomatic of a brewing tribal conflict in western Anbar. By late June 2005, local tribes in that area regarded AQI as a greater threat than the Coalition to their short and long-term objectives. In al-Qaim in particular, the situation had deteriorated to the point where members of the Albu Mahal tribe found it difficult to move about freely without coming under attack by AQI.[445] As a first step towards reestablishing their traditional influence over their respective cities, these tribal leaders backed an attempt by residents to expel all foreign fighters. On June 22 local residents succeeded in doing just that in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and then turned the city over to the Hamza Battalion.[446]

~~(S/NF)~~ It would be a mistake to assume that every tribal member followed the decisions of his sheikh. In fact, many members of the Karbuli, Rawi, 'Ubaydi, Salmani, and even the Albu Mahal remained indecisive about whether to support AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or the Hamza Battalion.[447] AQI was able to ensure the neutrality of many Albu Mahal tribesmen in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** by paying them off.[448] Though Zarqawi was now distrustful of many Iraqi tribes, he did rely on the Jasha'ama tribe to move foreign fighters in Ramana, Baghuz, and Usush.[449]

~~(S/NF)~~ Local insurgent groups, since they were composed of tribesmen from the area, also split over whether to support AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or the Hamza Battalion. Ra'ad Saleh Mutar, the unofficial leader of the Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, and Jaysh Mohammed insurgent groups decided to stay neutral and the groups loyal to him were thus divided over on whether to support AQI or the Battalion.[450] Some members of al-Asa'ab al-Iraq were willing to hire out their services to whoever would pay the most.[451] In order to distinguish themselves from the rest of al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, those members of the group that chose to fight alongside AQI adopted the name al-Asa'ab al-Qaim.[452] The mercenary attitude adopted by al-Asa'ab al-Iraq was due in part to its

Approved for Release

[444] Ibid.
[445] [1.4c
[446] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050711 | 20050711 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[447] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050716 | 20050716 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[448] [Militar TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050720 | 20050720 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[449] [1.4c
[450] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050717 | 20050717 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[451] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050716 | 20050716 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[452] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050724 | 20050724 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

new leader Sa'ad Ghraib al-Rawi, who had taken over the group following the capture of Abd al-Hadi and the disappearance of his successor Mohammed 'Ubaydi Jassim.[453]

~~(S/NF)~~ By mid-July the Hamza Battalion controlled not only Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (preventing AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** from carrying out any attacks on Camp Gannon), but also Sadah and Old 'Ubaydi. AQI controlled Karabilah, New 'Ubaydi, and the Jazira areas of Ar-Rabit and Ramana.[454] Aware that massing their forces risked Coalition attack, many AQI fighters in Karabilah and Ar-Rabit redeployed further north towards Tal Afar and Bayji.[455]

~~(S/NF)~~ While many of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s foreign fighters had fled western Anbar in response to Coalition offensives, those that remained active were a force to be reckoned with, especially in contrast to the Hamza Battalion. Despite having more than 900 active fighters spread out across Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Akashat, Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Muhammadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, weapons and material shortages continually plagued the Battalion.[456] Additionally, the Battalion was also unable to penetrate AQI's internal structure and was reluctant to attack their rivals in the absence of specific intelligence for fear that the Coalition would end up targeting the Battalion during a firefight.[457]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** now shifted their attacks to Akashat, which lay on the Hamza Battalion's [1.4b] **Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. In order to maintain its dominance of these necessary and lucrative smuggling routes, the Battalion was forced to dispatch 130 fighters from Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to Akashat under the command of former members of the Iraqi National Guard. The Battalion leadership apparently believed that the Coalition presence in Husaybah would keep AQI at bay.[458] In retrospect this would prove to be a fatal mistake, since the reduction in fighters, combined with shortages in weapons and ammunition, allowed AQI to overpower the Battalion in Husaybah. By the beginning of August, AQI had largely defeated the Battalion in the city, setting up their banners over public buildings and moving freely about the city without fear of attack from residents.[459]

Consequences of the Hamza Battalion's Defeat

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Before the defeat of the Hamza Battalion, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had been willing to make a distinction between the Battalion and the Albu Mahal. After taking Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, however, this distinction disappeared, and AQI

Approved for Release

---

[453] Ibid.
[454] [1.4c]
[455] [| Militar_ TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050713 | 20050713 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[456] [| 1.4c
[457] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050716 | 20050716 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[458] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050725 | 20050725 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[459] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050801 | 20050801 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

began actively targeting the tribesmen in nearby villages like Barghuz, where many wealthy and influential Mahalawi lived.[460] The defeat of the Battalion also allowed AQI, in tandem with Ansar al-Sunna, to reposition many of its fighters (apart from those now active in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) to Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Haqlaniyah, Bani Dahir, and Barwanah, with Barwanah serving as the primary staging area.[461]

Snapshot of the Insurgency

~~(S/NF)~~ Throughout the summer of 2005 AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** faced and apparently overcame a series of challenges. These included decisive solutions for the conflicts with the Hamza Battalion and the Albu Issa as well as the creation of the 'Umar Brigade to appeal to the Sunni by openly targeting Shi'a militias. The ineffectual efforts by 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.** to re-enter the battlefield showed that AQI continued to play a dominant role in the fighting on the ground.

~~(S/NF)~~ Yet the summer revealed four serious problems for AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to overcome. First, the growing movement for political engagement supported by many SAR groups was a direct threat to the existence of the insurgency as a whole. Second, the continued disagreement with Ansar al-Sunna prevented the unification of the two largest SRE organizations. Third, the stiff letter from al-Zawahiri showed that AQSL was growing weary of Zarqawi's reckless attacks that killed far more Muslims than it did Coalition troops. Finally, the defeat of the Hamza Battalion did not solve the tribal issue, but simply postponed a confrontation until 2006. The four issues meant AQI had to fight several enemies besides the Coalition.

The Foreign Connection (July-September 2005)

Foreign Fighters

(U) During the summer of 2005 the Coalition became more concerned about the infiltration of foreign fighters into the Iraq battlefield. A key element of Zarqawi's strategy for rebuilding his AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** after Operation AL FAJR was the increased use of foreign fighters as suicide bombers and special advisors for his group. Although foreign fighters were never a large element of the Iraqi insurgency or AQI, their experience and leadership made them a key element of the group.

(U) According to an overview of forei n fi hter recruiting 1.4b by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, many 1.4b recruits were motivated by revulsion at the idea of an Arab land being occupied by non-Arab troops, a view that was intensified by their reliance on

[460] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050803 | 20050803 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[461] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

extremely anti-American and anti-war TV and internet sources.[462] The 1.4b recruits were particularly prized by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** because each recruit often brought $10-15 000 in ersonal fundin .[463]

1.4b

1.4b

(S/NF) An investigation by the Tunisian DGNS provided insight into AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s ability to recruit North African fighters for Iraq. Tunisian recruits were angry over the situation in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[465] Like-minded individuals discussed these concerns in online discussion boards. Some became radicalized and were then contacted by AQ recruiters.[466] Once recruited, they stopped attending mosque and adopted a low profile, wearing modern dress, shaving their beards, and finally traveling to 1.4b **rror! Bookmark not defined.** in preparation to fight in Iraq.[467]

(S/NF) An investigation by the Algerian DDSE into the connection between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and its North African ally Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad bil-Maghrib (JTJM, see Chapter 4) uncovered the existence of an international support network run by followers of Zarqawi's mentor Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The purpose of the network was to convey AQ propaganda and recruit foreign fighters to serve as suicide bombers in Iraq.[468] It was divided into six regional nodes:[469] (there are six nodes shown below)

1.
2.
3.
4.

1.4b

[462] [| Open Source | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES/ANTHONY CORDESMAN AND NAWAF OBAID: SAUDI MILITANTS IN IRAQ: ASSESSMENT AND KINGDOM'S RESPONSE | 20050919 | (U) |] p. 9
[463] Ibid., p. 10
[464] Ibid . . 10-11

1.4c

Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

5.

6. 1.4b

~~(S/NF)~~ The flow of foreign fighters into Iraq depended on the needs of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Zarqawi's preferences and paranoia. For instance AQI sent out a call for more foreign fighters in January 2005 to target polling sites for the Iraqi elections, yet during a meeting of AQI facilitators in al-Salt, Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in October 2005 recruiter Bilal Mansur al-Hiyari (Abu 'Asim) told the other attendees that there were already enough foreign fighters in Iraq and that Zarqawi's primary concern was now money.[470] That September, 1.4b were informed that Zarqawi was increasingly paranoid that the U.S. or Israel was trying to infiltrate his foreign fighters and had recently beheaded a Tajik national he believed to be a spy.[471] As a result, his 1.4b were instructed only to recruit Arabs to join AQI because he believed them to be trustworthy.[472]

Training Camps

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN AND GBR)~~ There were few discernible patterns in the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq.[473] Most foreign fighters traveled to 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.** by plane and contacted facilitators there who were able to move them to Iraq through discreet inquiries at local mosques.[474] From there, they were taken first to Aleppo and then to the northern route through al-Qamishli or a southern route through al-Qaim.[475] The amount of time spent at safe houses in Aleppo depended on the facilitator's access, the security situation along the border, and whether or not the skills of the foreign fighters matched those that were currently needed by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[476] Experienced fighters were sent into Iraq immediately while "green" foreign recruits were sent to training in 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.** or ad-hoc training facilities on the other side of the border.[477]

MCIA Insert Map of FF Infiltration Routes

Approved for Release

---

[470] [| 1.4c]
[471] [|]
[472] Ibid.
[473] [| Military | CIOC SPECIAL ANALYSIS PAPER, MAY 4, 2005 | 20050504 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[474] Ibid.
[475] Ibid.
[476] Ibid.
[477] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Two [1.4b] training camps that appear most prominently in the intelligence reporting were the [1.4b] Arab Council for Victory in Iraq camp at Hasakeh run by FREs and another at al-Qamishli run by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[478] The existence of AQI training facilities in [1.4b] **Error! Bookmark not defined.** should not be surprising, as an AQAM training facility was reported as active at an abandoned penitentiary in Tadmur as early as June 2004.[479]

(S/REL) In addition to providing terrorist and guerrilla training to prospective insurgents, these training facilities assisted foreign fighters with assimilating into the local population by providing them with instruction on Iraqi customs and dialects, though much of this training was unsuccessful.[480] Foreign fighters' ID cards and other distinguishing items were also altered to make them less conspicuous upon their entry into Iraq.[481]

(~~S/FGI~~ [1.4b] ~~/NF~~) These camps did more than simply provide training for the Iraqi insurgency. Tayarah al Qaeda member Jamal Sayf Abdallah Salih al-Maqrami (Dr. Abu 'Ubayda, Abu Amr) was trained in the use of remote controlled explosives in [1.4b] **Error! Bookmark not defined.** by Abu Hasan al-Suri and then sent back to Yemen to carry out a terrorist attack against the Sheraton Hotel.[482]

(~~S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR AND NZL~~) Those foreign fighters entering Iraq through the northern route would enter the country at the Tal Kushik border crossing or via the smuggling routes southeast of al-Qamishli using the back roads near al-Hasakaharea or Ash-Shaddadah.[483] Once inside Iraq, they were taken to the border towns of Marhub al-Tayr, Bab al-Khair, Sununi, and Wardiyah.[484] "Green" recruits were taken to the ad-hoc terrorist training facility at Biaj, while trained fighters were taken to Sinjar for transport to Tal Afar or Mosul**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[485] Another southern infiltration route into Iraq was to cross at Abu Kamal, Ar-Tanf, or Rabi'ah and be transported to Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and other parts of Anbar or sent on to Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[486]

Syrian Support for the Insurgency

[1.4b]

[478] Ibid.
[479] Militar 1ST CALVARY DIVISION DAILY INTSUM, JUNE 4, 2004 | 20040604 | (~~S/NF~~) |] See also [[1.4c] [1.4c]
[480] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050530 | 20050530 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[481] Ibid.
[482] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050303 | 20050303 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[483] [| Military | CIOC SPECIAL ANALYSIS PAPER, MAY 4, 2005 | 20050504 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[484] Ibid.
[485] Ibid.
[486] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Page 90 redacted for the following reason:
- -
1.4b

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b

Operation SAYYAD (HUNTER) Phase I (July 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ During this period, the Coalition focused on reducing the violence in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. As an economy of force effort, the Coalition forces in Anbar were limited to two options to allow widespread participation in the upcoming elections: clear and hold the Euphrates valley or secure the border with Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Two considerations—the need for Iraq to have control of its own borders and the need to prevent the smuggling of foreign fighters into Anbar—gave precedence to securing the border. Thus, MNF-W began preparations for a phased operation, named Operation SAYYAD.[500]

~~(S/NF)~~ The first phase of SAYYAD was a shaping operation, designed to prepare the battlefield for the major kinetic phase later that fall. The Coalition began developing the required intelligence to establish an enduring Iraqi security force in western Anbar. In particular the 2nd Brigade, 7th Division of the Iraqi army was focused around Anah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[501] Mid-level insurgent leaders Mohammed Cent, Wahayb al-Abir, Khalid Abdul Rahman, and Sabah Nuri were killed.[502] These losses severely damaged al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal, forcing it into a prolonged period of inactivity as the group attempted to restructure in order to compensate for its losses.[503]

~~(S/NF)~~ Operation SAYYAD I forced AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna to shift their operations from al-Qaim and Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haqlaniyah corridor.[504] Barwanah, which had previously been heavily influenced by Ansar al-Sunna's Haditha amir Abu Ayman, was abandoned by most of the group at the onset of SAYYAD I.[505] With the influx of insurgents into Haditha, sentiments toward the

[497] Ibid.
[498] Ibid.
[499] Ibid.
[500] [| Open Source | Interview : LtGen JR Vines, August 2005 | 200508 | (U) |]
[501] [| Military | "Operation SAYYID," FRAGO: 0142-05 | 2005 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[502] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050804 | 20050804 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[503] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050807 | 20050807 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[504] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050803 | 20050803 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[505] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Coalition changed from neutral to negative due to the intimidation campaigns carried out by the new insurgents. Residents stayed in their homes or fled the area rather than assist the Coalition.[506] Zarqawi was also active in Haditha during this period, meeting in Haditha with Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** amir Hamid 'Awid al-Wayr, al-Qaim deputy amir Halid Ali Dawud, and an unknown Saudi cleric.[507] While there, he also visited 'Ukab Hamad al-Karbuli, all of whose sons served as AQI amirs.[508]

Aftermath of Operation SAYYAD I (July 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ Well established in the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haqlaniyah corridor, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna divided the region. Each group controlled "turf" by assigning cells to specific areas to carry out surveillance and small arms, IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, or mortar attacks.[509] Ansar al-Sunna was most active in Haditha, dividing the city into sectors, while AQI was centered on the palm tree forest in Haqlaniyah. Both groups maintained a small presence in Barwanah where they competed for control.[510] All major roads were under continuous surveillance and all hospitals were controlled by the insurgency, which used them both as medical centers and as safe havens.[511]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Zarqawi maintained a base at the al-Thawid Mosque in Haqlaniyah during this period, threatening to punish the Jaghayfi tribe for attacking AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[512] The root of the latest fighting between AQI and the Jaghayfis began when AQI kidnapped the driver of the director for oil pipes in Haditha, who was a member of their tribe.[513] The Jaghayfis retaliated in an effort to free the hostage, killing two AQI fighters and capturing three. This prompted senior AQI leaders negotiate for their release.[514] During the night following the negotiations, AQI attacked the Jaghayfi and burnt down their houses in Haditha.[515]

~~(S/NF)~~ As Zarqawi grew stronger, large numbers of FREs in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, many of whom were unemployed, were persuaded either by money or by ideological appeal to join AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or Ansar al-Sunna.[516] This is reflected by the AQI leadership in Haditha. Its top leaders were former Republican Guard Chief of Staff Lieutenant

---

[506] Ibid.
[507] Ibid.
[508] Ibid.
[509] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050805 | 20050805 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[510] Ibid.
[511] Ibid.
[512] [| Military | 1.4c |
[513] Ibid.
[514] Ibid.
[515] Ibid.
[516] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050805 | 20050805 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

General Saif al-Din Falayh al-Rawi and his nephew Usam Malik al-Rawi. The other leaders were kidnapping chief Abd al-Razzaq al-Rawi, and spiritual leader Abu al-Hadi Armar al-Rawi who doubled as the head of AQI's secret police in the city and acted as judge and jury when dealing with suspected "collaborators."[517] In recognition of his role in defeating the Hamza Battalion in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Zarqawi promoted Husayn Shihab al-Karbuli (Abu Ali) to the position of one of his top lieutenants in Iraq, with authority from al-Qaim to Haditha.[518]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS AND GBR)~~ In Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, the permanent Coalition presence since Operation SWORD had finally begun to turn the tide against AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna.[519] The sustained Coalition presence had forced insurgents to leave the urban areas and regroup along the outskirts of the city, enabling residents to partially overcome their intimidation campaign.[520]

AQIError! Bookmark not defined. **rebuilds in Western Anbar (July-August 2007)**

~~(S/REL)~~ Despite losses suffered during Operation SAYYAD, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was down rather than out in western Anbar. In Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, for instance, AQI operatives only withdrew briefly from most of the city, finding shelter in outlying areas until the operation ended.[521] By the beginning of August, AQI had successfully reconstituted its fighters in Karabilah to pre-SPEAR levels, using it as a staging point and operational hub to smuggle 1.4b **Error! Bookmark not defined.** all the way to Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[522] AQI also solidified its position in New 'Ubaydi using weapons brought from Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. They prepared for renewed attacks against the Hamza Battalion.[523] Through July and August AQI leaders in Anbar continued to focus more on fighting the Battalion than on attacking the Coalition.[524]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ To regain their momentum against the Hamza Battalion, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** began offering $300-400 monthly salaries for rank-and-file members and $1,000 monthly salaries for all cell leaders, with bonuses of $15,000 for every major attack on the Hamza Battalion.[525] Faced with AQI's superior financial resources and ideological appeal, the Battalion was unable to keep AQI from luring away those who might have otherwise supported its efforts for tribal or ideological reasons.[526]

---

[517] Ibid.
[518] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050807 | 20050807 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[519] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050812 | 20050812 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[520] Ibid.
[521] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050810 | 20050810 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[522] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050808 | 20050808 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[523] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050807 | 20050807 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[524] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINRSUM 050808 | 20050808 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[525] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050813 | 20050813 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[526] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ **AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined. **Renews Attacks on the Hamza Battalion**: Using the weapons shipped from Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to New 'Ubaydi, AQI initiated a major operation against the Battalion in early August. AQI evicted the Battalion from New 'Ubaydi and expanded its influence into Jurayjib and Sa'dah. [527] AQI's fighters set up curfews and checkpoints along the main road in New 'Ubaydi and, using computer-generated lists and photographs, searched house-to-house for Albu Mahal tribesmen in order to kill them.[528]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite this victory, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** remained otherwise quiet in the al-Qaim region for fear of provoking another Coalition offensive, focusing instead on rebuilding the support of the local population.[529] To counter Coalition accusations that AQI fighters fought only for money, AQI began capturing and executing suspected thieves in Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. This demonstrated that they were fighting for the implementation of shari'a, not venal gain, and they were better able to protect Iraqis than the Coalition.[530]

~~(S/NF)~~ **MML and Government try to Counter AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.: The Iraqi government, however, had little doubt as to AQI's intentions. Minister of Defense Sadun al-Dulaymi met with MML and representatives from the Albu Nimr and Albu Mahal tribes to discuss the creation of a majority Sunni Iraqi army division to fight AQI in Anbar. The Albu Nimr representatives offered the Defense Minister 500 recruits, stating that they could provide more if needed, but Sadun al-Dulaymi warned them that neither Prime Minister Jafari nor SCIRI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** leader Hakim wanted a Sunni army division created even as they feigned support for Sunni political inclusion.[531]

~~(S/NF)~~ This revelation led MML to meet with tribal sheikhs in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to discuss the formation of a special Ramadi-based military unit to eliminate AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in the city.[532] MML requested that the sheikhs identify members of their tribes who had served as soldiers or officers under the former regime but had not retained strong ties to the Ba'ath Party.[533] Knowing that Prime Minister Jafari would never agree to the formation of an all-Sunni military unit, MML informed the sheikhs that the unit would have to contain Shi'a and Kurds but that Sunnis would be the majority.[534] To appeal to his former allies in the Ramadi Shura Council, MML claimed that he had spoken with Mohammed Daham and had received his approval.[535] This claim might have been true, as Daham had been using his contacts in the medical

[527] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050810 | 20050810 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[528] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050902 | 20050902 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[529] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050811 | 20050811 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[530] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINRSUM 050808 | 20050808 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[531] Ibid.
[532] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050818 | 20050818 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[533] Ibid.
[534] Ibid.
[535] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

staff at Abu Ghraib prison to send messages to MML, among them a request to increase surveillance on Coalition convoys in the hope of kidnapping a sufficiently high-level Coalition or Iraqi official who could be used to barter for his release.[536]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Defense Minister's message was eagerly adopted by Hamza Battalion recruiters, who told prospective members that their group would form the basis for the new Iraqi National Guard and police in al-Qaim as soon as AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was defeated.[537] There was, however, no practical way for Hamza Battalion to match AQI's international financial or logistical advantages, nor could they replace their losses in personnel and equipment.[538] The Battalion was only able to keep up the fight because Coalition operations, primarily MATADOR and SPEAR, had degraded AQI's position in the al-Qaim area.[539] In fact the Battalion was incapable of conducting operations involving more than 15-30 fighters, lacked proper training and equipment, and many of its potential recruits could not afford to leave their homes unguarded in order to receive proper training or conduct long-term operations.[540]

~~(S/NF)~~ **Another AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined. **Offensive against the Hamza Battalion**: In late August 2005, AQI mounted a major offensive against the Hamza Battalion, possibly under the personal direction of Zarqawi.[541] This offensive, which involved the use of 1,000 fighters against the Hamza Battalion's 300, led to significant AQI gains in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and isolated the Hamza Battalion to the northeastern corner of the city. Coalition air strikes on August 26 prevented the Hamza Battalion from being driven out of Husaybah completely, but by the end of the offensive, AQI fighters under the command of Abu Islam controlled 75% of the city.[542] AQI then began increasing their attacks on Camp Gannon as Battalion members fled southeast towards the al-Tenek area.[543] In their section of the city, AQI fighters reportedly began going house to house, separating out adults and adolescents from the Albu Mahal tribe and executing them in order to send a message to other Iraqi tribes about the price of fighting AQI.[544]

~~(S/NF)~~ Exploiting the Albu Mahal's long-standing rivalry with the Karabilah and Salmani tribes, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** began conscripting fighters from the latter two tribes to further its influence in the al-Qaim region.[545] Karabilah, Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Sa'dah, and Ramana were now under the influence of Iraqi AQI augmented by foreign fighters.[546]

[536] [| Military | 1.4c]
[537] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050813 | 20050813 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[538] Ibid.
[539] Ibid.
[540] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050815 | 20050815 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[541] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050826 | 20050826 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[542] Ibid; [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050829 | 20050829 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[543] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050829 | 20050829 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[544] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050830 | 20050830 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[545] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050901 | 20050901 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[546] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

From al-Qaim, AQI was able to control western Anbar's lucrative smuggling routes to facilitate AQAM operations throughout the Middle East and Europe.[547]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** prepared to attack the 100-150 Hamza Battalion fighters who had been active in Akashat.[548] Perhaps distracted by their need to consolidate gains in the al-Qaim area, as well as by the next phase of Operation SAYYAD, AQI never attacked. Given a reprieve, the remaining Battalion members began working with the Iraqi MOD to create the Desert Protectors Battalion designed to fight AQI and protect the borders of Iraq.[549]

Return of the Abu Harun in Ramadi Error! Bookmark not defined. **(August 2005)**

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) With AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** consolidating its victory in western Anbar, the inadvertent release of Abu Harun Group leader Basim Muhammed Hazim Ahmed al-Fahdawi (Abu Khattab) by the Coalition caused the situation in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to take a turn for the worse.[550] Unlike the AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members who had only recently arrived in the city, Abu Khattab had been active there as leader of the Abu Harun Group since 2004. He possessed a great deal of local knowledge and was able to use it against the Coalition. Among Abu Khattab's top subordinates were his secret police chief Suhain Khalid Fadil Abu Ali Jasim (later killed in a car accident), former Republican Guard Colonel Naithem Hammed Rashid (Abu Othman), and former IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** analyst Satar Jubayr Rashid.[551]

~~(S/NF)~~ Under the direction of Abu Khattab, the Abu Harun Group (also known as the Abu Bakr Group), AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and the Islamic Army of Iraq began distributing propaganda demanding that all police resign, that all Shi'a in the city depart, and that MML resign.[552] Zarqawi also threatened to kill any Sunni imams who supported the constitutional referendum.[553] Abu Khattab's followers forced Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s Christian community to adhere to *shari'a* law if they refused to convert to Islam.[554] MML retaliated by using his influence with several Dulaymi confederation tribes to protect a Shi'a neighborhood from attack by AQI, which he claimed wanted to turn Ramadi into another Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[555]

Approved for Release

[547] Ibid.
[548] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050901 | 20050901 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[549] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050916 | 20050916 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | GRINTSUM 050921 | (S/NF) |]
[550] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050801 | 20050801 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[551] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050809 | 20050809 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[552] Ibid.
[553] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050814 | 20050814 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[554] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050809 | 20050809 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[555] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050814 | 20050814 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/NF~~) Abu Khattab's prominence among the Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** insurgents was due in part to his relationship with Anbar Ministry of Oil and Gas Deputy Director Yusif Abid Farhan al-Fahdawi.[556] Every week, Abu Khattab or one of his lieutenants would receive a kickback from Yusif, who had turned control of his building over to the Abu Harun Group.[557]

(~~S/REL~~) This set the stage for open fighting between MML and Zarqawi over MML's support for the Iraqi political process. While many political and religious elites in Anbar shared Zarqawi's goal of ending the Coalition presence in Iraq, they also agreed with MML's criticism of his methodology. Zarqawi flatly rejected MML's efforts at negotiation, regarding it as "abandoning the law of Allah" and "deserting the Qur'an."[558]

(~~S/NF~~) With many Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** insurgent groups now working in at least tacit alliance with AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna, a curious phenomenon emerged in which specific functions within the Ramadi insurgency were handled on a tribal rather than on a group or cell basis. For instance, the Albu Faraj housed foreign fighters and engaged in surveillance; the Albu Alwan acted as coordinators between the groups in the Tamim and Jazira districts and conducted small arms, IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and kidnapping attacks; and the Albu Ghanem engaged in counterfeiting and document forgery.[559]

(~~S/NF~~) In an effort to rectify the security situation in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, the Coalition carried out a series of operations aimed at Abu Bakr (Ghazi Ahmed Sharmut Abu Ali Jassim), who was the leader of the Abu Harun Group prior to Abu Khattab's release. Abu Bakr had a group of sixty fighters who were personally commanded by him even after he resumed control of the group.[560] These operations led to the capture of one of Abu Bakr's top lieutenants and forced the Abu Harun Group to operate clandestinely for fear of a similar fate. Key leaders fled Ramadi while local cells attempted to root out the spy that Abu Bakr believed had betrayed him to the Coalition.[561] Abu Bakr himself fled to the Albu Faraj tribal area in the Jazira area north and east of Ramadi, where he was protected by his ally Abu Marwan.[562]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) The Jazira area encompassed the tribal lands of the Albu Diab, and the Albu Aetha tribes in addition to the Albu Faraj, and served as a well-known refuge for insurgents from Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. This was probably because of the presence of the al-Quds mosque, which acted as a gathering and meeting place for insurgents in general.[563] Among those members of the Abu Harun Group who fled to the Jazira area in addition to Abu Bakr was

[556] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050902 | 20050902 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[557] Ibid.
[558] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050815 | 20050815 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[559] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050802 | 20050802 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[560] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050816 | 20050816 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[561] Ibid.
[562] Ibid.
[563] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050817 | 20050817 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Abu Othman, who had used his IIS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** connections to help manage the logistics and reorganization of the Abu Harun Group following the initial capture of Abu Khattab.[564]

MCIA Insert Map Here

The Assassination Attempt on Governor Mamoun

(~~S/NF~~) To maintain pressure on Anbaris to prevent them from participating in the political process, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** attempted to assassinate Governor Mamoun during a meeting with fifty Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** imams at the Saddam Mosque. This particular meeting was held to discuss MML's proposal to set up a Sunni military force to fight AQI in the city.[565] The attack failed, but AQI injured provincial *Awqaf* officials Sheikh Dhafir 'Ubaydi and Sheikh Abdullah Jallal in the subsequent scuffle.[566] The attack was organized by Abu Khattab in conjunction with local AQI leader Haji Walid and his fighters.[567]

(~~S/NF~~) The failed assassination attempt on Governor Mamoon led to serious repercussions for AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Foremost among these was a meeting between MML's allies in the al-Nu'man Brigade and the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades chaired by Ghanam al-Khalifawi to discuss retaliation for AQI targeting members of the *Awqaf*.[568] Ghanam, who urged his fellow insurgents to respond to any AQI attacks or threats against them with a show of force, had already captured two AQI members who took part in the attack and tortured them into giving him the name of the AQI leader who ordered it.[569] He would later capture this (un-named) AQI leader, planning to execute him publicly in order to demonstrate to Zarqawi that not everyone in Ramadi was afraid of him.[570]

Operation QUICK STRIKE (August 2005)

(~~S/REL~~) After the Marines lost four more sniper teams, the Coalition carried out Operation QUICK STRIKE in and around Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** with over 1,000 Marines. The operation forced more than 100-150 AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna fighters under Yahya Ayish and Sheikh Hamid Rashi Salib to flee Haditha for Kubaysah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[571]

---

[564] Ibid.
[565] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050818 | 20050818 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[566] Ibid.
[567] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050823 | 20050823 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[568] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050822 | 20050822 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[569] Ibid.
[570] Ibid.
[571] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050816 | 20050816 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/NF~~) Intelligence gathered during the course of Operation QUICK STRIKE confirmed the continued presence of Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in Haqlaniyah and Barwanah, with both groups exerting considerable influence over the general population through an extensive propaganda, murder, and intimidation campaign. The insurgents had been able to use Haditha as a base to manufacture IEDs and VBIEDs for use in cities along the Euphrates all the way to Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. While QUICK STRIKE forced some insurgents to flee to Bayji or Kusaybah, many Haditha insurgents were in fact based in outlying towns such as Dulab, Jubbah, and Baghdadi along the Euphrates, which meant the Coalition operations missed them entirely. Insurgents in Haqlaniyah and Barwanah on the other hand did flee first south and then north to escape Coalition cordon and search operations, before returning to Haditha and re-exerting influence over the population.[572]

(~~S/NF~~) **Pattern of Coalition Operations**: As we have seen, this was the usual pattern for Coalition operations. Another recurring pattern, typical for insurgencies as a whole, was that local residents would assist the Coalition as long as Coalition forces were present but would also tolerate (or even support) the insurgency in their absence. At times, even the presence of Coalition forces was not enough to ensure cooperation, since recent experience had shown that they would leave and the insurgents return to exact their vengeance.

(~~S/NF~~) Ansar al-Sunna, for instance, openly stated their intention to reenter Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as soon as Coalition forces departed. Despite QUICK STRIKE, Husayn Shihab managed to remain active in the Haditha-Haqlaniyah corridor with as many as 2,000 fighters, and would oversee the resumption of the intimidation campaign in the area.[573] The AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** propaganda campaign also resumed in earnest, circulating flyers depicting a "secret memo" from a high-ranking UIA official to rig the constitutional referendum in favor of the Shi'a.[574]

MCIA Insert Map Here

(~~S/NF~~) The *shari'a* court established by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna in the Albu Hayan area of Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** played a major role in the renewed intimidation campaign.[575] For instance, a woman accused of prostitution was whipped 200 times and died from her injuries.[576] Two men who had publicly complained about the insurgency were kidnapped within hours and decapitated, their heads displayed on spikes along the Barwanah

[572] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050819 | 20050819 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[573] Ibid.
[574] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050821 | 20050821 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[575] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050901 | 20050901 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[576] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050831 | 20050831 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Bridge.[577] Anyone who sought to participate in the elections was threatened with decapitation and a curfew was set up throughout Haditha for all residents.[578]

(~~S/NF~~) Among the positive effects of Operation QUICK STRIKE were the creation of Coalition bases in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and the heavy attrition among al-As'ab al-Ahwal leadership.[579] The surviving members of the group were forced to flee the city for Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[580] The Albu Nimr tribe exploited the group's weakness, attacking its members in Hit and the Albu Tiban area.[581] His organization fractured and in decline, al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leader Sinan Metib was forced to seek shelter in the anonymity provided by Baghdad.[582] Those al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal members who fled to Ramadi gathered in the Tamim district or the Hai al-Sakani Military Housing Complex.[583]

AQIError! Bookmark not defined. **Defeats the Albu Mahal**

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) By early September, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had established itself across much of western Anbar. Having defeated the Hamza Battalion, AQI now dominated al-Qaim, Karabilah, Sadah, Ramanah, Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and 'Ubaydi to the point of conducting armed patrols and setting up checkpoints whenever Coalition forces were not immediately present.[584] The defeat of the Albu Mahal opened the door for AQI and its allies to consolidate their influence over a wide swath of western Anbar from the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor all the way to Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. They created a virtual "shadow government" based in Haqlaniyah and Barwanah complete with *shari'a* courts and a secret police force.[585] Anticipating Coalition military action against Husaybah, AQI began contracting large numbers of Salmani and Karbuli tribesmen to serve as additional fighters in the event of a Coalition attack on the city.[586]

(~~S/REL~~) The goal of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and its co-belligerents such as Ansar al-Sunna was to openly assume control of the upper Euphrates River region just as they had Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in 2004 and use it as a base for further attacks east towards Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[587] *Hadd* punishments had been implemented by AQI throughout September against suspected collaborators,

---

[577] Ibid.
[578] Ibid.
[579] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050822 | 20050822 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[580] Ibid.
[581] Ibid.
[582] Ibid.
[583] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 050825 | 20050825 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[584] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051002 | 20051002 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[585] Ibid.
[586] Ibid.
[587] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Iraqi police, and any Shi'a found in the area.[588] The frequency of these killings increased dramatically the closer the Coalition came to mounting military operations against the area.

The Anbar General Conference and the Anbar People's Committee

(~~S/NF~~) AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s gains were balanced with Sunni efforts to join the political process. In late September 2005, the Anbar General Conference was formed in Amman, Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. An outgrowth of the earlier Sunni Shura Council (see Chapter 5a), it supported the creation of a unified political front to represent the Sunni community (including many SAR insurgent groups) to the Coalition and the Iraqi government.[589] The group also supported the constitutional referendum process to prevent further Shi'a influence in Iraq.[590] In addition to AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** secretary-general Harith al-Dhari and MML, a number of prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians agreed to join the Anbar General Conference including Sheikh Abdullah Janabi's top deputy Sheikh Dhafir al-'Ubaydi.[591]

City Stories (October 2005)

RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) By the end of October, an estimated 1,200 insurgents were active in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, divided between MML's Ramadi Shura Council (which was funded by Mudhir and Abd al-Latif Humayin al-Kharbit) and AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and affiliated groups. The Shura Council was probably responsible for at least some of the attacks on Coalition forces and IEDs, particularly those using secondary devices. AQI, meanwhile, targeted the Coalition as well as government figures and buildings. It was responsible for two assassination attempts against Governor Mamoun in September and October as well as the kidnapping of the Governor's son. AQI also assassinated Deputy Governor Taleb Ibrahim Hidawi and repeatedly attacked the Government Center. In addition to political leaders, AQI (and perhaps the Shura Council as well) targeted the Iraqi security forces to create instability in the city. This intimidation campaign enabled the insurgents to move in platoon-sized groups whenever Coalition forces were not present.[592]

Approved for Release

[588] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051003 | 20051003 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[589] [| 1.4c | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[590] Ibid.
[591] Ibid. Other members included Saleh al-Mutlaq and Sheikh Abdullah al-Mashhadani of the Iraqi National Dialogue Council, Sunni constitution drafter Dr. Hasib Arif al-Ubaydi, Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** city council deputy chairman Qasim Muhammad Abd al-Sattar al-Jumayli, IFTA Sheikh Dr. Abd al-Qadir Abdallah al-Ani, Abd al-Latif Humayyim Muhammad al-Lafi al-Fahdawi, and Ahmad Dakhil al-Fahdawi. Ibid.
[592] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: MNF-W OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT BRIEF OCTOBER 24, 2005 | 20051024 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Insurgent motivations in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** continued to vary considerably. All the insurgents wanted the Coalition to leave Iraq and feared Shi'a influence. But MML and his declining number of SAR followers remained open to political engagement, while AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and other SREs wanted to disrupt the political process and targeted moderate Sunnis in order to do so.[593]

Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah Error! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ These two towns under District Manager Thaer Hulu Hamdala served as important safe havens and way stations for an estimated 900 insurgents traveling between Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. The Jazira area of Khalidiyah was home to a large number of retired FRE military and security officials. Insurgents were able to move freely through the area but were unable to mass in large numbers for fear of being targeted by the Coalition. As a result, they focused on contesting control of the Khalidiyah Bridge. IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** attacks were common, and while residents did not support the insurgency they were intimidated by the rise of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and feared the group would turn its attention to them rather than Fallujah or Ramadi if they actively opposed them. The key insurgent leaders in the area were Abed Dawud Sulayman and explosives expert Captain Salam Dawud Sulayman al-Fahdawi.[594]

FallujahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** served as a political example for all of Anbar with a standing city council under Mayor Sheikh Dari Abed Yousef and a strong Coalition presence that generally prevented insurgents from returning to the city. The roughly eight hundred fighters in the greater Fallujah area made up of the defeated Fallujah Mujahideen Shura forces, while nominally under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi and Sheikh Khamis al-Rasheed, were in reality controlled by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Janabi made a half-hearted effort to retake the city on the anniversary of AL FAJR, but most of the actual insurgent activity in Fallujah was linked to criminality, with insurgents entering or leaving the city with the help of local smugglers.[595]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** associate Munam Kamel Ahmed Abu Sheba, who had previously served as a deputy to Umar Hadid, worked from Lutayifiya with Janabi's lieutenant Ismail Sraya Jumayli as the operational leader of the insurgents in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[596]

Karmah

---

[593] Ibid.
[594] Ibid.
[595] Ibid.
[596] [| Military | 1.4c ~~(SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/NF~~) Majid Hamed Mothan al-Halbusi used his position as mayor of the city of Karmah to facilitate smuggling insurgents to and from Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. An abundance of safe houses and arms caches existed in the area under the control of the dominant insurgent force in the city, the 300-member FRE Green Battalion now led by Thamir Khalid Ubeid al-Khudhair and Jassim Ubeid al-Khudhair. Jaysh Mohammed explosives expert Salaam Dera Abdullah Thamir served as the Green Battalion's primary contact with other elements of the insurgency.[597]

Amariyah

(~~S/NF~~) During the late summer and fall of 2005 there was a relative absence of insurgent activity in Amariyah area, although significant numbers of insurgents remained in the city, concentrated in the northern Ankur district. Two possible explanations for the dip in attacks were a prolonged Coalition presence in the area and a desire by insurgents to use Amariyah as a safe-haven. The destruction of a nearby police station in Feris Town and resulting lack of Iraqi security forces inside the city tends to support the latter explanation. Major insurgent figures in the city were Zarqawi associate Essa Handi Ahood al-Essawi, foreign fighter facilitator Abu Mukhlas, and Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Fizza.[598]

HitError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) Though nominally under the control of Mayor Ali Hamdi Nasser al-Awee and the "People's Sheikh" Yassin Muflin Ham Hadi, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s murder, intimidation, and IO campaigns had successfully converted or cowed the local population by October. With assistance from local FREs, Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** served as the last stop for insurgent and foreign fighters traveling to Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and its hospital was co-opted by the insurgency to treat their own wounded fighters. AQI was the dominant group in the city, but Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Mohammed, and (until their defeat) al-Asa'ab al-Awhal also maintained a presence.[599]

RawahError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) Once the insurgents felt relatively secure in al-Qaim and Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Quwwat Allah al-Tharib attempted to re-establish the Bayt al-Masada training camp north of Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[600] A number of Quwwat Allah al-Tharib leaders were Iraqi or foreign fighters who had been trained by AQAM instructors at this camp before its

[597] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: MNF-W OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT BRIEF, OCTOBER 24, 2005 | 20051024 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[598] Ibid.
[599] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: MNF-W OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT BRIEF, OCTOBER 24, 2005 | 20051024 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[600] [| Military | DIIR MNFW HET03 0306 05 | 20050408 | (~~SECRET//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

destruction in 2003 (see Chapter 3) and escaped to 'Ubaydi, al-Qaim, and Husaybah to join the nascent insurgency.[601]

Al-Qaim, Husaybah Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Karabilah**

(~~S/NF~~) Throughout this entire area, *shari'a* courts were set up and the *hadd* punishments were implemented by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** clerics. Using boats and back roads, AQI was able to move rank-and-file insurgents as well as foreign fighters in and out of the area on a regular basis. The AQI senior leadership left for Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** as Operation SAYYAD II began, but 300 fighters under the command of mid-level leaders remained in both Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Karabilah to set up fortifications, plant IEDs, and establish C2 nodes in preparation for a Coalition attack.[602]

(~~S/NF~~) After their defeat of the Hamza Battalion, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** forcibly evicted Battalion members from the area in mid-September and most of the cities' populations fled south and east in anticipation of the Coalition attack.[603]

RutbahError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) As Coalition pressure on Anbar's northern border sanctuaries increased, Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** became a key location for fighters crossing into Iraq at Trebil and Waleed. The insurgency used the city as a meeting ground for arranging attacks, and had successfully persuaded locals that any problems in the city were caused by the Coalition. Cars purchased in Rutbah were taken to Akashat, Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** to be turned into VBIEDs. While the number of insurgents in Rutbah was estimated at only seventy-five men, all under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammed Abdul Khudayr and Mohammed al-Aswad, they exerted more influence over residents than did Acting Mayor Raheem Sabah Awadi.[604]

The Example of Haditha Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah: AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s ideas in action**

(~~S/NF~~) By October 2005 AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had thoroughly penetrated the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** area and, perhaps aided by the presence of the many FREs

[601] Ibid.
[602] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: MNF-W Operational Assessment Brief, October 24, 2005 | 2051024 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[603] Ibid.
[604] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

in the area (including former intelligence officers and former Republican Guard Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Saif al-Din Falayh al-Rawi), created a sophisticated organization in this region. A study of captured documents suggests that AQI had in fact created an infant "state within a state" in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah. The incipient state had centralized command structures, intelligence and security cells, *shari'a* courts, a Shura Council, and a highly developed financial infrastructure. This bureaucracy, while not fully mature, generated reports, kept meticulous records, and had set rules for conducting business.[605]

~~(S/NF)~~ The documents show several other interesting facts about AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in this part of Anbar. First, the development of guerrilla tactics and therefore the evolution of the insurgency did not occupy much of the attention of the leadership. Second, religio-ideological justifications for their actions dominated the internal documents, suggesting that these justifications were more than simply talk, but rather speak to the deeper motivations of many AQAM members. Finally, while much time was devoted to local concerns and figures, almost no thought was focused on understanding the Coalition—its motivations, potential strategies and tactics.[606] These documents indicate the insurgents understood the fact that insurgency is a political rather than military struggle and that all politics are based on local issues.

~~(S/NF)~~ A closer look at the situation in the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** region reveals some details about the larger state that AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** hoped to create in Anbar. AQI organized their insurgent cells by city block and street and enforced their version of *shari'a* throughout the area with their police force, security forces and court system.[607] Reports on "immoral" residents (such as prostitutes or homosexuals) were collected and stored, as was a "black list" of people wanted by AQI for various infractions. The management of disputes and the mediation of local grievances were of special concern for AQI, which took the time, for instance, to arbitrate a dispute over land use near Haditha.[608]

Snapshot of the Insurgency (September 2005)

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite the series of operations designed to disrupt the insurgency in Anbar, secure the borders, and prepare the region for the elections, the bloodshed and intimidation in Anbar continued. AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and other insurgent groups seemed more entrenched than ever in certain parts of the province, able to create in places like Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** a "state within a state" that enforced their ideas of governance on the unwilling populace.

Approved for Release

[605] [| Military | MCIA-2420-IRQ-010-07 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[606] Ibid.
[607] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051003 | 20051003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[608] [| Military | MCIA-2420-IRQ-010-07 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Yet all was not well within either AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** or the insurgency as a whole. AQI's continued inability to defeat Coalition forces caused the organization to lose credibility in parts of Anbar, while the divide between SRE and SAR insurgents was more pronounced than ever. Genuine differences of opinion had formed over whether or not to participate in the upcoming referendum. From late September onward, tensions over this issue created a split between AQI and MML's followers in the Islamic Movement of Iraq Mujahideen, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Jaysh Mohammed. JM even warned merchants in insurgent strongholds not to distribute AQI leaflets, posted flyers listing known AQI members, and preached anti-AQI sermons at mosques.[609]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Meanwhile local concerns and personality-driven disputes continued to cause problems between AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna. There were, in addition, continued AQI efforts to recruit Ansar al-Sunna fighters, the sectarian attitudes of the AQI leadership, and AQI's carefree attitude towards the killing of Iraqi Sunnis.[610] While Ansar al-Sunna continued to cooperate both strategically and tactically with AQI, Zarqawi's all-out declaration of war against the Shi'a over the summer had been the last straw for the Ansar al-Sunna leadership, and prospects for a merger between the two groups faded.[611]

The Referendum (October 15, 2005)

~~(S/NF~~) As the referendum neared, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** attempted to disrupt the political process by distributing a *fatwa* written by prominent al-Qaeda imam Abu Qatadah al-Taei. The *fatwa* declared that voting was punishable by death under *shari'a* and that Sunnis should fight rather than vote. AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, MML, and insurgent financier Abd al-Latif Humayin al-Kharbit all countered this charge by claiming that participation in the referendum (in order to vote against the constitution) was a duty equivalent to participating in *jihad*.[612]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) The influence of these competing declarations, as well as the effects of the Coalition's shaping operations, was reflected in the turn-out for the referendum. Voting in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Nasser Wa Salaam, Saqlawiyah, and Zaidon, where the insurgency had been more thoroughly suppressed and where the AMS**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Anbar People's General Conference had advocated participation in the political process (in order to keep the Shi'a from imposing their ideas), was quite high, with 106,200 out of 153,477 eligible voters (69%) participating. The atmosphere in the area was so open to the referendum that additional ballots were requested for delivery to Fallujah.[613]

Approved for Release

---

[609] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: MNF-W OVERVIEW, OCTOBER 2005 | 200510 | ~~(S/NF) |~~]
[610] [| Military | CIOC REPORT EXPLOITING: CONTINUED DISCORD BETWEEN ANSAR AL-SUNNA AND AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ, NOVEMBER 2005 | 200511 | ~~(S/REL TO USA AUS GBR~~) |]
[611] Ibid.
[612] [| Military | MNF-W OVERVIEW, OCTOBER 2005 | 200510 | ~~(S/NF) | ~~]
[613] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051015 | 20051015 | ~~(S/MCFI)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) The picture was quite different in western Anbar. The only town that had good turnout was Barwanah, where the atmosphere was described as "festive." Voting in Akashat, Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Sadah, Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Baghdadi, and Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, on the other hand, was extremely low: only 7,510 citizens out of 158,682 eligible voters participated (4.7%). The reason for this low turnout varied from place to place: Haditha residents were too intimidated by insurgents to participate in the referendum. Hit residents were told not to vote in mosque sermons. Residents in al-Qaim, Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and Haditha were unable to vote because there were no polling stations due to of a lack of security. In al-Qaim AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** reportedly set up cameras to identify and record individuals attempting to vote, so that they could be targeted.[614]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Voting in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Tammim, and Zangora was also low, with only 4,297 out of 217,940 eligible voters participating, barely 2%. The main reason given for the lack of voting was that the lack of visible Coalition forces at the polling stations made citizens feel unsafe.[615]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Turnout across Anbar was estimated at 22% or 118,000 of the 530,000 eligible voters in the province.[616] Most attacks that took place the day of the referendum were both ineffective and directed against Coalition forces. It was intimidation, conflicting religious and political guidance, and widespread perceptions of insecurity rather than actual violence that were primarily responsible for the low turnout.[617]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Despite this estimated turnout, the official statistics for Anbar reported 217,471 votes cast, of which 97% were against the constitution. The discrepancy between estimated and official turnout would lead to an official investigation of the referendum after its conclusion.[618] When the results across Iraq were tallied, Anbar, Salahaddin, and Nineveh had all voted against the constitution but Nineveh had failed to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority necessary to defeat it. The investigation into the elections in Anbar was therefore closed and the constitution was approved.[619] Some Anbari elites claimed that they were being disenfranchised by the Shi'a majority, but most begrudgingly accepted the results and began selecting candidates for the December elections.[620]

Operation SAYYAD II (October-November 2005)

(~~S/NF~~) With the successful conclusion of the referendum, the Coalition began the last phase of SAYYAD, designed to secure the borders and create enough security for the vital December

Approved for Release

[614] Ibid.
[615] Ibid.
[616] Ibid.
[617] Ibid.
[618] [| Military | Referendum Investigations, October 24, 2005 | 20051024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[619] [| Military | Final Referendum Statistics, October 25, 2005 | 20051025 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[620] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

elections to occur. Phase II of SAYYAD would establish a Coalition military presence in al-Qaim, Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Baghdadi, and Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, in some cases displacing AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** for many months from these important cities.

(~~S/NF~~) Before SAYYAD II began, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s ability to mass, communicate, and coordinate in western Anbar was shown in two ways. First, the organization established active communication with satellite cells in 1.4b

1.4b

Second, AQI was able to plan and coordinate attacks, mounting an increased intimidation and coercion campaign against the local population.[621] AQI relied on the Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor for logistical support, using murder and intimidation to force locals to comply with their demands and setting up "shadow governments" based on *shar'ia* law to maintain their influence and control within major cities.[622] SAYYAD II helped to rectify that state of affairs, with a series of supporting operations (GREEN LIGHT, LIGHTNING STRIKE, and IRON FIST), which specifically targeted AQI cells in Sadah, Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Barwanah, and Baghdadi.[623]
(~~S/NF~~) By the end of Operation SAYYAD II, 529 AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters had been killed and 1,584 detained.[624] Among the dead were Husayn Shihab (the regional amir of AQI), Abu 'Ubayda al-Kubaysi (head of the Nu'man Brigade and AQI member), Abu Asil (Shihab's successor as regional amir), and Asad Allah (senior AQI commander for the Anah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor), while the captured included senior amir Muhammad Hamud Kanush, Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** amir Khalid Hamid Zeballa, Rawah amir Hoqar Jamal Razzaq, and senior AQI facilitator Sadiq Ayad Findi.[625]

(~~S/NF~~) Despite these losses, as had occurred in previous Coalition operations, many of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s mid- and senior leaders in the region were able to flee the area while the majority of the rank-and-file members simply went underground. The ability of AQI to "melt away" during the course of battle enabled the group to preserve its forces when confronted with superior firepower at the expense of holding terrain.

Operation STEEL CURTAIN (October 2005)

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) In support of the upcoming elections, and to increase security along the Iraq-Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.** border, the Coalition launched a separate phase of

Approved for Release

[621] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060104 | 20060104 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[622] Ibid.
[623] Ibid.
[624] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060104 | 20060104 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[625] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

SAYYAD II named Operation STEEL CURTAIN (AL-HAJIZ Al-FULADHI) with 2,500 Marines from RCT-2 and 1,000 Iraqi troops.[626]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Operation STEEL CURTAIN specifically targeted the insurgent networks headquartered in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had a virtual free run of this part of al-Qaim since driving the Hamza Battalion out of Husaybah in August. During September and October, the AQI leadership in the city was able to plan a major attack on Camp Gannon with the goal of seizing or destroying the base. Executed in late October, the attack, though unsuccessful at seizing Camp Gannon, was sophisticated and complex. The Coalition clearly needed to disrupt the insurgency in Husaybah.

(U) Beginning on November 5, combined Coalition and Iraqi forces pushed into Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, encountering small arms fire and IEDs from insurgents. Nine Coalition air strikes were called against suspected insurgent strongholds on the first day of the operation and preparations began to begin a methodical search of every house in the city.

(U) By November 9, the Coalition had completed its sweep of Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Coalition forces worked with Iraqi troops to set up a permanent presence in the city. Raids continued against Karabilah, however, and on November 14 the Coalition mounted another operation to secure 'Ubaydi, which had served as a safe haven for many insurgents who had escaped from Husaybah. By the time 'Ubaydi had been cleared on November 17, 256 suspected insurgents were captured and 139 killed.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Some insurgents fought in RPG or machine-gun teams, and leadership in New 'Ubaydi coordinated IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and VBIED attacks. Some residential buildings were rigged with IEDs to explode when Coalition forces breached and cleared rooms. All main roads and avenues of approach had been rigged with IEDs, and large VBIEDs were found and destroyed in Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Karabilah, and New 'Ubaydi. Pre-planned defensive positions were used and some insurgents fought wearing flak jackets, kevlar helmets, and other forms of body armor. Later assessments stated that the degree of tactical discipline displayed by the insurgents showed that many had received military or terrorist training.

Revelations about AQI Error! Bookmark not defined. **from SAYYAD II**

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Operation SAYYAD II revealed a great deal about AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** operations and sophistication.[627] For instance, an AQI voucher discovered in a weapons cache near Albu Hyatt contained a day-to-day record of expenditures during the course of SAYYAD II for sixty-five fighters. The record was extremely detailed at the beginning, but

[626] This entire section is taken from [| MILITARY | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060104 | 20060104 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[627] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060205 | 20060205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

became less meticulous as time went on. The AQI cell that compiled the record regarded a visit by the group's Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** amir Methat Ibrahim Fahdawi (Abu Mustafa) as a great honor, spending roughly $1,000 to throw a party for him. The cell also spent more money on transportation and maintenance than on weapons, although "vehicle maintenance" was also the preferred euphemism for modifying cars to serve as VBIEDs.[628]

~~(S/NF)~~ After SAYYAD II, the Coalition realized the extent of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** influence over Iraqi society and the sophistication of its bureaucratic infrastructure throughout the western Anbar region. For instance a November 20, 2005 document found in Albu Hyatt detailed an AQI leadership meeting focused on how to take control of a city. The document discussed Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Barwanah in particular and included the names of individuals approved to take over the land in the city and what type of land they were to receive. Many of the individuals listed were still involved in local government in early 2006. A second document, found at a weapons cache in Barwanah, was a transcript of an official insurgent meeting in which specific cases that had been brought against various residents of the town (for being Coalition informants or attempting to join the Iraqi police) were discussed. The documents also listed individuals who had been declared "thieves" and what they stole.[629]

(U) **SPOILS OF WAR (ANFAL).** Al-Qaeda, like many jihadist groups, believes that the spoils of war are a legitimate source of income provided by God for the mujahidin. They therefore take very seriously the division of any goods or land taken through fighting. The parceling out of territory in the Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** area should be seen as part of the larger attempt to impose *shari'a* on the populace and to win over Muslims through legitimate *shari'a* means to the side of the insurgency.

City Stories Post-SAYYAD II (December 2005)

Al-Qaim

~~(S/NF)~~ As the Coalition and Iraqi army retook control of al-Qaim, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s ability to carry out operations in the city was severally degraded and the group was forced underground. AQI lost its ability to coordinate attacks in the city, to support insurgent activity further east, and to use the area as the capital for their notional state.[630]

HitError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ The presence of Coalition forces provided both stability and security for Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** residents. The Coalition forced the bulk of the insurgents from AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal to the outskirts of the city where they were reduced to conducting harassment attacks against Coalition bases and patrols. Al-Asa'ab al-

[628] Ibid.
[629] [| Military | DIIR MNFW HET03 0329 06 | 20050000 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[630] [| This entire section is taken from City Assessment, October 2005 ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Ahwal continued to fragment under Coalition pressure, while AQI fighters were limited in their ability to move, forcing them into a reactionary stance of conducting attacks around the Coalition operation schedule.

RawahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Coalition and Iraqi army presence in Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** since late July had disrupted AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s intimidation campaign against the general population, though the group continued to have IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** cells in the city. While weapons transfers and smuggling operations still took place within the city, it was severely curtailed by the Coalition presence that continued to deny AQI freedom of movement, disrupted command and control, and forced their fighters to remain underground.

HadithaError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ Aggressive company-sized Coalition patrols and checkpoints forced both AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and Ansar al-Sunna back underground, reducing their ability to organize, mass their fighters, or intimidate the population. While the two groups continued to contest the Coalition presence in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, both were forced to keep a low profile to avoid being targeted by the Coalition. In doing so, they preserved their organizations to re-emerge later.

Baghdadi

~~(S/NF)~~ Because of the absence of a permanent Coalition presence in Baghdadi, the town served as a haven for AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** fighters fleeing other parts of western Anbar including senior leaders such as Sadiq Ayada Fandi al-Mahalawi. These AQI fighters were able to successfully intimidate residents, keeping the general sentiment anti-Coalition.
RutbahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ While Coalition operations in Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** were able to seize a number of weapons caches, safehouses, and suspected insurgents, the town remained an isolated, provincial transit point for foreign fighter movement, vehicle smuggling, and weapons trafficking. Smuggling continued to be a mainstay for local tribesmen and criminals, but residents were displeased at the presence of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in the city and the growing number of Saudi nationals becoming involved in traditionally Iraqi criminal activities in the area.

Snapshot of the Insurgency

~~(S/NF)~~ Operation SAYYAD II and STEEL CURTAIN allowed Coalition troops to create a presence in the previous insurgent strongholds of al-Qaim, Hit,**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, though AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** forces under Kunther Selma retained some influence in al-Qaim and Baghdadi.[631]

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile the Anbar General Committee evolved into the Anbar People's Conference following a national reconcilitation conference sponsored by the Arab League that recognized the right of "legitimate armed resistance" against occupation.[632] This recognition increased SAR and SRE divisions within the insurgency, with 1920 Revolution Brigade leader MML organizing a group of more than 70-100 politicians, technocrats, sheikhs, and insurgent leaders in order to organize municipal security committees in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** made up of members of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Mohammed, and Islamic Army of Iraq to assist in the December 15 elections.[633]

The Amman Bombings

~~(S/NF)~~ Zarqawi's broader regional concerns were highlighted when, after numerous failed attempts, he finally succeeded in carrying out a terrorist attack in his native Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.** on November 9. Using non-Jordanian suicide bombers facilitated by Uthman Ismael Fahad al-Khalifawi (including a relative of top Zarqawi lieutenant Thamir Mubarak Atrouz), AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** carried out attacks against the Radisson, Hyatt, and Days Inn hotels in Amman, Jordan, killing 57 and injuring 60. The attack on the Radisson Hotel in particular was a major source of pride for Zarqawi, who had targeted it since 1999.[634]

(U) Zarqawi did not anticipate the wave of popular revulsion that the Amman bombings caused in Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. More Jordanians were killed than foreigners and one of the attacks targeted a wedding party largely made up of Palestinian Jordanians. The attacks sparked a popular outcry against AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. In an effort to defend his actions, Zarqawi posted two online defenses justifying his choice of targets. He claimed that the wedding party was made up of "Israeli Arabs" rather than Palestinian Jordanians and that it was well-established that the hotels were "the backyard of the enemies of the faith." He also claimed he had sent a warning in AQI's attempted attack against U.S. warships in Aqaba in August 2005. He offered an alternate explanation in a subsequent audiotape, claiming that AQI had attacked the hotel because Israeli intelligence officials were meeting there and that the roof had fallen on the wedding hall as a result of the explosion.[635]

Atiyah al-Jaziri

Approved for Release

[631] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051007 | 20051007 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[632] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: Prominent Assassinations 20310307 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[633] Ibid.
[634] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060116 | 20060116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[635] [| Open Source | INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP/MIDDLE EAST REPORT NO. 47–23 NOVEMBER 2005: JORDAN'S 9/11: DEALING WITH JIHADI ISLAMISM | 20051123 | (U) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) AQSL appears to have been just as furious with Zarqawi over Amman as the Jordanians were. In an uncharacteristically blunt letter, AQSL Atiyah al-Jaziri scolded Zarqawi for his actions, informing him that all operations had to be subordinate to AQAM's long-term goals and rebuking him for undermining AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s ability to win hearts and minds in Iraq. According to al-Jaziri, Zarqawi's widening scope of operations was alienating the Sunni community and reducing support for AQAM. Zarqawi was therefore ordered to cease killing popular Iraqi Sunni leaders, to forge strategic relationships with moderate Sunni tribal and religious leaders, and to follow all previous orders from 'Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri concerning war with the Shi'a (i.e. to cease agitating for sectarian violence) and operations outside of Iraq. Al-Jaziri then proceeded to criticize Zarqawi's advisors in Iraq for their inadequate political and religious expertise, warned Zarqawi against arrogance, and implied that there might be someone more qualified than Zarqawi to command AQI. He closed with an order for Zarqawi to send couriers with regular reports on his activity to AQSL in Waziristan or use jihadi discussion forums to speak with AQSL directly.[636]

(U) Atiyah al-Jaziri's letter, which amounted to a formal rebuke of Zarqawi's activities and strategy in Iraq from the highest echelons of AQSL, was a major factor in the January 2006 formation of the Mujahideen Shura Council.[637]

The December Elections (November – December 2005)

The Rise of Anbari Political Parties

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ When the insurgency failed to disrupt the constitutional referendum, many Anbari elites, including the members of the Anbar People's Conference with ties to the insurgency, began preparing for the December elections. The shift from insurgency to political actions is in keeping with a long-established insurgent pattern of setting up formal and informal political wings in order to engage the government. By October 27, the Sunni political groups Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP**Error! Bookmark not defined.**), Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC), and the Conference of the People of Iraq (CPI) joined together to form the Iraqi al-Tawafuq Front (ITF) coalition in preparation for the December elections.[638] The IIP and INDC had originally intended to ally with Iyad Allawi, but his support for Operation AL FAJR made him a political liability in Anbar.[639] Operating on a platform calling for insurgent disarmament and Coalition withdrawal, the ITF planned to field as many as 230 candidates.[640]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The ITF was not the only Anbari political faction to form during this period. Former INDC leader Saleh Mutlaq tried to create another political coalition that would

[636] [| Military | CTC Westpoint: Letter Exposes New Leader in al-Qa'ida High Command | 20060925 |(U)|]
[637] Ibid.
[638] [| Military | Special Assessment: Sunni Political Parties | 20051030 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[639] Ibid.
[640] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

include more extreme Sunni religious groups. At the same time, Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** technocrat Engineer Farouk founded the Majlis Siyasi Watani Leel Iraq (National Political Council for Iraq, NPCI).[641]

(~~S/NF~~) The Sunnis realized they could gain more seats in the National Assembly by pooling resources and running together rather than as independent candidates.[642] While the specific candidates were not announced in Anbar until immediately prior to the elections due to security concerns, Governor Mamoun believed the ITF in particular was a strong, balanced coalition that could represent Anbari interests in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. He felt any insurgent group that attacked it would draw the wrath of the provincial elites.[643] A key part of Mamoun's security plan was to engage the local imams and tribal leaders who opposed the referendum in order to overcome the intimidation against voting. [644]

City Stories (November 2005)

RamadiError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) The insurgency remained extremely active in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, with IEDs serving as the major threat to Coalition troops.[645] Because they were focused on western Anbar, Coalition forces maintained a minimal presence in Ramadi. Still, Coalition patrols, bases, and operating positions were the primary targets for insurgent attacks. Iraqi security forces were still targeted with kidnapping and execution in the hope of convincing them to quit their posts.[646] A major factor in the insurgency's ability to operate in the city lay in the fact that Police Chief Shakr Mohammed Saleh had been collaborating with the insurgents until his detention.[647] Even so, the SRE-SAR divide was apparent in Ramadi, with SARs loyal to MML hoping to join the political process and SREs loyal to Zarqawi hoping to disrupt it.[648]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) In a positive development for the Coalition, residents of the Sufia district formed a militia to fight AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in their area.[649] While a positive development, this decision also reflected a lack of trust in the government's ability to provide security.

Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah Error! Bookmark not defined.

Approved for Release

---

[641] Ibid.
[642] Ibid.
[643] Ibid.
[644] Ibid.
[645] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: CITY ASSESSMENT | 200511 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[646] Ibid.
[647] Ibid.
[648] Ibid.
[649] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051210 | 20051210 | (~~S/MCFI~~) |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in this area reflected the difficulties that the Coalition faced in Anbar, as well as illustrating an important standard al-Qaeda technique. On the one hand, residents of Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** remained unsupportive of the insurgency, but there was, at the same time, a great deal of anger and civil unrest directed against the Coalition. With the arrival of the 9th Brigade of the Iraqi Armed Forces, the area was actively patrolled by professional Iraqi soldiers. The response of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was to use the two towns as their safe-havens for attacks on Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** while refraining from carrying out attacks within Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah themselves.[650] This was standard practice for al-Qaeda around the world, reflecting both a religious as well as practical reading of the demands of an insurgency.

> (U) **SAFE HAVENS.** As with other insurgent groups, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** needs safe havens to rest, resupply and train. The insurgency in Anbar has safe havens in neighboring countries as well as within the province itself. Because of a particular reading of Muhammad's life, AQI believes in using one city or town as a safe haven that will be spared attacks, while carrying out attacks in neighboring cities. A town or area of a city where attacks do not occur is often the sign that this is the center of an AQI safe haven.

FallujahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ The city remained a prime target for the insurgency. Insurgents found ways to enter the city using forged documents or by traveling the Euphrates River from Saqlawiyah or Amariyah to carry out grenade attacks, drive-by shootings, IEDs, and other "low risk" attacks.[651] One major exception was AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s November 29 assassination of Sheikh Hamza, the widely beloved and influential religious leader who had supported both the elections and reconstruction.[652]

Karmah

~~(S/NF)~~ Karmah continued to serve as the primary planning and networking center for the Green Battalion. It conducted explosives training outside the city and then entered it to plant IEDs. The Green Battalion exerted a strong influence on residents through family and tribal ties, causing the city's atmospherics to change on a weekly basis depending on the strength of the group. As a result, tribal leaders suffered a loss of influence and the city council was rendered completely ineffective. While residents did not support either the Coalition or the insurgency, many tolerated the insurgents for fear of being attacked. No Iraqi security forces were active inside the city and those local officials that worked with the Coalition were targeted for intimidation and assassination.[653]

---

[650] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: CITY ASSESSMENT | 200511 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[651] Ibid.
[652] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051206 | 20051206 | ~~(S/ MCFI)~~ |]
[653] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Amariyah

(~~S/NF~~) Having successfully won over or intimidated police chief Captain Saldoon Hansal Subhee Husayn, the insurgent's receieved aid and support from many police. Learning from their earlier lesson of massing in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, insurgents in Amariyah did not stay in one area for very long and exercised good operational security.[654]

HadithaError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) Infiltrating back into Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** from Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Bayji, and Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** after STEEL CURTAIN ended, insurgents were able to organize a limited number of attacks, but could not carry out more sophisticated operations.[655]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) The government agricultural building in Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** was used as a headquarters and a field hospital by Ansar al-Sunna.[656] Staffed by trained doctors and nurses, wounded Ansar al-Sunna fighters from across Anbar were brought to the area for treatment.[657]

HitError! Bookmark not defined.

(~~S/NF~~) Coalition operations in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, which forced most leaders to flee to the outskirts, suppressed the insurgents' ability to operate in the city and limited activity to harassment attacks directed against targets of opportunity. A lack of safe houses also disrupted networks in the city and the ability to prepare more sophisticated attacks. As a result, insurgent intimidation and coercion campaigns against the general population ended.[658]

RawahError! Bookmark not defined.

Approved for Release

[654] Ibid.
[655] Ibid.
[656] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051103 | 20051103 | (~~S/MCFI~~) |]
[657] Ibid.
[658] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Coalition presence in Rawah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** limited AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s ability to conduct operations in the city, though night attacks using IEDs were on the rise in and around the nearby town of Anah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[659]

Al-Qaim

~~(S/NF)~~ Although still forced to operate covertly, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** continued to carry out IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and small arms attacks in a desperate attempt to contest Coalition control of the city.[660] AQI also attempted to infiltrate the new Iraqi security forces and intimidate residents into submission.[661]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Meanwhile, the weakening of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in the al-Qaim area led to an escalation in tribal tensions, as the Albu Mahal tribe sought to consolidate its power in the region over its rival Salmanis.[662]

RutbahError! Bookmark not defined.

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** believed that the Coalition could not or would not conduct major offensives in Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and as a result chose the area as their safe haven after being driven from Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[663] Small villages in the al-Jafalah region were used as ad-hoc terrorist training facilities and the local criminal element was co-opted to support AQI personnel and operations after being told by AQI that the Badr Corps was planning to suppress the Sunni vote in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[664]

The Insurgency Divided (Late 2005)

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Coalition operations in western Iraq had decisively shifted the balance of power in the area away from AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and back towards the Iraqi government.[665] This is an interesting conclusion given the city by city analysis above. Across the province, insurgent groups of all ideologies were under pressure to avoid Sunni civilian casualties, while constant Coalition and Iraqi patrols prevented AQI from gaining the necessary momentum to re-impose its influence on the general population.[666] From the perspective of the AQI leadership, the situation in their former stronghold of western Anbar was increasingly grim and the group needed to mount new operations to maintain momentum.

Approved for Release

[659] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: CITY ASSESSMENT | 200511 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[660] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: CITY ASSESSMENT | 200511 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[661] Ibid.
[662] [| Military | GRINTSUM 051210 | 20051210 | ~~(S/MCFI)~~ |]
[663] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051221 | 20051221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[664] Ibid.
[665] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051230 | 20051230 | ~~(S/MCFI)~~ |]
[666] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s leadership in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (particularly the Albu Ubayd tribal region), Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and throughout western Anbar had been seriously attrited by Coalition military operations. Many key leaders and facilitators fled the province or went completely underground.[667] Among them was Khalid Hamad Zibalah al-Hayyani (Abu Harith), the AQI amir of Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** who had fled to Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** during Operation STEEL CURTAIN and instructed other leading and mid-level insurgents to disperse to outlying river towns and villages near Haditha.[668] In an effort to regain momentum, Zarqawi began appointing a handful of temporary commanders to oversee the province until new leaders could be approved.[669] To avoid being targeted by the Coalition, the bulk of AQI's scattered fighters fled to the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridor or to the Albu Faraj and Albu Dhiyab tribal areas of Jazira to regroup.[670]

~~(S/NF)~~ Fearful that other insurgent groups would seek to fill the power vacuum left by AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, local commanders began targeting the leadership of Ansar al-Sunna and the 1920 Revolution Brigade in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[671] From Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Sheikh Abdullah Janabi directed the Umar Brigade to begin moving some 225 Iraqi and foreign fighters who had been dispersed across western Iraq to Ramadi, Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, and al-Qaim in the hope that they would reinforce the existing AQI cells in those cities.[672]

~~(S/NF)~~ Ironically for a group for whom hatred of the Shi'a was a key ideological component, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** sought to use its ties to Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army to help reconstitute its infrastructure.[673] Ties between AQI (then known as JTJ**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) and the Mahdi Army had first formed in April 2004, when al-Sadr had provided support to the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** insurgents under Umar Hadid (see Chapter 4). This support had been reciprocated by JTJ, which sent heavy arms, ammunition, and fighters to assist al-Sadr against the Coalition in An Najaf in 2004. Mahdi Army fighters had fought alongside AQI during Operation AL FAJR, but ties between the two organizations had become more strained after al-Sadr joined the political process and it is unclear whether or not their efforts to enlist al-Sadr's assistance were successful.[674]

Approved for Release

[667] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[668] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051126 | 20051126 | ~~(S/MCFI)~~ |]
[669] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[670] Ibid.; [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051222 | 20051222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[671] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[672] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051222 | 20051222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[673] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051103 | 20051103 | ~~(S/MCFI)~~ |]
[674] Ibid.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Potential cooperation with al-Sadr was not the only means through which AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** planned to re-invigorate itself. Zarqawi told a senior AQI leader, who was later captured by Coalition forces, that following the group's losses in 2005, only starting a full-fledged civil war in Iraq would convince the other insurgent groups to support his strategy for jihad in Iraq.[675] Among those insurgents that the senior AQI leader recounted as having objected to this sectarian strategy were 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Mujahideen, Jaysh Islami, and Ansar al-Sunna. The latter was of particular concern because it was attempting to make these objections known to the al Qaeda senior leadership.[676] It was the implementation of Zarqawi's strategy that would lead to the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra**Error! Bookmark not defined.** in February 2006.

~~(S/NF)~~ The other insurgent groups in Anbar were divided over the prospect of joining the political process. The Rahman Brigade (the new name for the al-Nu'man Brigade),1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Haq, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Islamic Movement of Iraq Mujahideen all sought to engage the political process in order to increase their wealth, influence, and power in Anbar by covertly sponsoring candidates or political parties.[677] The 1.4b leaderships of these groups were already negotiating with both the Coalition and Iraqi government in order to resolve the insurgency in Anbar so that the Coalition troops could begin to withdraw.[678] Other groups based in western Iraq, including Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Mohammed, Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, were divided over whether to join the political process or to continue to support AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.**.[679]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite these considerable gains against the insurgency, the underlying conditions in Anbar were unchanged. Corruption remained widespread among local officials and elites in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. Young men had only a limited number of ways to achieve status and financial independence. During the former regime, they could join the Iraqi army, but in Ramadi government employees were often paid late or simply not paid for months on end. The entire November payroll was stolen by the insurgency. Insurgent groups, by contrast, paid $400 to plant an IED**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and $750 to detonate one, the equivalent of a month's insurgent salary and significantly more than a government employee. The families of suicide bombers were paid up to $10,000 and insurgent groups supported the families of their detained fighters. False documents and counterfeiting shops were a huge business in places like Ramadi, enabling easy access for insurgent groups. As it sought to regroup in Anbar from 2005 onwards, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** would exploit these financial hardships to serve its ideological goals and begin recruiting new fighters.[680]

Approved for Release

---

[675] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051221 | 20051221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[676] Ibid.
[677] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[678] Ibid.
[679] Ibid.
[680] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051226 | 20051226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Parliamentary Elections (December 2005)

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) During the run-up to the elections, major Anbari political parties began actively campaigning, though the manner and degree to which this occurred varied from city to city depending on the security situation. In the most secure areas like Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, this took the form of political rallies, speeches at mosques, and television advertisement blitzs, while in less secure areas like those in western Anbar the only sources of election news other than national television were the mosques and meetings of tribal leaders.[681] Political parties had been announced on November 5, but only Allawi's denounced the insurgency.[682] All of the other major parties in Anbar instead stressed Sunni identity politics, opposition to federalism, condemnation of Shi'a militia activity, support for the reconstitution of the Iraqi army, and a timeline for Coalition withdrawal.[683]

(~~S/REL TO USA, MCFI~~) Anbari support for the elections convinced AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and its allies they had to change their tactics. Rather than threatening to kill anyone who participated in the voting, they decided to concentrate on attacks against the Coalition.[684] Complex attacks in Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and suicide bombings in al-Qaim demonstrated that AQI was still able to carry out mass casualty attacks. AQI believed that it had to continue to challenge the Coalition presence in order to regain its former standing in western Iraq.[685] With AQI's intimidation campaign weakened, however, many residents began discouraging insurgent groups from operating in their area except in Rutbah**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, where the insurgency continued to wield significant influence over the general population.[686]

(~~S/NF~~) MML played a major role in the December 15 elections, using the 1920 Revolution Brigades to drive AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** from several Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** neighborhoods in order to ensure security at the polls.[687] He was assisted in this effort by his lieutenant Sheikh Nasser Fahdawi, who raised a militia in the Sufia district to protect the population against AQI.[688] MML used agreements with Sunni leaders in Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** similar to those he had with Sheikh Nasser to reduce violence in the city during the elections.[689] This move was also self-serving, as it helped to extend MML's authority from his center of power in Ramadi into the Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.**-Haditha**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** corridors.[690] Even so,

[681] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051127 | 20051127 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[682] Ibid.
[683] Ibid.
[684] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051221 | 20051221 | (~~S/MCFI~~ |]
[685] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051230 | 20051230 | (~~S/MCFI~~) |]
[686] Ibid.
[687] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060101 | 20060101 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[688] Ibid.
[689] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 060111 | 20060111 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[690] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

MML's 1920 Revolution Brigades had been seriously weakened in the Fallujah area, with many members absorbed into AQI or forced out of Zaidon and into Ramadi during inter-insurgent violence.[691]

~~(S/NF)~~ In Karmah, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** did not take the support by other insurgents for the December elections lying down. Accusing the local Islamic Army of Iraq of collaborating with the Coalition, AQI leader Hajji Hamadi al-Janabi attacked them. The attack failed, leading to the death of at least four AQI fighters.[692]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Popular reaction to the elections in Anbar was delayed for several weeks into early 2006 while ballots were tallied and allegations of intimidation and voter fraud were addressed. Non-AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** insurgents led by MML expressed their continued willingness to engage the Iraqi government and the Coalition, even to the point of providing security at polling sites, but regarded that willingness as contingent upon the results of the election and the share that Sunnis received in the new government.[693]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ As with the referendum, the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** area took the lead with upwards of 200,000 votes.[694] This high turnout was the result of pressure on the general population from local mosques and imams to participate. Local elites had made agreements with all non-AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** groups to refrain from attacks on election day and "wait and see" whether or not the political process would provide real benefits for Anbaris.[695] Even so, some insurgents continued to carry out attacks on Coalition forces in order to obtain political concessions.[696]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite the absence of violence during the elections, the situation in Anbar was by no means stable. Tensions in Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.** were particularly high as local elites engaged in grandstanding against the anticipated election results, claiming that they had been "fooled" into participating by the Coalition. Many of them were, however, simply positioning themselves to negotiate concessions from the Iraqi government in return for their continued political participation.[697] Nationally, some Sunni parties and Allawi denounced what they argued had been elections rigged to favor the United Iraqi Alliance, while the Badr Corps and Mahdi Army were told to be ready to move if the election results did not correspond to what they believed the "correct" results of the voting should be.[698]

---

[691] Ibid.
[692] [| Military | 1.4c
[693] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051221 | 20051221 | ~~(S/MCFI)~~ |]
[694] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051216 | 20051216 | ~~(S/MCFI)~~ |]
[695] Ibid.
[696] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051226 | 20051226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[697] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051224 | 20051224 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[698] [| Military | TACTICAL FUSION CENTER: GRINTSUM 051222 | 20051222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(U) The October Constitutional referendum and the December national elections were a significant step for Iraq, and for Anbar Province. Still, insurgents roamed the province creating havoc and attempting to establish themselves in urban and rural areas.

Conclusion

(U) The year 2005 thus ended on an uncertain note. There had been many positive developments throughout the year: the participation of a significant percentage of the Sunni population in the elections, the division of the insurgency over political participation, the active support of the *Awqaf* on the side of the Coalition, the decision by at least some of the tribes that their interests coincided with those of the Coalition, and the serious disruption of AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** and affiliated insurgent networks in western Anbar. These events gave hope for the year to come.

(U) However, AQI**Error! Bookmark not defined.** had not been destroyed, its leadership and organization were still intact, and Zarqawi would now determine that AQI's very survival depended on taking desperate action to provoke the sectarian violence that could be its only salvation. Still, Zarqawi's stature with the AQSL was waning as they became increasingly concerned with his tactics and large-scale slaughter of other Sunnis.

Attack Data (September – December 2005)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the middle trimester (May to August 2005). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks**Error! Bookmark not defined.**) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

~~(S)~~ The attack levels during this period demonstrated a sustained peak from late September through early November, maintaining levels much higher than immediately before and after, and only surpassed previously by the incident rate during Fallujah II. This peak is coincident with SAYYAD II and Operation STEEL CURTAIN. The drop-off may be related to increased security efforts surrounding the December 2005 parliamentary elections. Though all attack types showed a similar pattern, there were particularly significant drop-offs of Indirect Fire and Complex Attacks after the peak period, and there were almost no Complex Attacks at all by the end of the year. The majority of attacks were taking place in AO Topeka during late 2005.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506





Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Complex Attacks





Insurgent Profile: 2005

~~(S/NF)~~ In 2005, the typical street-level insurgent captured in Anbar was an Iraqi male about 28 years old, much more likely to be married than to be unmarried, and educated at a high-school level or less. Most captured detainees were associated with tribes and had some military experience. These conclusions are based on an analysis of more than 5,500 tactical interrogation reports gathered from intelligence sources.

~~(S/NF)~~ Most insurgents captured in 2005 were 30 years old or younger (59.5%), with a significant group (9.9%) under 20 years old. The middle 50% of the population was between 23 and 36 years old. The fact that the median of 28 years is lower than the mean of 30.4 years confirms that the data is skewed younger and also indicates that the age range among older detainees has a large spread. The most common age among detainees was 23 years old.

~~(S/NF)~~ Almost all of the insurgents captured in 2005 claimed to be Iraqi (98.3%), with only 1.7% claiming to be of foreign origin. Of those foreigners, the most frequent origins named were Jordan**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Syria**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Kuwait**Error! Bookmark not defined.**, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

~~(S/NF)~~ The majority of detainees were associated with blue collar or other labor occupations. The most common occupation claimed was *shepherd* or *farmer* (21.6%), though the largest grouping of occupations was *blue collar workers* (23.9%), which included jobs like *electrician*, *carpenter*, and *laborer*. Though only 5.9% of detainees claimed to be actively unemployed, it is likely that many more detainees were actually unemployed but provided their previous job or training when asked their occupation. In addition, a noteworthy fraction of detainees (8.0%) were employed in positions of trust such as the Iraqi police or local security forces.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506



Figure 1: 2005 Street-Level Insurgent Profile ~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~

Approved for Release

~~(S/NF)~~ More than half of those captured in 2005 claimed to have some military experience (58.1%), while a portion of those that had not served were still students and were too young to have served in the military. This finding indicates that a large segment of the insurgent population had some form of prior military training, combat experience, and perhaps access to weapons.

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ At least three-quarters of those detained had no education beyond high-school, with nearly half (47.8%) having no more than an elementary education (6th grade or less). More than 14% had some post-secondary education or had completed a degree program.

~~(S/NF)~~ The tribe with the most captured members in 2005 was the Albu Eissa tribe. From January through July, Albu Eissa consistently had the most captured members, averaging almost 45 per month, though by the end of the year, the rate of capture decreased dramatically, averaging only 17 captured per month. During this latter part of the year, other tribes such as Jumayli and Albu Mahal were captured more frequently than Albu Eissa. Though these were the most frequent tribes claimed, there were many tribes well-represented, as only 60% of the detainees associated themselves with one of the top 20 tribes.

~~(S/NF)~~ By far, the most frequently claimed residence among detainees in 2005 was the Fallujah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** area, with more than 43% of detainees, compared to only 10% from Ramadi**Error! Bookmark not defined.**. This major spike likely was a result of the chaotic situation in Fallujah after the 2004 operations, allowing many people to claim Fallujah residence because of the difficultly in confirming that information. In particular, the Fallujah-area towns of Karmah (8.8%) and Amiriyah (5.6%) contained a large concentration of detainees. Other detainees came from Hadithah (9.1%), Al Qa'im / Husaybah**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (7.4%), Hit**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (5.9%) or from outside Anbar in Baghdad**Error! Bookmark not defined.** (4.4%), though this was somewhat limited.

~~(S/NF)~~ More than 60% of all detainees in 2005 claimed to be married, engaged, or widowed, though most detainees under 30 (68.4%) were still single. Almost all married detainees (91.5%) claimed to have children, but this data is unreliable. The need to support a family likely was a factor that led those with children to participate in the insurgency to receive larger financial gain than their regular jobs or while unemployed.

Approved for Release

Derived from: MCIA, Multiple Sources
Declassification on: 2028

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Chapter Six

AQI Dominates the Insurgency

(2006)

January to April

Introduction

(U) *The insurgency in Anbar suffered a major blow in late 2005. Operation SAYYAD II created a serious disruption of the AQI network in western Anbar that continued into 2006. This created an opportunity for many of the SAR insurgent and political groups that had energed in 2005 to seek political engagement with the Coalition under the direction of* (b)(6) *Nevertheless, AQI would regroup in early 2006, allowing it to shift tactics and target insurgent and tribal leaders favoring political negotiation. This strategy was so successful that AQI was able to completely recover from its losses the previous year to become the dominant insurgent group in Anbar.*

(U) *The success of AQI offered it a position of unparalleled power, but also threatened to dillute the group's Salafist focus and to make it difficult for the leadership to preserve the ideological integrity of the organization. AQI's murder and intimidation campaign also alienated a large number of Anbaris, providing opportunities for both the Coalition and the SAR insurgents. The death of Abu Musab Zarqawi bolstered these opportunities, but also allowed less volatile AQI leaders to rise to the fore within the organization, among them the group's new leader* (b)(6) (b)(6)

Political Progress in Anbar and AQI's Reaction (January-February 2006)

~~(S/NF)~~ The results of the December elections showed that Anbaris were willing to defy AQI intimidation to participate in the political process. The Independent Electoral Commission in Iraq (IECI) reported a jump in Sunni voter participation, with Anbar turnout increasing from 55% to 85%.[1] Anbaris in general seemed quietly concerned but hopeful about the value of the results of the December elections. The few protests that occurred in late December were staged by Anbari political leaders to position themselves for negotiations with Kurdish and Shi'a leaders over a national unity government.[2] Meanwhile, emerging elites in Ramadi, Baghdadi, Barwanah, Haqlaniyah, and al-Qaim now actively sought approval from the provincial council for the reestablishment of local governance and security efforts.[3]

~~(S/NF)~~ The IECI preliminary election results named nine representatives from Anbar, with seven from the Tawafuq Front and two from the Iraqi National Dialogue Front.[4] The Tawafuq Front was a coalition of the IIP, Iraqi People's Gathering, and Iraqi National Dialogue Council (not to be

[1] [| Military |060117 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[2] [| Military |060108 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[3] [| Military | 060111 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060111 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[4] [| Military | 060129 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

confused with the Iraqi National Dialogue Front mentioned in the previous sentence).[5] Later results released in late January gave the four Sunni political parties active in Anbar fifty-nine seats in the parliament, with the Tawafuq Front doing better than expected by taking forty-four seats.[6] As a result, the Shi'a majority UIA was forced to negotiate with the Sunnis and the Kurdish Alliance to form a coalition government and to begin work on revising the constitution. There was a muted response from Anbaris on these developments perhaps because of an underlying fear that 1.4b 1.4b Shi'a would now seek to drive Anbar's political agenda.[7]

~~(S/NF)~~ Prime Minister Jafari, U.S. Ambassador Khalilizad, and General Casey held a meeting with Governor Mamoun and prominent Ramadi sheikhs in mid-January, giving them a promise of $75,000,000 in reconstruction funding and approval to recruit Sunnis into the 7th Iraqi Army division. Fallujah had already been promised $75,000,000 in funding, so the additional money helped to mitigate rivalries between Fallujah and Ramadi elites and to raise Mamoun's status in Anbar. With this pledge of funding, Governor Mamoun was also able to resolve ongoing pay issues plaguing the Iraqi police throughout Anbar.[8] This served as a small milestone for Mamoun as he continued to press Baghdad for further support for his troubled province.

~~(S/NF)~~ In response to these developments, AQI carried out a series of attacks in Ramadi, Baghdad, Karbala, and Bayji intended to sabotage negotiations between the leaders working to form a national unity government. Al-Sharqiyah Television in Baghdad inadvertently fanned the flames by carrying news summaries of an "unprecedented security deterioration across Iraq" that influenced popular Iraqi perceptions of security, leading to open disputes between Allawi and Jafari over the failure of the Iraqi government to provide security.[9]

The Insurgency Reorganizes in Western Anbar

~~(S/NF)~~ In truth, while Operations SAYYAD II and STEEL CURTAIN killed more than 529 suspected AQI members and led to the detention of 1,584, it had not mortally wounded AQI.[10] The signal success of SAYYAD II lay in its destruction of major insurgent logistics networks, removal of experienced leaders, and diminishing of AQI's ability to influence the cities of western Anbar through murder and intimidation. These developments enabled tribal leaders and local Iraqi elites to

Approved for Release

---

[5] Ibid. The elected representatives from these groups were Iraqi National Dialogue Council secretary-general Khalaf Alayan Khalaf, former Sunni Endowment director (b)(6) (b)(6) The Iraqi National Dialogue Front was a splinter group of the Iraqi National Dialogue Council led by (b)(6) who broke away after a conflict with IIP over its support of the constitution referendum. Its two seats went to prominent Fallujah civic leader and former city council president Asa'ad Ibraheem Housen and Moustafa Mohamed Ameen Mohamed Ali.

[6] [| Military |060120 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060120 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

[7] [| Military |060120 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060120 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

[8] [| Military | 060115 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

[9] [| Military | 060109 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORM~~ | 20060109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

[10] [| Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] Among these losses were key commanders including AMZ lieutenant (b)(6) (b)(6)

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

regain influence over many of their cities and villages in western Anbar, allowing 57,000 citizens to vote in this region during the December 15, 2005 elections.[11]

~~(S/NF)~~ Even so, AQI remained active in the area, developing secondary routes to acquire weapons, funding, and personnel from Mosul and Tal Afar to reduce their reliance on western Anbar as a logistics hub.[12] Some AQI fighters from al-Qaim sought refuge in Khaffajiyah to avoid targeting by the Coalition as they fled southwards towards Haditha using unwatched roads.[13] Others reinforced the existing AQI presence in New 'Ubaydi, intimidating locals into allowing them to store weapons and conduct surveillance on Coalition and Iraqi forces in the area.[14] These fighters were led by AQI New (b)(6), who sought refuge in al-Badr village near al-Qaim following STEEL CURTAIN. (b)(6) taught AQI fighters to adapt to the continued Coalition presence in al-Qaim and to reorganize their leadership in order to regain some influence over the local population through murder and intimidation.[15]

~~(S/NF)~~ During this reorganization, AQI and their criminal allies had to change somewhat their methods for crossing the borders. Up to this point, the Baghuz border crossing had been a key facilitation node for the movement of foreign fighters and weapons. Because the Coalition now maintained bases near the border crossing, AQI fighters were forced to transit the area using the Umm Athnatain village, a small settlement 25 kilometers southeast of al-Qaim. This would become a key location for insurgent movement because of its remote location and proximity to al-Qaim and the villages between Ubaydi and Rawah.[16]

~~(S/NF)~~ Other border crossings not secured by Coalition presence were more amenable to insurgent and criminal activity. The Waleed and Trebil crossings, under the control of the Iraqi Interior Ministry, remained subject to corruption despite increases in security.[17] New directors and security forces were assigned to both crossings, but neither received adequate supplies or money from the ministry, which refused to support the efforts of the new directors to remove corrupt personnel.[18] Without pay from the central government, the incentives for criminal activity far exceeded the consequences of corruption. Trebil customs inspector (b)(6) was making so much money through corruption that he was able to provide funds to AQI leader (b)(6) and helped to smuggle vehicles across the 1.4b border.[19] By mid-January, officials at Waleed were helping foreign fighters to smuggle personnel and equipment between 1.4b and Iraq, receiving undisclosed amounts of money to let foreign fighters pass through checkpoints without being inspected.[20]

~~(S/NF)~~ Another result of the reorganization was more focus by AQI on towns like Rawah and Anah between al-Qaim and Haditha. (b)(6) served as the AQI amir for the Rawah-Anah

[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid.
[13] [| Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[14] [| Military | 06 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[15] [| Military | 060112 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[16] [| Military | 060117 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[17] [| Military | 060116 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[18] Ibid.
[19] [| Military | 060107 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[20] [| Military | 060117 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

corridor, producing IEDs and VBIEDs that are used by AQI throughout the al-Qaim area.[21] His subordinate (b)(6) oversaw AQI activity in Anah.[22] Under (b)(6) direction, AQI established an extremely effective murder and intimidation campaign that culminated in the February 17 assassination of Sheikh Nuri, the head of the city council. Despite AQI's obvious culpability, the group was able to convince residents that he had actually been poisoned by the Coalition.[23] The assassin was (b)(6) a deputy of (b)(6) (b)(6) who had been mistakenly released from Coalition detention on January 26 and returned to Anah to oversee the planting of IEDs in addition to helping run the city's murder and intimidation campaign.[24]

City Stories: The AQI Reorganization (January-February 2006)

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ While Operations SAYYAD II and STEEL CURTAIN shifted some influence away from AQI and towards the Coalition and the Iraqi government in western Anbar, the local situation varied greatly from town to town. One new phenomenon that held true throughout the province was pressure from residents on insurgent groups to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. Another new fact on the ground was that AQI had lost its previous influence in al-Qaim and, because of active Coalition and Iraqi patrols, was unable to use murder and intimidation to reassert its authority in the town.[25]

Rutbah

~~(S/REL TO USA, GBR, AUS, CAN, AND NZL)~~ AQI was, however, able to exploit the fractured local government and inadequate security in Rutbah to maintain a sizable presence, augmented by AQI fighters who fled to the city during Operation SAYYAD II.[26] The AQI leadership in the town was headed up by (b)(6), who had served as amir there since the days when AQI had been JTJ. (b)(6) facilitated AQI's regional connections through his ties in 1.4b which made him the ideal individual to aid the movement of foreign fighters. He also helped to fund the insurgency in Rutbah using smuggling, vehicle theft, carjacking and kidnapping rackets stretching from Rutbah to Ramadi. From Rutbah, AQI operatives were able to deploy suicide bombers and VBIEDs to attack targets as far away as al-Qaim and Ramadi.[27]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS GBR)~~ To rectify the situation in Rutbah, the Coalition carried out raids between January 1-8, detaining sixty-two insurgents including smuggler, drug trafficker, foreign fighter facilitator, and VBIED manufacturer (b)(6) and smuggler and car thief (b)(6).[8] Key AQI leaders fled to 1.4b or dispersed into the desert, allowing residents to engage with the Coalition for the first time in two months.

Approved for Release

---

[21] [| Military | 060121 GRINTSUM ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[22] [| Military | 060218 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060218 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[23] [| Military | 01 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[24] [| Military | 03 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060303 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[25] [| Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[26] [| Military | 060115 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[27] [| Military | 060118 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[28] [| Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The presence of Coalition forces in Rutbah prevented insurgents from reentering the town and disrupted their operations within the city.[29] A number of the AQI fighters who fled Rutbah attempted to reach Akashat, but they were turned away by a shootout with Albu Mahal tribesmen.[30] Other AQI fighters, led by (b)(6) hid in bedouin tents near Tabat.[31] AQI Rutbah amir (b)(6) fled all the way to Baghdad, where he was apprehended on February 3.[32]

Fallujah

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The situation in Fallujah was far better, since the insurgents were relatively weak and isolated due to a strong Coalition presence in Fallujah proper. This prevented large-scale attacks from occurring inside the city, but tensions remained between residents, the Coalition, and the Iraqi government, generally blamed on the slow compensation process for damages suffered during Operation AL FAJR and the high price and limited availability of fuel.[33]

~~(S/NF)~~ A significant weakening of the *'ulama* did create some security problems in Fallujah. The leading member of the *'ulama*, Sheikh Hamza Abbas (assassinated November 29), had pursued a moderate agenda of reconciliation and progress. City leaders believed that Sheikh Hamza's death, while unfortunate, would mobilize residents against the insurgency, but they badly misread the lasting damage stemming from the loss of the Sheikh. His successor, Sheikh Muhammad Mutlaq al-'Ubaydi, was forced to flee the country after insurgent intimidation, leaving Sheikh Ahmed al-Janabi to accept the position of mufti.[34] Sheikh Ahmed was unable to ease residents' fears of the insurgents, which disillusioned imams in Fallujah and led them to disengage from politics. The weakening of the 'ulama in Fallujah allowed AQI to increase activity in mosques and subvert moderate clerics, further demoralizing the religious establishment.[35]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ In addition to AQI (still led in Fallujah by former Umar Hadid lieutenant (b)(6) and Black Flags Group under (b)(6) several other groups including the 'Umar Brigade, Ansar al-Sunna, and the Tanzim Sayf al-Qa'ata were now active in the Fallujah area.[36] AQI fighters in Fallujah initiated a major campaign against suspected Coalition informants, posing as Coalition interpreters and telephoning suspected informants to confirm their cooperation.[37] If the suspected Iraqi "collaborator" admitted to cooperating with the Coalition, they were killed.[38]

Approved for Release

---

[29] [| Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[30] [| Military | 060126 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[31] [| Military | 060130 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; see also [| Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[32] [| Military | 060210 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060210 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[33] [| Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[34] A mufti is a member of the 'ulama who is empowered to right fatwas. In this case, it also means the leading member of the 'ulama in the city.
[35] [| Military |060113 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[36] [| Military | 02 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; [|Military | 060115 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[37] [| Military | 060114 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[38] [| Military | 060114 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Zaidon

~~(S/NF)~~ One of the top AQI facilitators in central Iraq, as well as the *de facto* head of AQI in Zaidon was (b)(6) The leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Zaidon and a prominent member of the Zoba tribe, (b)(6) had lost several relatives and an arm fighting the Coalition.[39] (b)(6) was able to use his ties to former IIS Chief of Staff Ahmad Ali Waelis to facilitate cooperation between former IIS officers and AMZ.[40] A number of his subordinates had Iraqi government contracts and used their contract money to support the insurgency. The AQI associate groups Jamaat Ali, Jamaat Abu 'Umar, and Jamaat Ajami that served the primary insurgent groups in Zaidon were controlled by (b)(6)[41] Ahl al-Sunna, an offshoot of Ansar al-Sunna, was also active in Zaidon.[42]

Saqlawiyah

~~(S/NF)~~ The AQI Saqlawiyah leader was (b)(6) whose force of foreign fighters was large enough to form their own groups and conduct independent operations without the assistance of locals.[43] The AQI associate group al-Hizb al-Salafi, also known to locals as al-Salafi al-Takfiri,[44] was made up of poor farmers who had gotten wealthy by intimidating the residents of near-by Dhiyabat.[45] Despite the presence of these insurgents, Saqlawiyah was relatively quiet, since many fighters and their facilitators lived in the city and did not wish to attract Coalition attention.[46] In early 2006 AQI fighters wearing Iraqi security uniforms began questioning Saqlawiyah residents about assisting the Coalition and killed them if their suspicions were confirmed. Followers of Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi maintained an insurgent network in Albu Shijil west of Saqlawiyah that engaged in kidnapping, murder, and propaganda with the support of the census bureau director and Black Flags leader (b)(6)[47]

Approved for Release

[39] [| Military | 060219 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060219 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[40] [| Military | 060219 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060219 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[41] [| Military | 060221 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[42] [| Military | 060223 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060223 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[43] [| Military | 03 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[44] "The Salafis who Excommunicate Other Muslims"
[45] [| Military | 060121 GRINTSUM ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[46] [| Military | 060119 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[47] [| Military |060204 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Amariyah, Karmah, and Ferris Town

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS GBR)~~ AQI remained active in Amariyah, Karmah, and Ferris Town despite Coalition presence in the three cities. The situation was the worst in Karmah, where AQI attacks on the police and the Coalition had left most local police too frightened to go to work.[48]

~~(S/NF)~~ Some insurgent cells in and around Karmah were motivated solely for profit rather than by ideology or nationalism. Members of these cells served as mercenaries for the head of AQI, (b)(6) (b)(6) who supplied them with money and weapons. Members of these mercenary cells were professionally competent but incapable of sustaining long-term operations. Using the small farms in and around Karmah, AQI was able to support a robust cell network capable of conducting attacks inside both Karmah and Fallujah.[49]

~~(S/NF)~~ The AQI associate group Swords of Truth was also based in Karmah but operated in Fallujah, Baghdad, Tikrit, and other Sunni cities in Iraq.[50] Primarily focused on kidnapping Westerners and Iraqis loyal to the government, its members included foreign fighters from 1.4b 1.4b in addition to Iraqis. Its IED, VBIED, and RPG training was conducted in concert with (b)(6) Death Company, another AQI associate group which operated in Anbar, but was based in Diyala. It was led by an amir named (b)(6) in Anbar and was essentially a criminal organization that had adopted religious rhetoric to add legitimacy to its activities.[51]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Coalition forces netted a major victory on January 30 with the capture of Green Battalion leader (b)(6) who had served as a founding member of the group.[52]

~~(S/NF)~~ In Amariyah, AQI manufactured IEDs to be used in carrying out attacks elsewhere in order to avoid detection. While the group continued to lack a solid foothold in Fallujah, it was now able operate more freely in the surrounding area.[53]

Hit

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The insurgency in Hit was very complex, with many fighters possessing the necessary military training, discipline, and capability to conduct coordinated attacks in the city. Using detailed terrain models and surveillance networks, they were also able to gather information on Coalition bases and activities.[54]

Approved for Release

[48] [| Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[49] [| Military | 060124 GRINTSUM ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[50] [| Military | 060115 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[51] [| Military | 060125 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[52] [| Military | 060130 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[53] [| Military | 060125 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[54] [| Military | 060110 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, AND GBR)~~ Saddam-era Hit mayor Abd al-Samad Muhammad served as an AQI financier who facilitated the movement of foreign fighters through Husaybah to Hit using his connections with 1.4b AQI, and Ansar al-Sunna.[55]

Khaladiyah

~~(S/NF)~~ The AQI-associate Ghazwan Group was the primary insurgent threat in Khalidiyah, targeting communications centers and cell phone towers.[56] The Ghazwan Group was a splinter faction of the Islamic Army of Iraq led by (b)(6) (b)(6).[57] It was made up primarily of Iraqis with a handful of foreign fighters from 1.4b serving in key leadership positions.[58] Their destruction of telecommunications networks in 2005 had shut down 17,500 phone lines in Ramadi and 3,000 in Khalidiyah.[59]

Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, GBR)~~ The government structures in these three cities were thoroughly penetrated by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members, who used their positions to support the insurgency and to undermine Coalition attempts to ameliorate the situation in their towns. While the Barwanah city council held several meetings with Coalition to promote a secure environment, many of the council members were AQI or Ansar al-Sunna members, and in some cases key leaders of these groups.[60] For instance Haqlaniyah mayor Jemal Salah Menazel and Barwanah mayor Fa'iq Ismail Mohammad were active dual members of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, establishing control of their cities through legitimate political channels to influence and promote their extremist agendas.[61]

~~(S/NF)~~ The same situation held in Haditha, where newly-elected Mayor Imad Jawad Hamza, a former staff colonel in the Iraqi air force, was now a member of Ansar al-Sunna. Haditha dam manager (b)(6) was a Wahhabi who supported the insurgency and worked to conceal the identity of insurgents and their supporters. Haditha city council members loyal to or intimidated by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna wanted the Coalition to keep its checkpoints in southern Haditha while moving all other checkpoints to the outskirts of the city and pulling its forces out of the K3 pumping station. This would confine the Coalition in those areas they did not regard as critical to the insurgency while keeping up the pretence of cooperation.[62]

~~(S/NF)~~ In late January, Coalition forces arrested Haqlaniyah mayor Jamal Salah Manzal for his involvement with AQI. The other AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members holding office in the Haditha

Approved for Release

[55] [| Military | 060206 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[56] [| Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[57] [| Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[58] [| Military | 07 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060407 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[59] [| Military | 060205 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[60] [| Military |02 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; Among these city council members was (b)(6) the head of Ansar al-Sunna in Barwanah. 060107 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~
[61] [| Military |060110 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[62] [| Military |060107 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

area declined to retaliate, preferring instead to expand their power base in the political elections scheduled to take place in late spring.[63] They also planned to create an Iraqi police force drawn from its members that could influence local decision-making by providing "peace and stability."[64]

~~(S/REL USA AND MCFI)~~ Other AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders in the Haditha area chose to remain in the outlying villages of Albu Hayat, Alus, Bahni Dahir, and Sakran under the command of (b)(6) a former Iraqi brigadier general who served as the amir for all AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha.[65] (b)(6) served as the day-to-day commander of AQI in Haditha, having assumed command following November 27 capture of (b)(6) (b)(6) rapid ascent through the AQI hierarchy from a low-level fighter at the beginning of December to the head of the group in the city by the end of January helps to illustrate the struggles AQI was forced to go through in order to rebuild its organization in Haditha following Operation SAYYAD II.[66]

Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ In early 2006, AQI reorganized itself to avoid being targeted by basing their leadership for the Ramadi area in the Jazira and by changing their patterns of movement.[67] AQI's (b)(6) (b)(6) meanwhile focused on pushing the group to higher forms of warfare. He worked to find steady sources of income —including donations from wealthy Iraqis — so that the insurgency would be internally financed, set up a quasi-military hierarchy; and began paying mercenaries per attack against the Coalition.[68] As a member of the AQI shari'ah committee, (b)(6) answered directly to AMZ and oversaw the activities of all AQI-affiliated groups in Ramadi.[69]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) did face at least one challenge. Operation STEEL CURTAIN had convinced several senior and mid-level AQI leaders to leave Ramadi for Baghdad. To compensate for their loss, AQI appointed younger and less experienced members of the group to succeed them. These commanders often lacked training and experience, but their appointment could not be questioned because they had been personally approved by the AQI *shura majlis*.[70]

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile the Abu Harun Group (led now by (b)(6) continued to operate in the Albu Ali Jasim and Albu Dhiab tribal areas of Ramadi. The leader of the group until (b)(6) release from prison, (b)(6) maintained an active presence in the group, exploiting his status as a former IIS officer with close ties to many former Ba'athists. He regularly met with (b)(6) the 1.4b former respective heads of the

Approved for Release

[63] [| Military | 060122 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[64] [| Military | 060111 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060111 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[65] [| Military | 02 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[66] [| Military | 060123 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060123 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[67] [| Military | 060107 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[68] [| Military | 03 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] ; [| Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[69] [|Military | 03 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[70] [| Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Iraqi army missile program and the IIS directorate for Anbar. The Abu Harun Group has as their direct head AQI leader (b)(6) who answered to (b)(6) (b)(6) while operational command of the group in Ramadi was divided between (b)(6) (b)(6) who oversaw the Albu Dhiab area and (b)(6) who oversaw the Albu Ali Jasim area. The group's financial network was run by (b)(6) who owned the gas station where the funds received from the group's 1.4b FRE and 1.4b intelligence financiers were dispersed.[71]

~~(S/NF)~~ While leader of the Group, (b)(6) had created a well-structured organization with excellent operational security. His support network consisted of two groups, each of which would retain the ability to reinforce the other in the event of a major push against his organization. As a result, (b)(6) was able to evade Coalition raids and train his subordinates to assume leadership in his absence.[72] In 2005 (b)(6) frequently traveled to a terrorist training camp in Dayr al-Zawr, 1.4b but with the successes of Coalition operations in western Anbar in late 2005, he evidently decided to create a new camp for use by his group near Lake Thar Thar.[73]

~~(S/NF)~~ Other insurgent groups with ties to AQI included Saraya al-Tha'r, led by (b)(6) (b)(6)), who worked for (b)(6) second-in-command (b)(6)[4] Ta'if al-Mansura was based south of Lake Thar Thar[75] and led by (b)(6)[6] Meanwhile, former IIS officer (b)(6) continued to recruit and finance a variety of insurgent groups in Ramadi, acting as the primary conduit between local groups and the 1.4b insurgent financier Sheikh Abdul Latif Humayem al-Kharbit.[77]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI was concerned too about maintaining religious authority for the group. When the 1920 Revolution Brigade kidnapped (b)(6), AQI's mufti for the Tamim and Qatana districts, (b)(6) was immediately promoted to take his position, providing a continuity of leadership for religious advice and fatwas.[78]

~~(S/NF)~~ The lives of these two muftis strikingly illustrates how fluid were the boundaries between supposedly secular Ba'athists and the new Islamists who dominated the insurgency in Anbar. (b)(6) (b)(6) had been a former Iraqi military officer before serving as an Islamic Studies teacher at the al-Sadoon School.[79] (b)(6) was a member of the Ba'ath Party who converted to Wahhabism

[71] [| Military | 060126 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[72] Ibid.
[73] [| Military | 060113 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 060126 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[74] [| Military | 060117 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[75] As in 2005, the area around the southern end of Lake Thar Thar was used to train and facilitate a variety of insurgent groups, housing a large number of safe houses, arms caches, training facilities, and holding areas for hostages. It was considered attractive for insurgent groups because the desert area was laced with poorly mapped and unimproved roads to a series of chicken farms with unobstructed views of all nearby avenues of approach by Coalition forces. [| Military |060122 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[76] [| Military | 060211 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060211 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[77] [| Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[78] [| Military | 060112 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[79] [| Military | 060125 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and now served as both religious and military leader of AQI members recruited from his Marrawi tribe.[80] Meanwhile, (b)(6) (b)(6), a Ba'athist (b)(6) who had been installed by Saddam as deputy mayor of Hit remained loyal to the Ba'ath Party and cooperated with AQI under orders from (b)(6) (b)(6).[81]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Insurgent booklets captured on January 26 during a cordon-and-knock operation in Ramadi demonstrated AQI's seamless integration of war and religion. The booklets contained after-action comments, lessons learned, and instructions for successful operations written in the form of moral admonitions. Poor behavior to be avoided included bragging about attacks, cutting off supplies to other insurgents, not properly accounting for weapons and supplies, taking credit for attacks carried out by others, improper mortar training, infighting, arguing about the legitimacy of jihad, and nepotism. Recommended targeting included not only Coalition troops, military bases, staging areas, and contractors, but also criminals, television stations, cinemas, clubs, liquor stores, whorehouses, internet cafes, music stores, adult stores, and Masons.[82]

AQI Absorbs More Insurgent Groups

~~(S/NF)~~ The close relationship between AQI and other insurgent groups in Ramadi was reflected in the Anbar insurgency as a whole. In late 2005 Ansar al-Sunna and AQI apparently came to an understanding to cooperate in certain areas. In Hit this cooperation was formalized by a December 2005 agreement between the local leaderships of the two groups under which Ansar al-Sunna would seek AQI's permission before conducting attacks.[83] In Fallujah the Ansar al-Sunna cell was also loyal to AQI. This cell would provide $300,000 in funding from (b)(6) a senior aide to AMZ, to a new group called al-Fursan Brigade (the Knights Brigade), whose leader (b)(6) (b)(6) was headquartered in Bayji.[84] The Haditha-based Ansar al-Sunna, which controlled a stolen car ring, had an agreement with AQI that would allow AS to keep the proceeds of the sales. However, local AQI leaders soon began feuding with their Ansar al-Sunna counterparts over the disbursement of the money.[85]

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in Karmah further illustrated the complex interaction between AQI and other groups that defined the state of the insurgency in early 2006. Throughout 2005, there had been infighting between pro- and anti-AQI factions of various insurgent groups—particularly the Green Battalion. By the end of 2005, (b)(6) had won out with the help of (b)(6) (a member of the 'Umar Brigade), persuading a number of senior Green Battalion members to join AQI and the 'Umar Brigade.[86] One of these members, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

[80] [| Military | 060112 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]. (b)(6) had been operating in the al-Tash refugee camp since December when the Kurdish refugees who had settled in al-Tash were successfully relocated to northern Iraq.
[81] [| Military | 060112 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[82] [| Military | 060212 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060212 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[83] [| Military | 03 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060303 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[84] [| Military | 060126 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[85] [| Military | 060208 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[86] [| Military | 060213 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060213 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

although not an AQI member now expanded his operations to Baghdad and Samarra at (b)(6) behest.[87]

~~(S/NF)~~ The success of (b)(6) was due in part to a crucial decision by the new leader of the Green Battalion, (b)(6) replaced (b)(6) after the latter's capture in May 2005 and decided to align his group with the Islamic Army of Iraq. This decision created a problem, since IAI was under the command of (b)(6) a member of Parliament and the head of a political party.[88] As part of his political engagement, (b)(6) had decided to turn some of his guns on AQI, forcing Green Battalion members to fight both AQI and the Coalition. Many members were unhappy with this state of affairs, enabling AQI to appeal to them to leave (b)(6) and fight for them.[89]

~~(S/NF)~~ The tension between AQI and local insurgents in Karmah was affected by Sheikh Khamis Jasim Dewichat al-Halbusi, the imam of the al-Kabir mosque. Although a Wahhabi cleric who supported local Karmah insurgents in 2004, Sheikh Khamis was a critic of AQI who was angered by their killing of Karmah police and who had worked with tribal leaders to mobilize voters in an effort to influence the December 15 elections.[90]

~~(S/NF)~~ In Ramadi, AQI gained a major victory in early 2006 when it successfully persuaded (b)(6) one of the top IED experts in the 1920 Revolution Brigade, to break with (b)(6) and form the AQI associate group Abdallah bin Malik Brigade, bringing his second-in-command (b)(6) and explosives experts (b)(6) and (b)(6) Following his defection from (b)(6), AQI promoted (b)(6) to the rank amir and granted him authority over the Abu Harun Group.[91]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) defection led to a renewed effort by the 1920 Revolution Brigade to maintain its status and legitimacy as an insurgent organization, with its leaders holding a series of arguments with local AQI leaders at mosques over the morality of attacks that harmed Sunnis. As one of the highest-ranking 1920 defectors, (b)(6) often took part in these debates.[92]

~~(S/NF)~~ The 1920 Revolution Brigade was not the only insurgent group that suffered defections to AQI. Believing that (b)(6) through defections and infiltration had become nothing more than a section of AQI, former JM members created a new group, Jaysh al-Khalas to carry on their fight.[93]

Internationalizing the Conflict

Approved for Release

[87] [| Military | 060107 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[88] [| Military | 060129 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[89] [| Military | 060213 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060213 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[90] [| Military | 04 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060104 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[91] [| Military | 060110 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[92] [| Military | 060111 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060111 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[93] [| Military | 060113 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Perhaps encouraged by the growth in his organization's relative strength, AMZ had advanced plans by January 2006 to use his followers, particularly those from Ramadi, to carry out attacks beyond Iraq's borders, with special emphasis on 1.4b [94] As we shall see, one reason that AMZ was able to pursue international goals independent of AQSL was that his group was now financially self-sufficient in Anbar.[95]

~~(S/NF)~~ AMZ-related plots in 1.4b 1.4b To target airports in 1.4b AMZ attempted to recover SAM missiles that he believed had been buried in the Iraqi desert. On January 9, nine AQI fighters were infiltrated into 1.4b to await a suitable opportunity to carry out attacks. This effort may have been related to planning by an AQI associated Salafist group in Ramadi, which hoped to carry out attacks on the U.S., 1.4b embassies in 1.4b during the Eid al-Adha (January 10-13) using VBIEDs and missiles.[96]

Developments within the Iraqi Security Forces

(U) All of this activity was helped by the uncertain condition of the Iraqi police and army. With the fall of Saddam, police recruiting, training, and oversight had been left at the local level for several years, creating an uneven state of affairs. Some towns, such as Baghdadi, managed to create and maintain a relatively effective police force, while others suffered from perennial problems with corruption, insurgent infiltration, and susceptibility to murder and intimidation campaigns.

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI penetration of the police was quite advanced in places like Rawah and Rutbah. Corrupt Iraqi police officer and former IIS officer (b)(6) served as AMZ's operations chief in Rawah, using his position to influence the local outcome of the December elections through bribes and threats.[97] The Rutbah police also assisted AQI in its activities, providing the group with information that could be used to target pro-Coalition police. Many police even went as far as to kidnap and torture their fellow officers for AQI. As a result, the remaining police were considered complicit in the insurgency by residents.[98]

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, GBR)~~ The situation in Fallujah was slightly different. The city's police chief was Brigadier General Salah, a professional police officer but an outsider in Fallujah who was aware of his limitations and was forced to cooperate with local leaders to maintain their support and stability. As a result, he allowed himself to be influenced by former Fallujah city council chairman Sheikh Khalid and city council member Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Dafar to release captured insurgents who were of interest to them.[99] Sheikh Sattar also screened applicants for the Fallujah police, hiring

Approved for Release

[94] [| Military | 060109 GRINTSUM - NOFORM | 20060109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[95] [| Military | 060116 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] In an effort to show that he was still subordinate to the central leadership, AMZ dispatched a number of select Iraqi AQI members to Afghanistan as a sort of tribute to Usama bin Ladin. [| Military | 060109 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[96] [| Military |060116 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[97] [| Military | 060203 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[98] [| Military | 060131 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 200060131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[99] [| Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Salafists to work for the Ministry of Defense intelligence unit in the city and regularly arriving at the Fallujah police station to personally order the release of detainees.[100]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ A massive bombing near the glass factory in Ramadi on January 5, 2006 would persuade some locals, including several imams, to support the recruitment of police and other security efforts.[101] Police recruits had lined up outside the factory in hopes of gainful employment when a suicide bomber set off his explosives, killing thirty-one and injuring seventy. In the aftermath of the bombing, the recruits returned to the line and 142 were accepted for training. The attack was denounced by influential elites and ordinary citizens alike, with al-Sharqiyah Television even going so far as to refer to the slain police as "martyrs," a term with profound implications in Islamic theology. Even so, the poor economic situation in the city meant that those Ramadi police who signed up were paid infrequently, leading in January to a threat of mass resignation by the force.[102]

Tribal Developments and the Anbar People's Committee

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in the official police forces was connected to a larger struggle between the Coalition and AQI over the loyalty of the tribes in Anbar, and here developments throughout 2006 would provide some of the most encouraging news for the Coalition. Many of the recruits who were killed or wounded during the attack outside the Ramadi glass factory came from the Albu Nimr tribe[103] In response to the bombing, the Albu Nimr declared *tha'r* (blood vengeance) against the perpetrators. The Coalition had been in talks with this tribe since December to take part in Iraqi police recruiting and the bombing led Albu Nimr sheikhs to nominate recruiters for the Desert Protector Force, Iraqi army, and local police forces in western Anbar. Albu Nimr tribesmen also joined the Iraqi security forces and anti-insurgent paramilitaries in and around Hit where they fought both insurgent and criminal activity.[104]

~~(S/NF)~~ It would be unrealistic, however, to describe the entire Albu Nimr tribe as "pro-Coalition." Of the 20-25,000 Albu Nimr tribesmen, loyalty varied greatly from subtribe to subtribe, with many sheikhs maintaining ties to former Ba'athists. The al-Gaoud subtribe of the Albu Nimr, led by former governor Faisal al-Gaoud, was by far the most supportive of the Coalition.[105]

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile, many Albu Mahal tribesmen of the now defunct Hamza Battalion also sought employment in the Iraqi police and the Desert Protectors with the support of Sheikh Sabbah and Sheikh Osama Ja'adan al-Karbuli.[106] In al-Qaim and Husaybah Albu Mahal Hamza Battalion members made up a majority of the 314 recruits for the police while the larger Karbuli tribe from Karabilah only constituted 1%.[107]

Approved for Release

---

[100] [| Military | 060107 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[101] [| Military | 06 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[102] [| Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[103] [| Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[104] Many Albu Nimr tribesmen understood how to battle an underground force, having been forced to become one themselves after 1995 when Saddam Hussein declared their tribe outcasts, forcing them to survive on smuggling and organized crime. [| Military | 060112 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[105] Ibid.
[106] [| Military | 03 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[107] [| Military | 060109 GRINTSUM – NOFORM | 20060109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Other tribes held positions that were more ambiguous. For instance, the Albu 'Ubayd tribe in Baghdadi was split between pro- and anti-Coalition tribesmen. Those who supported the Coalition were either employed in some fashion at Al Asad Airbase or worked for the unofficial Baghdadi police (their existence had not been sanctioned by the interior ministry).[108] Actions by AQI would, however, soon force 'Ubaydis out of their ambivalent stance and into a more pro-Coalition position.

~~(S/NF)~~ On January 1, (b)(6) hosted a meeting of tribal sheikhs and Ramadi elites at the home of Sheikh Salah Dari Numan al-'Ubaydi to discuss the creation of an Anbar People's Committee (the evolutionary descendant of the earlier Ramadi Shura Council) to represent Anbari tribes to the Iraqi government on issues ranging from security to social services. (b)(6) had planned for these organizations to operate parallel to the existing government and to form the nucleus of an all-Sunni Iraqi army and police units under his direction.[109]

~~(S/NF)~~ More than seventy tribal leaders, technocrats, former military officers, and insurgent leaders attended this meeting.[110] Soon afterwards, (b)(6) hosted Anbari tribal leaders for another meeting of the Committee to elect members to serve on the subcommittee that would work with the provincial government on security issues.[111] Six sheikhs were chosen to represent the Albu 'Ubayd, the Albu Aetha, the Albu Fahd, the Albu Alwan, the Albu Risha, and the Albu Khalifa tribes.[112] Former Iraqi general Muhammad Sa'ab Manfi al-Rawi hosted a group of sixty former or retired Iraqi army officers in the Hay al-Dhubat district of Ramadi to discuss possible security initiatives, with a group of elected officers then elected to serve as members of the security subcommittee.[113] During a January 8 meeting of Governor Mamoun and the provincial council, security council member (b)(6) introduced (b)(6) and requested his inclusion and that of the Anbar People's Committee's security subcommittee within the provincial security council.[114]
~~(S/NF)~~ This engagement led to more than 1,000 prospective police recruits arriving at the Ramadi glass factory from January 2-4 to enlist in the Iraqi police. Of the 921 who were screened by the Coalition, 619 were eventually cleared for recruitment.[115]

All Quiet out West?

~~(S/NF)~~ In early 2006, residents of western Anbar enjoyed a more peaceful environment then they had during 2005, though they continued to trust filial and tribal ties to resolve disputes before turning to the Coalition or the Iraqi government.[116] Because AQI had murdered various prominent

Approved for Release

[108] [| Military | 060115 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[109] Ibid.
[110] [| Military | 03 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[111] [| Military | 06 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[112] [| Military | 060112 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[113] [| Military | 06 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[114] [| Military | 060112 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[115] [| Military | 03 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[116] [| Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

sheikhs, the Albu Nimr, Albu Julib, and Karabilah tribes were now openly anti-AQI. To counter this tribal threat, AQI and its associate groups began formal cooperation with the Ba'ath Party in western Anbar.[117]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ While some Iraqi tribal engagement with the Coalition was exaggerated, such as the claim by Sunni tribesmen in Karabilah that they had captured 270 AQI (including 200 foreign fighters from 1.4b, other efforts were more genuine. Thus the self-declared Baghdadi police based, as we have seen, on the 'Ubaydi tribe, managed to successfully apprehend AQI (b)(6)[118]

~~(S/NF)~~ Coalition operations carried out in early January made it more difficult for AQI to operate in Rutbah and many members were forced to seek refuge in 1.4b or in outlying villages.[119] AQI leader (b)(6) for instance, fled Rutbah for Abu Tiban, a small village southeast of Hit near Muhammadi.[120]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite these challenges AQI fighters in the Hit-Baghdadi corridor continued to conduct sporadic attacks on the Coalition and AQI was able to intimidate residents in Jubbah, Baghdadi, Mysriyah, and Muhammadi who supported the Iraqi police and their municipal government.[121]

(b)(6) vs. AQI

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) was now able to enlist the help of these new allies to fight alongside his 1920 Revolution Brigade, in order to drive AQI fighters out of Ramadi and to foment sentiment against foreign fighters. This enabled him to carve out a solid power base stretching from Ramadi to the Hit-Haditha corridor and into Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah. His ability to achieve a similar success in Fallujah was, however, weakened by the fact that many 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters in the area had been absorbed into AQI during the insurgent infighting over the summer of 2005.[122]
~~(S/NF)~~ Intent on dismantling (b)(6) political initiative, AMZ had his Shari'ah Committee issue a *fatwa* calling for the death of every Ramadi sheikh participating in the Anbar People's Committee. AMZ had recently reconfigured the AQI Shura Council to give himself more direct control over the legal decisions issued by the Shari'ah Committee, a move that was controversial, but very useful in situations like this fight with a fellow devout Muslim like (b)(6)[123]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ AQI and Ansar al-Sunna now stepped up attacks on Iraqi police recruits and prominent Anbaris. Fighters from as far afield as al-Qaim, Fallujah, and Diyala reinforced Ramadi's outlying Tamim district, already an AQI stronghold, to take part in the fight with (b)(6) AQI fighters wearing Coalition uniforms roamed the Albu Faraj, Albu Fahd, Albu Ubayd, and Albu

Approved for Release

[117] [| Military | 060212 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060212 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[118] [| Military | 060128 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[119] Ibid.
[120] [| Military |060202 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[121] [| Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[122] [| Military | 060111 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060111 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[123] [| Military | 060119 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Maraj tribal areas, targeting sheikhs, imams, technocrats, and Iraqi military personnel for assassination and counteracting positive perceptions of the Coalition.[124]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI and local fighters were able to carry out two complex attacks against the Ramadi Government Center and Coalition bases using IDF, SAF, RPGs, and VBIEDs on January 20-21. Whereas previous attacks of this scale had created anti-Coalition sentiment in frightened residents seeking to avoid violence, there was little response to these attacks since the violence was widely perceived as a test of wills between the local 1920 Revolution Brigade and the less popular but more powerful AQI.[125]

The Mujahideen Shura Council

~~(S/NF)~~ AQSL was well-aware of the declining popularity of AQI and placed pressure on AMZ to put an "Iraqi face" on the insurgency. On January 10 AQI announced the creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council to serve as an umbrella organization for SRE groups under the command of (b)(6).[126] A former Ba'athist interior ministry official under Saddam Hussein, (b)(6) had reportedly facilitated AMZ's entry into Iraq from 1.4b at the 1.4b border crossing in 2002.[127] According to the announcement, the Mujahideen Shura Council member groups consisted of AQI, Jaish Ta'if al-Mansura, Jaish al-Sunnah, Ansar al-Tawhid, Islamic Jihad Brigades, and the al-Ghuruba Brigade. The creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council, which led to a reduced role for AMZ, was a reaction to complaints from both AMZ lieutenants and AQSL that AMZ had created a cult of personality and that AQI had become too isolated to form a united Islamist front in Iraq.[128]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ In reaction to the creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council, the Iraqi daily *Al Sabah* reported that six Ramadi insurgent groups had decided to pool their efforts against AQI, declaring that they had no relationship with AMZ or his foreign fighters and would fight them in support of local politicians. This declaration was a result of the efforts of the tribal sheikhs and imams in the Anbar People's Committee as part of their pursuit of political engagement rather than violence with the Iraqi government and the Coalition.[129] The six groups referenced by *Al Sabah* were almost certainly the Islamic Movement of Mujahideen, the Islamic Army of Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the al-Nu'man Brigade, Jaysh Muhammad, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen, the national leadership of which opposed AQI to varying degrees in Ramadi and Fallujah.[130]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) outreach efforts and AMZ's brutality even created the potential for fractures within AQI. Throughout January 2006, meetings were held in Baghdad and Fallujah between Jaysh Muhammad and dissident leaders of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna to discuss ways to rid Iraq of AMZ's influence. From the example of Abu Ghraib, they concluded that negotiating directly with the

Approved for Release

[124] Ibid.
[125] [| Military | 060121 GRINTSUM ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[126] [| Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[127] [| Military | 12 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060412 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[128] [| Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[129] Ibid.
[130] [| Military | 060129 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ |20060129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Coalition would not be productive, making (b)(6) and the Anbar People's Committee their only option.[131] Jaysh Muhammad convinced the dissidents to hold meetings with members of the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in the al-Dura district of Baghdad, where the groups discussed a way to negotiate a peaceful end to the insurgency with their power base intact.[132]

AQI Attacks the Anbar People's Committee and Anti-AQI Tribes

~~(S/NF)~~ In an effort to counter-act political progress in Anbar by (b)(6) and those tribes that were turning against AMZ, AQI mounted a major murder and intimidation campaign against them to prevent serious engagement with the Coalition.[133] Many of their targets were members of (b)(6) Albu Fahd tribe that had been so instrumental in pre- and post-election security in Ramadi and now formed the core of the Anbar People's Committee. Among the more prominent killings:

- In late December, AQI operative (b)(6) began kidnapping, torturing, and murdering children from the Albu Affan School.[134]
- On December 20, AQI killed AMS member Hamid Ayash al-Alwani, a friend of (b)(6) who served as the spiritual leader and day-to-day commander of the 1920 Revolution Brigade.[135]
- In early January, al-Zobai tribesmen loyal to AQI mortared a number of villages, including al-Ta'us, that were suspected of cooperating with the Coalition.[136]
- On January 1, Sheikh Ibrahim N'aif Mishan of the Albu Aetha was kidnapped by AQI fighters from the Albu Ubayd tribe who did not agree with his support for the elections. Sheikh Ibrahim was a lieutenant of (b)(6) ally Sheikh Nasser Fahdawi, who had been instrumental in the formation of a militia in the Sufia district of Ramadi to support the December elections.[137]
- On January 5, AQI fighters from the Albu Faraj tribe kidnapped Sheikh Khamis al-Fahdawi. In retaliation, the Albu Fahd kidnapped seven Albu Faraj tribesmen including an AQI financier. AQI responded by murdering Sheikh Khamis's brother Walid, leading to tribal warfare between the Albu Fahd and the Albu Faraj tribes.[138]
- Around January 6, (b)(6) deputy, Albu Fahd tribal leader, and Anbar University professor Dr. Hamid al-Faysal was assassinated by AQI fighters from the Albu Faraj tribe. A number of rank-and-file members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade also were killed by AQI as they attempted to join the Iraqi police.[139]

Approved for Release

[131] [| Military | 060127 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[132] [| Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[133] [| Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[134] [| Military | 060109 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[135] [|Military | 060122 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[136] [| Military | 060109 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[137] [| Military | 01 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[138] [| Military | 05 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[139] [| Military | 06 Jan 06 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

- On January 8, Iraqi army major Faraj Yas Hammadi was killed by AQI operative (b)(6) (b)(6) for failure to end his support for the Coalition or to resign his position.[140]
- On January 14, (b)(6) associate and prominent IIP member Sheikh 'Abd al-Ghafar al-Rawi was dragged from the Shafi al-Kabir mosque in the Tamim district of Ramadi and murdered by AQI members wearing stolen American military uniforms. Sheikh 'Abd al-Ghaffar was a member of the clerics' subcommittee of the Anbar People's Committee and his death damaged (b)(6) ability to get backing for his goal of establishing provincial security.[141]
- On January 16, AQI murdered Sheikh Nasser Abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi, the leader of the Albu Fahd tribe, in the Sufia district of Ramadi. Sheikh Nasser was a prominent tribal leader in Ramadi who was both respected and influential at the highest echelons of Anbari society. He was a key member of (b)(6) Anbar People's Committee who had served as a driving force to improve security in the provincial capital. Because the Albu Fahd tribe is large and divided into many factions and subtribes, AQI used a fighter from the Albu Fahd to eliminate him. Sheikh Nasser's (b)(6) assumed leadership of the tribe upon his death.[142]
- On January 18, AQI killed al-Nu'man Brigade leader Sheikh Muhammad Sadaq al-Battah Albu Chulayb, the head of the Albu Chulayb tribe, along with his nephew and an Iraqi National Intelligence employee in an apartment in the Bayaa district of southern Baghdad. Sheikh Sadaq was a relative of Iraqi Defense Minister Sadoun al-Dulaymi and was en route to a meeting of the Anbar People's Committee at the time of the murder. Sheikh Sadaq was also a key member of (b)(6) inner circle and the chairman of the defense subcommittee of the Anbar People's Committee. (b)(6) wanted to use the Anbar People's Committee to attack AQI following the killing of Sheikh Nasser and Sheikh Sadaq, but the rest of the Committee was too afraid to do so and the sheikhs insisted on only working on pre-arranged topics and tasks.[143]
- On February 7, AQI assassinated the well-regarded Fallujah city council chairman Sheikh Kamal Shakir al-Nazal.[144] Following the assassination, several local politicians and technocrats pulled back from dealing with the Coalition.

~~(S/NF)~~ The killing of Sheikh Nasser Abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi was a decisive blow against the Anbar People's Committee. Sheikh Nasser was a major player in Anbar and his death prompted many senior members of the Committee to withdraw from public view for their own safety. Neither (b)(6) 1920 Revolution Brigade nor the personal security measures taken by senior members of the Committee had been enough to stop AQI from murdering its leadership, leaving (b)(6) unable or unwilling to mount an effective counter-attack.[145]

Approved for Release

[140] [| Military | 060108 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[141] [| Military | 060114 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[142] [| Military | 060116 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[143] [|Military | 060118 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[144] [| Military | 060207 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[145] [| Military | 060122 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ These killings were not random acts of violence but rather part of a deliberate campaign of targeted assassination by AQI. An internal report on the assassination campaign to the AQI *shura majlis* was recovered on a thumb drive by the Coalition in February 2006. The document described the group's plan to destroy the Anbar People's Committee and its status to date by detailing the killing of several sheikhs including Sheikh Nasser. According to the author of the document, these killings had resulted in several sheikhs rescinding their pledges of cooperation with the Coalition for fear of assassination. The document concluded by submitting a detailed list of recommended additional targets including (b)(6) the leadership of the Albu Nimr and Albu Khalifa tribes, and Lieutenant General Muhammad Sa'ab Manfi al-Rawi.[146]

AQI Moves on Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's successful targeting of Anbari tribal elites created a threat to both local security and the political process, making residents less open to the Coalition and creating more freedom of movement and action for the group. AQI used this opportunity to build up its forces in Ramadi, putting even more fighters into the Tamim district.[147] This expansion was financed in part by AQI member (b)(6) who funneled money from a 1.4b NGO based near the al-Mustafa hospital in Ramadi to support the insurgency. The head of the NGO in Iraq was AQI member Abu 'Umar, who regularly drove to 1.4b to receive regular payments of $5,000.[148]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the end of January 2006 AQI spread its fighters from the Tamim district into the 5 Kilo, Sufia, Julaybah, Albu Ubayd, and Albu Bali areas of Ramadi.[149] To support the influx of fighters, AQI set up levies to recruit military-aged males in Fallujah and Ramadi from allied tribes.[150] Those recruited in the Fallujah area were sent to Ramadi to fight.

~~(S/NF)~~ The expansion of AQI in Ramadi set off another round of defections for (b)(6) foremost among them was the Khalidiyah 1920 Revolution Brigade leader Muhammad Ayid Fayath, who joined AQI to exercise greater influence over the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah corridor.[151] Another important defection was (b)(6) the accounting manager of the Anbar Provincial Government Center, who had supported 1.4b financially, but in early 2006 switched to giving funds to AQI.[152]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) and his allies in 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Albu Fahd tribe continued however, to fight AQI. Led by Sheikh Nasser's brother (b)(6) some of these allies killed three members of the Albu Ali al-Hamad subtribe of the Albu Fahd on the suspicion that they had assisted in the killing of Sheikh Nasser.[153] On January 28, the Fahdawis killed

Approved for Release

---

[146] [| Military | 060221 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[147] [| Military | 060122 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060122| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[148] [| Military | 060127 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[149] [| Military | 060123 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060123 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; see also [| Military | 060124 GRINTSUM ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[150] [| Military | 060131 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[151] [| Military | 060128 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[152] [| Military | 060129 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[153] [| Military | 060129 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

four AQI members in a drive-by shooting, among them the group's Malaab district amirs Abd al-Fatah and Muzhir. These efforts, ordered by Sheikh Khamis, were overseen by Saddam-era General Thumayl Jarbawi al-Fahdawi, who had garnered support from the Albu Fahd tribe to drive all insurgents (i.e. all those not supporting the Anbar People's Committee) from Ramadi.[154] Meanwhile the residents of the Albu Thiyab al-Thanya district formed a militia to keep AQI from exerting influence over their area.[155]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI reacted to this resistance by destroying the home of Sheikh Anwar Abd al-Razzaq al-Kharbit in an effort to intimidate his anti-AQI militia into disbanding.[156] The attack had the intended result and the Sufia militia promptly disbanded after an AQI threat stating that it would kill imams and tribal leaders in the district if the militia refused to comply. With the militia defeated, AQI began attacking its one-time ally Jaysh al-Haqq because of its support for a political solution to the insurgency.[157]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ Another target for AQI was (b)(6) and his family, who had purportedly swindled the group out of $1,600,000 (by his account, it was only $1,160,000).[158] (b)(6) was a member of the (b)(6) which provided the leadership of the Green Battalion, and had been entrusted by AQI to act as a courier to Hajji Hamadi in Karmah in January 2006. This was an attempt at cooperation between the two warring groups, but (b)(6) decided to keep the money for himself, thus severing cooperation between the two groups until his (b)(6) to repay their father's debts.[159]

Approved for Release

[154] [| Military | 060130 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[155] [| Military | 060201 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060201 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[156] [| Military | 060130 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[157] [| Military | 060131 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[158] [| Military | 060201 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060201 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[159] [| Military | 060219 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ |20060219 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

AQI Triumphant in Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ By the beginning of February, AQI had become the preeminent insurgent group in Ramadi. The 1920 Revolution Brigade had been completely defeated, with its remnants concentrated in the Tamim and Sufia districts of Ramadi. (b)(6) and his second-in-command (b)(6) (b)(6) were both forced to flee Ramadi to escape assassination.[160] Perhaps in recognition of his success in the city—or as a way to secure the religious life of Ramadi— Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) member (b)(6) the overall AQI amir for Anbar, shifted (b)(6)

(~~S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR~~) With AQI's victory in Ramadi, there began a gradual shift in the dynamics of many cities in western Anbar away from the optimism following Operation SAYYAD II toward a neutral stance between the insurgency and the Coalition. AQI fighters returned in force to Karabilah, Haditha, southeastern Hit, and Albu Hyatt, where they established a strong insurgent presence through murder and intimidation.[162] AQI's renewed efforts in western Anbar were aided by the release of former AQI amir (b)(6) from Abu Ghraib. (b)(6) immediately rejoined the group and used his experience at intimidating locals to bolster AQI morale and recruiting efforts by telling them that they had nothing to fear from Coalition detention.[163]

~~(S/NF)~~ Under normal circumstances, the capture in early March of (b)(6) (AQI's amir for the Baghdadi to Husaybah region) would have severely hurt the group. A former IIS major in the Iraqi army, (b)(6) had orchestrated much of AQI's murder and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi security forces in 2005. The fifth highest ranking AQI amir, (b)(6) had relocated to first (b)(6) and then (b)(6) to escape Operation STEEL CURTAIN but had retained ties to the AQI leadership in Ramadi. Unfortunately, the effects of (b)(6) capture were undercut by the release of equally senior AQI amirs like (b)(6) from Abu Ghraib that enabled the group to rebuild existing networks or to create new ones to compensate for (b)(6) loss.[164]

~~(S/NF)~~ Angered by (b)(6) capture, AQI fighters from Haditha traveled to Baghdadi to search for police chief Colonel Sha'ban. Their goal was to carry out (b)(6) threat to destroy Sha'ban's home if he handed the AQI amir over to the Coalition.[165] When Sha'ban proved elusive, AQI kidnapped and later murdered a Baghdadi police captain whose relatives had been extorting the group for money.[166]

Approved for Release

[160] [| Military | 060202 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[161] [| Military | 060215 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[162] Ibid.
[163] [| Military | 060202 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[164] [| Military | 060204 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[165] [| Military | 060206 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[166] [| Military | 060210 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060210 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Renewed Murder and Intimidation

~~(S/NF)~~ Not surprisingly, the victory of AQI and its allies over (b)(6) and the Anbar People's Committee led to an escalation in the group's murder and intimidation campaign.[167]

- In late January the "Anbar Insurgent Command" posted "night letters" in Hit that threatened residents who cooperated with the Coalition, warning that insurgents were watching everyone in the city.
- About the same time AQI fighters in the 5 Kilo, Tamim, and al-Tash areas of Ramadi kidnapped suspected collaborators, bringing them before Mullah Khattan to determine whether they were to be tortured or killed. The Coalition later uncovered an AQI detention facility near Lake Thar Thar that contained a number of torture devices, makeshift cells, and signs of recent use.
- On January 23 AQI murdered two Shi'a in the Shahid market of Ferris Town. The group set up checkpoints in order to monitor or threaten locals who are entering or leaving the complex.[168]
- On January 29 four insurgents led by (b)(6) (b)(6) detonated an IED in front of a house in Bani Dhari, firing AK-47s into the house and forcing the family to flee, believing them to have passed information to Coalition patrols.
- On February 1 AQI fighters (b)(6) killed a local hairdresser in front of her children in Karmah for violating *shari'ah*.
- In early February, AQI fighter (b)(6) kidnapped and murdered an Iraqi police officer in Ramadi. He then proceeded to beat women who were not properly covered or those accused of cooperating with the Coalition.
- In early February AQI fighter (b)(6) kidnapped, tortured, and then beheaded an Iraqi police officer in Ramadi.
- In mid-February AQI murdered Jaysh al-Haqq leader Sa'ad Badria, leading to open fighting between AQI and Jaysh al-Haqq for control of the Tamim district of Ramadi. AQI would ultimately prevail over Jaysh al-Haqq, increasing its presence in the district.[169]

Domination of Anbar University

~~(S/NF)~~ The larger fight between (b)(6) and AQI is reflected in miniature in the struggle over influence at Anbar University. The university was the only institution of higher learning in Anbar. The 1920 Revolution Brigade had been the dominant insurgent group, active in the school since 2003, reflecting the orientation of the university as a whole: formerly Ba'athist, but open to religion. This domination enabled (b)(6) to use many student groups as a recruiting pool for his organization. Distinguished faculty professors like legal studies professor (b)(6) were part of (b)(6)

Approved for Release

[167] Unless indicated, all examples are taken from [| Military | 060207 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[168] [| Military | 060206 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[169] [| Military | 02 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060302 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

command and control network.[170] Campus security director (b)(6) led a cell of the Yarmuk Brigade (an associate group of the 1920 Revolution Brigade) that met regularly on campus, receiving payments of up to $20,000 from university contractor (b)(6) (b)(6) Despite this, much of the faculty was apolitical and tried to distance themselves from their country's current crisis.[171]

~~(S/NF)~~ By late 2005, loyalty began to shift among some faculty and student groups towards AQI, though the fact that the school was commuter-based kept at bay, at least temporarily, some of the dangers of extremism on campus.[172] Two law professors (b)(6) (b)(6) exemplified the shift in the faculty. (b)(6) became an AQI organizer and planner, preaching jihad and delivering anti-government lectures to the student body.[173] (b)(6) meanwhile, used his position to promote Salafism and recruit students to join AQI. (b)(6) frequently traveled to Baghdad on business trips, using them as a cover for meeting with AQI in the city.[174] AQI relied too on the internet cafe in Anbar University as its key means of communication in Ramadi due to a permissive environment and lack of usage fees.[175]

~~(S/NF)~~ By early March 2006 AQI and Ansar al-Sunna had displaced 1920 Revolution Brigade from its place as the dominant insurgent group at the University. *Shari'ah* was declared on campus, a strict Islamic dress code was enforced, and male and female students were segregated. Some students were unhappy with the dress code, but they were unable to resist AQI. Members of the university faculty and staff who opposed AQI or questioned the group's interpretation of Islam were removed from their positions and in some cases murdered.[176] For instance, (b)(6) (b)(6) was personally opposed to AQI but, after he was kidnapped for a month by the group in mid-2005, he stopped protesting the group publicly.[177] Cowed into submission by AQI, (b)(6) (b)(6) provided the group with money acquired from contacts in 1.4b as well as the funding allocated to him by the Ministry of Education.[178]

AQI Continues the Fight outside Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ While AQI leadership had much of its attention focused on the fight with (b)(6) they did not ignore the rest of Anbar. For instance, in an effort to broaden the group's appeal throughout the province, AQI began offering money to families whose homes were damaged by the Coalition during combat; more than 300 families would accept their offer.[179] AQI was also able to recruit some current and former Abu Ghraib detainees, offering them protection at the prison in return for joining the group. AQI and other Wahhabi groups forced prisoners to adopt Wahhabi practices, a

Approved for Release

[170] [| Military | 060110 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[171] [| Military | 060227 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060227 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[172] [| Military | 060110 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[173] [| Military | 060227 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~| 20060227 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[174] [| Military | 11 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060511 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[175] [| Military | 060216 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~| 20060216 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[176] [| Military | 06 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[177] [| Military | 28 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 200603128| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[178] [| Military | 11 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060511 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[179] [| Military | 060208 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ |20060208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

key indicator that the most extreme religious elements within "the *mujahidin*" would impose their views not only on ordinary Iraqis, but also on the insurgency as a whole.[180]

~~(S/NF)~~ Attention was also paid to the burgeoning relationship with Ansar al-Sunna. In stark contrast to the bitter conflict with (b)(6) cooperation between Ansar al-Sunna and AQI cells (with often interchangeable membership) intensified throughout February and March. Joint AQI and Ansar al-Sunna forces carried out kidnappings, vehicle theft, propaganda and IED attacks in Baghdadi, overseen at times by (b)(6) (an AQI leader) and at other times by (b)(6) (b)(6) (an Ansar al-Sunna leader).[181]

~~(S/REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR)~~ Fallujah was not ignored by AQI, but the improved security situation made this city far more difficult for insurgents. In late February AQI and the five lesser groups that made up the Mujahideen Shura Council began a concerted propaganda campaign, focusing on media efforts when the situation on the ground did not favor actual attacks. The credibility of the attack claims made by the Mujahideen Shura Council ranged from measured and accurate to complete fabrications.[182]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI was supported financially in its efforts in Fallujah by Sheikh Barakat al-Sa'adun al-Ifan al-Issawi and his associate Sheikh Khamis, who had been based in 1.4b since the conclusion of Operation AL FAJR. In addition to funding AQI through his Baghdad-based engineering and construction company, Sheikh Barakat supplied the group with mortars, RPG-7s, and SA-7s that he had stolen after the fall of Saddam Hussein and buried in the desert.[183]

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Abdullah Janabi's top deputy Sheikh Dhafir Sobhe Bukori al-'Ubaydi also helped to finance AQI in Fallujah. While Sheikh Dhafir had opposed the presence of (b)(6) and the foreign fighters allied with him in Fallujah, Janabi had supported it and Sheikh Dhafir remained loyal to him as the two men continued to back AQI from the new base of operations in 1.4b[184]

(b)(6) **Resistance**

~~(S/NF)~~ The defeat of the 1920 Revolution Brigade did not, however, mean a complete end to anti-AQI resistance in Ramadi. In the short-term, the center of these efforts simply shifted to the Islamic Army of Iraq. Supported by the remnants of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Fahdawi tribe, Islamic Army of Iraq killed three AQI fighters and attempted to assassinate (b)(6) injuring one of his bodyguards. Driving AQI from the Malaab district of Ramadi, the Islamic Army of Iraq declared the area off-limits to AQI.[185] Despite these efforts, Amman hotel bombing facilitator (b)(6) continued to operate in the Malaab

Approved for Release

[180] [| Military | 060209 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ |20060209 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[181] [| Military | 06 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060306 | | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[182] [| Military | 060222 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[183] [| Military | 060223 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060223 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[184] [| Military | 03 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060303 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[185] [| Military | 060203 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

district.[186] (b)(6) was also able to remain active in the Malaab district using his ties to the criminal elements centered around the Muhammad Daham Mosque.[187]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) took advantage of the Islamic Army of Iraq's resistance of AQI to stage his own comeback, reforming the Anbar People's Committee into the Anbar Revolutionary Group. Realizing that AQI was too powerful to attack directly, (b)(6) new goal was to obtain detailed intelligence on AQI and its allies, and then to use this intelligence to carry out attacks against them using the Iraqi army. (b)(6) accelerated the Anbar Revolutionary Group's infiltration of the Iraqi army in an effort to push for these attacks.[188]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) renewed struggle with AQI galvanized other elements of Ramadi society into action. Tribal leaders throughout the provincial capital stated that killing any Iraqi male wearing a ski mask or other "typical" insurgent clothing would not warrant a blood payment. In the Sufia district, locals took up arms against AQI to deny them freedom of movement through their area.[189] The Albu Dhiab tribe also restricted access to their section of Ramadi, setting up barriers and checkpoints to deter AQI entry.[190] (b)(6) trusted ally Lieutenant General Muhammad Sa'ab Manfi al-Rawi reorganized old FRE soldiers to begin hunting down and killing AQI.[191]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ The Coalition also achieved its own successes against the insurgency, capturing Ghazwan Group leader (b)(6)[192]

The Failed Ba'athist Regroup

~~(S/NF)~~ A similar attempt at resistance was made by Ba'athists of various stripes. A few FRE military officers in Anbar unsuccessfully attempted to form a new insurgent group that would be Ba'athist, Sunni, and anti-AQI and have the goal of retaking control of Iraq. They were supported by the surviving 1.4b who believed (correctly) that the insurgency had been hijacked by non-Ba'athists and AQI, which left them with nothing to do but facilitate other movements. The attempt failed because FREs in Anbar had already joined SAR or SRE insurgent groups, with some regularly shifting back and forth between various insurgent groups, political parties, and criminal networks. This dynamic made it all but impossible for the 1.4b Ba'athists to reconsolidate their followers into a cohesive organization.[193]

~~(S/NF)~~ In mid-February 2006, the New Ba'ath Party attempted to demonstrate its control over the insurgency and to force direct negotiations with the new Iraqi government by calling for a cease-fire

Approved for Release

---

[186] [| Military | 060204 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[187] [| Military | 060214 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060214 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[188] Ibid.
[189] [| Military | 060215 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[190] [| Military | 060216 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060216 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[191] Ibid. Not all tribes supported (b)(6) opposition to AQI. For instance, the Albu Bali tribesmen allowed the group to operate in its section of Ramadi, anticipating that an AQI leader would marry the daughter of Albu Bali tribesman and Iraqi Kurdish businessman (b)(6) thus cementing a relationship between AQI and the tribe. [Military | 060218 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060218 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[192] [| Military | 060224 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060224 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[193] [| Military | 060119 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

across Anbar between February 12-14. Despite this, attack levels remained within statistical norms during the cease-fire.[194]

~~(S/NF)~~ In light of this failed attempt to exercise their former authority, the Iraqi Ba'athists were forced to return to their earlier agreement with AQI to coordinate efforts to hasten a Coalition withdrawal from Iraq as their only recourse. Among those Ba'athists who had joined AQI as part of this agreement was Haditha mayor Imad Hamza al-Hayani, who helped to facilitate the infiltration of Ba'athists and AQI into the Haditha police. Faced with his own lack of followers and resources in Anbar and throughout much of Iraq, Ba'athist leader (b)(6) who was attempting to unify the Ba'athists into a coherent force, was reduced to requesting AQI to carry out attacks on targets that he thought were important.[195]

~~(S/NF)~~ The ambiguous relationship between AQI and the Ba'athists is most clearly demonstrated by shady dealings in the oil business. Four companies, al-Gadeer, Fajr al-Sham, al-Shira al-'Abyad and al-Fiou, had authorization from the Iraqi ministry of oil to export petroleum through the Waleed border crossing into 1.4b Two of these companies (al-Gadeer and Fajr al-Sham) were managed by Ba'athists, and one of them (al-Gadeer) used his profits to fund AQI. The way that this happened was rather circuitous. Al-Gadeer was owned by (b)(6) (the former director of IIS's M4 (Secret Service) Directorate who reportedly served as Saddam Hussein's liaison to AQSL pre-OIF) and Hijazi employed (b)(6)

(b)(6)

the profits from al-Shira al-'Abyad went directly to fund AQI.[197] It is very unlikely that Shi'a Iraqi oil minister Hussein Shahristani and his Shi'a-dominated ministry deliberately awarded export contracts to AQI, but the control of these two companies were one of the major reasons that AQI became fully funded from internal Iraqi sources by early 2006.

The Golden Mosque Bombing (February-March)

~~(C/REL)~~ In the middle of these developments, the face of the war in Iraq would change forever on February 21, 2006. On that evening, four gunmen wearing Iraqi interior ministry uniforms gained entry into the al-'Askari Golden Mosque in Samarra, overpowering local guards and planting explosives over the next nine hours. They then proceeded to destroy the dome of the mosque, which holds the tombs of the 10th and 11th Shi'a imams Ali al-Hadi and Hasan al-Askari and was the site of the occultation of the final imam.[198]

Approved for Release

---

194 [| Military | 060221 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
195 [| Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
196 [| Military | 17 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060517 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
197 [| Military | 19 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060617 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
198 "Samarra: Prominent Al Qa'ida in Iraq Affiliates Probably Behind Destruction of Golden Mosque," 1.4c 1.4c June 21, 2006.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(C/REL)~~ The gunmen were associates of AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) had been recruited into AQI by AMZ lieutenants in late 2004, leading to a personal meeting with AMZ in July 2005. Even so, he retained his autonomy and was able to conduct attacks at will without approval from a higher organization in contrast to regular AQI leaders in Samarra whose operational decisions were supervised by the *shari'ah* committee.[199]

~~(S/REL)~~ Local Iraqi security forces personnel were also likely complicit in the bombing. (b)(6) (b)(6) a Sunni Turkoman commander of the interior ministry's special commando Lion Brigade in Samarra, met with (b)(6) who worked as a guard for the Golden Mosque Facilities Protection Service. Both (b)(6) (b)(6) were scheduled to work the night of February 21 but they did not report for duty.[200]

Reactions to the Golden Mosque Bombing

~~(S/NF)~~ Almost immediately after the bombing, Sunni mosques in Baghdad were attacked and a wave of killings swept Baghdad and other religiously mixed areas targeting primarily Sunnis. Because of the religiously homogenous nature of Anbar, there was little danger of immediate sectarian violence in the province, in contrast to the "mixed" provinces such as Baghdad. Indeed, the first reaction to the bombing in Anbar was a peaceful demonstration in the largely Shi'a town of Nasser wa Salaam to protest the destruction of the Golden Mosque.[201] Even so, Nasser wa Salaam residents watched the sectarian violence unfolding across Iraq with concern for their own safety.[202]

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ In Fallujah, there was some tension between the largely Sunni police and the largely Shi'a Iraqi army soldiers, with the latter expressing anger and frustration over the destruction of one of the holiest Shi'a shrines.[203] Nor was this unique to Fallujah, as many Shi'a soldiers and officers were furious over the destruction of the Golden Mosque.[204]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) and his allies were extremely concerned by the outbreak of violence that followed the bombing of the Golden Mosque, fearing that Iraq was on the brink of civil war unless the government intervened to ease sectarian tensions. (b)(6) issued a fatwa against Anbaris joining Yazid—an anti-Shi'a vigilante group named after the man who killed the Shi'a Imam Husayn—that sprang up in Baghdad in reaction to the sectarian violence. While not affiliated with AQI, Yazid sought to kill Shi'a imams and destroy Shi'a mosques for every Sunni imam or mosque harmed by Shi'a militias. (b)(6) shared Yazid's concern about the protection of Sunni mosques against attacks by Shi'a militias, but he was more worried about the prospect of a full-scale civil war, believing that it would play into AMZ's hands.[205]

Approved for Release

---

[199] Ibid. (b)(6) had served as the AQI amir for Samarra since the death of his brother in April 2005, being promoted to the position of amir for Salahaddin governate in October 2005 as a Ramadan gift.
[200] Ibid.
[201] [| Military | 060222 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[202] [| Military | 060226 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[203] [| Military | 060224 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060224 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[204] [| Military | 060226 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[205] [| Military | 060225 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ Reactions among Sunnis in Anbar showed that ordinary citizens might be prone to conspiracy theories, but that they well understood the potential implications of the bombing. In Ramadi, residents were divided as to the identity of the perpetrators of the bombing. Many working class residents believed that the Coalition blew up the mosque to give the Iraqi government a pretext to kill Sunnis, while more educated residents believed it to be the result of a 1.4b 1.4b to divide Iraq, possibly as a prelude to invasion.[206] In Zangora, the Albu Risha tribesmen set up their own security network to protect the village for possible attack by either Shi'a militias or hostile foreign powers.[207]

~~(S)~~ The general population of the Ramadi-Khalidiyah corridor did not believe that a sectarian civil war was imminent, though the security situation in Baghdad and other "mixed" religious areas of Iraq was of concern to them. For these Anbaris, the absence of a functioning police and judicial system in western Ramadi was of far more immediate concern than the area's small and largely unseen Shi'a population.[208]

~~(S/NF)~~ In and around the Wahhabi hotbed of Zaidon, reactions to the Golden Mosque bombing were quite different. Shi'a were banned from attending prayers at several of the mosques and volunteers armed with wooden or metal sticks carried out patrols to attack any Shi'a they came across.[209]

~~(C)~~ In the aftermath of the Samarra bombing, Ambassador Khalilzhad pressured Prime Minister Jafari to convene his advisory council on February 25. Jafari did so, drawing in leaders from the Tawafuq Front into his crisis management team. At the conclusion of the meeting, all attendees denounced sectarian violence and emphasized their determination to avoid civil war and establish a national unity government.[210]

AQI Exploits the Situation

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) was quite correct in his fears that AMZ would exploit the sectarian violence in Anbar for his own ends. On February 26, AQI assassinated Anbar Revolution Group leader former Lieutenant General Muhammad Sa'ab Manfi al-Rawi, putting an abrupt end to (b)(6) efforts to create a united anti-AQI force in the province.[211] (b)(6) the director of propane distribution in Ramadi who moonlighted as a leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, was also murdered by AQI.[212] With Anbaris now increasingly certain that either the Coalition or 1.4b for the destruction of the Golden Mosque, AQI was able to persuade the Ramadi insurgent groups that Shi'a militias and the interior ministry were implementing collective retaliation against the entire Sunni population. The Ramadi insurgent groups reluctantly agreed with AQI, leading to the creation of the Joint Committee of the Jihad Platoons of Anbar

Approved for Release

---

[206] Ibid.
[207] [| Military | 060226 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[208] [| Military | 02 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060302 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[209] [| Military | 05 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[210] [| Military | 060227 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060227 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[211] Ibid.
[212] [| Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Province.[213] (b)(6) supervised the first major sectarian retaliation in Anbar, overseeing the murder of twelve Shi'a merchants in the Tamim district of Ramadi on February 27.[214]

~~(S/NF)~~ The creation of Jihad Platoons of Anbar Province was a major blow to (b)(6) efforts to unite the SAR insurgents into an anti-AQI force. Even the leadership of his own 1920 Revolution Brigade overruled him, agreeing to join AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Muhammad, Islamic Resistance Movement, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Islamic Army of Iraq as a pan-Sunni reaction force under the leadership of AQI, which had already sent its own fighters to Baghdad in order to exact retribution against the Shi'a. This resulted in AQI and 1920 Revolution Brigade agreeing to temporarily set aside their differences in Ramadi.[215]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI leader (b)(6) who had been the AQI amir for all of western Anbar since August 2005, served as the primary coordinator of the Jihad Platoons, traveling to M'asasa to meet with AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Muhammad, al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, and 1920 Revolution Brigade representatives from Hit, Haditha, Rutbah, Rawah, and Baghdadi in order to consolidate their operations under his leadership.[216] The stated purpose of the Jihad Platoons was to fight against the Shi'a in Baghdad and other mixed areas, yet (b)(6) managed to convince Jaysh Muhammad, 1920 Revolution Brigade, al-Asa'ab al-Iraq, and Ansar al-Sunna to merge or cooperate with AQI in its effort to gain control of the Hit-Haditha corridor.[217] Ironically, the result of what had begun as a sectarian reaction to the Golden Mosque bombing was to expand AQI's dominance within the insurgency from Ramadi to encompass Hit, Haditha, Rawah, Baghdadi, and Rutbah as well.

~~(S/NF)~~ As a result of the formation of the Jihad Platoons of Anbar Province and thanks to al-Wayir's unification efforts, the following senior insurgent leaders and their followers were successfully incorporated into the framework of the Mujahideen Shura Council:

- (b)(6) the amir of the Islamic Army of Iraq in Qusaybah[218]
- (b)(6) the new leader of al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal[219]
- The anti-Shi'a nationalist Anwar al-Mujahideen group, which was made up of former military personnel from Fallujah, Karmah, and Abu Ghraib[220]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) efforts led to a spike in insurgent activity in the Hit-Haditha corridor. While Coalition offensives had maintained the initiative in Hit and Haditha since the conclusion of Operation SAYYAD II and STEEL CURTAIN, the rise in activity by AQI and its allies were

Approved for Release

[213] [| Military | 060227 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060227 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[214] [| Military | 01 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[215] [| Military | 060227 GRINTSUM - ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060227 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[216] [| Military | 06 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[217] [| Military | 07 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060307 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[218] [| Military | 13 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[219] Ibid.
[220] [| Military | 14 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060314 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

viewed by many residents as a sign that the outcome of the fighting was in doubt and created concern about the future of Coalition control in the area.[221]

AQI Exploits Tribal Issues

~~(S/NF)~~ The resurgence of AQI after the bombing encouraged some members of the group to settle old scores with tribal rivals. For instance, Ramadi-based AQI fighters from the Albu Dhiab tribe led by (b)(6) began killing Albu Shaban tribesmen who had sided with the Islamic Army of Iraq against AQI.[222] In Baghdad, AQI murdered Sheikh Hamid Rashid Mahana al-Alwani, the acting head of the Albu Alwan tribe, in a false flag attack intended to attribute the killing to the Badr Brigades. AQI subsequently sent a letter to Governor Mamoun demanding that he resign and see to his Albu Alwan tribe, or he would also be killed.[223]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI was also able to make substantial inroads in Haditha through its spiritual leader (b)(6) (b)(6) who brokered a series of successful negotiations with the leadership of the Albu Najim subtribe of the Jughayfi tribe. Under the terms of their agreement, the Albu Najim would provide logistical support to AQI and not report their activities to the Coalition in return for AQI agreeing to reimburse the tribesmen whose homes and vehicles had been destroyed during the fighting between the Jughayfis and AQI in the summer of 2005. Additionally, the agreement specified that the Albu Najim would be offered positions of power and influence in the new Islamic State of Iraq. Because the source of the Jughayfi rivalry with AQI lay in AQI stripping the tribe of the power and influence they had wielded in the Haditha area under Saddam Hussein, AQI was able to enlist their support to further infiltrate local government and police forces so that the group could maintain power and control in the Haditha area despite the increased Coalition presence.[224]

Successes Scored by the Coalition

~~(S/NF)~~ Albu Nimr tribal leader Sheikh Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Inad Majil al-Kaud al-Nimrawi by contrast, pledged his continued support to the Coalition and the Iraqi police in the wake of the Golden Mosque bombing. While the Albu Nimr still wanted to deal with AQI on their own in order to satisfy *tha'r* obligations, their tribal leaders were involved in high-level provincial and national negotiations concerning security plans for Anbar as a whole.[225]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Coalition also scored a major success against AQI in Karmah by capturing (b)(6) (b)(6) who had successfully coopted or marginalized the Green Battalion, Islamic Army of Iraq, and 1920 Revolution Brigade groups in the city.[226] (b)(6) second-in-command (b)(6) (b)(6) was also captured, leaving (b)(6) to assume command of

[221] [| Military | 12 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060312 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[222] [| Military | 01 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[223] [| Military | 05 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[224] [| Military | 02 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060302 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[225] [| Military | 05 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[226] [| Military | 02 Mar 06 MNF-W INSTUM | 20060302 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

AQI in the city.[227] The Coalition made a number of significant captures in Ramadi including the leader of the al-Nu'man Brigade and dual AQI and Ansar al-Sunna commander (b)(6) (b)(6) who had issued fatwas on behalf of both groups but fled to Baghdad during Operation SAYYAD II.[228]

The Sunni Political Establishment Reacts to the Sectarian Violence

~~(S/NF)~~ By early March, the initial sectarian violence had shifted from retaliation by individuals to coordinated attacks by militias. The Shi'a Mahdi Army and Badr Corps were the two largest militias and Tawafuq Front leader (b)(6) actively urged senior members of the Tawafuq Front, IIP, and AMS to work together to create an independent Sunni militia capable of defeating the threat posed by these two Shi'a groups. (b)(6) wanted the militia to be under the command of former Iraqi military officers loyal to the Tawafuq Front and IIP and to deploy battalion-sized forces to the various governates where sectarian violence was occurring. (b)(6) believed that rank-and-file members of the militia would be drawn from a cadre of smaller armed groups affiliated with Sunni political and religious elements (i.e. insurgents).[229]

~~(S/NF)~~ To obtain the blessing of AMS for this plan, (b)(6) had been in negotiations with AMS secretary-general Harith al-Dhari since the destruction of the Golden Mosque. Both (b)(6) Harith agreed that reprisal attacks against Sunni mosques had gone on virtually unchecked since the destruction of Golden Mosque, indicating to them that the UIA was providing tacit approval for the actions of the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps. If the Sunnis could not depend on the government to protect them, (b)(6) argued, then they had to protect themselves.[230]

City Stories: Post-Askari Bombing

Fallujah

~~(S/NF)~~ By March, the situation within most cities of Anbar showed the effects of two major developments: the mosque bombing and the increasing dominance by AQI of the insurgency. Fallujah, however, seemed to be one of the exceptions AQI maintained a significant presence in the cities and villages outside Fallujah, though it was unable to reestablish a solid foothold within the city itself. The assassinations of Sheikh Hamza and Sheikh Kamal had slowed but failed to stop political engagement, reconstruction, and the creation of Iraqi security forces, because AQI was unable to dominate the insurgency in Fallujah as they now did in Ramadi. While the assassination of Sheikh Hamza in particular had been a surprising blow to the Fallujah elite, active Coalition and State Department engagement efforts kept the political process alive in the city. After the assassination of Sheikh Kamal, several members of the Fallujah city council fled the country and the local press over-reacted in a panic. But by March 9, the Coalition and the State Department had persuaded the Fallujah city council to resume regular political engagement.[231]

---

[227] [| Military | 06 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[228] [| Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM | 20060308 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[229] Ibid.
[230] [| Military | 06 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[231] [| Military | 09 Mar MNF-W INTSUM | 20060309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Karmah

~~(S/NF)~~ On the other hand, events in Karmah clearly showed the effects of the growing sectarian violence. Many Sunnis displaced from the Shi'a majority provinces of southern Iraq this violence began gathering in tents around Karmah by mid-March. Sheikh Kamis Jasim Dewichat of the al-Kabir Mosque attempted to organize humanitarian efforts for them, but many of the Sunni males had been radicalized against the Shi'a as a result of the violence and as such were perfect fodder for AQI recruiting.[232]

Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ Through its murder of six key members of the Anbar People's Committee, the provincial security committee, and the provincial council, AQI had neutralized the threat posed by the Anbar People's Committee, sending (b)(6) into seclusion and leaving Governor Mamoun and his advisors increasingly isolated.[233] Using murder and intimidation tactics,[234] AQI became the dominant influence in key Ramadi neighborhoods and surrounding villages.[235] While Ramadi residents were not as cowed by AQI as their Fallujah counterparts had been in 2004, the city's atmospherics had flattened to a neutral steady state as residents became passive in the face of AQI's aggressive intimidation. Many residents and the leadership of local insurgent groups such as the 1920 Revolution Brigade were angry and wanted to retaliate against AQI, but in every case they were outfought by AMZ, leaving them unable to unseat the group on their own.[236]

~~(S/NF)~~ These successes enabled AQI to infiltrate the local and provincial government of Ramadi, assume control of black market activity in the city, and establish roots in the outlying tribal areas. Although the dominant AQI presence in Ramadi now represented the most significant threat to success of the Coalition, AQI did not present an obvious or simple target for direct action. The majority of AQI fighters in Ramadi were local Iraqis who easily blended into the general population and had become adept at avoiding targeting by Coalition and Iraqi security forces.[237]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's infiltration of Anbar's provincial government was also thorough and included members of the command element of the police department. Even Governor Mamoun's secretary (b)(6) was an AQI informant, who regularly provided the group with detailed information about activities at the Government Center. AQI also exerted control over a large number of mosques, hospitals, schools, universities, local contractors, and businesses, often selling material stolen from Coalition and trade ministry convoys in order to finance operations. To counter

Approved for Release

[232] [| Military | 16 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060316 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[233] [| Military | 09 Mar MNF-W INTSUM | 20060319 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[234] [| Military | 08 Mar 06 INTSUM |20060308 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] See e.g. AQI's murder of twenty Iraqi civilians from Jarayshi village north of Ramadi.
[235] Ibid.
[236] [| Military | 09 Mar MNF-W INTSUM | 20060309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[237] [| Military | 22 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060322 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

popular resentment against their tactics, AQI and its allies posted flyers or went door-to-door to warn residents of impending attacks.[238]

~~(S)~~ The Anbar ministries of finance and treasury attempted to conceal their corruption by avoiding contact with Coalition personnel. When confronted, officials with access to the dispersal of millions of dollars claimed that there were no records of how the money was allocated. No finance director-general or finance deputy director-general existed; the province instead relied on a treasurer, four deputy treasurers, and a provincial accountant. AQI financiers (b)(6) (b)(6) were able to extort funding from the provincial government, threatening department heads with death unless they paid money to AQI.[239]

~~(S/NF)~~ Efforts to oppose AQI in Ramadi were further complicated by a schism within 1920 Revolution Brigade between (b)(6) and his top lieutenant (b)(6) over the direction of the group in the light of the sectarian violence (b)(6) wanted to protect fellow Sunnis, while (b)(6) saw this as a Zarqawi-generated distraction), as well as mutual accusations that operational funds had been misused. The resumed conflict between (b)(6) and AMZ had taken a severe toll on the group's resources and many rank-and-file members now questioned (b)(6) policy of political engagement.[240] These divisions led (b)(6) the leader of 1920 Revolution Brigade in the Tamim district in Ramadi, to turn his attention to drug smuggling and the arms trade as the fortunes of his group continued to fade.[241]

~~(S)~~ To demonstrate its anti-Shi'a credentials, AQI robbed and then murdered nine Shi'a men in the Sufia district of Ramadi. They had planned to kill the women who had been traveling with them as well but were deterred from doing so by members of the influential Albu Ghanam tribe.[242] This incident, combined with AQI's killing of a Habbaniyah resident who opposed sectarianism, resulted in the flight of Habbaniyah's small Shi'a community for southern Iraq.[243]

Approved for Release

[238] Ibid.
[239] [| Military | 24 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060524 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[240] [| Military | 13 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[241] [| Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[242] [| Military | 16 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060316 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[243] [| Military | 19 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060319 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Haditha

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI maintained a strong influence on Haditha through the direct presence of 700 fighters (only a handful of them foreign) and alliance with other insurgent groups that had joined the Jihad Platoons. By actively recruiting unemployed or disenfranchised Iraqis, AQI was able to keep its strength at a near-constant level in the city.[244] Unemployed military-aged males in Haditha were seen as particularly attractive targets for AQI recruitment: many of them were disappointed by the results of the political process and fearful of Shi'a attack on their city.[245]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI also expanded its operational control of Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha. According to the former Ansar al-Sunna amir of the South Karkh in Baghdad. This was due to the fact that AQI and Ansar al-Sunna had renewed negotiations for a merger between the two groups following the creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council. The example of (b)(6) who was simultaneously the amir of Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha as well as the AQI amir for Bani Dahir, Barwanah, and Haditha shows the extent of the ongoing integration of the two groups.[246]

Bani Dahir and Dulab

~~(S)~~ These two minor villages in the Hit-Haditha corridor show that the dispersion of AQI and other insurgents to the smallest villages, begun in 2005, continued throughout 2006. In Bani Dahir, AQI regularly replaced traditional imams with those loyal to AQI. A number of mosques in the town actively recruited fighters for AQI, with daily training and propaganda efforts being run out of the al-Sha'bani mosque.[247]

~~(S/NF)~~ In Dulab, AQI began gathering survivors who had fled Husaybah, Anah, Rawah, and Rutbah during Operation SAYYAD II and Operation WESTERN SHIELD, assembling them in groups of forty (Iraqi and foreign fighters together) in the Tamaniya, Mar'abia, al-Mabghra, Mashkuka, Sa'da, and Zikhikha subdivisions of the city.[248] Many of the mid-level AQI leaders in Dulab had formerly been active in Samarra until they were displaced by Coalition operations, including (b)(6)[249] A number of foreign fighters led by (b)(6) also relocated from the southern end of Lake Thar Thar to Dulab. Implementing a draconian interpretation of *shari'ah* even by AQI standards, they began murdering any residents who did not support their cause, prompting many locals to flee to nearby Jubbah.[250] More than sixty residents were reportedly kidnapped and murdered as part of (b)(6) murder and intimidation campaign. As a result, AQI fighters openly walked the streets of Dulab, intimidating the population without retribution as they searched for those residents who were attempting to flee to Jubbah.[251]

Approved for Release

---

[244] [| Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[245] [| Military | 16 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060316 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[246] [| Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[247] [| Military | 20 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060320 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[248] [| Military | 19 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060319 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[249] [| Military | 30 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060330 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[250] [|Military | 26 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060326 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[251] [| Military | 7 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060307 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Baghdadi

~~(S)~~ In Baghdadi, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members from the al-Ghariri tribe continued to target the Baghdadi police leadership through kidnappings. Victims were released after an initial interrogation and offered $200 per month to inform on the Baghdadi police, $1,000 for specific locations that could be used to target the Baghdadi police, and $100,000 for killing the police chief, his brother, or a high-ranking officer of comparable status. The Baghdadi police chief responded by sending a message to the al-Ghariri tribe threatening to kill any al-Ghariri tribesmen currently in his custody and the kidnappings soon ceased.[252]

Rutbah

~~(S)~~ As a result of the subversion of the Jihad Platoons, AQI was able to re-establish itself as the dominant insurgent group in Rutbah. The 1920 Revolution Brigade, Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq were all active in the city, but AQI conducted a majority of attacks in Rutbah, coordinating with other groups and occasionally sharing the spoils gained through illicit activity. Through vehicle theft and other criminal activities, AQI was able to finance its operations in western Anbar from Rutbah and still have enough left to share spoils with other groups to ensure its peace and influence in the city. AQI members regularly traveled from Rutbah to Qusaybah and Hit.[253]

Snapshot of the Insurgency

~~(S/NF)~~ By March 2006, AQI had managed to skillfully use the Samarra bombing to spread its influence even further. Even before the attack, AQI played a dominant role in the Anbar insurgency, but the creation of the Jihad Platoons allowed AQI to take control of many local 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Muhammad, Islamic Resistance Movement, Jaysh al-Mujahidin, and the Islamic Army of Iraq groups. Meanwhile the one remaining challenger to AQI dominance, Ansar al-Sunna, was slowly becoming integrated into AQI through joint operations, joint leadership, and negotiations. AQI leaders and rank-and-file members throughout Anbar believed that the organization was winning against the Coalition in the province. Despite the loss of numerous key leaders in December 2005 and January 2006, AQI believed that a steady drumbeat of continued attacks and images of dead American soldiers would serve to sway the American media and public opinion against the war in Iraq, forcing the Coalition to withdraw. As a result of these perceptions, the continued killing of American soldiers was made a top priority within AQI no matter what the cost to its own fighting cadre.[254]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI perceived that American policymakers and the general public cared more about the individual lives of their soldiers than AQI did about its own fighters, resulting in AQI's greater willingness to sacrifice its fighters who had joined the jihad to expel the Coalition from Iraq or die as

[252] [| Military | 16 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060316 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[253] [| Military | 20 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060320 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[254] [| Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

martyrs trying. This perception resulted in individual AQI fighters regarding the death of even one Coalition soldier as a personal victory, since every dead soldier was seen as another step towards the Coalition withdrawal from Iraq. In preparation for the Coalition withdrawal, foreign AQI fighters were encouraged to marry the sisters or daughters of their Iraqi counterparts. This was done both to facilitate their assimilation into Iraqi society and to serve protection against possible infiltration,[255] as the foreign fighters' wives reported back to their Iraqi relatives on their husband's activities.[256]

~~(S/NF)~~ The AQI leadership was not concerned by the Ramadi-based insurgent groups now fighting against it, believing that they did so out of fear rather than out of genuine conviction. From the viewpoint of the AQI leadership, their organization had access to better weapons, resources, and fighters whose willingness to die for their cause gave the group an insurmountable advantage in inter-insurgent fighting against (b)(6) and his remaining followers. They were particularly encouraged by the emerging consensus among other insurgent leaders that AQI had become too powerful for anyone to stop.[257]

AQI's Post-Iraq Planning

~~(S/NF)~~ Among the group's leadership, post-withdrawal plans were already being made by late 2005. These plans included the creation of a totalitarian Islamist theocracy similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Once the Coalition left Iraq, the AQI leadership believed that they could easily seize control of most of the major cities and towns in Anbar and use them as a base for AQAM's long-term war against the United States and its allies.[258] Reflective of this global jihad worldview was the fact that propaganda distributed by the Mujahideen Shura Council began to show fighters in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq in their videos and flyers.[259]

~~(S/NF)~~ Even so, AQI leadership thought that it might take 7-10 years of fighting to conquer the whole of Iraq. AQI believed that this timeframe would be cut down considerably once the United States withdrew. They were convinced that it was only a matter of time before that event occurred. This was because AQI believed that the faith of its fighters and their reliance on Fourth Generation Warfare was superior to the Coalition reliance on technology. Looking beyond the war in Iraq, AQI argued that its continued attacks were draining Coalition resources, benefiting long-time American opponents such as 1.4b. It was believed among the AQI leadership that while 1.4b 1.4b would benefit in the short-term from this weakening of American power, AQI would ultimately prevail, earning this strategy the nickname of " 1.4b In compliance with this strategy, AQI cells were instructed to continue targeting American soldiers and to be willing to sacrifice as many fighters as necessary to do so.[260]

International Connections to the Insurgency

[255] A perennial fear of AMZ, see Chapter 5's discussion of foreign fighters.
[256] Ibid.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Ibid.
[259] [| Military | 22 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060322 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[260] [| Military | 15 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Pages 38 through 39 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
1.4b

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Foreign Fighters

~~(S)~~ For AQI, internationalizing the insurgency meant, above all else, the involvement of the larger Islamic community in the struggle. This made the group place an emphasis on foreign fighters that far outweighed the actual usefulness of these warriors. As a result of Operation SAYYAD II and Operation STEEL CURTAIN, smuggling foreign fighters into Anbar was now far more difficult with the loss of al-Qaim and the disruption of cross-border networks. Part of the reason for the AQI emphasis on the Hit-Haditha corridor was that AQI hoped to use it as a base from which to reassert influence over the western Euphrates River valley and then to recreate their networks through al-Qaim once again. In the meantime, AQI was forced to use 'Ubaydi as their primary node for smuggling foreign fighters, a route which left much to be desired in terms of security and ease of transit.[272]

AQI's Renewed Assassination Campaign

~~(S)~~ Having dealt with (b)(6) and the Anbar People's Committee, AQI now began attacking government officials. Among their first targets was Anbar provincial council chairman Qudayr 'Abd-al-Jabber al-'Abdali, whom they assassinated outside his home in the Mualimeen district of Ramadi. Within Anbari politics, Qudayr was known as a passive personality, a weak leader, and a poor manager who had been offered the position of deputy governor in 2005 following the assassination of his predecessor but declined to accept it due to personal security concerns. He was always deferential to Governor Mamoun, who had been his predecessor as provincial council chairman in 2004 and early 2005 and had chosen Qudayr to succeed him in order to prevent any significant opposition to his authority.[273]

~~(S/NF)~~ On the other hand, the AQI assassination of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Albu Faraj tribal leader Muhammad Turki Muslah was probably vengeance for his past support to the Anbar People's Committee. The death of Muhammad Turki deprived (b)(6) of one of his last viable lieutenants in the 1920 Revolution Brigade. With the ongoing schism in the 1920 Revolution Brigade, (b)(6) prospects for resurgence were now in doubt.[274]

Approved for Release

[272] [| Military | 31 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060331 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[273] [| Military | 17 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060317 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[274] [| Military | 19 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060319 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Anbari Security Forces

(U) Efforts towards reestablishing security throughout the province, as we have already seen, were complicated by problems in the Anbari security forces. To deal with the uneven situation in the police forces in particular, the new commander of MNC-I, LtGen Chiarelli, declared 2006 "The Year of the Police," and began an Iraq-wide effort to establish an effective national police force.

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ As part of this endeavor, Brigadier General Ghalib called on all Iraqi police to register with the government and return to duty by February 10.[275] The call was heeded by 1,840 police and 700 were processed for future employment.[276] In some cities, such as Khalidiyah, the police functioned well and were trusted by the residents to provide security.[277]

~~(S/NF)~~ Nevertheless, there were serious obstacles to security throughout Anbar, among them the fact that Iraqi police in the western part of the province had not been paid since November.[278] By mid-March, the Iraqi interior ministry had still not provided salaries for 258 police officers who had been asked to take up their posts along the Iraq 1.4b The issue of pay was a consistent source of friction between the Iraqi bureaucracy and individual units, being particularly troublesome in al-Qaim where there was a steady rise in the number of desertions due to the widespread perception that the Iraqi police and army in Baghdad stole or diverted funds away from Anbar for sectarian reasons. The ongoing AQI murder and intimidation campaign exacerbated the situation, though many units were able to remain cohesive and effective as a result of strong local leadership.[279]

~~(S)~~ The situation in the provincial police headquarters in Ramadi was far worse, perhaps explaining the poor condition of Anbari police in general. The provincial police chief General Sha'aban Muhammad Samir al-Janabi was unable to find any qualified candidates to assume leadership posts in the police force. As a result, leadership of the police force was overseen entirely by Sha'aban,

(b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ Sha'aban's concerns about the lack of qualified candidates for leadership posts in the police force was justified, as a number of Ramadi police were already actively working with the insurgency.

(b)(6)

supplied the Mahdi Army with detailed information on police, army, and Coalition movements. In

Approved for Release

[275] [| Military | 060208 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ |20060208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[276] [| Military | 060209 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ | 20060209 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[277] [| Military | 26 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060326 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[278] [| Military | 060210 GRINTSUM – ~~NOFORN~~ |20060210 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[279] [| Military | 07 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060407 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[280] [| Military | 17 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060317 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

nearby Zangora, the entire Iraqi Highway Patrol had been compromised by the insurgency and was actively working with AQI and the Islamic Army of Iraq.[281]

~~(S/NF)~~ In many ways, the legacy of the tenure of Ramadi's first post-OIF police chief, Ja'adan helps to explain the extent of the collusion between the Ramadi police department and the insurgency. Under Ja'adan, the Ramadi police had suffered a steady decline as a result of insurgent collaboration and corruption, which led eventually to complete collapse. The Coalition removed Ja'adan from his post and arrested him for involvement with the insurgency, but his legacy remained. During 2004, it was not uncommon for Ramadi police to use their vehicles to conduct pre-attack surveillance of Coalition positions and to plant IEDs. Much of the current Ramadi police force had served under Ja'adan at some point or another and as such a number of the officers continued to retain their insurgent associations.[282]

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in other cities was just as bad as in Ramadi. In Saqlawiyah, acting police chief Captain Ihab threatened to use his insurgent contacts to attack his own police station if he were removed by Sha'aban.[283] Police captain (b)(6) of the Jensiyah Office in Saqlawiyah provided *jensiyah* (identification) cards to AQI fighters, using his relationship with a major in the internal investigations division of the Fallujah police to prevent his activities from attracting notice.[284]

~~(S/NF)~~ While much of the reporting during this period gives the impression of a corrupt and thoroughly infiltrated Iraqi police force, at least some of these claims were exaggerated, falsified, or used by their sources against rivals or superiors in an effort by individual police officers to gain personal advantage. There was a moderate degree of corruption and insurgent collusion among the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army, particularly in Fallujah, but the more spectacular claims were the result of continued friction and cultural hostility between the native police and the "foreign" Iraqi army that played out daily in different cities throughout the province.[285]

~~(S)~~ These suspicions about the army had some basis in fact. In Ramadi, 70% of the Shi'a soldiers either supported or identified with the Mahdi Army. Believing that the Iraqi government was unable to provide security in Baghdad, these soldiers saw the Mahdi Army as the only reason that Sadr City was safe. While they were prepared to defend Iraq against 1.4b they did not support any action against 1.4b which they saw as a friend of the Iraqi Shi'a. These sentiments were widely held by many Shi'a soldiers in the Iraqi army after the destruction of the Golden Mosque, though only a few actually advocated sectarian violence and most of the Iraqi soldiers maintained sound relationships in the communities in which they operated. Because many of these units stationed in

Approved for Release

[281] [| Military | 24 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060324 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] While Sha'aban seemed to take his role as chief of police in Anbar seriously, his ability to carry out these actions may have been complicated by his personal life. Reportedly, he was a claustrophobe who had been removed from his post in the Iraqi army pre-OIF after trying to force unwanted homosexual advances on a subordinate. Since becoming provincial police chief, he had reportedly maintained an active sex life with all of the male members of his personal security detail. [| Military | 16 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060516 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[282] [| Military | 26 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060326 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[283] [| Military | 20 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060320 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[284] [| Military | 06 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060406 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[285] See e.g. [| Military | 19 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060419 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Anbar had access to satellite television and would be aware of any friction between the Iraqi government, the Mahdi Army, and the Coalition, it remained an open question as to whether these units would remain professional, head east to assist Sadr, or instigate local violence if fighting broke out between the Coalition and the Mahdi Army.[286]

Sectarian Violence Begins to Affect Anbar

~~(S)~~ Yet, until mid-March 2006, the sectarian violence now killing thousands of Sunnis and Shi'a across Iraq, hardly affected Anbar. This period of relative quiet now ended. One of the first places to see a flare-up of sectarian violence was Fallujah, where comments by American officials that civil war would be an internal Iraqi problem stirred up alarm among residents, who feared the spectre of 1.4b Shi'a militias attacking their city. This led to open fighting between the largely Sunni police and the largely Shi'a army as many Fallujans supported the removal of the Iraqi army from their city.[287]

~~(S/NF)~~ These sectarian tensions were exacerbated by the views of the Fallujah city council members, many of whom were now convinced that 1.4b controlled both the Baghdad police department and the Iraqi Interior Ministry. From their point of view, political pressure on the United States to hold formal talks with 1.4b over Iraq were nothing more than a ruse to facilitate 1.4b In discussions with the Coalition, the Council members charged that the predominantly Shi'a Iraqi army had coerced the Fallujah police into not going to work, with some claiming that the army was seeking to forment civil war.[288]

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, sectarian violence in Baghdad and other religiously mixed areas of Iraq continued to impact Anbar. Forty Sunni families from southern Iraq sought refuge in Karmah, while thousands of Fallujah residents who had fled to Baghdad during Operation AL FAJR now returned to Fallujah and the surrounding area to escape the violence in the capital. To show Anbari Sunnis that they were not immune to the effects of the violence, Shi'a militants dumped the bodies of six Sunnis killed in Baghdad in Nasser wa Salaam.[289]

~~(S)~~ This act infuriated the Sunni population, and flyers and fatwas were circulated from Zaidon justifying immediate retaliation against every Shi'a in Anbar. Fearing Sunni vengeance, Shi'a living in small hamlets north of Nasser wa Salaam began fleeing to the southern outskirts of Baghdad.[290]

~~(S/NF)~~ The result of the sectarian violence and subsequent internal refugees was that some Ramadi and Fallujah residents began to change their opinions from a prior suspicion of strangers, to a more welcoming attitude toward their co-religionists in a sign of Sunni solidarity. While many Anbaris now regarded the Coalition as a buffer between the Sunni community and the Mahdi Army, they unfortunately viewed AQI as another possible source of protection. For the majority of Anbaris,

Approved for Release

[286] [| Military | 06 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060406 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[287] [| Military | 17 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060317 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[288] [| Military | 23 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060323 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[289] [|Military | 26 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060326 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[290] [| Military | 2 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060402 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b and the Iraqi Shi'a were becoming the immediate threats to their safety. AQI exploited these events as an opportunity to present itself as "protector of the Sunni faithful."[291]

The Attempt on Sheikh Khamis

~~(S)~~ In the midst of these developments, on March 26, an assassination attempt was mounted against the home of Sheikh Khamis al-Issawi, only to be repelled by Sheikh Khamis's well-armed bodyguards. As noted in Chapter 5b, in addition to being the leader of the Albu Issa tribe Sheikh Khamis was also a supporter of the Coalition who had attempted to prevent the Albu Issa from participating in the insurgency. While the assassination attempt was carried out by AMZ's lieutenant (b)(6) it was planned and approved by a number of senior insurgent figures including AMZ, Harith al-Dhari, and Jaysh Muhammad leaders who blamed Sheikh Khamis for the capture of their leader (b)(6)[292]

~~(S/NF)~~ It was AQI's creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council of Fallujah, by facilitating inter-insurgent cooperation, which made the assassination attempt on Sheikh Khamis possible. A smaller variant of AQI's national Mujahideen Shura Council, the Mujahideen Shura Council of Fallujah was presented by AQI as a successor to the 2004 Fallujah Mujahideen Shura that would help unite the diverse insurgent groups in the city under AQI's auspices. AQI convinced part of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the Khalifa al-Islamiya Group, and the Wa'id al-Haqq to join its new umbrella organization. However, unlike in Ramadi or Haditha, where AQI had achieved near-complete dominance over local insurgent groups, the environment in Fallujah was still competitive, with many local groups unwilling to surrender influence or control to AQI.[293]

Tribal Warfare and the Insurgency

~~(S)~~ There was one other element of Anbar that AQI could not completely control: the tribal situation. In al-Qaim the rise of Quwwat Albu Mahal showed that the Albu-Mahal did not accept their earlier defeat by AQI. At first led by (b)(6) and recruited from Albu Mahal tribesmen, Quwat Albu Mahal was made up of disaffected members of the Hamza Battalion who wanted to reestablish Albu Mahal tribal dominance from Husaybah to Akashat. A former high-ranking member of al-Theeb who had opposed the Coalition since 2003, (b)(6) lost most of his power and influence when AQI drove the Albu Mahal from Husaybah.[294]

~~(S/NF)~~ By early April the Quwwat Albu Mahal had once again named itself the Hamza Battalion. Armed with RPGs, PKCs, AK-47s, and pistols that they carried openly when the Coalition was not present, the Hamza Battalion used false identification to gain passage through Iraqi army checkpoints. Their objective was to target the Salmani tribe, whom they regarded as responsible for the influx of AQI into the city the previous year.[295]

---

[291] [| Military | 16 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060416 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[292] [| Military | 29 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060329 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[293] [| Military | 09 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060409 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[294] [| Military | 12 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060312 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[295] [| Military | 11 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060411 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The Hamza Battalion's actions were not entirely the result of paranoia or misguided vengeance. (b)(6) was directing the transportation of AQI propaganda from his base of operations in 1.4b and into the Nissan 7 neighborhood of the Salmani area of al-Qaim in the hopes of rebuilding support for AQI in the city. The Hamza Battalion captured and executed anyone caught distributing the AQI propaganda, Badran Turki's second-in-command (b)(6) among them.[296]

~~(S)~~ As we have seen, AQI urgently desired to increase operations in the al-Qaim area. This resulted in a revived targeting of the Albu Mahal tribesmen, beginning with the murder of Sheikh Habib al-Jashami in Ramana by AQI amir (b)(6) Targeting former Hamza Battalion members, Desert Protectors, and Iraqi soldiers, AQI initiated a preparatory operation designed to build their combat power in western Anbar as part of an effort to challenge Coalition presence in the western Euphrates River valley.[297] The Albu Mahal and Albu Jughayfi tribes responded in kind, killing twelve Saudi and Yemeni AQI fighters as they attempted to enter Iraq through 1.4b[98]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) who also sought revenge against AQI, decided now to play the tribal card as well. In mid-March he sent representatives of the 1920 Revolution Brigade to the Albu Dhiab tribe to negotiate their support in fighting AQI. Under the agreement, 1920 Revolution Brigade and Albu Dhiab tribesmen would form a militia around the Albu Dhiab tribal lands. Despite these efforts, the Albu Dhiab tribal lands continued to be frequented by AQI members and leaders. The problem was that a number of Albu Dhiab tribal leaders supported AQI, while others were subjected to an intense murder and intimidation campaign. As a result, (b)(6) could only count on the support of the most non-conformist Albu Dhiab tribesmen in his fight against AQI.[299]

~~(S)~~ AQI's response to (b)(6) outreach to the Albu Dhiab tribesmen was to have local commander Nassir Ali Awad Shahid and four 1.4b fighters murder the sheikh of the Albu Dhiab's Shabanai subtribe, Ali Awad Shahid. Shahid had preached against terrorism and urged his tribesmen to register for the Ramadi police and cooperate with the Coalition.[300]

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile, AMS and the Tawafuq Front continued to work with the 1920 Revolution Brigade under the direction of AMS Secretary-General Harith al-Dhari to form a Sunni militia capable of protecting mosques in Baghdad and Abu Ghraib as well as to take revenge on Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army for their role in the sectarian violence. In Anbar, this effort was headed up by Harith's relative and 1920 Revolution Brigade leader Sheikh Hussein al-Zobai, who hoped to unite elements of the Zobai tribe in Zaidon, Amariyah, and northern Babil with 1920 Revolution Brigade to form the core of the Sunni militia. These discussions with the Zobai, unlike (b)(6) with the Albu Dhiab, did not include any major action against AQI.[301]

Approved for Release

---

[296] [| Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[297] [| Military | 03 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060403 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[298] [| Military | 12 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060412 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[299] [| Military | 22 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060322 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[300] [| Military | 27 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060327 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[301] [| Military | 23 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060323 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Progress in Karmah

~~(S)~~ The tribal and sectarian issues came together in Karmah to create some progress toward a resolution of the violence in that city. On March 8 concerns over the sectarian violence led representatives from the leadership of the Albu Issa, al-Jumayli, and Albu Khalifa tribes to meet to discuss supporting the local police in Karmah in order to achieve better security conditions now that Sunni internal refugees from Baghdad and other parts of the country were resettling there. Prior to this, the tribes had regarded the police as weak and incapable of defending themselves against the insurgency, making them hesitant to support the institution. As the flow of internal refugees increased and the police became more robust, the tribal leaders changed their views and became more willing to discuss supporting the expansion of the police into areas of Karmah not protected by Coalition patrols.[302]

~~(S)~~ The tribesmen may also have been encouraged to support the police by the capture of (b)(6) (b)(6) and the disruption of his network. Since these events, the security situation in Karmah had improved dramatically. The Green Battalion, which by this point had either been dismantled or merged into AQI, was forced to relocate to the area north of Fallujah, while the 1920 Revolution Brigade in the city was heavily weakened from insurgent infighting with AQI. Those small groups of foreign and Iraqi AQI fighters that remained were regularly captured or killed by Coalition forces. AQI's weakness in Karmah would lead to a renewed power struggle for control of the insurgency in the city between followers of AMZ and (b)(6)[303] These divisions would continue until (b)(6) (b)(6) was able to reunite the divided Karmah insurgents in an effort to carry out vengeance against the Coalition for capturing (b)(6)[304]

AQI Attempts to Re-Establish Influence in Western Anbar

~~(S/NF)~~ By March, AQI was ready to redress its loss of influence in the al-Qaim-Haditha corridor. From its foothold in the village of Albu Hyatt, AQI infiltrated Barwanah and exploited the absence of permanent Coalition forces to mount an extensive propaganda, murder, and intimidation campaign.[305] This campaign, combined with effective propaganda efforts, began to pay off.[306] By the end of March, the Barwanah city council dissolved itself and the councils in Haqlaniyah and Haditha followed suit soon afterwards.[307] The Hit police force also disbanded at about the same time.[308]

~~(S/NF)~~ With the city council disbanded, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna implemented a draconian murder and intimidation campaign in Haditha, carrying out beheadings and cutting off the hands and feet of suspected collaborators. These acts had been prevalent in the city prior to Operation STEEL CURTAIN, and AQI had maintained a network of spies following the Coalition operation to monitor any Iraqi who violated *shari'ah* or cooperated with the Coalition. The group now sought to

Approved for Release

[302] [| Military | 06 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060406 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[303] Ibid.
[304] [| Military | 11 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060411 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[305] [| Military | 03 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060403 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[306] [| Military | 2 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060402 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[307] Ibid; [| Military | 11 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060411 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[308] [| Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

carry out retribution. While the presence of Coalition units in Haditha prevented the creation of a large AQI presence in the urban area, the city was still subjected to a regular series of attacks and intimidation actions such as the implementation of *hadd* punishments.[309]

~~(S)~~ With the collapse of city government in these cities, AQI now formed the associate group al-Shari'ah al-Diniya in al-Jabib east of Husaybah under the leadership of the (b)(6) (b)(6) The group was primarily focused on building VBIEDs for use in attacks in Baghdad and Bayji, its explosives experts having attended 1.4b 1.4b They were ordered by the AQI leadership to limit their attacks on the Iraqi security forces to no more than once every two weeks in order to create a false sense of security and lessen the likelihood of retaliation.[310]

~~(S)~~ Everything did not go as AQI wished, and in fact the group faced a new problem in western Anbar: fresh tension between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna due to the desertion of AQI leader (b)(6) (b)(6) and more than 150 fighters to Ansar al-Sunna. Formerly a senior lieutenant to AQI leader (b)(6) (a former Iraqi special forces commando who had assumed command of many of AQI amir (b)(6) forces in Haditha following his detention), (b)(6) had declined a seat on the Mujahideen Shura Council and his defection was a blow to overall AQI efforts to maintain dominance in western Anbar. (b)(6) (b)(6) operatives in Baghdad, Haditha, and Rutbah made up more than half of (b)(6) entire force.[311] The defection may have been prompted by a disagreement with AMZ's policies, since (b)(6) would later rejoin AQI after AMZ's death.

AQI Dominance in Ramadi Continues

~~(S)~~ There were no such difficulties in Ramadi. Having brought the other Ramadi insurgent groups to its side, AQI and its allies were able to regularly conduct IED, SAF, and IDF attacks against Coalition and Iraqi patrols and bases. Increasingly, the group was able to orchestrate complex attacks against key targets such as the Government Center and Observation Post Horea. Many of (b)(6) AQI fighters lived in safe houses in the Albu Dhiab, Ghazwan, and Julaybah farming communities outside the city, skirting Coalition entry control points by using side roads through the Sufia and 2nd Officer districts.[312]

~~(S/NF)~~ The al-Hajj Mosque in the Qatana district served as AQI's primary command and control node during its attacks on the Government center. From the al-Hajj Mosque, (b)(6) (b)(6) were able to oversee attacks and issue coded orders by playing cassettes containing select portions from the Qu'ran from the mosque loudspeakers.[313]
~~(S)~~ Typical AQI fighters active in Ramadi during this period were armed with AK-47 7.62mm rifles, 57-122mm rockets, and a wide range of IEDs that were regularly used in stand-off attacks, ambushes, and as a cover for retreats. Most of the attacks conducted by AQI targeted the Coalition

[309] [| Military | 14 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060414 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[310] [| Military | 07 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060407 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[311] [| Military | 23 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060323 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[312] [| Military | 09 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060408 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[313] [| Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

in the center of Ramadi as well as the Tamim and Malaab districts, though Iraqi security forces were also regularly targeted. AQI planning for complex attack and ambushes was often highly detailed, involving the use of sand tables, written operational orders, and percision timing. The overwhelming majority of AQI fighters active in Ramadi were Iraqi nationals who were familiar with the urban terrain and whose sophisticated attacks took full advantage of constricted lines of sight, covered support-by-fire positions, pre-registered IDF, and the occasional use of synchronized SVBIEDs to achieve initial surprise against hardened positions. At any given time, AQI was able to mass up to 150 fighters, drivers, mortarmen, spotters, and scouts, with most major attacks involving up to thirty fighters against 3-4 separate targets.[314]

~~(S/NF)~~ By April 2006, AQI had expanded their organization's involvement in the Ramadi black market to the point where the group was not only supported by organized crime but had in effect become the center of Ramadi organized crime. The group directly controlled a wide range of criminal operations in Ramadi including vehicle theft, extortion, robbery, and black market gas sales.[315] This control helped AQI to be financially self-sufficient and to profit from vehicle theft, blackmail, extortion, robbery, and kidnapping, using the proceeds to cover day-to-day operations and provide regular salaries to members. Local criminal gangs loyal to AQI successfully extorted money from contractors to support their illicit ventures. International facilitators provided AQI with recruiting incentive funds as well as the necessary money to buy off or coerce elements of other insurgent groups into joining it. AQI maintained an extremely tight grip on the population of Ramadi, employing sophisticated intimidation tactics while taking into account local sensitivities by reducing attacks on civilians not directly associated with the Coalition.[316]

~~(S)~~ With the Ramadi self-sufficiency model in mind, AQI instituted a three-pronged local funding strategy to limit the need for international support:[317]

1. Exploit the Coalition's civil-military reconstruction contracts by gathering information on reconstruction or economic development initiatives to gauge which Iraqi contractors are most likely to win Coalition contracts. The contractors were then targeted for infiltration, extortion, or co-opting to force them to contribute a part of their profits to AQI.
2. Extort money from local government officials or tribal leaders with access to government funding through kidnapping and protection rackets. Kidnapping targets were not limited to the affluent, but the Ramadi elite was a favored target due to their greater access to government funding and their personal wealth.
3. Vehicle theft allowed AQI to turn a 100% profit on the Ramadi black market. This was the least preferred of the three options because vehicle theft was manpower intensive and exposed AQI fighters to Coalition attack.

~~(S/NF)~~ Each district of the city was put under the command of a different amir. For instance in the Albu Dhiab area, AQI amir (b)(6) controlled propane deliveries in the area, only

[314] [| Military | 09 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060409 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[315] [| Military | 04 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060404 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[316] [| Military | 09 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060409 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[317] All material is taken from [| Military | 14 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060414 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

allowing AQI supporters and their families to receive the fuel. Because most Iraqi families relied on propane to cook their meals, this was effectively a means of starving the opposition into submission. Setting up a network of secret police made up entirely of formerly Ba'athist teenagers, (b)(6) authorized them to engage in violent crime against anyone suspected of betraying AQI.[318]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI still used the Ramadi General Hospital in the Warar district as its primary command post, with secondary command nodes set up at the Women and Children's Hospital and a number of electronic shops.[319] AQI members (b)(6) (b)(6) regularly extorted several members of Governor Mamoun's staff, forcing them to award preferential contracts to their (b)(6) and his al-Mutaqin construction company that could then be used to support the insurgency. (b)(6) of slain AMZ lieutenant Thamir Mubarak Atrouz and failed 1.4b suicide bomber (b)(6) (b)(6) served as the head of AQI in the 5 Kilo district.[320]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's expansion in Ramadi attracted international notice in the form of (b)(6) an emissary from AQAM to the Mujahideen Shura Council who also acted as a mufti. Visiting the Albu Jabr area of Ramadi, he was so impressed by AQI's progress in the city that he issued a fatwa in support of their activities. While AQI in Ramadi had already received similar religious sanction for their criminal activity from their local spiritual leaders (b)(6) in fatwas that authorized them to steal money paid to contractors by the Coalition and the Iraqi government, (b)(6) was far more well-known and as such his opinion carried much more weight. While these fatwas did not create significant traction among Ramadi residents, they were used by criminal gangs loyal to AQI to justify their activities.[321]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's dominance in Ramadi had an unexpected side-effect. Sajil Forces leader (b)(6) (b)(6) and Yarmuk Brigade leader (b)(6) quickly came to the conclusion that if the Coalition didn't kill them, then AQI would. The two fled Ramadi soon afterwards, further depleting (b)(6) pool of potential allies in the city.[322]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Coalition scored a success in the propaganda war with the capture of (b)(6) (b)(6) along with Associated Press correspondent and AQI propagandist (b)(6) (b)(6) had been one of AQI's spiritual leaders, issuing fatwas authorizing anti-Coalition and criminal activities. In addition, he was the head of AQI propaganda in Ramadi, producing high-quality media to support AQI. (b)(6) served much the same role and an analysis of his laptop, thumb drive, and over sixty CDs and DVDs revealed extensive footage of anti-Coalition attacks, including videos taken alongside insurgents during attacks.[323]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite their dominance in Ramadi, there was little enthusiasm among Ramadi residents for AQI. The increase in criminality that AQI brought to the town, along with their usual murder and

Approved for Release

[318] [| Military | 10 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060410 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[319] [| Military | 04 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060404 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[320] [| Military | 05 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060405 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[321] [| Military | 04 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060404 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[322] [| Military | 16 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060416 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[323] [| Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

intimidation campaigns, meant that AQI was feared rather than loved. Many AQI fighters were aware that they had lost the support of Ramadi residents, but did not believe that this was necessary for their domination of the city. They appear to have believed that they would prevail in the city because they were superior to other insurgent groups, and then could win back the support of the citizens.[324]

AQI Attempts to Regroup in Karmah

~~(S)~~ With these successes, AQI now decided to regenerate its operations in Karmah. The new drive in Karmah was under the leadership of (b)(6) and included an alliance with (b)(6) a Salafist member of Jaysh al-Mujahideen who was one of the group's top commanders. Amassing a significant number of Iraqi and foreign fighters, AQI and Jaysh al-Mujahideen carried out a large, coordinated attack against Coalition positions in Karmah on April 8. The main attack was directed against the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines Observation Post #3, with some insurgents forming blocking positions throughout Karmah while others positioned VBIEDs. A third group formed another assault element that burned tires on the road to prevent the Coalition from passing. In another action, AQI leader (b)(6) was able to plan and execute a complex attack with his Jaysh al-Mujahideen allies that included a major attack on the Iraqi army position in western Karmah, an ambush on 20th Street that served as the most likely route of Coalition reinforcements, diversionary IDF and sniper attacks, and a feint operation intended to draw Coalition forces into a complex ambush north of the Karmah police station.[325]

~~(S)~~ The successful Coalition defense of Karmah with the assistance of the Iraqi army was a significant tactical victory against AQI and Jaysh al-Mujahideen, which were unable to defeat the 1st Battalion, 4th Brigade of the 1st Iraqi Army Division despite mounting the largest insurgent attack in Karmah since June 2004. Of the roughly 100 AQI and Jaysh al-Mujahideen fighters that took part in the attack, twenty-three were killed, two were wounded, and six were captured, while the Coalition suffered one dead and the Iraqi army suffered five dead and five wounded.[326] The Coalition success in Karmah was based on the Coalition's tactical superiority at the small unit level. Air and artillery strikes played no role in the Coalition success although the entire Coalition and Iraqi army forces in Karmah outnumbered the insurgents 280 to 100.

Further Subordination of the Islamic Army of Iraq

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite this victory, the advance of AQI in the province was not halted. By late April 2006, the Islamic Army of Iraq in Anbar had been almost completely broken by AQI, with its local and regional leaders in the province receiving orders from the Mujahideen Shura Council. While the national leadership of the Islamic Army of Iraq had originally rejected participation in the Mujahideen Shura Council, its provincial leadership in Anbar was far less discriminating. Sheikh Fahd Majid al-Kurdi, the imam of the Mu'adh bin Jabal mosque in the Tamim district of Ramadi

[324] [| Military | 31 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060331 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[325] [| Military | 21 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060421 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[326] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

and head of the Islamic Army of Iraq in Anbar, agreed to become a member of the Mujahideen Shura Council.[327]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite his break with the Islamic Army of Iraq leadership, Sheikh Fahd continued receiving large amounts of money from (b)(6) the group's primary patron, via 1.4b The funds allowed the group to purchase weapons and ammunition. (b)(6) of AMS secretary-general Harith al-Dhari, was willing to finance any group that would carry out attacks on the Coalition. While (b)(6) role in the insurgency had taken on a more political role during trips to the Middle East and Europe to rally support for AMS, he continued to serve as an active financier and facilitator for the insurgency.[328]

AQI Perceptions of Western Anbar

~~(S)~~ A rare glimpse into the AQI leadership's decision-making in Anbar can be seen in a message from the *shura majlis* to a senior commander identified only by the *kunya* of (b)(6) In it, the *shura majlis* makes the following points:[329]

- Sunnis were never to be killed, especially not in a brutal fashion, unless they were known to have collaborated with the Coalition or the Iraqi government.
- Sunni civilians were not to be targeted for killing, only collaborators, soldiers, or police. If they were targeted for killing, it was better if it was carried out discreetly rather than in a public venue.
- Negotiations were to be held with tribal leaders cooperating with the government before they were targeted for assassination. If they agreed to cease cooperating with the government following these negotiations, they were to be left alone.
- Albu Nimr tribe had to be targeted in Hit, preferably discreetly, though the AQI leadership did authorize the use of "missiles" against them.
- AQI activity in Rawah and al-Qaim were currently at unacceptably low levels.

~~(S)~~ The letter to Abu Usama illustrated the AQI leadership's shift to a less public murder and intimidation campaign now that it was the dominant insurgent group in Anbar. The leadership's disapproval of the low level of activity in Rawah and al-Qaim indicated its likely awareness of the popularity enjoyed by anti-AQI mayor Farhan Takan Farhan. While Mayor Farhan was too powerful for AQI to attack directly in al-Qaim, the same was not true for many of his Albu Mahal tribesmen.[330]

~~(S/NF)~~ This shift away from a public murder and intimidation campaign by the AQI leadership may have been due in part to pressure on AMZ from AQSL. On March 30, AMZ reportedly left Iraq and went to 1.4b He apparently did this with the assistance of Sunni officials in 1.4b 1.4b The purpose of AMZ's

Approved for Release

[327] [| Military | 19 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060419 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[328] Ibid.
[329] [| Military | 2 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060402 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[330] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

trip to 1.4b was to meet with a member of AQSL who demanded that AMZ speak with him face-to-face to learn why he had initiated sectarian warfare in Iraq despite explicit orders to the contrary from Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri.[331] A personal emissary of AQSL, (b)(6) also met with AMZ, ordering him to stop recruiting new members for AQI online without a proper background check.[332] In AMZ's absence, AQI was put under the command of (b)(6) (b)(6) the head of the Mujahideen Shura Council, and a man who would soon play a much larger role in AQI.[333]

AQI and Bayji Oil Smuggling

~~(S)~~ Zarqawi's continued defiance of al Qaeda leadership was fueled, in part, by the financial self-sufficiency. As we have seen, AQI was benefiting from their relationship with two of the four oil companies licensed to transport oil across the border into 1.4b By the end of March reports indicated AQI had begun working with Jaysh al-Mujahideen, its associate group al-Fursan Brigade, and criminal elements in Bayji to profit even further from oil smuggling, producing as much as $50,000 a week for the group in revenue. Inadequate law enforcement and high-level corruption throughout the Ministry of Oil and the North Oil Company created conditions that AQI was able to exploit. Smuggling 10-100 tanker trucks each week from Bayji to other regions of Iraq and neighboring states such 1.4b AQI was able to sell oil on the black market or to foreign buyers at more than three times the Iraqi government-subsidized price.[334]

~~(S)~~ By the end of April, AQI was acquiring fuel for resale on the Ramadi black market directly from the state-owned refinery in Bayji using official government requisition forms and manifests. AQI supporters trucked the oil to Ramadi then drove the empty trucks back to Bayji and extorted or bribed officials into refueling them. Their oil trucks then returned to Bayji with the same manifest for safe passage. AQI continued to reuse manifests until the next authorized allotments of fuel was made, at which time it received new manifests as they were issued.[335]

~~(S)~~ AQI's operation was made possible by Anbar's acting director-general for oil distribution (b)(6) (b)(6) who worked for (b)(6) Formerly the manager of the Ramadi distribution terminal, (b)(6) had originally acquired fuel for AQI to resell on the black market in return for a share of the profit. (b)(6) apparently dissatisfied with this relationship, kidnapped (b)(6) son, releasing him ten days later after receiving $50,000 in weapons and vehicles. Under the terms of his (b)(6) agreed to provide AQI with official requisition forms, giving the group access to a source of funds that enabled it to expand its activity in Anbar.[336]

~~(S)~~ Later reports indicated estimated AQI's monopoly on black market fuel sales in Ramadi provided the group with $500,000 a month from the sale of benzene alone. When combined with the full

[331] [| Military | 12 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060412 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[332] [| Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[333] [| Military | 12 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060412 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[334] [|Military | 2 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060402 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[335] [|Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[336] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

spectrum of AQI's other criminal activity (extortion, kidnapping, and hijacking), the group's total monthly income amounted to several million dollars, more than enough to cover its operating costs several times over. As a result, excess capital was divided up with the rest of AQI or invested in legitimate real estate or small business ventures in Ramadi that enabled AQI to make significant inroads into the provincial economy.[337]

~~(S/NF)~~ 1.4b remaining followers from the Albu Fahd tribe did not accept the situation in Ramadi. The tribe carried out sporadic resistance against AQI in the city and its outskirts, driving them out of Albu Bali village.[338] This action set off another round of tribal warfare between AQI and the Albu Fahd, leading to the AQI assassination of IIP activist and Anbar University student Ibrahim Faisal Antar al-Fahdawi. The Albu Fahd responded by killing an AQI fighter named Majid, prompting an agressive AQI patrol in the Sijaria and Julaybah tribal areas east of Ramadi in an effort to locate the killer. The patrol was led by a 1.4b AQI fighter who told residents that Shi'a agents had killed Majid in preparation for an attack on Ramadi and that AQI was now their only protection.[339]

City Stories

Hit

~~(S/NF)~~ To strengthen their presence in Hit, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna began recruiting from the more than 800 unemployed Iraqi police in Hit that were disbanded in early April, offering to pay their salaries and help support their families. More than one hundred former police accepted their offer and AQI made good on their promise to the unemployed men by paying them in money gained through black market sales to finance their operations.[340] Those recruits who accepted AQI's offer were sent to Wadi al-Maut ("Death Valley") in the Jabab area east of 'Ubaydi for training. If they showed promise, they were sent to 1.4b for more advanced terrorist training.[341]

Haditha

~~(S)~~ Throughout the Haditha area, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna continued their brutal murder and intimidation campaign. This campaign was largely successful and attempts to re-form the local police or municipal government were completely stalled. While the national Ansar al-Sunna leadership still refused to join the Mujahideen Shura Council, in Haditha AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders had all but integrated their efforts and organizations.[342]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) was the AQI amir for the Haditha area, having been promoted to replace (b)(6) following Operation SAYYAD II. In this role, (b)(6) oversaw all financing and operational orders that affected AQI in the Haditha area, maintaining

[337] [| Military | 20 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060420 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[338] [| Military | 21 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060421 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[339] [| Military | 24 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060424 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[340] [| Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[341] [| Military | 25 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060425 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[342] [| Military | 04 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060504 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

AQI's murder and intimidation using a network of spies. Most of AQI's recruiting was overseen by a group of Wahhabi preachers who received funding from 1.4b [343]

~~(S)~~ The Haditha police were now based in Ash Sharqat under the command of (b)(6) (b)(6) who wanted to return to Haditha and reestablish the police force there with the support of the Coalition and the Iraqi army. The Albu Hyatt-based AQI leadership met with (b)(6) and offered to stop attacking his tribe if he agreed to disband the police force, but he refused.[344]

Anah

~~(S/NF)~~ As in Hit and Haditha, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna pooled their efforts in and around Anah, undermining security in the city through a murder and intimidation campaign. The remnants of Saraya al-Jihad were also active in Anah, calling for a boycott of 1.4b goods in the city.[345]

Rawah

~~(S/NF)~~ Former Iraqi colonel, Ba'athist, and Jerusalem Army member (b)(6) (b)(6) succeeded (b)(6) as the leader of AQI in Rawah. Prior to OIF, (b)(6) had commanded the 2nd Regiment of the Ghaza Brigade in Haditha under Saddam Hussein, but he had fled to 1.4b following Saddam's overthrow only to return as an insurgent in 2004. He had served as a deputy to (b)(6) prior to his capture in early 2005 (see Chapter 5a) and now commanded 50-60 fighters in the city.[346]

Dulab and Albu Hyatt

~~(S/NF)~~ A significant number of Iraqi and foreign AQI fighters flowed in and out of the Dulab area to avoid detection by the Coalition. Much of AQI's Anbar leadership based itself in the Dulab and Albu Hyatt areas north of Hit and south of Haditha. The Dulab area in particular provided quick access into the major cities along the Euphrates River as well as an easy escape into the desert to avoid Coalition operations.[347]

Baghdadi

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI began to reassert its authority in Baghdadi first by sabotaging the water treatment plant on April 10, leaving the town without water, and later by murdering fifteen civilians outside the Baghdadi Municipal Building. AQI's renewed activity in Baghdadi was a result of the efforts of its local associate group al-Asa'ab al-Asham led by (b)(6) This group had been specifically created by AQI to target the Baghdadi police and was supported financially by Brigadier General Sutayir Muhammad Su'ud al-'Ubaydi, who registered the group's

[343] [| Military | 20 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060420 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[344] [| Military | 07 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060507 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[345] [| Military | 02 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060502 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[346] [| Military | 08 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060508 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[347] [| Military | 01 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060501 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

members as personnel in the "Baghdadi Electricity Police." Among al-Asa'ab al-Sham's more infamous activities were posing as police recruiters and convincing a group of fourteen Baghdadi residents to sign up with promises of training and signing bonuses. They then proceeded to interrogate the would-be recruits before executing them outside the Baghdadi Muncipal Building.[348]

Kubaysah

~~(S/NF)~~ In the nearby town of Kubaysah, AQI also attempted to reassert their presence by killing assistant Kubaysah district director (b)(6)[349] AQI leader (b)(6) had earlier attempted to assassinate the Kubaysah mayor, but residents fought back, killing four AQI fighters and injuring Aqada. Kubaysah resident (b)(6) took (b)(6) to his home and contacted the Baghdadi police to have him arrested, but AQI fighters set up checkpoints around Kubaysah to keep the police from entering the city.[350]

Akashat

~~(S)~~ A force of sixty Desert Protectors provided security against AQI in Akashat, augmented by thirty police officers from al-Qaim under the command of (b)(6) The Akashat police would normally have been funded by the Rutbah police district, but since Rutbah had no police force there were no funds available for Akashat.[351]

Rutbah

~~(S)~~ On March 31, the Rutbah city council held their first meeting since the release of self-declared "city leader of Rutbah" (b)(6) who had been arrested by the Coalition for attempting to solicit a copy of the BOLO ("Be On the Look-Out") list from an Iraqi soldier. During the meeting, (b)(6) offered to help the Coalition apprehend insurgents, a remarkable and disingenuous about-face given that (b)(6) was tied to both the insurgency and to organized crime in Rutbah and used extortion and blackmail to control the city council.[352]

~~(S)~~ AMZ believed that there was an increase in Coalition efforts to disrupt the insurgency in Rutbah and dispatched a courier to AQI members in the city to increase their activities. Rutbah resident (b)(6) served as AQI's primary courier in Rutbah, traveling to al-Qaim to receive messages from AMZ from another AQI courier who received messages from another AQI courier from an unknown location.[353]

Snapshot of the Insurgency

Approved for Release

[348] [| Military | 18 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060418 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[349] [| Military | 21 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060421 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[350] [| Military | 16 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060516 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[351] [| Military | 01 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060501 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[352] [| Military | 31 Mar 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060331 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[353] [| Military | 11 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060511 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ By April, AQI had managed to regain much of the ground it had lost during the operations of the previous year. Networks that had been disrupted were rebuilt, intimidation and murder campaigns were begun anew, and residents of the towns of western Anbar who had worked with the Coalition were targeted as "collaborators" and "traitors." Only two areas remained outside AQI influence: Fallujah and al-Qa'im, with the resistance of the tribes in the latter city provided a foretaste of the more serious tribal resistance to AQI that would appear in September and October.

Jafari Ousted but Violence Continues (April – May)

~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~ National political developments, in contrast to the events in Anbar, moved in a more positive direction. On April 22, Islamic Dawa Party politician Jawad al-Maliki won a 6-1 vote in the UIA leadership council to replace Ibrahim Jafari as the UIA candidate for prime minister. In contrast to Jafari, al-Maliki was regarded by Anbaris as an opponent of the Shi'a militias and was not seen as excessively influenced by [1.4b] A new Iraqi government was formed soon afterwards with Jalal Talabani as president.[354]

Further AQI Consolidation in Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ On a local level, events in Anbar were dominated by three trends during this period: first, the rising sectarian violence provided ample new recruits for AQI; second, the consolidation of AQI's victories in Ramadi continued and led to attempts to create a similar environment in Fallujah; and finally, there was a backlash against AQI.

~~(S/NF)~~ The consolidation in Ramadi showed the directions in which AQI hoped to take the insurgency. In contrast to earlier murder campaigns, the organization now merely intimidated SAR insurgent leaders into pledging bayat to AMZ or into joining the Mujahideen Shura Council.[355] AQI had already won over the majority of Islamic Army of Iraq fighters in Anbar through the defection of Sheikh Fahd, and now targeted [(b)(6)] of the Islamic Army of Iraq's national leader (and Tawafuq Front MP) [(b)(6)].[356] These efforts were supervised by [(b)(6)] [(b)(6)] with the assistance of [(b)(6)] a representative of AQSL and deputy of 'Usama bin Laden who had spent the previous two years fighting Coalition forces in Afghanistan. [(b)(6)] recently arrived in Ramadi to deliver a large sum of money to support AQI operations there, though it is interesting to note that representatives of AQSL chose to interact with local commanders rather deal with AMZ or his lieutenants.[357]

~~(S/NF)~~ The efforts of [(b)(6)] were largely successful and within just a few weeks, they convinced the Ramadi, Fallujah, and Zaidon branches of the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Saraya Jaysh al-

Approved for Release

[354] [| Military | 23 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060423 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[355].These efforts included the kidnapping of Majid Muhammad Abu Yasim, the leader of the SAR group Harakat al-Islamia who had supported both the December elections and the Anbar People's Committee.
[356] [| Military | 25 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060425 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[357] [| Military | 24 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060425 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Mansoura al-Muslimeen to unite under the AQI banner, adopting AQI rank structure and common goals.[358]

~~(S/NF)~~ By this time in late April, AQI's financial network had grown so large in Ramadi that it required its own bureaucracy to adequately manage its finances. (b)(6) (b)(6) oversaw the administration of AQI finances (including the *khams*) from central Ramadi. Their aides were the direct links between AQI cells and their criminal allies, who extorted money from the government contracting process.[359]

~~(S/NF)~~ By May 2006, AQI's financial network was sufficiently organized, mature, and robust that the average salary of a starting AQI fighter in Ramadi was $1,000 a month; the next highest paying group was Ansar al-Sunna at $250 a month. There were also regular bonuses of $200 per successful IED attack, $600-700 for attacking and destroying a Humvee, and $7,000 for shooting down a Coalition helicopter. The only exception was in Fallujah, where the less established AQI financial network could only afford to pay salaries of $190-380 a month for starting fighters and $760 a month for cell leaders. To compensate, the group offered all new members a free car regardless of their rank.[360]

~~(S)~~ To manage its operations in Ramadi, AQI relied on an elaborate courier network to transmit verbal or written orders to subordinate commanders in order to prepare for complex attacks against the Coalition targets in a timely manner. When the local or regional AQI leadership had determined a target to attack in Ramadi, a time and rally point was relayed through the chain of command using couriers at various mosques.[361]

~~(S/NF)~~ Given the sheer number of cells and allied groups that AQI could organize to carry out complex attacks, the use of human couriers reflected a dedication to operational security by (b)(6) (b)(6) and his subordinates. AQI fighters in Ramadi were told that all cellular, landline, and high-powered cordless phones were monitored by the Coalition or its informants.[362] The AQI leadership in Ramadi also began a systematic destruction of the landline system and cell phones towers throughout eastern Anbar to impose communication discipline on their subordinates by force.[363]

~~(S)~~ The result of AQI's efforts in Ramadi was clear: key areas of the city now saw a daily series of running gun battles between AQI and Coalition troops. While over 200 AQI members were killed by the Coalition in Ramadi between March and April 2006, the majority were low-ranking fighters. AQI's robust infrastructure in Ramadi meant that it was able to easily regenerate personnel losses.[364]

The Results of AQI Influence in Ramadi

Approved for Release

---

[358] [| Military | 27 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060427 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] and [| Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[359] [| Military | 25 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060425 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[360] [| Military | 04 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060504 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[361] [| Military | 28 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060428 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[362] [| Military | 28 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060428 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[363] [| Military | 28 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060428 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[364] [| Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060430 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ AQI now used the region surrounding Ramadi as a hub for activity throughout western and central Iraq, employing a system of relatively unregulated roads to transport personnel and materials throughout Anbar and into Baghdad, Karbala, and Diyala. These established transit routes were used despite a constant Coalition presence. By using cells from other regions they hoped to avoid detection of AQI infrastructure in the local area by Coalition or Iraqi forces. AQI leaders met and planned anti-Coalition and anti-government operations in remote areas of the Ramadi-Haditha corridor, transporting assets throughout Iraq using roads through al-Tash. AQI assets traveling specifically to eastern Iraq (including SVBIEDs destined for Baghdad) also used roads through Amariyah and continued towards Mahmudiyah or Jurf al-Sakr.[365]

~~(S)~~ VBIEDs and suicide bombers intended for use outside Ramadi were kept in the areas surrounding Ramadi to facilitate their infiltration. AQI was not concerned about operational security in the Ramadi area because much of central Ramadi and its surrounding area were considered "safe" by the group. In light of this perception, AQI believed it could consolidate personnel in Ramadi with little chance that its operations would be compromised. AQI used the areas north of Ramadi such as Saddamiyah and Lake Thar Thar to transport personnel and materials into the northern provinces of Iraq to carry out attacks in Mosul and Tikrit.[366]

~~(S/NF)~~ Ramadi was thus the new center of AQI efforts in Anbar and possibly throughout Iraq. In the absence of similar success in Baghdad, AQI sought to control Ramadi and the surrounding countryside. If this strategy succeeded, AQI would be in a position to finance, organize, and control a large terrorist organization that would be capable of carrying out mass casualty attacks in Baghdad, 1.4b at will.[367]

AQI Moves in Fallujah

~~(S/NF)~~ In mid-April AQI senior leaders met in Amariyah to discuss shifting their attention to Fallujah now that they had solidified their control over insurgent and criminal networks in Ramadi. AQI's goals in Fallujah were to undermine the deployment of Iraqi security forces, distract the Coalition from carrying out attacks against AQI in Ramadi, demonstrate their solidarity with the Sunni community by attacking Shi'a soldiers, and put Fallujah back in the international media spotlight. After this meeting, AQI persuaded the local 1920 Revolution Brigade, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Ansar al-Sunna groups to pool their resources in order to attack the largely Shi'a Iraqi army forces in the city.[368] While this led to AQI resuming its status as the dominant insurgent group in Fallujah, tribal violence often resulted in anti-AQI activity from its would-be allies.[369]

(b)(6) **Last Redoubt**

Approved for Release

[365] [| Military | 14 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060514 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[366] Ibid.
[367] Ibid.
[368] [| Military | 20 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060420 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[369] [| Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) remained one of the few challengers to AQI's dominance of the insurgency in Ramadi. Yet, though he was still active in Habbaniyah—with his surviving 1920 Revolution Brigade followers—(b)(6) would not assume the mantle of former Brigadier General al-Rawi as the public face of anti-AQI efforts in Anbar. He did, however, surreptitiously circulate propaganda that AQI was supported by 1.4b in order to undermine their claims to be "the protectors of the Sunni." Under his general direction 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters also shot AQI cell leader Muhammad Fahid, whose superior had been involved in kidnapping fighters from the Islamic Army of Iraq.[370] Even so, (b)(6) was unable to prevent AQI from regularly kidnapping and murdering Iraqi army and police force members in Habbaniyah, showing that his influence and power were greatly reduced.[371]

Anbari Perceptions of the Insurgency

~~(S/NF)~~ By early May, then, AQI had largely reached its goal of dominating the insurgency in Anbar. Yet it had achieved this at a cost: the general population saw it as much as a glorified criminal enterprise as a jihadist organization. Brutality and cutthroat tactics had enabled AQI to seize control of the insurgency and the black market, giving the group a position of unparalleled power, but these tactics had also alienated ordinary Anbaris. Yet AQI was in no danger of being displaced as long as it was able to maintain financial self-sufficiency, intimidate the population, and keep its relative freedom of movement.[372]

~~(S/NF)~~ The shift in perceptions of AQI in Anbar was based on the reality that despite its rhetoric about jihad, much of its resources (money, weapons, and fighters) was used by low-level amirs for their own financial gain. In addition, the tribal areas that supported AQI were controlled using brutal tactics. Common criminals and thugs who had once operated independently now served AQI, committing violent acts in the name of AQI, but in reality for their personal profit.[373]

~~(S/NF)~~ Growing Anbari animosity towards AQI was, however, not enough to challenge AQI's dominance. Popular sentiment toward the group was far outweighed by the destruction of the Anbar People's Committee, the marginalization of (b)(6) the absence of a functioning police force and AQI's continued ability to move fighters throughout Anbar.[374]

~~(S)~~ The weakness of Anbaris relative to AQI can be seen in the May 2 kidnapping of (b)(6) (b)(6) from the Jazira area near Ramadi. (b)(6) was the brother of Sheikh Sa'ad Na'if Mishan Hardan Albu Aetha, the head of the Albu Aetha tribe. An ardent Ba'athist and one of the last surviving members of (b)(6) inner circle, Sheikh Sa'ad had agreed to support political engagement at the behest of Sheikh Nasser. After the death of Sheikh Nasser and Lieutenant General al-Rawi, Sheikh Sa'ad's brother (b)(6) had become more active in Ramadi politics, attending provincial-level meetings on a semi-regular basis. This made (b)(6) and by extension Sheikh Sa'ad a target for AQI violence over concern that he would begin cooperating

Approved for Release

[370] [| Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[371] [| Military | 30 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060430 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[372] [| Military | 03 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060503 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[373] Ibid.
[374] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

with the Coalition. Yet despite the kidnapping of his brother, Sheikh Sa'ad feared that AQI was too powerful to attack directly and made no plans for retaliation.[375]

~~(S/NF)~~ The dangers of shifting Anbari perceptions of AQI were recognized by some within the group, and a few even agreed that the negative views had basis in reality. The leadership of AQI in Karmah, for instance, came to the conclusion that much of their group had drifted away from Salafism and was now synonymous with nothing more than theft, murder, kidnappings, and beheadings. They believed that it was time for their followers to return to the Qu'ran and ordered their followers to stop harming the Iraqi people.[376]

Tribal Resistance Resumes against AQI

~~(S/NF)~~ In early May, the tribes renewed resistance. Sheikh Hamayid Hamid Mirwal al-'Ubaydi, whose cousin had been burnt alive by AQI, convinced nine 'Ubaydi subtribal sheikhs (representing 6,000 tribesmen) to issue a leaflet urging the al-Sa'ida, Albu Amar, and Albu Gitashat tribes to hand over any AQI members in their area to the Coalition and the Iraqi police. The three targeted tribes were located primarily in Baghdadi, Dulab, Hit, and Haditha and the leaflet called for violence against the tribesmen even if the tribes themselves were not aligned with AQI.[377]

~~(S/NF)~~ In addition to the nine 'Ubaydi subsheikhs, the Albu Nimr, elements of the Albu Mahal, and several other tribes, also united against AQI. Yet despite this public show of anti-AQI sentiment there were still considerable divisions and weaknesses within the tribes. Thousands of Albu Nimr, Albu Mahal, and Albu 'Ubayd tribesmen worked for or at least supported AQI and thousands more thought that the sheikhs issuing the anti-AQI statements were not legitimate representatives of their tribes.[378]

Further Insurgent Infighting

~~(S/NF)~~ Anti-AQI sentiment was also inflamed in Fallujah. In this case, it was by a video from AMZ, who stated anyone who sought a military or government position was an infidel. The SAR insurgent groups in the city were primarily composed of former soldiers or government officials who had joined the insurgency in order to regain their former positions once a political settlement was reached. Angered by AMZ's statement, Fallujahns killed four AQI fighters soon after the video's release. (b)(6) exploited the situation, having the 1920 Revolution Brigade draw up a hit list of forty-two AQI leaders to assassinate. The 'Umar bin Abd al-Aziz Group was formed as a result of this tension with the stated purposes of opposing AQI and protecting the people of Fallujah from the group's extreme view of *shari'ah*. Both (b)(6) were targeted for assassination as a result of these efforts and AQI responded by assassinating Sheikh Umar of the Usama bin Zayd Mosque near Fallujah.[379]

Approved for Release

---

[375] [| Military | 07 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060507 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[376] [| Military | 03 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060503 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[377] [| Military | 07 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060507 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[378] Ibid.
[379] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ AMZ's declaration also appears to have inspired AQI fighters to assassinate Governor Mamoun's secretary Umar Sari al-Alwani, one of AQI and (b)(6) most highly placed informants in the Anbar provincial government.[380] While Umar Sari had been both corrupt and an insurgent informant, he had also been the lynchpin of day-to-day operations at the Government Center.[381] With his death, most of the provincial government officials and bureaucrats simply stopped coming to work in the belief that they could be next.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) now attempted to rally members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the al-Nu'man Brigade, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and Harakat Islamiya against AQI in Ramadi, only to find that those fighters who heeded his call were in such disarray that even those commanders who would have supported him did not possess a clear organization or status. In some cases, the groups that (b)(6) hoped would support him had already been absorbed into or subordinated by AQI. This was the case with both the Islamic Army of Iraq and (b)(6) own 1920 Revolution Brigade in Ramadi.[382] As a result, when (b)(6) 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters (who had accompanied him to Habbaniyah) managed to return to the Tamim district of Ramadi in mid-May 2006, they found themselves opposed by many of their former 1920 Revolution Brigade comrades who were now loyal to AMZ.[383]

~~(S)~~ AQI responded to (b)(6) latest action against their group by murdering Hajji Raja al-Fahdawi and his two sons at their home in the Albu Fahd tribal region. Hajji Raja had been an ally of (b)(6) who had been involved in efforts to legitimize the goals of 1920 Revolution Brigade by having the group join the political process using his high-level contacts in the Iraqi interior ministry.[384]

~~(S)~~ As a result of the renewed anti-AQI sentiment, 1920 Revolution Brigade senior leader (b)(6) who had previously broken with (b)(6) over the issue of political engagement, now ordered his followers to cease cooperation with AQI and to cooperate with the Iraqi police and the military against AQI by capturing or killing its leaders.[385]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI retaliated by kidnapping a senior leader of the remnant Islamic Army of Iraq along with his top aides. This act convinced national leaderships of Islamic Army of Iraq and 1920 Revolution Brigade to reach out to their treacherous subordinates in an effort to persuade them that AQI was a direct threat to the security and stability of Anbar. The leadership of both groups and many Fallujah residents now referred to AQI as "al-Tawlid wal Ijhadh," a play on the group's old name of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad that meant "Birth and Abortion" because of the harm that AQI had caused to the people of Fallujah.[386]

Approved for Release

---

[380] [| Military | 21 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM| 20060521 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]. There may have been more mundane motives, namely that Umar had been unable to support his killers' attempts to obtain legitimate government contracts. See [| Military | 24 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060524 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[381] [| Military | 02 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060602 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[382] [| Military | 15 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060515 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[383] [| Military | 16 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060516 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[384] [| Military | 19 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060519 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[385] [| Military | 12 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060512 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[386] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Zaidon-based AQI leaders (b)(6) decided to act preemptively against 1920 Revolution Brigade to prevent inter-insurgent violence from spreading to their area, kidnapping 1920 Revolution Brigade leader (b)(6) (b)(6) and his top deputy (b)(6). Both (b)(6) had been negotiating with the Coalition on behalf of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Jaysh Muhammad in an effort to create a new paramilitary group called Kateebat that would provide security for the Fallujah area. The kidnapping of (b)(6) brought the negotiations to an abrupt end and all of the groups with a stake in the outcome sent a message to (b)(6) AQI superiors in Abu Ghraib, demanding that they order the release (b)(6) or violence would ensue.[387]

~~(S)~~ In an effort to prevent open conflict, Sheikh Barakat al-Hamam al-Zobai sought to negotiate between AQI and the Kateebat member groups, only to learn that it was too late: the Kateebat member groups had already ordered (b)(6) assassination. The Kateebat member group's unwillingness to dialogue was due to the long-running feud in Zaidon between 1920 Revolution Brigade and AQI (see Chapter 5b).[388]

~~(S/NF)~~ This eruption of anti-AQI violence following AMZ's videotape was due to far more than just AMZ's statement or disgust over the increasing criminality of AQI. There was also the violence against relatives of SAR insurgents and Anbaris in general; the arrogance of many of the younger AQI amirs who had been promoted by the group's leadership to replace those captured or killed by the Coalition; friction with the tribes (including the Albu Fahd, Albu Issa, Albu Mahan and Zobai) over whether or not to support AQI; Iraq's sectarian tension; (b)(6) claims that AQI was supported by 1.4b fighting between SARs and AQI for control of the Fallujah insurgency; loss of SAR control of the Ramadi black market to AQI; efforts by the Ba'athist financiers who supported the 1920 Revolution Brigade to regain control of the insurgency; and ongoing efforts by AQI to subordinate all the local 1920 Revolution Brigade and Islamic Army of Iraq groups through threats, intimidation, and murder. Yet the SAR groups were still weak and disorganized compared to AQI and its allies, making them incapable of mounting any direct attack. Various SAR cells and groups also lacked leadership and cohesion due to a complex web of cultural, organizational, or operational factors. In the absence of a SAR leader or group of leaders who truly represented the insurgency, Coalition negotiations with or support for individual SAR leaders outside local frameworks was simply impractical.[389]

~~(S/NF)~~ In mid-May, Islamic Army of Iraq leader (b)(6) sought to change that during a meet with (b)(6) his top commanders for Ramadi and Baghdad respectively. At the conclusion of the meeting, the group changed its name to Jaysh al-Fatihin to distance the group from Islamic Army of Iraq members who now followed AQI. Giving $50,000 each to (b)(6) told them to give $500 to every cell leader and $250 for every fighter to keep them from joining AQI while he sought a way to facilitate the entry of Jaysh al-Fatihin into the Iraqi army or security forces the same way the Hamza Battalion had done in 2005.[390]

Approved for Release

---

[387] [| Military | 14 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060514 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[388] Ibid.
[389] Ibid.
[390] [| Military | 21 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060521 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ It is worth noting that the movement of the Islamic Army of Iraq (now Jaysh al-Fatihin) into the Iraqi military was quite in keeping with (b)(6) original design for the organization. (b)(6) had first created the Islamic Army of Iraq in 2004 with the goal of carrying out attacks in Ramadi in order to generate the need for a Sunni military force to protect the city. The Islamic Army of Iraq was intended to serve as that military force and (b)(6) would then control the capital of Anbar through his (b)(6) [391]

The Ambiguous Position of Harith and (b)(6) al-Dhari

~~(S/NF)~~ Unlike these insurgent leaders, Harith al-Dhari continued to support all sides in the fighting. Harith al-Dhari's son (b)(6) for instance, used pilgrims returning from the Hajj to smuggle money to AQI even while Harith had relaxed his views on political participation in an effort to heal the split between himself and other members of the Sunni leadership (see Chapter 5a). This may have been because he felt that he had been betrayed when Shi'a interior minister Bayan Jabr ordered his arrest in February 2006, forcing him to flee the country. This left Harith with little option in his own mind but to continue supporting AQI through (b)(6).

~~(S/NF)~~ The Jamiyat al-Fatwa NGO that (b)(6) used to fund AQI was a subsidiary of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), a blanket organization for numerous SRE NGOs and charities worldwide that was funded by Nada Management Organization, which financed AQI and AQAM worldwide through the al-Taqwa Bank. All of these organizations were affiliated with the international Muslim Brotherhood. While AMZ publicly but sporadically derided the authenticity and faith of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of the foreign fighters facilitated into Iraq by the Muslim Brotherhood through AMS ended up fighting for AQI.[392]

Ba'athists Renew Efforts to Regroup

~~(S/NF)~~ In the midst of these anti-AQI efforts, Ba'athist leaders attempted to reinvigorate their movement. Because these efforts were halting, limited, and ineffectual, the Ba'athists were forced to content themselves with financing nearly every Anbari insurgent group, operating under the delusion that this gave them influence over the insurgency. According to this school of thought, providing money to AQI allowed the Ba'athists to bide their time, grow stronger, and eventually challenge AQI for control of Iraq. Others, like former IIS officer (b)(6) returned to Haditha as an AQI financier in the belief that AQI's shift towards criminality had lessened its original Salafist zeal enough that more secular Ba'athists could now feel comfortable working with it.[393]

~~(S/NF)~~ Among the Iraqi Ba'athist leaders now trying to rebuild their shattered organization from 1.4b was (b)(6) who had assumed command of the Iraqi branch of the 1.4b Ba'ath Party National Command. Because of his ties to both senior Iraqi and 1.4b Ba'athists,

[391] Ibid.
[392] [| Military | 25 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060525 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[393] [| Military | 27 Apr 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060427 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6) was able to serve as an intermediary between the two parties despite the 1.4b Party's official stance opposing Saddam Hussein. While the Iraqi wing of the 1.4b Ba'ath Party had undergone significant leadership changes from 2003-2004 with (b)(6) replacing (b)(6) (b)(6) as the group's leader in late 2003 only to have his position usurped by (b)(6) (b)(6) it is unclear as to whether or not this resulted in a reduction of (b)(6) (b)(6).[394]

1.4b, 1.4c, (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ The Ba'athists had originally planned to field more than one hundred candidates in the December 15, 2005 elections, only to have their strategy fail. Since the 1.4b was one party that was on the ballot, 1.4b hoped to cooperate with it, only to have their anticipated point of contact, Moshir Ahmad, die unexpectedly. As a result, the 1.4b officials wanted the Iraqi Ba'athists to identify a senior 1.4b Ba'athist in their ranks who could help facilitate their infiltration of Iraqi 1.4b political groups. (b)(6) was particularly prized by the 1.4b in this regard since he had made inroads with numerous AQI leaders, including 1.4b AQI members.[396]

~~(S/NF)~~ 1.4b Ba'athist leader (b)(6) supported other efforts by (b)(6) (b)(6) to convince Albu Mahal tribesmen and AQI leaders to attend Ba'athist-run terrorist training camps in 1.4b. He believed that they could be persuaded to set up Ba'athist training camps in Anbar upon their return. In an effort to gain broader support for this maneuver, (b)(6) was in intermittent communication with AMZ. Ironically, his chief rival, (b)(6) was also involved with AQI, colluding with them in order to keep Iraq destabilized in the hope that it would serve to facilitate the eventual return of Sunni-dominated Ba'athists to power.[397]

Approved for Release

[394] [| Military | 28 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060528 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] (b)(6) continued to manage the Office of Iraqi Popular Organizations in 1.4b serving as the primary conduit for expatriate Ba'athists financiers that included Fadil al-Rubai, the spokesman for Sheikh Majid al-Gaoud's Wahaj al-Iraq (Higher Committee of Forces Opposed to the Occupation).
[395] [| Military | 10 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060510 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[396] Ibid.
[397] [| Military | 12 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060512 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) also remained in contact with Saddam Hussein through one of his attorneys, explaining the current state of both the insurgency and the Ba'ath Party to the former ruler of Iraq (see Chapter 4). Saddam Hussein had sent (b)(6) out of Iraq in 2003 just before the collapse of his regime, giving him large sums of money and gold to support his operations. (b)(6) had subsequently settled in 1.4b where he began financing the insurgency through his al-Suqr Company front. By May 2006, he had been expelled from his duties in the Ba'ath Party by (b)(6) (b)(6) and sought Saddam's aid in getting his position reinstated. Acting through his attorney, Saddam sent a reply ordering (b)(6) to reconcile with (b)(6) but (b)(6) continued to struggle with (b)(6) over who would serve as the legitimate leader of the Ba'ath Party in Saddam's absence. As a result of this infighting, the entire Karbala branch of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party had broken with the leadership and refused the offers of various pretenders to return.[398]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) who served as the primary financier for (b)(6) was also active in 1.4b trying to recruit former IIS officers in Anbar to travel to 1.4b to receive terrorist training. (b)(6) was a close associate of Saddam Hussein, (b)(6) (b)(6) who worked for (b)(6) (b)(6). He maintained as well ties to Ramadi-based former Ba'athist Sheikh Sa'ad Naif Mishan Hardan al-Ithawi, who now supported political engagement with the Coalition.[399]

~~(S/NF)~~ It is clear that (b)(6) and his followers lacked detailed information on the nature of the insurgency in Anbar, in some cases substituting their own wishful thinking for hard data. An example of this can be seen in the military readiness report sent to (b)(6) from a non-existent group calling itself the "Amariyah Forces." Similar to Iraqi military readiness reports created under Saddam Hussein, the Amariyah Forces report detailed a complete line and block chart for a well-organized military unit, including the names for each member of the battalion, company, platoon, and squad. While the report's author stated that the group was seriously involved in the insurgency in Anbar and was prepared to seize control of Baghdad at (b)(6) command, the actual intent of the document was to impress (b)(6) in order to convince him to provide funds for members of the non-existent organization. Determined not to be fooled again, (b)(6) created the Kateebat al-Ayon (Eyes Battalion) to give him an accurate intelligence on the Coalition, police, Iraqi army, and the insurgency in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah, Fallujah, and Abu Ghraib.[400]

~~(S/NF)~~ To strengthen his influence in Iraq, (b)(6) began negotiations with the Iraqi National Dialogue Front (INDF). Under the terms of the agreement between (b)(6) and INDF representative (b)(6) (formerly IIS officer (b)(6), the INDF would represent the interests of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in parliament. Contacting Ba'athist military officers who were now living in 1.4b (b)(6) urged them to return to Iraq and run for office as INDF candidates. To raise support for his alliance with Iraqi Ba'athists inside Iraq, (b)(6) traveled to Tikrit and Mosul to meet with Major General Muhammad Awaid, Major General Subat Matar al-Azawi, General Rashid al-Afghani, and former 14th Infantry Division Commander (b)(6) (b)(6)[401]

Approved for Release

---

[398] Ibid
[399] [| Military | 14 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060514 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[400] Ibid.
[401] [| Military | 19 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060519 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) took a major step toward consolidating the disorganized and feuding Ba'athists by ousting (b)(6) the former secretary of the treasury under Saddam Hussein and a close associate of (b)(6) enemy (b)(6) whom (b)(6) also removed as the head of the Ba'ath Party's military wing. Demanding that (b)(6) returned to Iraq, (b)(6) (b)(6) charged that he had not adhered to Party rules, that he maintained active ties to countries considered enemies of Iraq (a reference to (b)(6) meetings with 1.4b intelligence officials), that he held meetings without informing the Party leadership, that he publicly disagreed with Party members, and that he failed to follow his assignments. The ouster of (b)(6) and (b)(6) coincided with (b)(6) recruitment of General Faris Ali Salih al-Alkawi as part of his concerted efforts to consolidate control of the Ba'ath Party under his rule by staffing its ranks with loyalists. This move was in direct defiance of Saddam Hussein's order to reinstate (b)(6) as a member of the Ba'ath Party.[402]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) selected (b)(6) to serve as (b)(6) replacement in his new Ba'athist hierarchy. A 1.4b national, (b)(6) was a member of the 1.4b Ba'ath Party who had worked with the Abu Ras wing of the 1.4b Ba'athists to recruit 1.4b volunteers from 1.4b to fight the Coalition prior to the beginning of OIF. He had later used his connections to the 1.4b Ba'athist front company People's Corporation for Iraq and Palestine Defense (Corporation for Arab World Defense) to finance the travel of foreign fighter recruits to Iraq. Traveling with his 1.4b Ba'athists to Baghdad (b)(6) had received training from Iraqi special forces units to fight the Coalition but returned to 1.4b upon the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. (b)(6) had been grooming (b)(6) to assume this position as soon as it became clear to him that his differences with (b)(6) were irreconcilable.[403]

~~(S/NF)~~ By the beginning of June 2006, (b)(6) managed to reunite the entire Iraqi Ba'ath Party under his rule, including the Ba'ath Party Military Command. Ali al-Rih became head of the Party's civilian wing, while (b)(6) was the liaison between (b)(6) and his 1.4b counterparts. (b)(6) decision to appoint (b)(6) as his liaison to the 1.4b Ba'athists was surprising, as (b)(6) had gone to great lengths to support (b)(6) The willingness of (b)(6) to appoint an individual who had been associated with his primary rival only weeks earlier—and at a time when he was determined to appoint only loyalists—should help to demonstrate the level of weakness and desperation that now typified the Iraqi Ba'athist leadership.[404]

Al-Duri's Negotiation Offer

~~(S/NF)~~ Faced with increasingly dismal prospects for success, (b)(6) attempted to open up a dialogue with the Coalition through Sheikh Tayyib Muhammad Uthman al-Barzanji, who informed a local religious leader in Sulaymaniyah that the Ba'athists were prepared to negotiate with the Coalition in return for a cessation of military operations in Ramadi, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala where the Party still had residual influence. According to Sheikh Tayyib, Saddam Hussein continued

[402] [| Military | 26 MNF-W INTSUM | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[403] Ibid.
[404] [| Military | 31 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060531 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

to lead the Ba'athists through messages passed through his lawyer (b)(6) As evidence of this claim, Sheikh Tayyib noted that Saddam had tried to reconcile (b)(6) with (b)(6), though he neglected to mention that this effort had been disregarded by (b)(6) and was insufficient to prevent him from ousting (b)(6) as the head of the Ba'ath Party military wing. Sheikh Tayyib stated that if the Coalition wanted to get in touch with (b)(6) it could do so through his tribesman General Abd al-Karim al-Duri. Despite (b)(6) apparent ignorance about factual matters concerning the insurgency, Sheikh Tayyib stated that (b)(6) was kept very well-informed in national Iraqi political developments because Iraqi members of the parliament (MPs) (the latter of whom doubled as the political leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq, now Jaysh al-Fatihin) continued (at least in the minds of the 1.4b Ba'athists) to serve as active Ba'ath Party members.[405]

~~(S/NF)~~ While some of Sheikh Tayyib's claims could not be verified, his claim about Saddam Hussein's defense attorney (b)(6) was accurate. In addition to serving as Saddam's lawyer, (b)(6) received coded account information from Saddam Hussein that enabled him to withdraw large sums of money from Ba'athist bank accounts that he then funneled to Ba'athist leaders and other insurgent groups. (b)(6) regularly transfered money from Saddam Hussein into clandestine Ba'athist accounts throughout the Middle East, including those managed by his daughter (b)(6) in 1.4b When traveling through Anbar, (b)(6) security was overseen by an AQI cell based in Ramadi led by (b)(6)[406]

~~(S/NF)~~ The negotiations between (b)(6) and the Coalition would continue throughout the rest of 2006 and into 2007, but led to no agreements between the two sides or reduced violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces.

AQI Infrastructure and AMZ's Master Plan

~~(S/NF)~~ In contrast to this scene of disorganization and weakness, AQI was making plans to take over Iraq. At a May 4 meeting of the AQI *shura majlis* and senior leadership in the Jazira area southeast of Lake Thar Thar, AMZ outlined his plan to set up a caliphate over Anbar, Salahaddin, and Diyala in the next three months over which he would reign as caliph. The first step of his plan was for AQI to escalate attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces in Ramadi, which AMZ intended to use as his capital until he took Baghdad. AQI leaders were instructed to tell their subordinates that all agents of the Coalition and the Iraqi government were to be killed immediately without prior approval from their superiors. Because the Iraqi police and army were an unacceptable threat to the security of the new caliphate, AMZ decreed that all police and soldiers were to be beheaded to deter Iraqi youth from joining them. The meeting concluded with AMZ making cash payments of $10,000 and $500 to select lieutenants to fund specific operations. The meeting was held at Lake Thar Thar because AMZ considered it a secure location for him to hold meetings with his lieutenants. Its lack of landmarks complicated Coalition and Iraqi efforts to locate him and

Approved for Release

[405] [| Military | 04 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060604 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[406] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

facilitated his rapid access to Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Saqlawiyah, Fallujah, and east into Salahaddin province.[407]

~~(S/NF)~~ The May 4 meeting included a 41-slide AQI PowerPoint presentation detailing the group's bureaucracy and infrastructure in Anbar and AMZ's plan to better organize its administrative and operational structure. As with AMZ's April 25 video, this presentation was shown in order to reinforce AMZ's control of the group. It could be argued that AMZ was dramatically accelerating his plan to assume direct control of the Sunni Triangle as a result of a groundswell of confidence in AQI's strength as a result of their success in Ramadi, an ever-increasing financial surplus from black market operations, and AQI's successful infiltration of low and mid-level Iraqi bureaucracy throughout Anbar. AMZ believed that the Coalition would withdraw from Iraq as soon as a national unity government was formed, enabling him to overwhelm the Iraqi police and army in Anbar in short order, seize control of Ramadi, and proceed from there to establish his caliphate.[408]

~~(S/NF)~~ AMZ's meeting had been preceded by another gathering of the AQI leadership in Baghdad to discuss the focus of AQI and plan further Baghdad attacks. This meeting was chaired by (b)(6) (b)(6) who explained to the attendees that AQI was preparing a major operation that would illustrate the weakness of Iraqi and Coalition forces. (b)(6) described AQI as being at a crossroads and claimed that AMZ's April 25 video had already had its intended effect of demonstrating the group's predominance in the insurgency. According to (b)(6) statements would soon be released by 'Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri that, when combined with decisive battles in AQAM's favor worldwide, would prove the strength of AQAM to the Muslim world and incite more Muslims to join the fight.[409]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) claimed that AQI had already established an army of fighters that would transform their campaign of individual suicide bombings into organized and collective attacks. AQI would use the same well-coordinated intelligence efforts as their Coalition enemies to improve infiltration of the Iraqi security forces in preparation for the coming Coalition withdrawal. At the conclusion of the meeting, (b)(6) relayed general instructions from AMZ to his subordinates to mobilize support for AQI's post-withdrawal plans to their subordinates.[410]

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraqi intelligence reporting on AQI reflected knowledge of AMZ's planning and some interesting insights into the dilemmas he faced. They believed that AQI had united several insurgent groups under its banner in preparation for an "Islamic revolution" that would make Ramadi, Samarra, and Baghdad part of a planned caliphate. According to Iraqi intelligence, AQI sought to evolve to more conventional warfare, but lacked the necessary operational momentum or tactical capability to do so. Their current stage of development required the full and direct support of the local population, uncontested safe havens, and a sufficient military force to challenge government forces in select small-scale engagements. While AQI was able to hide, train, and store weapons in the area around Lake Thar Thar, the terrain did not afford the group the ability to hide a sizeable force from aerial observation by the Coalition. The Coalition also maintained an overwhelming

[407] [| Military | 26 MNF-W INTSUM | | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[408] Ibid.
[409] [| Military | 17 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060517 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[410] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

advantage in firepower, rendering AQI unable to defeat or even stop platoon-sized Coalition forces.[411]

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraqi Intelligence believed as well that AMZ and the rest of the AQI leadership saw that the group was at a strategic crossroads and feared that their organization was beginning to shift internally from a Salafist terrorist group to a criminal organization. Their fear was that while this would still enable them to retain their necessary operational tempo and outlast the Coalition, it would not allow them to defeat either the Shi'a or resurgent Ba'athists following the Coalition withdrawal.[412]

The Humaydi Initiative

~~(S/NF)~~ While AMZ believed that black market financing and fear were sufficient substitutes for popular support, other members of his inner circle were far less sanguine. Under the leadership of (b)(6) a number of senior AQI leaders secretly met in the Amariyah district of Baghdad to discuss ways to win back this support. Among the attendees were (b)(6) (b)(6) former Republican Guard Brigadier General Hudhari Talal al-Jughayfi (Bin Sheikh Talal), and (b)(6) (b)(6). These commanders believed that they had suffered a number of unnecessary setbacks due to lack of support from ordinary Iraqis that had allowed the Coalition to capture or kill mid-level commanders who held important positions in the organization.[413]

~~(S/NF)~~ The meeting resulted in a new direction for AQI: to convince tribes to join AQI and cease supporting the Coalition. The plan was to negotiate with tribal sheikhs to have 5-10 trusted and well-connected members of each tribe join the organization's fearsome internal security network. The goal of these tribesmen would be to learn which tribesmen cooperated with the Coalition or the Iraqi government and to provide AQI with intelligence on Coalition military operations. The AQI leaders who attended the Amariyah meeting believed that their group's objective should be to strengthen its control of the Euphrates River valley in order to establish Sunni-controlled safe havens from al-Qaim to Ramadi.[414]

~~(S/NF)~~ By May 2006, (b)(6) and his supporters had convinced AQI recruiters in Anbar to seek out disaffected youth in poor urban areas and outlying communities, looking for young men playing soccer or loitering in public areas. The recruiter would then invite the young men to his house or a mosque, offering them cell phones or money. From then on, the recruiter would begin indoctrinating the youth, encouraging them with money, favors for their families, and other benefits in return for joining AQI. Once the recruits had agreed to join and been indoctrinated, they were assigned to plant IEDs, act as couriers, and other low-ranking jobs. If they survived, they were given additional duties and in this manner worked their way up the chain of command. Other more specialized AQI recruiters operated at mosques and schools, serving as teachers, professors, and

Approved for Release

[411] [| Military | 17 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060517 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[412] Ibid.
[413] [| Military | 16 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060516 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[414] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

imams. These more specialized recruiters sought to sign up disaffected Iraqi police who were frustrated over their lack of regular pay.[415]

Approved for Release

[415] [| Military | 17 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060517 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

City Stories

Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ By late May, the efforts of (b)(6) and his supporters in Ramadi were starting to pay off, with AQI providing support to local insurgent groups rather than seeking to absorb them. (b)(6) a former Iraqi general from the Albu Mahal tribe, served as the group's outreach coordinator to local insurgents who had already been cowed into submission by the group's terror campaign. As a result, when Coalition operations forced rank-and-file AQI fighters to abandon Ramadi for Muhammadi, Baghdadi, Jubbah, Hasah, Haditha, or even as far west as Husaybah in mid-to-late May, much of AQI's mid-level talent pool in the city was able to remain active, retaining the group's operational tempo by acting as special advisors to local insurgent groups who were now the primary fighting force in the city. The group's mid and senior leadership, for instance, sought refuge among the Albu Soda, Albu Faraj, and Albu Alwan tribes, all of whom now supported AQI.[416]

~~(S/NF)~~ This temporary disruption of its Ramadi leadership forced AQI into a diffuse cell structure, in which small groups of fighters operated independently of one another without any higher-level coordination. Operations against the police were especially affected. Before this, each case of murder and intimidation had depended on the officer's social and tribal standing as well as that of the AQI member carrying out the operation, the situation now became more chaotic. Even so, very few Iraqi police were willing to patrol the streets of Ramadi and when attacked, usually fled as quickly as possible.[417]

~~(S/NF)~~ The departure of some of the AQI fighters from Ramadi enabled (b)(6) followers in the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat Islamiya to finally reestablish a presence in the city. Many of the groups' members sought employment in the local government and awaited the outcome of the political process. While these insurgents still condoned and carried out attacks on Coalition forces, they did not target the Iraqi police or the army and refused to engage in kidnapping or theft. Jaysh Muhammad also returned to Ramadi, reuniting with Jaysh al-Haqq in an effort to compensate for both groups' weakness in Anbar.[418]

~~(S/NF)~~ One of the architects of 1920 Revolution Brigade's return to Ramadi was former IIS agent (b)(6) who was a senior advisor to (b)(6) While he had attempted to ensure AQI representation in a council of Sunni insurgent groups in Ramadi in late January 2006, this had been because he believed that only collectively could the other insurgent groups defeat AMZ. Impressed with his activities in Ramadi, Jaysh Muhammad was also able to recruit him to help them fight AQI.[419]

~~(S/NF)~~ In addition to (b)(6) efforts, members of the Albu Alay, Albu Assaf, and Albu Nimr tribes began forming their own militias to take matters into their own hands and prevent AQI from

[416] [| Military | 22 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060522 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[417] [| Military | 25 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060525 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[418] [| Military | 23 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060523 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[419] [| Military | 29 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060529 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

returning to their areas of the city.[420] Aware of this threat and worried that the Albu Dhiab tribe would participate, AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) organized the ambush of a group of senior Albu Dhiab tribesmen in Ramadi while they were returning from a funeral, killing prominent subsheikh Abd al-Mihsin Farhan Hayis al-Dhiabi. In the aftermath of the ambush, sixty Albu Dhiab tribesmen began searching through the area with the help of the Albu Ubayd and the Albu Shaban tribes.[421]

~~(S/NF)~~ A number of other anti-AQI vigilante groups also appeared in various parts of Ramadi and Fallujah. The most important were the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade (a reference to the cleric murdered by AQI in November 2005, see Chapter 5), the Martyrs of the Iraqi Police, and Sayf al-Haqq.[422] Of the three, Sayf al-Haqq was the largest and best organized, its members drawn from former Iraqi army, police, and national guard soldiers or relatives of Anbaris killed by AQI. In contrast to some anti-AQI groups such as 1920 Revolution Brigade, Sayf al-Haqq harbored no anti-Coalition sentiments but instead sought to kidnap, interrogate, and then murder suspected AQI members in the belief that in so doing they were carrying out the will of the average Anbari. Despite the emergence of Sayf al-Haqq, AQI operatives and their allies were still able to move freely through most of Ramadi by intimidating sheikhs, imams, police, and anyone suspected of cooperating with the Coalition.[423]

Fallujah

~~(S/NF)~~ The Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade was widely supported by Fallujah imams and residents concerned about the rise of AQI in the city. Made up of roughly one hundred fighters drawn primarily from the ranks of the Fallujah police force, it was supported by the Albu Alwan, Albu Issa, and Mohamdi tribal leaders.[424] Saraya al-Jihad, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and even Ansar al-Sunna were also frustrated by the extreme views of the Fallujah AQI leadership, particularly their belief that anyone who cooperated with the Coalition was a traitor to Islam who then had to be killed. Saraya al-Jihad in Fallujah was particularly anti-AQI, blaming the group for the killing of Sheikh Umar Sayid Huran and Iraqi police captain Ali, both of whom had been supporters of Saraya al-Jihad.[425]

Karmah

~~(S)~~ In Karmah, Mayor Majid resigned due to his belief that if AQI didn't kill him that the Coalition would, making resignation his only viable option. While Majid had been threatened with detention in 2005 and was related by marriage to insurgent leader (b)(6) through marriage, he had only provided passive support to SAR insurgent groups such as the now-defunct Green Battalion or Jaysh Muhammad.[426]

---

[420] [| Military | 24 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060524 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[421] [| Military | 28 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060528 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[422] [| Military | 29 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060529 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[423] [| Military | 31 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060531 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[424] [| Military | 01 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[425] [| Military | 06 June 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[426] [| Military | 02 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060602 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Haditha and Barwanah

~~(S/NF)~~ The influx of AQI fighters into Haditha from Ramadi made the group's murder and intimidation campaign worse than it had been for the last two months, leading to the killing of twenty residents during the first two weeks of May.[427] Many Haditha residents believed that the Coalition had abandoned them to AQI and that they had no means of protecting themselves now that their weapons had been confiscated by the group.[428]

~~(S/NF)~~ Ansar al-Sunna fighters led by (b)(6) now had a monopoly on petroleum products in Barwanah, with (b)(6) using gas station money to fund the group's activities.[429] Ansar al-Sunna also controlled all of the kerosene shipments into Barwanah, forcing residents to buy it from the group rather than on the black market. Much the same situation existed for AQI in Haqlaniyah, where former mid-level Islamic Army of Iraq commander (b)(6) (b)(6) was responsible for transporting weapons, distributing propaganda, recruiting, and conducting attacks.[430]

Anah

~~(S/NF)~~ The AQI leadership was frustrated by what it regarded as inactivity by (b)(6) who served as the amir of the Anah-Kubaysah corridor. As a result, AQI operative (b)(6) began working with several other associate groups to destabilize Anah, murdering a number of residents, including the local head of the IIP.[431] This was due in part to an AQI *fatwa* issued in Haditha stating that IIP leaders would be targeted if the group did not disband.[432] (b)(6) actions had their desired effect and AQI markedly increased its presence in Anah between the end of May and the middle of June.[433]

Rutbah

~~(S)~~ Operating from Rutbah with the assistance of local Saraya al-Jihad and Islamic Army of Iraq, AQI was able to stop vehicles, including tractor trailers, from entering or exiting the Waleed and Trebil border crossing in order to extort payments of up to $200. If the driver refused or was unable to pay, AQI fighters looted and then burned the vehicle.[434]

Further AQI Exodus from Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ In the first week of June, concerned by a rumor that the Coalition was about to start an AL FAJR-style operation against Ramadi, AQI mid and high-level leaders left the city en masse for safe

[427] [| Military | 22 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060522 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[428] [| Military | 26 MNF-W INTSUM | | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[429] [| Military | 24 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060524 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[430] [| Military | 02 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060602 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[431] [| Military | 29 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060529 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[432] [| Military | 24 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060724 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[433] [| Military | 11 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060611 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[434] [| Military | 28 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060528 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

havens in the Jazira area, the southern end of Lake Thar Thar, Haditha, and 1.4b [435] Residents of the Malaab and al-Hawz districts also began making preparations to evacuate for the same reason.[436] A number of AQI fighters remained in the city, however, preparing IED attacks against Coalition forces in the event a major operation was initiated. Having learned from Operation AL FAJR and Operation SAYYAD II, these fighters did not plan to confront the Coalition directly but instead relied on IEDs planted throughout the city to thwart their advance.[437]

~~(S/NF)~~ The decision to rely on IED attacks in response to a major Coalition operation was determined by AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) during a meeting at the Ibad al-Rahman mosque in Ramadi. They all agreed that AQI should not attempt to engage the Coalition directly and that the AQI leadership should make preparations to leave the city if major operations occurred.[438]

Conclusion

(U) The spring of 2006 thus ended with some good news for the Coalition. The decision by AQI to flee Ramadi seemed to show the essential weakness of the most powerful insurgent group. Meanwhile, many tribes were turning against AQI, the Ba'athists were willing to negotiate an end to their fighting, and there was internecine warfare between the disparate insurgent groups. All these developments pointed to a light at the end of the tunnel.

~~(S)~~Yet the underlying conditions in Anbar created by AQI's lengthy murder and intimidation campaigns, as well as the flexibility and adaptability of the group itself, allowed AQI to adjust to these setbacks. The sectarian violence only increased during the summer of 2006, providing fuel for the insurgency as a whole and large numbers of recruits for AQI in particular. By the fall of 2006, the organization would have a new leadership, new ties with the tribes, and a new willingness to compromise with other insurgent groups that would make it more powerful than ever.

Attack Data (January – April 2006)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (January to April 2006). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was lower than the extended peak of the previous period, but represented a continuation of the general increasing trend of activity. There was a general balance of activity among the three AOs for IED and Complex Attacks, but

[435] [| Military | 07 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060607 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[436] [| Military | 09 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[437] [| Military | 07 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060607 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[438] [| Military | 09 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060609 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

significantly lower occurrence of Direct and Indirect Fire incidents in AO Denver. All types of attacks showed a gradual but distinct increasing trend over the course of the period.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Complex Attacks





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Insurgent Profile: 2006

~~(S/NF)~~ In 2006, the typical street-level insurgent captured in Anbar was an Iraqi male about 27 years old, was slightly more likely to be married than to be unmarried, and was educated at a high-school level or less. Most captured detainees were associated with tribes and about half had some military experience. These conclusions are based on an analysis of more than 7,000 tactical interrogation reports gathered from intelligence sources.



Approved for Release

Figure 1: 2006 Street-Level Insurgent Profile ~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Most insurgents captured in 2006 were 30 years old or younger (63.7%), with a significant group (11.5%) under 20 years old. 2006 is the first year in which the mean age (29.4) is less than 30 years old. The middle 50% of the population distribution was between 22 and 34 years old. The fact that the median of 27 years is lower than the mean of 29.4 years confirms that the data is skewed younger and also indicates that the age range among older detainees has a large spread. The most common age among detainees in 2006 was 21 years old.

~~(S/NF)~~ Almost all of the insurgents captured in 2006 claimed to be Iraqi (99.4%), with only 0.6% claiming to be of foreign origin. Of those foreigners, the most frequent origins named were 1.4b 1.4b though this represents just a very few individuals.

~~(S/NF)~~ The majority of detainees were associated with blue collar or other labor occupations. The most common occupations claimed were *driver* (15.2%) and *shepherd* or *farmer* (14.8%), though the largest grouping of occupations was *blue collar workers* (29.0%), which included jobs like *electrician*, *carpenter*, and *laborer*. Though only 5.4% of detainees claimed to be actively unemployed, it is likely that many more detainees were actually unemployed but provided their previous job or training when asked their occupation. In addition, a noteworthy fraction of detainees (5.8%) were employed in positions of trust such as the Iraqi police or local security forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ About half of those captured in 2006 claimed to have some military experience (51.4%), while a portion of those that had not served were still students and were too young to participate. This finding indicates that a large segment of the insurgent population had some form of prior military training, had combat experience, and may even have had personal access to weapons.

~~(S/NF)~~ At least three-quarters of those detained had no education beyond high-school, with nearly half (43.8%) having no more than an elementary education (6th grade or less). More than 18% had some post-secondary education or had completed a degree program.

~~(S/NF)~~ The tribe with the most captured members in 2006 was the Mohamdi tribe, closely followed by the Fahad, Albu Eissa, and Qubaysah tribes. There was no consistent trend from month to month, as a variety of tribes had the monthly highs. There were many tribes well-represented, as only 69% of the detainees associated themselves with one of the top 20 tribes.

~~(S/NF)~~ More than 57% of all detainees claimed to be married, engaged, or widowed, though most detainees under 30 (61.8%) were still single. Of those married, only 44.9% claimed to have children, which is much lower than the overall rate of children in the population. However, this data is very unreliable and a significant difference from the results from previous years. If valid, it seems that those who had families were reluctant to participate in the insurgency and less willing to risk their lives, for fear of leaving behind unsupported children.

~~(S/NF)~~ The most common places of residence among detainees were Ramadi (28.1%) and Fallujah (23.0%), which correspond to the largest cities in Anbar. Ramadi was also the city with the greatest occurrence of insurgent activity. Hadithah (10.8%), Al Qa'im / Husaybah (8.3%), Hit (6.8%), and Rutbah (5.2%) also were major claimed sources of detainees.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

May to August

~~(S/NF)~~ *At the beginning of summer 2006, AQI was still the dominant force in Anbar, having defeated, marginalized, or absorbed other insurgent or tribal groups that sought to oppose it. By destroying the Golden Mosque and igniting a sectarian conflict throughout Iraq, AQI had impeded Sunni political engagement and threatened the unity of the country. AQI also achieved another major success through its domination of the Ramadi black market, which when combined with its role in both the licit and the illicit oil trades provided the group with a considerable amount of income.*

~~(S/NF)~~ *The brutality that characterized AQI's rise to power was not without negative consequences. The group had alienated much of the population of Anbar as a result of the same violence that had allowed it to achieve its ends. While some AQI leaders sought to rectify this situation, they were unable to do so before Zarqawi's death. As a result, the stage was set for a renewed resistance to AQI in Anbar.*

(U) The June 7, 2006 killing of Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi and his top spiritual advisor Sheikh Abd al-Rahman in a Coalition airstrike north of Baquba capped a string of good news from Iraq. Iraqi police were the first on the scene following the airstrike, followed by elements of Multi-National Division North. They identified Zarqawi by fingerprints, facial recognition, and known scars.[439]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the death of Zarqawi was both a morale boost and a success for the Coalition, there were a variety of reasons why it had little long-term impact on the insurgency in Anbar. AQI's continued freedom of movement, ample finances, ruthless murder and intimidation campaign, and network of diffuse, independent cells meant that AQI was able to sustain itself and even grow following the death of Zarqawi. AQI also maintained a sizeable cadre of individuals who could be quickly promoted. Thus, Zarqawi's death did not affect the long-term capability of AQI to continue operations and exert influence over much of the population of Anbar.[440]

Reactions to Zarqawi's Death

~~(S)~~ The Coalition exploited the opportunity provided by Zarqawi's death by dropping 500,000 leaflets on Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baquba announcing his demise to create fear and distrust among AQI and its supporters.[441]

(U) AQI began its own information campaign to counter the propaganda effect of Zarqawi's death, with various AQI websites publishing media products glorifying Zarqawi as a martyr. AQI's ability to produce these products so rapidly illustrated the speed and flexibility of AQI's media-savvy affiliates. Other supporters of the Iraqi insurgency flooded radical Islamist websites with multimedia depictions of Zarqawi as a martyr. These developments unfolded without the direction of AQI's central authority (which was likely in chaos as a result of Zarqawi's death), showing the ability of AQI's disparate supporters to organize a coherent and unified response using the internet.[442]

Repercussions of Zarqawi's Death in Anbar

---

[439] [| Military | 08 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060608 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[440] Ibid.
[441] [| Military | 09 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060609 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[442] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Zarqawi's demise left many low and mid-level AQI members in Ramadi confused about what the group was going to do next and who would replace Zarqawi. However, the AQI leadership in Anbar and their allies were still determined to fight, with Abu Khattab deputy (b)(6) (b)(6) declaring that "now we all are Zarqawi" at a meeting of the group's leadership. AQI fighters and recruiters began driving through the Albu 'Ubayd tribal areas, declaring to residents that Zarqawi's death had created "an army of Zarqawis."[443]

~~(S/NF)~~ A number of AQI leaders feared that they too would be targeted in the Coalition offensive they believed to be imminent and continued their plans to relocate. (b)(6) fled Ramadi for Humayrah. In his absence, (b)(6) was appointed to serve as the spiritual leader of AQI in Ramadi despite the fact that he was still completing his religious studies at Anbar University.[444] The decision of the AQI leadership to flee Ramadi for other parts of province proved to be a poor one, resulting in the June 10 capture of AQI Ramadi amir (b)(6) during a Coalition raid northwest of Fallujah.[445]

~~(S/NF)~~ In the absence of more senior AQI leadership in Ramadi, AQI amirs (b)(6) (b)(6) (a former Ba'athist), (b)(6) decided to oversee the defense of the city to increase their standing within the organization. Traveling to the Malaab district, the three AQI leaders attempted to persuade residents not to flee the city so that they could use them as human shields if the Coalition did attack.[446] They even sent a message to (b)(6) requesting that his followers in 1920 Revolution Brigade, Harakat Islamiyah, Islamic Army of Iraq, and the al-Nu'man Brigade provide support to AQI if the Coalition did attack Ramadi.[447] The request was rebuffed, as (b)(6) had already met with other leaders from 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Harakat Islamiyah in the al-Jam'iyah district of Ramadi as soon as the first rumors of a Coalition attack on Ramadi had occurred. The insurgent leaders who attended the meeting concurred with (b)(6) assessment that they should not attack or oppose Coalition operations in Ramadi in order to avoid further losses to their already-weakened organizations. They also hoped that Coalition operations would rid Ramadi of AQI.[448]

~~(S/NF)~~ The capture of (b)(6) convinced AQI leaders (b)(6) that it was safer to return to Ramadi and organize a more consolidated defense of the city. They thus deployed 100-150 fighters between the Malaab and Humayrah districts of the city, dividing the defense of other sections of Ramadi among select amirs, each of whom was given command of sixty fighters. Despite this apparent organization, a Coalition airstrike that killed six AQI fighters while they were planting an IED had a significant psychological impact on the AQI leadership and nearly all of them fled the city again on June 17.[449] Only (b)(6) remained behind to fight,

Approved for Release

[443] [| Military | 11 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060711 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[444] Ibid.
[445] [| Military | 12 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060612 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[446] [| Military | 14 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060614 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[447] [| Military | 16 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060616 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[448] [| Military | 14 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060614 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[449] [| Military |16 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060616 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

possibly in an effort to increase his stature within AQI now that he had been released from detention.[450]

The Rise of (b)(6)

(U) The demise of Zarqawi had another significant impact on AQI: senior AQI operative and Zarqawi lieutenant (b)(6) (b)(6) assumed command of the organization. An experienced leader, (b)(6) had been involved in international terrorism since 1982 when he first joined future AQSL (b)(6) as a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Traveling to 1.4b in 1999, he received explosives training at AQAM training camps and delivered lectures to other AQAM recruits. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to Iraq and by 2004 had assumed the position of Zarqawi's amir for southern Anbar, using his explosives training to become an expert in the construction of VBIEDs. He operated primarily south of Baghdad, where materials recovered during Coalition raids in April-May 2006 confirmed his ongoing involvement in terrorist attacks in Baghdad.[451]

~~(S/NF)~~ After Zarqawi was killed, (b)(6) authored a June 13 AQI statement that threatened retaliation and taunted the Coalition that its only option in Iraq was to flee. He then assumed command of AQI with the approval AQSL, pledging to work hard to improve the strained relationship between AQI and AQSL that had existed under Zarqawi.[452] His intimate knowledge of AQI and close ties to Zarqawi helped to ensure continuity of operations for most of AQI, but he also drew up a list of 150-200 members of the group to be purged in a "cleansing process" that would remove both potential traitors and opposition to his ascent.[453]

The Yusufiyah Meetings

~~(S/NF)~~ Not all within AQI in Anbar welcomed the rise of (b)(6) to replace Zarqawi. Long-time AQI leader Sheikh Abdullah Janabi held a series of meetings in Yusufiyah with up to fifty lieutenants to discuss the selection of (b)(6) as the new AQI leader.[454] Among those who attended the meetings were Fallujah city council member Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Abbas and (b)(6) (b)(6) Because Janabi had lost two sons to the fighting in Fallujah during Operation AL FAJR, he believed that AQSL should have chosen him rather than (b)(6) as the new leader of AQI.

~~(S/NF)~~ The results of this meeting are unclear, but it shows that there was an undercurrent of wariness amongst the Iraqi leaders of AQI about the new chief and especially about AQSL's decision to appoint (b)(6) rather than an established native insurgent leader.

Approved for Release

[450] [| Military | 19 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060619 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[451] [| Military | 16 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060616 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[452] Ibid.
[453] [| Military | 21 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060621 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[454] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Insurgent Reconciliation

~~(S)~~ Following the death of Zarqawi, Prime Minister Maliki unveiled a 24-point national reconciliation plan in a June 25 speech to the Iraqi parliament. Aimed primarily at Iraqi Sunni Arabs, the speech outlined broad security, reconstruction, and reconciliation priorities. However, Maliki provided little detail on contentious issues such as the extent of the amnesty offered to insurgents, de-Ba'athification reform, Coalition withdrawal, and militia integration. Instead, he offered a vaguely worded amnesty "for detainees not involved in terrorist acts, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," a quick release of prisoners not charged with crimes, greater domestic and international oversight of Iraqi prisons, and compensation for Iraqis who had been harmed by terrorism, military operations, and sectarian violence.[455]

~~(C)~~ While the Islamic Resistance Movement, Ansar al-Sunna, and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party all rejected Maliki's offer, eleven SAR insurgent groups agreed to join the political process under Maliki's National Reconciliation Plan. According to media reports, these groups laid out several demands as part of their reintegration: [456]

1. A timetable for Coalition withdrawal.
2. An end to Coalition and Iraqi military operations against SAR insurgent groups.
3. Compensation for Iraqis killed in Coalition military operations and reimbursement for property damage.
4. An end to the ban on army officers from Saddam Hussein's government in the new Iraqi military.
5. An end to the government ban on former Ba'athists.
6. The release of SAR insurgent group members currently being held in detention.
7. Recognition of SAR insurgent groups as legitimate political organizations.

~~(C)~~ These demands allowed Maliki to find common ground with the SAR insurgent groups, as most of them were similar to points already in his proposed reconciliation plan. However, Maliki risked undermining his own political support by reaching out too far to the Sunni community and being seen as "rewarding terrorists" for their behavior. Many Shi'a did not view the actions of the SAR groups as comparable to their own under Saddam Hussein.[457]

~~(S)~~ Several of the insurgent groups seeking political reconciliation with the Iraqi government, including a faction of the 1920 Revolution Brigade, insisted on specific guidelines before agreeing to lay down their arms that the Iraqi government found all but impossible to fulfill. Other insurgent groups, such as the local branches of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Ansar al-Sunna in Fallujah, sought a cease-fire with the Coalition in return for allowing members of the groups to join the Iraqi army while they would in turn provide information that would help the Coalition to target AQI.[458]

Approved for Release

---

[455] [| Military | 27 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060627 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[456] [| Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[457] Ibid.
[458] [| Military | 02 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060702 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ The workable mechanisms for any *quid pro quo* between the Coalition and insurgent groups were very problematic. The Coalition could never verify that any one group was no longer targeting either the Coalition or the Iraqi army since the majority of insurgent attacks were not attributable to a particular group. At the same time, the insurgents could not be adequately assured that their group would not be engaged by the Coalition due to its inability to determine the insurgent affiliations of groups of armed men in civilian attire. The foreign patrons of the insurgency would also be less than pleased to learn that their largesse was bankrolling an idle insurgency. Finally, rapproachment with the Coalition ran counter to the ingrained notions of resistance to occupation, restoration of Sunni dominance in Iraq, restoration of the Sunni to positions of privilege, and shielding the Iraqi Sunnis from Shi'a reprisals that motivated the majority of rank-and-file SAR fighters. To these low-level fighters, the Coalition was an implacable foe with whom no negotiation was possible under any circumstances.[459]

~~(S)~~ Another obstacle to reconciliation in Ramadi lay in the fact that residents were increasingly dissatisfied and pessimistic about Maliki's ability to enact a more effective solution to the security situation and to bring an end to sectarian violence. While the Iraqi security forces had now received better equipment and training, the same could be said for the Shi'a militias. Ramadi residents in particular feared the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi army units, believing that the large number of Sunnis killed in Baghdad was proof of a conspiracy between Shi'a militias and Iraqi government officials. Combined with widespread rumors of Sunnis being kidnapped and tortured by 1.4b these perceptions made the Sunni population skeptical of any Shi'a moves towards political reconciliation.[460]

The Anbar Central Council

~~(S/NF)~~ In response to Maliki's initiative, the Anbar Central Council was formed at a meeting of SAR Anbari leaders in 1.4b in late July 2006. It consisted of tribal, religious, economic, political, military, professional, social, and youth committees, members of which were elected through a secret ballot. The Central Council rejected Iraqi federalism, called for the withdrawal of Coalition forces from Iraq, supported "national resistance," demanded the dissolution of Shi'a militias and an end to 1.4b in Iraq, accused the Coalition of massacres, called for an end to de-Ba'athification, supported Maliki's national reconciliation plan, called for an international investigation into the embezzlement of Iraqi funds, rejected modifications to Iraqi provincial borders, called for an end to external and internal refugees, supported AMS, and called for ties between Iraq and the United States following a Coalition withdrawal.[461]

~~(S/NF)~~ All in all, the Anbar Central Council helped to provide a platform for uniting the province's disparate Sunni and SAR leaders. However, its agenda was untenable within Iraqi politics and would remain so until the SAR leadership recognized the reality of their current situation and formed a lasting engagement with the Iraqi government.[462] While the Central Council lacked legitimacy within the "official" framework of the Iraqi government, it was able to win over rival political factions

[459] Ibid.
[460] [| Military | 07 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060707 | ~~(S/NF)~~]
[461] The following discussion is taken from [| Military | 21 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060721 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[462] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

outside Anbar. Its efforts, however, soon were hindered not by the Shi'a Iraqi government but instead by Sunni political rivals operating both within and outside of its framework. Unable to unify for the purposes of national politics, the Central Council could not assume a real leadership role in Anbar.[463]

Failed Plots and Counterplots

Salih Mutlaq's Plot

~~(S/NF)~~ The Central Council was not the only Iraqi group making plans from Amman. With Zarqawi dead, Iraqi National Dialogue Front (INDF) leader Salih Mutlaq held a conference of Iraqi politicians and military leaders in Amman from June 15-20 to discuss his plans to oppose terrorism (i.e. Shi'a militias), sectarianism and any division of Iraq. Salih's goal was to the long-term formation of a government-in-exile, complete with a shadow parliament, that could obtain international support and financial assistance for its own agenda while demonstrating to the international community that the current Iraqi leadership was made up of uneducated individuals incapable of running the government. Even though the shadow parliament was Salih's initiative, his Iraqi National Dialogue Front would remain active in Iraq's real parliament.[464]

1.4b, (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ One hundred-fifty individuals attended Salih's conference, including ten Tawafuq Front MPs and six INDF MPs (Khalaf Alayan, Dr. Abdul Latif Humaym Kharbit, Dr. Abd al-Wahhab al-Qasab, General Jalil Shauy'a, wealthy expatriate businessmen Sheikh Tariq Khalaf al-Abdallah al-Halbusi and Khamis Khanjar al-Dulaymi). Salih had long sought the political support of Ba'athist and SAR insurgent leaders, but the individuals who attended his conference were among the most dangerous of those still at large. The presence of both Alayan and Humaym Kharbit at Salih's conference illustrates the lengths that he was willing to go in order to undermine Iraq's elected government. Other SAR figures who attended the conference included (b)(6) (b)(6) all of whom represented hardline SAR groups that continued to sanction violence against the Coalition and Iraqi government.[466]

~~(S/NF)~~ In early August 2006, the GID Iraqi operations chief (b)(6) responded to Coalition queries about Salih Mutlaq's activities, stating that it was aware of the rumors that Mutlaq was setting up a "shadow government" or planning a coup but did not regard them as particularly credible. Regarding the alleged involvement of 1.4b representatives in Mutlaq's plot, (b)(6) stated that while Sharif Fawaz served as 1.4b

[463] [| Military | 07 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060807 | (S/NF) |]
[464] [| Military | 23 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060723 | (S/NF) |]
[465] Ibid.
[466] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b Iraq that the GID had no information that he had attended Mutlaq's conference in 1.4b (b)(6) also speculated that Mutlaq was not so much planning a move against the Iraqi government as trying to expand his own INDF by trying to enlist the support of AMS, anti-government Shi'a groups, and Iraqi tribes.[467]

~~(S/NF)~~ On August 28, GID's substantive authority on Iraq, retired Major General Sadi Zatari, described Mutlaq to the Coalition as an individual who was all talk and no action, dismissing the view that he was capable of perpetrating a coup. Zatari believed that there were no truly influential figures in the INDF other than Mutlaq and (b)(6) noting the entire INDF was made up of 8-10 Iraqi MPs, a few former generals, and former Ba'athists. As a result, Mutlaq's claims that he had recruited 3,000 individuals who would help him overthrow Prime Minister Maliki in a military coup should be taken with a grain of salt. Zatari believed that if Mutlaq were able to unite all of the Sunni sectarians, Ba'athists, and army officers then he could become powerful, but noted that he was severely weakened by his feuding with the IIP and the Tawafuq Front.[468]

~~(S/NF)~~ The continued association between INDF, FREs, and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party made both Iraqi and Coalition engagement with the party problematic, particularly given the Iraqi government's desire to highlight the role of FREs and Ba'athists as the primary threat to Iraqi security. Any Coalition attempts to redirect the INDF towards a more moderate tone of reconciliation were unlikely to produce any improvement in Sunni political unity or Sunni leverage inside the Iraqi government. Nascent Sunni political movements such as the Anbar Central Council, by contrast, generated modest amounts of unity among certain Sunni leaders and had some acceptance from Shi'a political organizations. Other than Mutlaq, however, INDF was primarily supported by Jaysh al-Fatihin leader (b)(6) and members of the powerful (b)(6) family who, upset with their minimal influence over the Anbar Central Council, hoped to further divide the Sunni political leadership for their own personal and economic gain. As a result, Mutlaq's movement remained active only 1.4b where it operated on the fringes of Iraqi expatriate politics.[469]

Kharbit and the Tribes

~~(S/NF)~~ In early July 2006, Mudhir Abd al-Karim al-Kharbit al-Khalifawi al-Dulaymi, an influential sheikh for the Albu Khalifa clan within the Albu Aitha, who had maintained close ties to Saddam Hussein, held a meeting of expatriate Iraqi sheikhs in 1.4b to persuade them to return to their traditional tribal areas in Rawah and al-Qaim. In attendance were Sheikh Najah Khalifa al-Karbuli (Albu Karabilah), Sheikh Amar Nijm al-Salmani (Albu Salman), (b)(6) (b)(6) Sheikh Sabah Sattam al-Sharji al-Mahalawi al-Dulaymi (Albu Mahal), and (b)(6) himself.[470]

~~(S/NF)~~ Prior to arriving in 1.4b many of the sheikhs in attendance had attempted to travel through 1.4b only to be refused entry by the 1.4b because of their ties to AQI. Sheikh Amar, for instance, led the pro-AQI faction of the Albu Salman tribe that supported AQI in its fight

[467] [| Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[468] Ibid.
[469] Ibid.
[470] [| Military | 03 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060803 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

with the Hamza Battalion in 2005 (see Chapter 5b). Sheikh Abd al-Hadi Amar al-Rawi was one of AQI's top financiers in Rawah who was an associate of AQI leader (b)(6) As a result, they relocated to 1.4b[471]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) attempt to repatriate the pro-AQI sheikhs was motivated by his desire to repopulate the Sunni tribal and political leadership in Anbar with individuals he believed he could manipulate to facilitate his eventual return to the province. (b)(6) remained more or less unchanged in his status from 2003: a megalomaniacal (b)(6) who sought to build a power base in order to become the next dictator of Iraq. Contrary to his views, his influence in Anbar had been marginal since his exile, though he and his Kharbit clan continued to pose a threat to Anbar because of their considerable wealth and willingness to fund any Sunni insurgent group intent on attacking Coalition or Iraqi personnel. His attempt to build an alliance of AQI allies, FREs, and pro-Coalition tribal leaders was likely doomed to failure from the beginning. Sheikh Sabah and Sheikh Najah, for instance, had both been feuding against one another ever since the latter sheikh sided with AQI against the Albu Mahal in 2005, resulting in the destruction of Sheikh Sabah's home.[472] Sheikh Sabah in fact stated that if the pro-AQI sheikhs returned to al-Qaim, he would not guarantee their safety.[473]

Ali Baban and the IIP Militia

~~(S/NF)~~ A different sort of political maneuver, with sweeping military implications, was planned by Iraqi Planning Minister Ali Baban, a leading figure in the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Baban was so concerned by the sectarian violence perpetrated by Shi'a militias that he intended to establish an 800-strong IIP militia that would be able to confront them if the need arose. The militia was formed under the cover of the security company al-Murabit and the communications company Sawa'iq for Communications. The reason for Ali Baban's concern was that the Facilities Protection Service, which numbered 135-150,000 armed men, was being brought under the control of the Shi'a interior ministry, leaving many Sunni leaders concerned over who would protect their public infrastructure and buildings.[474]

~~(S/NF)~~ Baban's effort to set up an IIP militia followed months of warnings from IIP, Tawafuq Front, and INDF that the Sunnis would set up their own militia if the Iraqi government failed to stop the Shi'a militias and balance out the predominantly Shi'a interior ministry. Prime Minister Maliki sought to integrate the militias into the Iraqi security forces, which many Sunnis feared would bring the security forces further under the control of the Shi'a and 1.4b While Ali Baban was a competent planning minister, he did not possess the military or religious expertise necessary for this effort and it seems likely that he was working with Sunni leaders within the IIP and its allies who did.[475]

Approved for Release

[471] [| Military | 03 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060803 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[472] Ibid.
[473] [| Military | 03 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060803 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[474] [| Military | 04 Aug 05 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060804 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[475] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The IIP also faced another challenge: AQI carried out continuous attacks against the group. Despite IIP efforts to corner the market on Islamist political sentiment in Iraq, its leaders were targeted by AQI in Ramadi and Haditha, necessitating some sort of protection. Furthermore, IIP participation in the Anbar Central Council provoked animosity between the IIP and more traditional provincial power blocs such as the (b)(6) This required the party to establish an armed wing in case the time came to settle old scores.[476]

~~(S)~~ The feud between AQI and the IIP in Anbar was a long-running one. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, IIP leaders including Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi had hoped to dominate the politics of Ramadi. During the 2003-2004 period, many IIP members supported FRE or SAR insurgents as a way of convincing the Coalition to withdraw from Iraq. With the rise of AQI as the dominant group in the insurgency, however, IIP leaders were actively targeted as traitors to Islam because of their cooperation with the Iraqi government and the Coalition. All AQI amirs in Ramadi were given a list of fifty IIP members to assassinate on sight. Among those IIP members killed were director Dr. Khamis Mutar Aysa of the Women and Children's Hospital and Ramadi lawyer Thakir Ubayd al-Alwani.[477]

~~(S)~~ The Haditha Shura Council also mounted a vigorous murder and intimidation campaign against IIP in the city, killing IIP member Layith al-Rawi, a teacher at the Haditha Technical School.[478] The murder of three IIP members by AQI leader (b)(6) provoked a popular reaction against the group, with IIP calling on the general population to rise up against AQI. AQI responded with a propaganda campaign of its own, declaring that IIP members were not true Muslims and that even the party's name was blasphemy. IIP members in the Anah police force responded by kidnapping (b)(6) nd bombing the home of AQI member (b)(6) (b)(6)[479]

~~(S/NF)~~ From August 22 onwards, the IIP fight against AQI was supported by elements of the Albu Mahal tribe. The Albu Mahal blamed the Anah AQI for vehicle theft that prevented al-Qaim from receiving fuel and other goods and were unwilling to give the group a foothold for control over lucrative smuggling routes.[480]

Approved for Release

[476] Ibid.
[477] [| Military | 28 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060828 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[478] [| Military | 02 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060802 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[479] [| Military | 29 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060829 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[480] [| Military | 01 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060901 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

AQI's Competitors Reorganize, June-July 2006

Ba'athist Efforts

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile, exiled Iraqi Ba'athists were making plans of their own. At the behest of the 1.4b (b)(6) formed the Democratic Arab Reform Organization (DARO) to support the Iraqi Ba'athists. (b)(6) plan was for DARO to set up offices in various Iraqi provinces in order to recruit former military officers and other elements of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party who would then be sent to 1.4b for training. These offices would also be in contact with other insurgent groups in Iraq. 1.4b intended DARO's agenda to be the formation of a 1.4b Iraqi government; halting the spread of Salafism in Iraq; serving as a substitute for the Iraqi Ba'ath Party; and lessening pressure on the remaining Iraqi Ba'athists. Saddam Hussein's (b)(6) agreed to provide funding for DARO through the 1.4b [481]

~~(S/NF)~~ One of DARO's few successes was (b)(6) whose network carried out minor attacks in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Baghdadi from his 1.4b sanctuary using Ba'athists drawn from former Iraqi military, intelligence, and security personnel as well as pro-Ba'athist tribesmen. (b)(6) attempted to coordinate his operations with AQI but found their ideology too extreme, forcing him to work instead with lesser insurgent groups such as Jaysh al-Fatihin, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and 1920 Revolution Brigade. Like other 1.4b Ba'athists. However, (b)(6) only provided limited support for the insurgency that resulted in proportionally limited influence.[482]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) meanwhile continued efforts to reorganize the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, implementing a number of recommendations made to him by an April 2006 committee of 1.4b (b)(6) Iraqi Ba'athists.[483]

1. (b)(6) was relieved of all responsibilities in 1.4b and ordered to return to Iraq.
2. (b)(6) was ordered to step down from his current position.
3. Former An Najaf governor Ali Abd al-Karim al-Sa'dun (Abu Tahsin) was made the new head of the Iraqi Ba'athists in 1.4b with Lieutenant General Tali al-Duri.
4. (b)(6) was made coordinator between the 1.4b Iraqi Ba'athists and their national leadership.
5. (b)(6) was made the liaison between (b)(6) and the other branches of the Ba'ath Party throughout the Middle East.
6. (b)(6) was placed in charge of monitoring the Iraqi emigre community in 1.4b and coordinating with the 1.4b Ba'athists through (b)(6)

[481] [| Military | 14 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060614 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[482] [| Military | 22 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060622 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[483] [| Military | 04 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060704 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b

(S/NF) By August 2006, Major General Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad and his deputy former IIS officer (b)(6) had managed to be reinstated as the leaders of the Ba'ath Party's military wing, though the political leadership remained solidly under the control of (b)(6) (b)(6) This was because Saddam Hussein sent a letter from prison that ordered (b)(6) to reconcile with (b)(6) through any means necessary. While (b)(6) wanted to continue supporting the insurgency, (b)(6) argued for a cessation of hostilities due to reports of Ba'athists killing other Iraqis in acts of sectarian violence. As a result of (b)(6) consolidation efforts, the Ba'athists had formed small cells at the local level in many Iraqi cities with assistance from 1.4b [485]

~~(C)~~ The Ba'athist history of participation in the 1958, 1963, and 1968 coups led (b)(6) and other Ba'athist leaders to believe that they could return themselves to power through a combination of violence, clandestine organization, infiltration of the Iraqi security forces, and external support. Towards this end, the leaders of the Iraqi Ba'athists sought 1.4b to help reorganize the Party for its return to power in Iraq.[486]

~~(S)~~ Even so, (b)(6) also sought to keep his options open and met with Iraqi parliament speaker Mahmud Mashadani during his trip to 1.4b . During the meeting, (b)(6) stressed that his opposition was to the Coalition rather than the Iraqi government and asked Mashadani why the government was not doing more to incorporate the Ba'athists into the new political process.[487]

Other Nationalist Efforts

~~(S)~~ These Ba'athists were not the only Iraqis abroad seeking to use a nationalist appeal to influence events in Iraq. In July, wealthy businessmen (b)(6) created in 1.4b the Harakat al-Qiwa' al-Wataniyah wa al-Qawmiyah, a political party designed to compete in provincial and national elections. A secular party, HQWQ was based around the ideals of national unity, anti-federalism, and equality between Shi'a and Sunni. The 1.4b General Intelligence Directorate (GID) supported the party's activities, helping it to establish a national organization and concentrate its efforts on Iraqi national unity. Towards that end, the group established contact with six insurgent groups and by late September 2006 had a military wing under the leadership General Ra'ad Hamdani made up of former Iraqi military officers drawn from the diaspora.[488]

Antagonism Between AQI and Jaysh al-Fatihin

[484] Ibid.
[485] [| Military | 21 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060821 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[486] Ibid.
[487] Ibid.
[488] [| Military | 09 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070109 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ If DARO, the Ba'athists and other expatriates had trouble effectively responding to AQI, a more serious challenge was presented by Jaysh al-Fatihin. By mid-June, any desire for prior cooperation between AQI and Jaysh al-Fatihin (formerly the national Islamic Army of Iraq, see Chapter 6a) had degenerated into a mutually hostile relationship. Those Jaysh al-Fatihin members who refused to join or ally with AQI were forced to relocate to areas around Fallujah and Baghdad where AQI was less active. The root of the hostility was Jaysh al-Fatihin political leader (b)(6) (b)(6) willingness to explore political participation to the point of considering the incorporation of his group into the Iraqi army and security forces in a manner similar to the Hamza Battalion (see Chapter 6a).[489]

~~(S/NF)~~ Unlike AQI, Jaysh al-Fatihin enjoyed a degree of popular support in the Sufia district of Ramadi and from the Albu Fahd tribe. Their political message and the all-Iraqi nature of their group resonated with Sufia residents, particularly the fact that the group's military wing was composed of former Iraqi army officers from the Dulaymi tribal confederation led by (b)(6) (b)(6)[490]

The Anbar Revolutionaries

~~(S/NF)~~ Jaysh al-Fatihin was not AQI's most dangerous opponent, however. The Thuwar al-Anbar (Anbar Revolutionaries) had reformed since its earlier dissolution after the death of Lieutenant General Sa'ab Manfi al-Rawi. Led by former military intelligence officer (b)(6) in Ramadi, the group assassinated fourteen AQI fighters suspected of killing Iraqi civilians and police officers. Allying itself with other vigilante groups such as Sayf al-Haqq as well as anti-AQI insurgent groups like 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Harakat Islamiyah, the group was determined to carry out its goal of removing AQI from Anbar.[491]

~~(S)~~ The group rose from a small, obscure organization, perhaps composed of only three brothers and an Iraqi army colonel named (b)(6) into an influential and important part of the anti-AQI resistance. By the summer of 2006, the Anbar Revolutionaries was carrying out attacks against AQI, including the June 9 killing of an entire AQI mortar team and the murder of AQI member Jassim Fadal Abbas, whose body was dumped on 17th Street with a note stating that he had killed Ramadi residents and police.[492]

~~(S)~~ AQI immediately fought back against the Anbar Revolutionaries, killing six leaders of the group later that month while they were speaking out against AQI. Another leader was injured separately, forcing him to flee to 1.4b while he recovered.[493]

~~(S/NF)~~ The efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries were bolstered by the actions of an unknown imam in the Tamim district of Ramadi. Frustrated over AQI's violence, this imam hired snipers to

[489] [| Military | 21 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060621 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[490] [| Military | 21 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060621 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[491] [| Military | 27 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060627 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[492] [| Military | 24 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060824 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[493] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

assassinate designated AQI leaders, killing two cell leaders. Ordering his followers to leave threatening messages at the homes of AQI members in Ramadi, the imam demanded that they leave the city or be killed.[494]

Continued Problems in the Iraqi Security Forces

~~(S/NF)~~ Amidst these political maneuvers the security situation in Anbar continued to deteriorate. Some of this was due to a failure to create an effective national Iraqi police force, especially in the two largest cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. AQI's Ramadi leadership, even when dispersed, managed to carry out an effective murder and intimidation campaign. While their dispersal should have provided an opportunity for the Iraqi police, very few police were willing to patrol the streets of Ramadi and even fewer possessed millitary experience. Instead, the Iraqi police usually fled immediately after coming under attack.[495]

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in the Fallujah police force was even worse. On June 21, Fallujah police chief Brigadier General Salah was summoned to the interior ministry in Baghdad to discuss reports he had submitted about the police in Fallujah as well as to discuss disagreements between Anbar police chief Brigadier General Sha'ban Muhammad Samir and the interior ministry. Salah told the interior ministry that he was forming a committee to investigate what happened to more than $6,000,000 in funding for the Fallujah police force. Sha'ban had been given the government funding for a variety of projects as well as $66,000 to cover expenses and salaries, none of which was accounted for. In light of this information, Undersecretary for Intelligence of the Ministry of the Interior Major General Kamal asked Salah to take Sha'ban into custody for corruption. Salah refused, noting that this was a duty for the interior ministry rather than the Fallujah police.[496]

~~(S/NF)~~ In actuality, Sha'ban was a former Ba'athist who had refused to kickback 10% of the Iraqi police payroll to a corrupt official in the interior ministry. His discontent with the interior ministry from this incident led him to steal millions of dollars from the interior ministry and the police. More ominously, he aided AQI efforts against the Coalition while taking money for himself. His personal security detail now included AQI members who took part a variety of violent activities including assassinations.[497] (b)(6) a member of Sha'ban's bodyguard, was an AQI cell leader in Fallujah associated with (b)(6).[498] Communicating with AQI in Ramadi through Hirzallah, Sha'ban let the group know when his police would depart for their patrols.[499]

~~(S)~~ In mid-July Sha'ban was arrested by the Iraqi interior ministry in Baghdad during a meeting with deputy interior minister for police affairs Dr. Ayden.[500] Anbar deputy police chief (b)(6)

[494] [| Military | 28 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060628 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[495] [| Military | 25 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060525 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[496] [| Military | 05 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060705 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[497] Ibid.
[498] [| Military | 07 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060707 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[499] [| Military | 05 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060705 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[500] [| Military | 17 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060717 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6) took over his duties as the police chief, but he would resign less than a month later out of fear that he too would be arrested by the interior ministry.[501]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) successor as acting Anbar police chief, (b)(6) (b)(6) AQI leader (b)(6) providing him with police pay rosters and other information on specific officers in order to target them for his murder and intimidation campaign.[502] By mid-August, (b)(6) anti-Iraqi police force had reportedly swelled to as many as 500 members of varying levels of commitment who prevented the Albu Sha'ban, Albu Muhjabil, and Albu Dhiab tribe from joining the Iraqi police or enlisting in the Iraqi army.[503] (b)(6) also repeatedly failed to pay the Iraqi police, some of whom were not paid for over 60 days but were afraid to confront him.[504] 25,000,000 Iraqi dinars ($17,000) was given by (b)(6) to (b)(6) to support AQI activities in Ramadi. As a result, while AQI routinely targeted senior Iraqi police officials for assassination, (b)(6) was able to travel without bodyguards because he was under AQI protection.[505]

~~(S)~~ In retaliation for the loss of Sha'ban as one of its most powerful Iraqi assets, AQI assassinated Fallujah district administrative police officer Major Ayad Khamis Salman along with another senior police officer (Brigadier General Khoudari).[506] The death of Ayad sparked a firestorm among the Fallujah police, as it was the first time that a senior Fallujah police officer had been killed since 2004.[507] AQI also kidnapped and beheaded Iraqi highway patrol captain Abbas Khodeir Taleb, the first time that the group killed a member of the highway patrol.[508]

~~(S)~~ The three officers were killed by the Karmah-based AQI leader Sheikh Nazar Sa'di Zahir, who led a "mixed" group of AQI, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and former Islamic Army of Iraq fighters. He was supported by Zaidon-based AQI leader (b)(6) who personally beheaded Abbas. Sheikh Nazar regarded it as a priority to target both the Iraqi army and the police, viewing them as both traitors to Islam and softer targets than the Coalition. Using forged identification cards and his intimidation of several Iraqi police to prevent his operatives from being detected, Sheikh Nazar was able to mount a particularly vicious murder and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi police in Fallujah.[509]

~~(S/NF)~~ Following the arrest of twenty-six AQI members by the Iraqi police on July 27, AQI leader Sheikh Nazar and (b)(6) sent a death threat to Fallujah police chief Brigadier General Salah, ordering him to cease cooperation with the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade or face the consequences.[510]

Approved for Release

---

[501] [| Military | 01 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060801 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[502] [| Military | 10 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060810 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[503] [| Military | 20 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060820 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[504] [| Military | 17 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060817 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[505] [| Military | 25 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060825 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[506] [| Military | 18 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060718 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[507] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[508] Ibid.
[509] [| Military | 27 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060727 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[510] [| Military | 30 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060730 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ The results of Sheikh Nazar's efforts are clear. From June 29 to August 2, he and his followers carried out fifty-nine attacks against Iraqi police in Fallujah, up from twenty-one during the same period in 2005. Because of (b)(6) support for the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade, AQI viewed (b)(6) and his top lieutenants as a major threat to their freedom of movement inside Fallujah.[511]

~~(S/NF)~~ Many Fallujah police became disillusioned over the summer by constant AQI attacks and internal corruption, resulting in some police quitting their jobs. Sheikh Nazar's near-incessant attacks, a lack of support from the Fallujah judiciary, and corruption in both the police and the judiciary were the most common explanations given for their departure. The increase in attacks on the Fallujah police was due to the fact that all of the disparate AQI factions in the city coordinated their murder and intimidation efforts against the police under the leadership of Sheikh Nazar.[512]

~~(S/NF)~~ Unfortunately, Fallujah lost a valuable asset at the end of August when (b)(6) left his position to take up the post of Karkh district police chief in western Baghdad, a job that would give him oversight of more than 10,000 Iraqi police. (b)(6) acceptance of the post was not a surprise given the stress of the previous six months, the assassination of fifteen of his men and friction with Fallujah civic leaders. He was succeeded as city police chief by the native Fallujan (b)(6) [13]

~~(S/NF)~~ Although Ramadi and Fallujah suffered the brunt of AQI's anti-police campaigns, other cities in Anbar faced similar attacks. Sustained attacks on police stations, recruits and police officers themselves occurred in Hit, Haditha, Kubaysah, Haqlaniyah, and Rawah, while the police forces of other towns, such as Karmah, were thoroughly penetrated by insurgents.

~~(S/NF)~~ One of the most vicious anti-police campaigns occurred in the Zangora area, where (b)(6) devoted his entire cell to nothing but killing police. He was supported by his superior, Zarqawi protégé (b)(6) who set up checkpoints to target the police, paying members of the cell $500 for every officer killed?[514] On July 3, he carried out numerous attacks against the Iraqi police in Zangora, Abu Tiban, and Zughayr after they returned from their training in 1.4b. The police were given the option of resigning, agreeing to work with AQI, or death. Nasayf's efforts ensured that the police, who replaced the ones he murdered or forced to resign, were infiltrated by AQI.[515] (b)(6) (b)(6) of the western Ramadi police station supported (b)(6) providing him with an Iraqi police roster.[516]

~~(S)~~ Another area that especially suffered during the summer was Jazira. On August 21, AQI leaders (b)(6) ordered a suicide bombing attack on the Iraqi police station in the Jazira area, killing eleven of the thirty Iraqi police assigned there. The Jazira police station was temporary

Approved for Release

[511] [| Military | 07 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060807 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[512] [| Military | 15 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060815| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[513] [| Military | 31 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060831| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[514] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[515] [| Military | 14 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060714| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[516] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

and had only become operational on July 20, but had already come under AQI attack on several occasions prior to that date.[517]

~~(S/NF)~~ Along with its infiltration of local police and government figures, AQI also penetrated Iraqi national intelligence in Anbar. (b)(6) western Iraq for the defense ministry, was in fact an AQI leader who maintained cells in Baghdad, Abu Ghraib, Khalidiyah, and Ramadi. An associate of AQI leader (b)(6) (b)(6) had traveled twice to 1.4b (the hub for 1.4b training and support operations for both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna) to acquire money.[518]

City Stories: Summer 2006

Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ Bolstered by their robust anti-police campaign, AQI pulled Ramadi even further into its hands. Perhaps most importantly, AQI began to re-educate Anbaris by using schools in Ramadi to indoctrinate Iraqi children with Salafist beliefs. Middle-class Salafis loyal to AQI taught several classes per day and falsified their employment records to extort money from the education ministry. While young children were already used by AQI as spotters or IED emplacers, the group had a more long-term vision of its war against the United States and sought to flood the curricula at all levels with classes designed to instill extremist values. Other classes, such as those held at the Ar-Rabat Elementary School instructed children how to build IEDs or suicide bomber vests. While groups such as Harakat Islamiyah and Islamic Army of Iraq also recruited children, they did so primarily by distributing toys and telling children that they should love, respect, and admire the insurgents for fighting the United States.[519] AQI, on the other hand, was indoctrinating children for its continuing war with the United States.

~~(S/NF)~~ At the same time, the flight of many AQI leaders reduced AQI activity in Ramadi, with the result that current or former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq allied with AQI became the primary insurgent force in the city. These Islamic Army of Iraq members maintained their operational relationships with Ansar al-Sunna, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen because of the groups' common goals and views on the insurgency, even while carrying out attacks at AQI's behest.[520] They also conducted a typical AQI murder and intimidation campaign to infiltrate members of their group into the police and local government. The one difference between these insurgents and other AQI members was that they generally refrained from targeting civilians.[521]
~~(S/NF)~~ The temporary departure of AQI fighters also enabled (b)(6) followers in the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat Islamiya to reestablish a presence in the city with the support of other insurgents in Mosul, Diyala, and Tikrit. Many of the members of these groups now sought employment in the local government as they awaited the outcome of the Iraqi political process. While members of both groups still carried out attacks on Coalition targets, they deliberately avoided

Approved for Release

[517] [| Military | 21 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060821 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[518] [| Military | 13 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060713| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[519] [| Military | 12 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060612 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[520] [| Military | 06 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20060606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[521] [| Military | 23 June 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060623 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

attacking the Iraqi police or army and refused to engage in kidnapping or theft. Jaysh Muhammad also reestablished a presence in Ramadi, reuniting with its splinter group Jaysh al-Haqq in an effort to compensate for the two groups' weakened state in Anbar.[522]

~~(S/NF)~~ The architect of 1920 Revolution Brigade's return to Ramadi was former IIS officer (b)(6) (b)(6) a senior advisor to (b)(6) While he had attempted to ensure AQI representation in a council of Sunni insurgent groups in Ramadi in January 2006, this had been because he believed that only a united insurgent front could mitigate the sectarian agenda of Zarqawi. Impressed with his actions in Ramadi, Jaysh Muhammad recruited (b)(6) to assist them with their own conflict against AQI.[523]

~~(S)~~ New sources of funding also made the revival of the 1920 Revolution Brigade possible. In late May, managers of several legitimate Baghdad-based businesses, all supporters of the insurgency, gave fifteen to sixteen million dollars to the group. The money was divided up among the companies, which then passed it on to 1920 Revolution Brigade members using wire transfers disguised as vehicle sales or contract deliveries to avoid suspicion. The origin of the fifteen to sixteen million dollars was former Iraqi Air Force chief of staff Lieutenant General Khaldun Khattab ibn al-Tikriti, who had agreed to finance the group at a meeting in 1.4b[524]

~~(S/NF)~~ The 1920 Revolution Brigade had long retained Ba'athists within its ranks and made use of Ba'athist front companies both in Iraq and abroad that had survived the overthrow of Saddam Hussein to support its activities. For instance, the engineer of al-Ashtar Free Trade was former Republican Guard officer and mid-level Ba'athist (b)(6) The Taj al-Arab Free Trade company was named after the former military division of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party made up of Ba'athist officers from the Republican Guard. They intended to counter 1.4b 1.4b into Iraq.[525]

City Stories: June 2005

Fallujah

~~(S/NF)~~ The insurgency in Fallujah continued to be characterized by a lack of coordination, leadership or defining structure. AQI in particular suffered from too many competing leaders, each of whom claimed the mantel of amir of Fallujah. The result was that the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade now found serious support from Fallujah imams, tribal leaders and residents concerned about a resurgence of AQI in their city.[526] The group was supported especially by sheikhs from the Albu Alwan, Albu Issa, and Mohamdi tribes, was funded by Iraqi expatriate Sheikh Ali Abbas Khalaf al-Hazimawi and wealthy Fallujah merchants, and coordinated with the Lions of Fallujah to

Approved for Release

[522] [| Military | 23 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060523| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[523] [| Military | 29 May 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060529 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[524] The companies were al-Nubugh Free Trade, Shumukh al-Rafidayn Free Trade, al-Amin Free Trade, al-Ashtar Free Trade, and Taj al-Arab Free Trade. [| Military | 16 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060716 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[525] Ibid.
[526] [| Military | 01 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

attack suspected AQI and other "Takfiris" in the city.[527] The Brigade was connected to the 1920 Revolution Brigade in Fallujah and followed a very similar agenda except that 1920 Revolution Brigade still carried out attacks against the Coalition.[528]

~~(S/NF)~~ Members of the insurgent groups Saraya al-Jihad, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Ansar al-Sunna in Fallujah likewise refused to oppose the al-Issawi Brigade. The refusal was because these groups disagreed with AQI's policy that anyone who cooperated with the Coalition was a traitor to Islam and had to be killed.[529] Saraya al-Jihad was particularly vehement in its anti-AQI views because AQI had killed Captain Ali, who had been one of the group's top informants and provided it with detailed information on agreements between the Coalition and the Fallujah city council.[530]

~~(S)~~ Sheikh Abdullah Janabi continued to support the insurgency in Fallujah financially. Prospective insurgent sheikhs traveled to Halab al-Hadir, 1.4b where (b)(6) met with them to discuss funding.[531] If (b)(6) approved of the sheikh and the sheikh agreed to operate on (b)(6) terms (which included providing (b)(6) with images and videos of insurgent attacks for use as propaganda), he received a letter to take to the Mutakib al-Islamia for $10,000.[532]

~~(S/NF)~~ After Zarqawi's death several senior AQI leaders formerly active in Fallujah fled to 1.4b Their absence made it difficult for AQI to recruit experienced new members, forcing the group to rely instead on 15-20 year-old recruits to help coordinate their attacks. Some AQI mid-level members, such as former lieutenant colonel (b)(6) were so demoralized by the recent setbacks that they deserted the group.[533]

~~(S/NF)~~ The AQI associate group Umar Hadid Battalion was also active in Fallujah, receiving funding from the al-Zeharan Company in Baghdad. Al-Zeharan was funded by an individual named (b)(6) through Standard London Bank. Interestingly, al-Zeharan did not exist until its owner (b)(6) applied for a $584,000 tansfer from the Standard London Bank to the account of the United Arabian Company, which is used by the 1.4b government to procure aircraft. (b)(6) used the United Arabian Company as a front for al-Zeharan's illicit activities, as a $584,000 deposit would not have been unusual for a business contracted to procure aircraft.[534]

Karmah

Approved for Release

[527] [| Military | 15 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060615 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[528] [| Military | 25 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060625 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[529] [| Military | 01 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[530] [| Military | 06 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060606 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[531] Halab al-Hadir was the home of (b)(6) late mentor (b)(6) retained a significant support base in the area through (b)(6) students.
[532] [| Military | 25 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060625 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[533] [| Military | 28 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060628 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[534] [| Military | 01 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ The insurgency in Karmah had become far less defined with the detention of (b)(6) It now had no clear leader or organization. Many fighters belonging to a number of insurgent and criminal organizations banded together from time to time in order to attack the Coalition.[535] In an effort to reinvigorate the insurgency, AQI formed the Jaysh Mujahideen Shura under (b)(6) (b)(6) to coordinate IED attacks in the city.[536] (b)(6) was an associate of AQI amir (b)(6) who was himself an associate of former Green Battalion leader (b)(6) (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ On June 16, the mayor of Karmah, Majid, was shot while en route to a city council meeting. Because Majid had connections to both the Coalition and the insurgency, he immediately suspected one or the other. In reality, the cause of the shooting had been his meetings with Fallujah police chief General Salah in an effort to convince him to fire Karmah police chief Lieutenant Colonel Najm Abdullah Abfus, an unsavory character with ties of his own to the insurgency.[537] The removal of Najm was the culmination of a series of events going back to the December 24, 2005 AQI attack on the Karmah police station as well as the April 8, 2006 attack on Karmah Observation Point-3 during which Najm provided no leadership or assistance to the Coalition in its actions against AQI. Najm was replaced with his predecessor (b)(6) who also had significant ties to the insurgency and had been relieved of his duties following the December 24 attack on the police station.[538]

Hit

~~(S)~~ Information on the insurgency in Hit began to dry up in the summer of 2006, perhaps because AQI and Ansar al-Sunna had so deepened their influence in the city throughout the early part of the year. What is known is that (b)(6) was the leader of Ansar al-Sunna in Hit, which was made up primarily of locals who targeted the Coalition and the Baghdadi.[539] Coalition efforts to develop a local police force in Hit failed due to the effectiveness of the Ansar al-Sunna murder and intimidation campaign, leaving the Baghdadi police force as the only effective police operating in the entire Hit-Haditha corridor.

~~(S)~~ Former Ba'athists facilitated insurgent activity in Hit, providing insurgents with access to large bank accounts and weapons caches.[540] While the Ba'athists did not take part in any attacks themselves, they readily encouraged others to do so.

Kubaysah

~~(S)~~ Because of their dominant presence in Hit, insurgents were able to spread their influence into neighboring towns. Thus, in response to recruiting drives in Kubaysah that resulted in 184 applicants for Iraqi police training, AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and former Hit launched an increased

[535] [| Military | 12 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060612 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[536] [| Military | 06 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060706 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[537] [| Military | 19 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060619 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[538] [| Military | 20 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060620 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[539] [| Military | 06 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060706 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[540] [| Military | 01 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060601 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

intimidation campaign against both police recruits and residents in Kubaysah. This led to the destruction of the Kubaysah police station on August 5, which was fortunately unoccupied at the time except for a small group of internally displaced Sunni refugees.[541]

Haditha

~~(S/NF)~~ Throughout the summer of 2006 AQI and affiliated groups also deepened their influence in Haditha. So intimidated was the population of the city that AQI fighters no longer bothered to conceal their presence or the identities to those who sought employment in the Iraqi security forces.[542] AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq had united into a single organization and coordinated SAF and IED attacks against the Coalition.[543] The earlier cooperation agreement between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna was formalized at a meeting in the Kassajra area between Hit and Haditha in late June 2006. Unlike Zarqawi, who had often been at odds with the Ansar al-Sunna leadership, members of both groups were hopeful that the rise of (b)(6) would lead to increased cooperation between their organizations.[544] The Haditha Shura Council served as the formal coordinating body between the various groups that operated in the area.[545]

~~(S)~~ One of the consequences of the AQI and Ansar al-Sunna unification in Haditha was the Black Banners, a group of fighters from both organizations consisting of financiers, IED facilitators, and an "action arm" that offered $200 for planting IEDs. The Black Banners were financed through the legal and illegal sale of vehicles and helped to coordinate local insurgent groups' attacks against the Coalition. Motivated by a combination of Salafist ideology and a desire for financial gain, the group was led by (b)(6) and former Republican Guard captain (b)(6) the latter of whom organized attacks on Coalition forces.[546]

~~(S)~~ To help the Haditha insurgency understand Coalition forces, former IIS officer, Ba'ath Party member, and AQI financier (b)(6) (see Chapter 6a) sought to recruit former 1.4b military officers who served in the 1.4b military under Saddam Hussein. The 1.4b based (b)(6) was another major financier for the Haditha Shura Council fighters. A former Ba'athist who relocated to 1.4b after the fall of Saddam Hussein, (b)(6) was able to finance the insurgency in Haditha through his brother (b)(6) using the smuggling networks created under Saddam Hussein. These smuggling networks allowed for a virtually endless supply of funding and material from 1.4b to insurgent fighters in the Haditha area.[547]

Haqlaniyah

Approved for Release

[541] [| Military | 06 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060806 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[542] [| Military | 13 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060613 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[543] [| Military | 15 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060615 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[544] [| Military | 09 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060709 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[545] [| Military | 02 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060802| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[546] [| Military | 18 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060618 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[547] [| Military | 18 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060818 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's killing of civilians and its constant attacks on the Haqlaniyah base forced the closure of the local market. This led many residents to become bitter and some to support the insurgency. AQI was thus able to use events it had helped to bring about to recruit some residents and intimidate others.[548] City council chairman (b)(6) and seven of his colleagues were forced to announce their resignation on June 13, leaving the three remaining city council members to manage the city.[549] This move was orchestrated by Haqlaniyah deputy mayor Mahir Fadil Odeh, a mid-level AQI leader who was detained by the Coalition on June 26.[550] Mahir had collected intelligence for Haqlaniyah AQI leader (b)(6) providing him with information on the city council and Coalition personnel to help the group conduct surveillance.[551]

~~(S)~~ After July 24 there was a surge in SAF attacks by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna until August 9. Under the guidance of the Haditha Shura Council, the Ansar al-Sunna fighters led by (b)(6) pooled their resources with AQI to carry out attacks in Haqlaniyah and Bani Dahir. AQI now outnumbered Ansar al-Sunna in Haqlaniyah several times over. (b)(6) was the operations chief, (b)(6) oversaw security, and (b)(6) carried out murder and intimidation campaigns for the group in the western part of the city. All of these AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders saw themselves as serving the Haditha Shura Council rather than any one individual group, though the Haditha Shura Council was itself controlled by AQI.[552]

~~(S)~~ On August 4, AQI destroyed the long-abandoned Haqlaniyah police station, leaving the Haditha police station as the only remaining police station in the entire area.[553] AQI was determined to prevent the successful creation of an Iraqi police force in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah at all costs, even using IEDs to target Iraqi security forces as they transited between Anbar and 1.4b [554]

Approved for Release

[548] [| Military | 09 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060609 | ~~(S/NF~~ |]
[549] [| Military | 13 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060613 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[550] [| Military | 04 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060704 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[551] Muthanna Khalif Taha al-Ghariri had earlier been involved in several botched kidnappings, the last of which resulted in his being shot in the head and later dying of his injuries [| Military | 27 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060727 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[552] [| Military | 16 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060816 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[553] [| Military | 06 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060806| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[554] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Barwanah

~~(S)~~ In Barwanah itself, a 1.4b AQI leader replaced the late Dhiab Khalaf al-Ubaydi (killed on July 9 during an attack on a Coalition outpost in Dulab) as the head of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in the city with the authority of the Haditha Shura Council.[555] AQI also controlled the gas stations in Barwanah owned by (b)(6) both of whom sold fuel at exorbitant prices and then used the profits to support the group.[556]

~~(S)~~ The area around Barwanah also experienced tribal conflict. Because of the murder of Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Yusuf, the Albu Nimr had become one of the most pro-Coalition tribes in Hit. As an expression of this support, thirty Albu Nimr tribal recruiters traveled to Barwanah in mid-August to recruit Iraqi police. The result was that Albu Nimr and al-Ghariri tribesmen in West Sakran were threatened with death by AQI al-Jughaifi tribesmen from Barwanah if any of them joined the Iraqi police.[557]

Anah

~~(S/NF)~~ To bolster the weak AQI organization in the Anah-Kubaysah corridor, AQI leadership sent up to thirty foreign fighters who had fled from Ramadi. Under the instruction of former IIS officer (b)(6) the Anah insurgents set up their base at a textile factory in the southeastern part of town.[558] AQI also made (b)(6) the new AQI amir for Anah, replacing (b)(6) who had been captured by the Coalition on May 12. Paranoid even by AQI standards, Jabbar had at one point ordered all public internet terminals destroyed in Rawah.[559]

~~(S)~~ Despite the relative disarray in the insurgency, Coalition relations with the Anah civic leadership continued to be fraught with difficulties, with city council members only sporadically attending meetings with the Coalition. The former head of the city council, the head of the government building and quality control, and the head of the famine organization had all been detained as a result of their connection to the insurgency. By the end of August, AQI had successfully marginalized the local government in Anah through a combination of intimidation and recruitment of councilmen. According to former city council member Haqi Farhan Abd Yusif, by the end of August the situation had gotten so bad that the entire city council had gone into hiding.[560]

Rawah

~~(S)~~ A similar situation existed in Rawah, where the local government and police found themselves on the verge of collapse. AQI beheaded Lieutenant Saddam and issued warnings instructing local police to post their names on the walls of the al-Sadiq Mosque, demanding that they denounce the

[555] [| Military | 03 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060803 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[556] [| Military | 04 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060804 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[557] [| Military | 17 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060817 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[558] [| Military | 11 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060611 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[559] [| Military | 21 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060621 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[560] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

police force or risk being murdered. Twelve of the police agreed to do so, posting their names and quitting the force. As a result of this murder and intimidation campaign, none of the police showed up when an order to assemble at their headquarters was issued on June 8.[561]

~~(S)~~ In early August 2006, AQI amir (b)(6) was able to set up two checkpoints on the main highway east of the city. Each checkpoint was manned by 20-30 fighters who forced residents and businesses to stay off the highway for fear of being killed, resulting in shortages of food, fuel, and supplies. To avoid attracting attention, Rawah AQI fighters regularly used boats to travel the Euphrates River from al-Jassiyah to the checkpoints.[562]

~~(S)~~ By late August, the Rawah city council agreed to relinquish its authority under heavy AQI intimidation. Citizens were appointed to direct their complaints to the Iraqi police and the city stamp was given to the imam of a mosque to authorize approval for government documents. This occurred in part because Rawah city council leader Sheikh Nuri Sa'ud and his (b)(6) supported AQI and intimidated locals who opposed the insurgency.[563]

Mintaqat al-Awlah

~~(S)~~ In preparation for what it saw as a full-scale civil war (or in hopes of provoking one) in Iraq, AQI began recruiting residents from the Haditha area to travel in small groups to the Mintaqat al-Awlah region to meet up with foreign fighters before moving on to Baghdad. At least 50-60 local fighters were sent from Haditha to Baghdad, while Coalition personnel in Albu Hyatt noted that a large number of men between the ages of 15-40 had also traveled to Baghdad.[564]

Rutbah

~~(S)~~ In Rutbah, AQI's murder and intimidation campaign took a new turn when leader (b)(6) (detained by the Coalition on July 14 and released July 22) ordered the rape of a female member of Rutbah city leader Majid Ayish S'ud's household after threatening him on two previous occasions. While Majid had ties of his own to the SAR insurgents, since April 2006 he had been attempting to persuade insurgents in Rutbah to cease attacks and let peace prevail in the city. Following the rape, AQI informed Majid that a member of his family would be killed if the group heard any further claims that he was cooperating with the Coalition. As a result, Majid refused to associate himself with the Rutbah city council or the Coalition.[565]

~~(S)~~ AQI spiritual leader (b)(6) issued orders for the Fayadh and Jughayfi tribesmen to leave Rutbah on August 7 because the families of Iraqi AQI fighters were being moved from Ramadi to Rutbah and needed homes to stay in.[566] The Karbuli tribesmen in Rutbah were also forcibly evicted from their homes by AQI fighters from Ramadi, who

[561] [| Military | 16 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060616 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[562] [| Military | 13 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060813 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[563] [| Military | 20 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060820 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[564] [| Military | 17 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060817 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[565] [| Military | 15 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060815 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[566] [| Military | 08 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060808 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

quickly took over the buildings and used them to house their own families. Masked AQI fighters recruited from the dominant Kubaysi tribe in the city patrolled the town market under the direction of (b)(6) At his order, members of the Rutbah energy department shut down all power in the city at night so that AQI members could move freely under the cover of darkness.[567]

Al-Qaim

~~(S/NF)~~ In contrast to the situation in other towns of Anbar, the insurgency remained weak in al-Qaim. AQI attempted to reach out to the revived Hamza Battalion in al-Qaim (see Chapter 6a), which now numbered roughly 500 members and operated in al-Qaim, Husaybah, Haditha, and Ramadi. While the old Hamza Battalion had fought against AQI throughout the summer and fall of 2005, the AQI leadership believed that it could negotiate with the new Hamza Battalion following the death of Zarqawi. Representatives of the Hamza Battalion met with AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) but no agreement ensued between the two groups and renewed fighting would break out in late 2006 between them (see Chapter6c).[568]

~~(S)~~ Nothing shows AQI's weakness in al-Qaim better than the decision by the group to recruit female suicide bombers. In both traditional Arab culture as well as within Islam, women are not supposed to participate directly in fighting unless forced to by necessity. While attempts to recruit women to serve as suicide bombers did not endear AQI to residents, the group believed that the use of female suicide bombers would either enable its operatives to get through checkpoints or force the Coalition to change its security stance towards women, angering residents and creating resentment that AQI could then exploit.[569] The first of these female Iraqi suicide bombers was used in a July 11 attack on an Iraqi national in Sa'dah. This suicide bomber was the daughter of AQI member (b)(6) who had been released from prison on July 1 and subsequently recruited his daughter to carry out the attack.[570]

Karabilah

~~(S)~~ AQI and al-Asa'ab al-Iraq were still closely aligned in Karabilah. With AQI's assistance, al-Asa'ab al-Iraq fighters were able to conduct patrols in Karabilah when the Coalition was not present, implementing a murder and intimidation campaign against residents. Substantial pay for conducting attacks served as a significant enticement for enough Karabilah residents to join the insurgency to bring al-Asa'ab al-Iraq back to a semblance of its former strength. Ironically, AQI's decision to use fuel as a weapon in its insurgency (see below) adversely affected the group's ability to reconstitute in Karabilah because the massive fuel shortages throughout the al-Qaim area prevented them from using any form of transportation.[571]

AQI Strengths and Weaknesses: June-July 2006

[567] [| Military | 15 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060815 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[568] [| Military | 23 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 23 Jun 06 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[569] Ibid.
[570] [| Military | 18 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 18 Jul 06 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[571] [| Military | 31 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 31 Aug 06 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Ramadi Remains the Center of AQI Activity

~~(S/NF)~~ As described earlier, AQI was not defeated in Ramadi, but rather voluntarily dispersed from the city. When the group resumed its focus on the city, it did so by escalating its murder and intimidation campaign. Up to five AQI fighters were now sent to every mosque in Ramadi to monitor and report back on the topics discussed during the prayer services. For Ramadi imams and mosque congregations, the voicing of any anti-AQI sentiments meant certain death. A chicken farm near Lake Thar Thar owned by AQI leader (b)(6) was used both to house and to execute hostages. One of the group's targets was (b)(6) of the Firdaus Mosque, who was forced to flee to 1.4b because AQI believed that his goal of improving security in Ramadi was irreconcileable with their own.[572]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Kateebat al-Muwahhidin al-Jihadiyah (The Wahhabi Jihad Battalion) was now the primary arm of AQI in the Tamim and 5 Kilo districts of Ramadi, seeking to unite all of the scattered jihadis and denouncing those who assisted the Coalition.[573]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI influence over Anbar University deepened throughout the summer. Those faculty who supported AQI recruiting on-campus included (b)(6) (b)(6) Most of these professors had been members of the Ba'ath Party under Saddam Hussein. As discussed earlier, the previous university dean (b)(6) had been intimidated into supporting AQI and the new acting university dean (b)(6) maintained AQI ties, as did the deans of the law, medicine, and agricultural schools. Of the 4,000 students who attended the university, roughly 30% were active to some degree or another in the insurgency. [574] AQI next set up an IED factory in the university, using security guards to move bombmaking materials onto the campus. Once the IEDs had been manufactured, the guards moved them off-campus to have them planted by AQI members.[575]

~~(S/NF)~~ In early July, AQI reorganized itself in Ramadi once again, shifting its leadership from Humayrah to Zangora. Prior to this, Humayrah had served as a staging area for (b)(6) and (b)(6) allowing them to quickly issue orders to the Iraqi and foreign fighters residing in the 2nd Officers' District of Ramadi to the north. The influx of AQI fighters into Zangora coincided with the rise in attacks against Iraqi police in Abu Tiban and Zughayr. Once established in Zangora, the AQI leadership was able to recall the fighters that had dispersed from the Malaab district to Zuwayyah, Abu Tiban, 5 Kilo, Tamim, al-Tash, and Zangora so that they could resume attacks. One of these attacks was the July 8 killing of three Iraqi police and IIP leader Hajji Taha (Taha Mukhlif Suwaydawi), the director-general of highways in Anbar and a close friend of Governor Mamoun. [576]

Approved for Release

---

[572] [| Military | 29 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060629 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[573] [| Military | 29 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060629 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[574] [| Military | 26 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060726 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[575] [| Military | 03 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060703 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[576] [| Military | 10 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060710 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) was the AQI amir for the Jazira area, overseeing the continuing kidnapping, murder, and intimidation of Ramadi police officers that forced many to resign. He also supervised the manufacture of VBIEDs, the recruitment of suicide bombers, and plots to kidnap sheikhs from the Albu Dhiab tribe. While (b)(6) had fled to Haditha to escape the rumored Coalition military offensive against Ramadi, he soon returned and assumed command of AQI from the Albu Shaban tribal area, an enclave in the Albu Dhiab tribal area four kilometers southwest of the Jarayshi propane factory that served as his primary meeting center and training facility. [577]

AQI Leadership Problems in Fallujah

~~(S)~~ The situation in Fallujah was quite different. Here AQI was run by a committee of seven leaders, each of whom were responsible for a different task: kidnapping, attacking the Coalition, attacking the Iraqi government, weapons smuggling, financing, assassinations, and execution. This committee answered to a larger committee of AQI leaders from Fallujah, Saqlawiyah, Amariyah, Karmah, Habbaniyah, and Yusufiyah.[578]

~~(S)~~ At the same time, (b)(6) was the operational leader of AQI in Fallujah, supervising fifty cells of ten-fifteen fighters (500-750 total fighters). He coordinated and financed large-scale attacks in Fallujah using funding and financial support from Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi al-Halbusi, who oversaw financing and facilitation of AQI fighters in Fallujah. He provided them with ID cards, money, weapons, vehicles, and combat replacements. While (b)(6) was AQI's operations chief in Fallujah, Sheikh Nazar Sa'di Zahir supervised his activities, coordinated strategy with the group's leadership, and personally commanded ten cells of fighters (100-150 men) on the eastern side of the city.[579] The reason for the confusion over the rightful amir in Fallujah lay in the fact that the group's last amir (b)(6) had fled to 1.4b following the death of Zarqawi in the belief that he would be targeted by the Coalition.[580]

The Hunt for a Single Fallujah Amir

~~(S/NF)~~ This confused leadership situation was not helped by the actions of (b)(6) (b)(6). By July 2006, (b)(6) was AQI's liaison with 1.4b intelligence as well as a key logistics amir with the authority to reassign and replace local city amirs. Following the death of Zarqawi, he ordered (b)(6) to replace (b)(6) as the head of AQI in Anah, sending (b)(6) to Fallujah. When (b)(6) proved unsuitable in Anah, (b)(6) (b)(6) ordered the two men to swap positions again, making (b)(6) the AQI amir for Anah and sending (b)(6) to Fallujah. [581]

~~(S)~~ Just at this point AQI leader (b)(6) (released from Bucca prison in April 2006) declared himself the new amir of AQI in Fallujah and the leader of the local AQI associate group Sons of Hadi al-Zabra in July. As the AQI leader responsible for most of the group's sniper attacks

[577] [| Military | 11 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060711 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[578] [| Military | 02 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060702 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[579] Ibid.
[580] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[581] [| Military | 11 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060711 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

against Coalition and Iraqi forces in Fallujah, Umar had as credible a claim as other prospective amirs. Moreover, he had access to a significant amount of funding through (b)(6) who had withdrawn $250,000 from the Baghdad Exchange to support (b)(6) operations. (b)(6) also received a $60,000 ransom from his kidnapping activities on July 7, which enabled him to use $15,000 to bribe his way out of Iraqi police custody that same day.[582]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite (b)(6) efforts, AQI remained fractured and weak in Fallujah. Many AQI members were even unable to obtain weapons, and thus had to resort to killing Iraqi police and stealing their weapons. This made AQI in Fallujah far more decentralized than elsewhere, with none of the feuding power brokers able to wield enough influence to effectively claim the position of amir. It would be a mistake, however, to regard this fracturing of AQI as lessening its tactical capabilities. The group was still able to assassinate senior police officials including Major Ayad (see below) and deputy police chief Brigadier General Khoudari.[583]

The Hit-Haditha Corridor Falls Further Under AQI Influence

~~(S)~~ The relatively low numbers of attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces in the Hit-Haditha corridor belied the continued influence AQI and Ansar al-Sunna exerted over the general population. By providing money and moral support to the families of their members, the two groups were able to provide an alternative to the Coalition and the Iraqi government. AQI and Ansar al-Sunna considerable financial resources were among the groups' most potent tool. The groups were also eagerly recruiting young men between the ages of 16-20 in the belief that the Coalition did not detain anyone younger than 18, making teenagers particularly valuable to recruit.[584]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) was the Ansar al-Sunna leader in Haditha who oversaw the planning and execution of attacks in the area, personally taking part in the destruction of the Haditha telecommunications centers. While he had been detained by the Coalition in late 2005 and sent to Abu Ghraib, he was released in the spring of 2006 and returned to Haditha to reassert his authority over the Ansar al-Sunna cells in the area.[585]

~~(S)~~ The other major group in the city was the Black Banners, who were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of more than sixty residents suspected of providing information to the Coalition. The group had kidnapped these people, interrogated them, and recorded their confessions on video to be distributed throughout the Haditha area.[586]

~~(S)~~ The Black Banners were organized into three committees: security, shari'ah, and attack. The security committee acted as a secret police, the shari'ah committee enforced Islamic law, and the attack committee carried out operations. The group had some difficulty recruiting after the death of Zarqawi because it had offended many Haditha residents through its murder of local residents in front of their families. The destruction of homes, local government buildings, the

[582] [| Military | 17 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060717 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[583] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[584] [| Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060730 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[585] [| Military | 05 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060705 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[586] [| Military | 05 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060705 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

telecommunications center, and the courthouse all created tension between residents and AQI, but the group regarded its murder and intimidation campaign as necessary to keep other insurgent groups in the area from negotiating with the Iraqi government.[587]

AQI Setbacks in Anah, Saqlawiyah and Amariyah

~~(S)~~ Despite these successes in Ramadi, Fallujah and the Hit-Haditha corridor, AQI suffered setbacks in both Anah and Saqlawiyah. In Anah, (b)(6) an AQI member, killed Sheikh Hajji Umar Muhammad Sahtut al-Jughayfi at a gas station in Anah following a public argument. Sheikh Umar had told (b)(6) that neither he nor (b)(6) was welcome at the mosque in Umm al-Waz (a nearby town). The argument had then deteriorated into a shouting match until (b)(6) shot Sheikh Umar. This created a turn against AQI in Umm al-Waz, where Sheikh Umar had been a major supporter of the group, harboring (b)(6) Anwar Araq, and (b)(6) in April 2006.[588]

~~(S)~~ Following the killing of Sheikh Umar, armed residents of Umm al-Waz planned to drive into Anah to attack AQI. They were only deterred after a warning from tribal leaders in Anah that if they did this that they could be mistaken for members of AQI by the Coalition and be captured or killed.[589]

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in Saqlawiyah was also far from ideal for AQI. The group's former amir, (b)(6) (b)(6) fled to 1.4b after operating in the area for more than a year and a half. In his absence, many AQI fighters fled Saqlawiyah for Lake Thar Thar.[590] (b)(6) (b)(6) replacement (b)(6) was then chosen to be the AQI amir in Karmah, and replaced by (b)(6) Both (b)(6) and his predecessor were former members of the Black Flags and Jaysh Muhammad. (b)(6) was supported by his brother (b)(6) who worked as a Coalition contractor and used the money he earned to assist AQI.[591]

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile Amariyah had become far less hospitable to AQI. In late June 2006, four AQI fighters attacked the Amariyah police station with hand grenades. The police responded by killing one of the attackers and detaining the other three who confessed under interrogation that they had been hired to kill anti-AQI police. A part of the Albu Issa tribe publicly supported the Amariyah police, issuing a statement that the police were sons of the tribe and that the tribe had a duty to protect them. To demonstrate the force of this claim, this section of the Albu Issa provided the police with 200 armed fighters, mortars, and RPGs intended to help defend Ferris Town. This was due in part to the fact that a majority of the AQI fighters who were active against the Amariyah police were from the al-Owesat subtribe of the Albu Issa.[592]

Approved for Release

---

[587] Ibid.
[588] [| Military | 10 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060710 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[589] Ibid.
[590] [| Military | 16 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060716 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[591] [| Military | 10 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060710 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[592] [| Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ There were other tribal problems in the Amariyah area for AQI. In June (b)(6) attempted to exploit the tension between AQI cells in Zaidon and Amariyah by instigating a conflict between rival fighters from the Zobai and Albu Issa tribes. The plan worked, and by late June the Zobai AQI fighters were attacking the Albu Issa AQI fighters in the belief that the latter were informing on them to the Iraqi police, leaving nine dead.[593]

~~(S/NF)~~ Since June 2006, members of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh Muhammad had been searching for senior AQI leader (b)(6) in order to assassinate him and any other AQI figures they encountered in the vicinity of Abu Ghraib. These efforts were supported by local residents in Ridwaniyah and Abu Ghraib who blamed (b)(6) for the murder of a number of community leaders. Among those killed during their efforts were (b)(6) cousin Badr and an unknown AQI amir.[594]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the core of the conflict between (b)(6) and 1920 Revolution Brigade was (b)(6) preemptive strike against the group in an effort to prevent insurgent infighting in Zaidon (see Chapter 6a). Throughout the latter half of the spring of 2006, AQI fighters led by (b)(6) had fought and defeated his former allies in 1920 Revolution Brigade in Zaidon. With the possibility of renewed violence, (b)(6) fled the village of al-Naz where he had been hiding for Samarra or Mosul.[595]

AQI and the Oil Trade

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile, AQI was forced to change how it exploited the oil business. By mid-July 2006, AQI was stealing gasoline trucks traveling from Bayji to Ramadi along the Saddamiyah road between Samarra and Ramadi. AQI did this by setting up checkpoints that were used to steal the gasoline trucks, which AQI members then drove to the Albu 'Ubayd tribal area. Once there, the trucks were emptied of their contents and the gasoline was taken to Ramadi to be resold at $1 per liter. AQI had been forced to resort to robbing the gasoline trucks because Bayji Oil Distribution Center director (b)(6) who had facilitated much of AQI's fuel acquisition operations, had fled the country. Combined with an increased Coalition presence in Ramadi, the AQI leadership decided that its fighters needed to steal at least half the load of fuel trucks entering Ramadi to compensate for the loss of Ibrahim.[596]

~~(S/NF)~~ To lessen the likelihood of Coalition interference, AQI set up makeshift fuel distribution points outside Ramadi. AQI operatives in the Jazira area in particular recruited young men to sell gasoline in five-ten liter containers along al-Jerashi road. Despite the departure of (b)(6), AQI was thus still able to find ways to buy and sell fuel.[597]

~~(S/NF)~~ Within Ramadi, oil distribution director (b)(6) also provided oil to AQI, appointing (b)(6) to supervise the distribution of fuel to the

[593] Ibid.
[594] [| Military | 14 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060814 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[595] Ibid.
[596] [| Military | 14 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060714 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[597] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

group. While Turki had fled Ramadi for 1.4b in April 2006, by July he had returned to the city and resumed his relationship with AQI.[598] Turki provided AQI (b)(6) (b)(6) and his representatives with 20-25,000 liters of petroleum every day that were then sold by truck on the black market to gas and large generator stations throughout Ramadi at the price of 1,000 dinars ($0.68) a liter. This enabled AQI to generate $105,000 per week and $450,000 per month in revenue from Ramadi petroleum profits alone.[599]

~~(S/NF)~~ The same sort of situation held true for propane gas. While the legal distributors of propane gas received 35,000 liters, only 5,000 were given to the general public and the rest ended up in the hands of AQI. Director-general of oil (b)(6) was supposed to account for oil, but he had been missing for several months and no ministry of oil personnel were willing to travel to the Government Center.[600]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's profits from the sale of black market fuel should not be underestimated. While it is impossible to put an exact figure on the group's profits because of the lack of complete records in Anbar, as of April 2006 AQI received 600,000 liters of benzene and 300,000 liters of crude oil per month. If AQI controlled only 50% of benzene distribution, the group could generate up to $597,000 a month in revenue according to the July black market price of $1.99 a liter or $7.57 a gallon in Ramadi. In addition to benzene and crude oil, AQI also controlled the distribution of propane and diesel, giving them power over the general population by controlling their access to fuel.[601]

~~(S/NF)~~ Significant fuel shortages in Anbar and some parts of Iraq forced oil minister (b)(6) (b)(6) to state on July 9 that Iraq would suffer fuel crises for at least another year. The Iraqi oil ministry's chronic production and distribution failures and inability to secure oil infrastructure from AQI infiltration or attack perpetuated the existence of the black market and promoted shortage-inducing activities like hoarding or price gouging.[602]
~~(S/NF)~~ This situation caused the Iraqi government to implement several measures to regain control over the national oil industry. These measures included the revaluation of Oil Protection Force (OPF) contracts and vetting procedures, the use of Iraqi army units as supplemental forces for the OPF, and physical security improvements at infrastructure sites like the Bayji refinery. However, these did not yield significant improvements in the availability of fuel products in Anbar, where the situation steadily grew worse.[603]

~~(S)~~ In some ways, AQI's new oil policy showed the influence of (b)(6) initiative. Whereas under (b)(6) AQI had only sold oil on the black market for profit, now oil was used to influence Anbaris to back the group. Between forty to sixty masked AQI fighters were sent to the oil distribution center in Ramadi every day to obtain oil for residents who supported the group, with some supporters obtaining fuel for themselves and others receiving free fuel to sell on the black

[598] [| Military | 24 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060724 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[599] [| Military | 28 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060828 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[600] [| Military | 24 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060724 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[601] Ibid.
[602] [| Military | 17 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060717 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[603] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

market. Because AQI rather than the Iraqi government or the provincial government now controlled who could purchase oil, this helped to build and maintain support for AQI in Ramadi. Whether residents approved of AQI's political or religious ideology or not, they were forced to at least feign support in order to receive fuel.[604]

~~(S)~~ On the other hand, those towns, villages or individuals who did not support AQI would have their propane, gasoline or oil cut off. Residents of the city of al-Qaim, for instance, were described as "traitors" and their fuel was nearly completely cut off during the summer of 2006, leading to widespread shortages and, ironically as noted above, also preventing the insurgency from reconstituting in the area.[605]

~~(S/NF)~~ In late August 2006, a number of private fuel transportation companies, including AQI leader (b)(6) contracted through the Anbar provincial government to form the al-Rawi Group Shipping Company trucking consortium. Both al-Gadeer and White Sails were affiliated with the al-Rawi Group and (b)(6) used his Ebkitar Investment Company to finance the import of commercial vehicles from 1.4b to Iraq through Ramadi-based intermediaries. Among those involved with Ebkitar were long-time oil smuggling boss Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bazia Ftaykhan and AQI operatives (b)(6) (b)(6) As Anbari residents became more dependent on private transportation companies like White Sails and the al-Rawi Group to deliver the fuel they needed for cooking, electricity, and transportation, AQI was able to insinuate itself further into vital sectors of Anbar's economy.[606]

Disrupting AQI's Oil Trade and Operation VALDEZ REVENGE (August 17 – 21)

~~(S)~~ In May 2006, the Coalition and the Iraqi army began conducting operations to reduce oil smuggling and corruption at the Bayji oil refinery and the surrounding gas stations, including pressuring the upper management of the refinery to ensure that no one would steal from the refinery. Gas station owners were compelled to ensure that the gas they obtained from the oil refinery was distributed to the Bayji population rather than being sold on the black market. By August 2006, these measures combined with new security procedures by the Iraqi oil ministry had decreased the amount of oil smuggling from Bayji.[607]

~~(S/NF)~~ In an effort to disrupt the AQI monopoly on oil and gas distribution in Ramadi, the Coalition launched Operation VALDEZ REVENGE on August 17, detaining eight fuel trucks.[608] Sixty-seven individuals and twenty fuel trucks would eventually be detained as part of VALDEZ REVENGE before its conclusion on August 21.[609] While VALDEZ REVENGE caused some immediate, temporary disruption of AQI's monopoly, its most practical impact was the disruption of

Approved for Release

[604] [| Military | 25 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060725 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[605] Ibid; [| Military | 31 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060831 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[606] [| Military | 20 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060820 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[607] [| Military | 11 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060211 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[608] [| Military | 18 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060818 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[609] [| Military | 21 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060821 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the previously unhindered AQI routine of stealing, moving, and selling fuel without serious challenge.

Insurgent Financing

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI could weather this operation with impunity because the oil trade was just one source of funding for the group. According to the CIA Office of Transnational Issues, the three main hubs of insurgent financial activity were located in Haditha, Mosul, and Ramadi, which when combined accounted for 44% of all cash seizures made by Coalition forces in Iraq. These hubs were important because they contained numerous extortion and kidnapping targets along the highways to 1.4b 1.4b The area between Fallujah, Baghdad, and Hillah by contrast accounted for 1/3 of all anti-Coalition attacks but only 1/9 of cash seizures. While the Coalition captured $1,100,000 between January and May of 2006, the insurgency spent between $20-40,000,000 during that same period.[610]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI also made extensive use of hawalas to move funds, which presented a serious problem for the Coalition and Iraqi security forces. Due to security concerns about traditional banking services in Anbar, many Anbaris used local hawalas as "citizen trust funds." Residents deposited their money with hawaladors who then used the funds to cover other transactions. As a result, money seized during hawala raids might belong to an insurgent group, but legitimate citizens could also inadvertently be denied access to their trust fund deposits. Furthermore, the money in these trust funds was dispersed to numerous safe houses to lower the chances of robbery. Coalition raids on AQI associated hawalas in Husaybah indicated that the group deliberately used hawalas in areas devoid of insurgent activity in order to avoid the discovery of their safe houses by Coalition or Iraqi security forces during counter-insurgency operations.[611]

Approved for Release

[610] [| Military | 18 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060818 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[611] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

The Sectarian Fighting Helps AQI

~~(S/NF)~~ Along with their assured sources of funding, AQI also had a continuous stream of potential recruits, many drawn from the continuing sectarian violence. By mid-July, more than 6,000 Sunni families had fled to Fallujah to escape the violence and the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad and Basra. The Fallujah city council estimated that refugees were now entering the city at a rate of 3,000 a month and that support for the refugees provided even more challenges for Fallujah given the city's own infrastructure and economic problems.[612]

~~(S)~~ Fallujah was regarded by Sunni refugees as far safer and more secure when compared to living in mixed cities where owning identification cards with typical Sunni names like Omar were enough to get one killed by Shi'a militias. AQI was able to capitalize on the fears of the refugees, gaining their support by claiming to protect them in order to further embed the group into Anbar's legitimate economy.[613]

~~(S)~~ AQI was bolstered in Haditha by an influx of Sunni families fleeing Baghdad due to their perceptions of the sectarian violence in the capital. Many of these refugees believed that 1.4b was orchestrating the violence in Baghdad using the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps, leaving them open to AQI recruiting.[614]

~~(S)~~ By late July, 50-60 AQI fighters recruited from the al-Rawi tribe were sent from Haditha to Baghdad to bolster other Sunni groups in the city for what many Iraqis believed was "the beginning of an Iraqi civil war." Acting on this same perception, the Mahdi Army and Badr Corps made similar troop movements from southern Iraq to Baghdad to strengthen Shi'a forces in the capital. The growth of the perception that Iraq was in a state of civil war facilitated AQI recruitment as more and more internal refugees arrived with stories of persecution and atrocities by Shi'a militias.[615]

Further Cooptation of other Insurgents by AQI

~~(S/NF)~~ Another source of potential recruits for AQI was other insurgent groups. Following the guidelines previously laid down by (b)(6) AQI had been in talks with a number of SAR and SRE insurgent groups in Ramadi to unite as many of them as possible under the banner of AQI's Mujahideen Shura Council. The main point of friction between AQI and the local groups was the continued targeting of members of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army. Yet every time the topic was raised the AQI representatives were able to make compelling arguments from the Qu'ran and the hadith that were ultimately viewed as persuasive by the other insurgent leaders.[616]

~~(S/NF)~~ As a result of AQI's ability to ally with, coopt, or subsume other insurgent groups, the group was able to increase the number of attacks in Ramadi to an average of 139 attacks per week. This coincided with ongoing AQI efforts to recruit insurgent amirs or commanders of SRE and SAR groups not represented in the Mujahideen Shura Council by offering them more money. This

Approved for Release

[612] [| Military | 18 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060718 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[613] Ibid.
[614] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[615] [| Military | 28 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060728 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[616] [| Military | 23 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060823 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

allowed AQI to not only retain its hold over former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq who had allied with the group but to expand that hold to encompass members of Jaysh al-Fatihin as well. Nor were these efforts limited to Ramadi, as can be seen by the establishment of the Haditha Mujahideen Shura and AQI efforts to recruit or subsume local insurgent groups in Hit. [617]

~~(S)~~ The cooptation of 1920 Revolution Brigade by both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna continued as well. A typical result was the July 9 attack on a Coalition outpost in Dulab carried out by former members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade led by (b)(6) (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ Also typical was the financial and weapons cooperation illustrated in a late July operation. (b)(6) a 1920 Revolution Brigade member, facilitated the transfer of $18 million to (b)(6) (an arms facilitator for the 1920 Revolution Brigade) so that (b)(6) could purchase various weapons, including SAM-7 rockets, Russian sniper rifles, RPGs, PKCs, TNT, 62mm mortars, and 82mm mortars. Once the weaponry was delivered, representatives of (b)(6) the 1920 Revolution Brigade members, and AQI leader (b)(6) (b)(6) intended to begin distributing the weapons. $15,000,000 of the $18,000,000 used to cover the purchase had been provided to 1920 Revolution Brigade by former Iraqi Air Force chief of staff Lieutenant General Khaldun Khattab ibn al-Tikriti. To place this purchase in context, it should be remembered that the weapons budget for the entire Iraqi interior ministry for 2006 was roughly $250,000,000.[619]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI was able as well to bring members of Harakat Islamiyah leader (b)(6) under its umbrella as a satellite group to help it target the Iraqi police in Ramadi. In addition to (b)(6) and former members of Islamic Army in Iraq and 1920 Revolution Brigade were under heavy pressure from AQI to target Iraqi police in Ramadi and to gather information on residents who had received military training in 1.4b Among those police assassinated by AQI were Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Majid al-Nafir and his cousin Muhammad al-Nafir.[620]

~~(S)~~ Another SRE group al-Rashidin Army, which became active in Hit in late August under the leadership of (b)(6) now allied with AQI and Ansar al-Sunna. Setting up checkpoints between Hit and Baghdadi in the Sahilyah, Zakikah, and Kasraq areas, the group targeted residents of Baghdadi and Jubbah for intimidation in the belief that they cooperated with the Coalition.[621]

~~(S/NF)~~ A second way to coopt insurgents was by forming associate groups from former members of other insurgent groups. In mid-August, AQI formed the associate groups Sadr Sunnah-Islamic Army of Iraq (made up of former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq now loyal to AQI), and (b)(6) to operate in the al-Azizia, al-Thaiala, and al-Sharqiyah districts of

[617] [| Military | 23 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060823 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[618] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[619] [| Military | 31 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060731 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[620] [| Military | 14 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060814 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[621] [| Military | 28 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060824 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Ramadi.[622] Of the two, Jaysh Abu Bakr al-Salafi was the most extreme and was led by (b)(6) (b)(6) an associate of Hajji Ibrahim (Abu Kubayd, Sheikh Mansur), who had been killed during an earlier Coalition attempt to kill Zarqawi. Hajji Ibrahim was an AQI imam in Baghdad who had ordered the death of businessmen that he believed had violated shari'ah[623]

~~(S)~~ In August, AQI fully reconstituted al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal as its primary associate group in Hit. Subordinate to the AQI leadership in Hit, the revived al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal was made up largely of insurgents who had belonged to AQI associate groups that had been dispersed or destroyed along the western Euphrates River valley during Operation SAYYID II. [624]

~~(S)~~ The revived al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal was led by (b)(6), whose representative in Hit was (b)(6) He oversaw the planning and execution for all of the group's attack in Hit after receiving permission from his AQI masters. While AQI wanted to reestablish al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal in order to provide the group with a "local face" through which to operate in Hit, the group had trouble finding an adequate successor to al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal's former leader Muhammad Cent (killed in July 2005). (b)(6) were all former associates of Muhammad Cent, while most of the leaders of the new al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal were remnants of the previous group or members of the previous leaders' families.[625]

Coalition Attempts to Disrupt AQI in Ramadi and Haditha

~~(S/NF)~~ The Coalition recognized the problems with AQI in both Ramadi and the Hit-Haditha corridor and took several actions to disrupt AQI influence in these parts of Iraq. On July 27, AQI leaders Abu Salih al-Saudi, Abu Abdallah al-Saudi, Adnan al-Suwaydawi, and fourteen other AQI fighters were killed by a Coalition airstrike during a meeting of the group's leadership in the Jazira area north of Ramadi. (b)(6) managed to survive the attack by leaving the meeting immediately prior to the airstrike and fled the area soon afterwards. The death of these three senior leaders represented a blow to AQI's capabilities in Ramadi. Abu Salih al-Saudi was a religious leader from the Mujahideen Shura Council who provided religious and operational guidance to AQI and its allies in Ramadi in addition to serving as the amir of 17th Street and an IED leader for the Jazira area. Abu Abdallah al-Saudi was a candidate to succeed Abu Mustafa as the amir of Ramadi who was amir of the Jazira area at the time of his death. (b)(6) was a top deputy to Abu Khattab and the amir of the Malaab district.[626]

~~(S/NF)~~ Since the capture of (b)(6) AQI had been in flux in the Ramadi area as local leaders (b)(6) all relocated to the Jazira area. While (b)(6) had been his designated second-in-command, he did not take over the group's operations following the capture of his uncle, and in fact AQI had yet to designate a successor from amongst their ranks. This meant

Approved for Release

[622] [| Military | 20 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060820 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[623] [| Military | 27 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060827 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[624] [| Military | 24 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060824 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[625] Ibid.
[626] [| Military | 02 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060802 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

that the deaths of three AQI leaders disrupted their own networks internally but would do little to the networks of the other AQI leaders in Ramadi.[627]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the same time, the Coalition stepped up its operations in Ramadi, beginning a series of battles throughout the city. In response to the loss of many fighters (sixty-five fighters killed and fouteen wounded between July 16-29 alone), many members of the group sought refuge among supporters in the Tamim district of the city. Because increased numbers of Coalition soldiers were restricting the movement of AQI fighters, the group began focusing on mortar and IED attacks against Camp Blue Diamond, the Government Center, the western Ramadi police station, and Camp Ramadi.[628]

~~(S)~~ To build support for the Coalition in Ramadi and provide basic services to residents, Civil Affairs personnel distributed seventy-six generators to homes in the al-Hawz and Hay al-Dhobat districts in the southern part of the town. No sooner had the generators been delivered, however, than AQI fighters led by (b)(6) begin intimidating those residents who received generators, telling them that they did not need electricity because the Prophet Muhammad did not use it. They then forced the residents to turn in their generators, selling them on the black market at $800 per generator.[629]

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, in Haditha, the Coalition detained Black Banners leader and AQI amir for Haditha (b)(6) Because the Black Banners were a merged group made up of AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and former 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters, (b)(6) detention was a setback for one of the few AQI associate groups that had been able to succeed at both Zarqawi and (b)(6) long-term goal of uniting different SRE and SAR insurgent groups under a common flag.[630]

Foreign Connections to the Insurgency

1.4b or the Insurgency in the Summer of 2006

~~(S/NF)~~ Developments during the spring and summer of 2006 would deepen ties between AQI and Iraq's regional neighbors. The relationship between AQI and 1.4b had always been complicated and was made even more complicated by an explosion in the spring of 2006. In late April 2006, an AQI bombmaker and two 1.4b officers were killed during an accidental detonation in Abu Kamal. A few days after the explosion, the 1.4b claimed that it had been a suicide bombing perpetrated by Jund al-Shams and issued arrest warrants for AQI's 1.4b leader (b)(6) relatives (b)(6) Using his connections with 1.4b intelligence, (b)(6) secured the release of (b)(6) who was his driver and lieutenant, while (b)(6) was later released and deported to Kuwait.[631]

Approved for Release

---

627 Ibid.
628 [| Military | 04 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060804 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
629 [| Military | 01 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060801 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
630 [| Military | 10 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060810 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
631 [| Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The 1.4b laim that the accidental detonation at Abu Kamal was a Jund al-Shams suicide bombing coincided with the infiltration of Jund al-Shams into Anbar. A loose confederation of 1.4b Islamists, Jund al-Shams had been tied back to both Zarqawi and the broader AQAM since at least 1999. Although conflicting reporting exists as to the exact relationship between Jund al-Shams and 1.4b intelligence, the latter was at minimum aware of the former's activities in Iraq. The increase in Jund al-Shams activity in Husaybah and al-Tanf coincided with 1.4b intelligence efforts information on the locations and dispositions of Coalition bases and Iraqi border posts.[632]

~~(S/NF)~~ The (b)(6) in al-Qaim were both associated with AQI. In March 2006, they served as the means through which 1.4b officer Brigadier General Muhsin al-Aqasi (Abu Amar), who is responsible for 1.4b operations in Abu Kamal, was able to support AQI. Muhsin passed $400,000 to (b)(6) who then deposited the money at the Ali Salih al-Rawi *hawala* branch office in Abu Kamal under the name of the AQI front Alwan Company. The funds were then transferred to al-Qaim, where they were withdrawn by (b)(6) and then transferred to (b)(6).[633] Interestingly, the two 1.4b officers killed in the accidental detonation at Abu Kamal worked for Brigadier General al-Aqasi.[634]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) held regular meetings with 1.4b chief Asif Shawkat, the brother-in-law of 1.4b president Bashar Asad who was married to (b)(6). So frequent were the meetings between Asif and (b)(6) that Asif jokingly referred to (b)(6) as AQI's ambassador to 1.4b AQI preferred to work with military intelligence rather than the 1.4b Mukhabarat, which has been led by Major General Ali al-Mamluk since mid-2005. Asif Shawkat, General Muhsin al-Aqasi, and Brigadier General Burhan Burhan all met with representatives of AQI, FRE, and SAR insurgent groups in interactions that were overseen or at least acknowledged by President Asad.[635]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the idea of 1.4b upport for AQI would appear counter-productive given its own internal problems with domestic jihadist groups bent on dismantling the "heretical" Alawite regime of Bashar Asad, Asad's track record of using propaganda implicating Islamists for actions that were undertaken by 1.4b is not without precedent. According to the UN investigation into the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Asif Shawkat forced Abu Adass at gunpoint to videotape a message claiming responsibility for Hariri's death under the guise of the Islamist group al-Nasra wal Jihad fi Bilad al-Shams. The UN International Independent Investigation Commission concluded that there is no evidence that such a group ever existed and that 1.4b agent (b)(6) planned and supported the Hariri assassination alongside (b)(6) and General Rustum Ghazali. In the same way, 1.4b military intelligence used Jund al-Shams as a cover for infiltrating intelligence agents in western Anbar, making earlier assessments of a strictly adversarial nature between 1.4b military intelligence and AQI over-simplified.[636]

[632] [| Military | 02 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060702| ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[633] [| Military | 05 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060605 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[634] [| Military | 30 Jun 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060630 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[635] [| Military | 11 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060711 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[636] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ 1.4b also stepped up its intelligence collection efforts over the summer of 2006 in order to gather as much information as possible should it choose to facilitate suicide attacks between the summer of 2006 and the end of Ramadan. 1.4b collection efforts were focused in particular against Coalition bases, which the 1.4b government believed would be turned over to the Iraqi army once the Coalition withdrew. In March 2006, Iraqi soldier (b)(6) was kidnapped by 1.4b while traveling to 1.4b to purchase a car. He was released in early June 2006 after his family paid a $4,000 ransom after four months of being tortured and interrogated by 1.4b intelligence during which they called him a traitor to the Arab world. As a result of his experience, many Iraqi soldiers and police now feared that they too would be kidnapped and tortured by 1.4b intelligence.[637]

~~(S/NF)~~ The fighting between 1.4b over the summer of 2006 did not affect 1.4b intelligence operations along the Iraqi border. While the 1.4b backed PFLP did send fighters to Lebanon to fight Israel, neither Israel nor 1.4b sought to engage the other in direct military action. For that reason, 1.4b intelligence was unwilling to divert a significant portion of its intelligence assets from their current duties on the Iraqi border with Anbar. However, the terrorist training in Latakia was run by members of Department 279, many of whose officers and agents were temporarily redeployed from Latakia to 1.4b in order to provide the 1.4b leadership with a better understanding of the ethnically and religiously diverse 1.4b in order to gauge which units were most sympathetic to 1.4b[638]

~~(S/NF)~~ By the end of the summer of 2006, there had been a major increase in 1.4b facilitated insurgent activity in Anbar since March 2006.[639] 1.4b intelligence and paramilitary units supported a variety of Iraqi insurgent groups including Jund al-Shams, AQI, the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, and a wide variety of SAR and SRE insurgent groups.[640] In the absence of migration control along the Iraqi-1.4b border and the scarcity of movement control measures throughout Anbar, 1.4b insurgents had little difficulty moving around the province to facilitate or participate in insurgent operations.[641]

Al Qaeda and the 1.4b

1.4b, 1.4d

Approved for Release

[637] [| Military | 19 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060719 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[638] Ibid.
[639] [| Military | 17 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060817 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[640] Ibid.
[641] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b, 1.4d

~~(S/NF)~~ Zawahiri's statement did not modify al Qaeda's stated goal of "a caliphate from Spain to Iraq," but it did modify the operational means used to achieve that goal. Instead of regarding the Shi'a as apostates who were to be converted or killed, Zawahiri called for a united Muslim front to oppose "tyrannical Western civilization and its leader, America" as part of a global war against the West. Zawahiri also attacked the Sunni Arab governments as impotent allies of the West, appealing to the populist anti-Israel sentiments of the Sunni Arab public. This ecumenical appeal indicated a new willingness on the part of Zawahiri to follow the old adage that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Both the supporters of Iranian president Ahmadinejad and AQAM desired that Israel be eliminated and the conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah provided both with an opportunity to rally support to further their own long-term goals.[644]

~~(S)~~ With the fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in mid-summer 2006, AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) returned to the Jaghayfi region of the Jazira area of Ramadi to begin stockpiling weapons in preparation for attacks.[645] All of these leaders were veterans of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, Operation AL FAJR, and Operation SAYYID II who had fled to Lebanon in 2005 to escape capture by the Coalition and were now forced by the war to return to Iraq.[646]

Approved for Release

[642] [| Military | 28 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060728 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[643] Ibid.
[644] Ibid.
[645] [| Military | 25 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060725 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[646] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

The Coalescence of Anti-AQI Forces in Anbar Begins

Muwafuq Abd al-Razzaq's Plan to Oppose AQI

1.4b, (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ At the meeting, (b)(6) stressed his belief that it was in the best interests of Anbar to support the Coalition against AQI in order to create a security situation suitable for control of Anbar to be turned over to Sunni Iraqi security forces. He argued that only by uniting could Anbar achieve favorable reconcilitation with the Iraqi government. (b)(6) recorded a message that was distributed via CD in Anbar's major cities from August 18-25 stating that Anbaris should not fear AQI and that they should support the Iraqi security forces.[648]

~~(S/NF)~~ Because (b)(6) was a highly respected Sunni religious leader who had been predominant in Sunni religious circles both before and after the fall of Saddam Hussein, he had the necessary religious and social credentials to challenge Anbaris who felt abandoned by their local leadership and betrayed by the national government. The former imam of the Salahaddin Mosque in Ramadi, (b)(6) had maintained a number of connections to the SAR groups represented in the Ramadi Shura Council.[649]

~~(S/NF)~~ While this was a positive development, the SAR groups represented by (b)(6) 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh Muhammad lacked the necessary financial, logistical, and manpower support to effectively oppose AQI in Anbar. Still, as the leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and founder of the Anbar People's Committee, (b)(6) maintained a certain amount of respect and influence in Anbari religious and political circles prior to going into hiding in early 2006 to avoid assassination at the hands of AQI.[650]

Tribal Resistance and AQI Realignment

~~(S)~~ A more serious challenge to AQI would be offered by tribes angered at the brutality of the insurgent group. One important example of this was the relationship of AQI with the Albu Ali Jassim. At the end of August, AQI leaders (b)(6) fled from the Albu Ali Jassim tribal area north of Ramadi to 1.4b where their families had already been relocated prior to their departure. Prior to their departure, the two AQI leaders demanded that all residents of the

[647] [| Military | 16 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060816 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[648] Ibid.
[649] Ibid.
[650] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Albu Ali Jassim tribal area surrender their weapons to AQI, resulting in a round of clashes between local tribes and AQI.[651]

~~(S/NF)~~ The demand by AQI was occasioned by a feud between the Albu Ali Jassim and AQI, a feud that began with a dispute between the Iraqi AQI fighters in the Albu Ali Jassim tribal area and foreign fighters in the Albu 'Ubayd tribal area. In early 2006, a 1.4b AQI leader who was a rival of (b)(6) had one of his Yemeni lieutenants kidnap an Iraqi police officer and kill him without receiving orders from (b)(6) Enraged, (b)(6) planned to kill the 1.4b AQI leader, but the 1.4b learned of his plans, declared the entire Albu Ali Jassim tribe infidels and ordered his fighters to kill them.[652]

~~(S/NF)~~ The result of the 1.4b declaration was that, by late August, the Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Nimr, Albu Alay, and Albu Assaf tribes were providing a large number of enthusiastic police applicants to the Iraqi government. In fact a majority of the 177 applicants for the Ramadi police who reported after a recruiting drive on August 17 came from these tribal lands in the Jazira area.[653]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's response to the Albu Ali Jassim tribe's resistance was true to type. On August 21, AQI fighters led by (b)(6) (released from Bucca Prison on August 20) assassinated Albu Ali Jassim tribal leader Sheikh Khalid Araq Ataymi al-Iliyawi, his son Husam, and his nephew Khalil Ibrahim Araq in Ramadi. A former general in the Iraqi army and local IIP leader, Sheikh Khalid had supported the Ramadi Shura Council in 2004 and had cooperated with AQI leaders Abu Bakr and Abu Uthman back when they had been members of the Abu Harun Group. An unsigned letter to the AQI *shura majlis* later recovered by Coalition forces had requested permission to assassinate eight IIP leaders, Sheikh Khalid among them. Clashes ensued between AQI fighters from the Albu Ubayd tribe and the Albu Ali Jassim tribe when the latter group attempted to retrieve Sheikh Khalid's body for a proper Muslim burial.[654]

~~(S/NF)~~ Yet the problems with the Albu Ali Jassim were just the tip of the iceberg for AQI. Throughout the summer of 2006, AQI's relationship with numerous Iraqi tribes worsened as repeated murder and intimidation campaigns gradually made AQI more hated than the Coalition. The most anti-AQI of the tribes, in addition to the Albu Ali Jassim, were the Albu Dhiab, Albu Assaf, Albu Nimr, Albu Mahal, Albu Sada, Albu Muthanna, Albu Hatam, Albu Alay, Albu Julib, Albu Risha, Albu Fahd and part of the Albu Issa. Albu Dhiab tribesmen supported Coalition operations in their tribal area north of Ramadi, operations which resulted in the capture or death of several AQI figures, including Akram Ibrahim Ali al-Dhiabi and Ansar al-Sunna amir Barakat Ahmad Ali al-Dhiabi. Senior Albu Dhiab, Albu Assaf, and Albu Ali Jassim tribesmen then requested Coalition assistance in permanently cleansing their tribal areas of AQI.[655]

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, following the murder of Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Yusif Khutayib of the Albu Nimr tribe in Barwanah by AQI, members of the Albu Nimr tribe began recruiting armed men to kidnap those

[651] [| Military | 18 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060818 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[652] [| Military | 23 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060723 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[653] [| Military | 22 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060822 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[654] [| Military | 31 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060831 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[655] [| Military | 06 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060806 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

responsible and kill them out in the desert. They received a blessing for this plan from several tribal leaders including Sheikh Abdallah al-Nimrawi, the highest-ranking sheikh of the Albu Nimr tribe in Barwanah. Sheikh Abd al-Sattar had been killed by AQI member (b)(6) as part of a recruiting test without regard for the second order effects of the murder.[656]

~~(S)~~ Tribal fighting next broke out among the Fuhaylat and Owesat subtribes of the Albu Issa over the former's support for AQI. The pro-Coalition Owesat leadership had confronted their Fuhaylat counterparts over their support for AQI fighters who had targeted their subtribe, leading to Fuhaylat accusations that the Owesats were puppets of the Iraqi government and the Coalition. Several murders and kidnappings soon followed, leading to Albu Muthanna, Albu Hatim, and Albu Sada subtribes of the Albu Issa siding with the Owesats when the Iraqi security forces did not take action to resolve the situation.[657]

~~(S)~~ The Owesat decision to target the Fuhaylats for their support of AQI was a momentous choice for the subtribe. AQI maintained a presence of between 200-300 seasoned fighters in Jurf al-Sakr, Yusufiyah, and other cities in nearby northern Babil, who could be called upon to suppress any resistance to the group.[658] In mid-July, these fighters assembled in the center of Fuhaylat life, the village of Qaryat al-Fuhaylat near Amariyah. Concerned over reports of AQI activities in Qaryat al-Fuhaylat, the Coalition conducted Operation SPOTLIGHT from July 22-27 to confirm the AQI presence and leadership in the village.[659]

~~(S/NF)~~ Residents of Manasir and other villages near Amariyah now took up arms (including AK-47s, PKCs, RPGs, and 120mm mortars recovered from old Iraqi ammo supply points) to support the local Iraqi police against AQI. The leaders of the Owesat organized these tribal fighters into a 200-strong militia that were deputized by the local Iraqi police. The militia provided the Iraqi police with the support to maintain their position throughout the early fall, but despite this early success, the struggle between the Fuhaylats, supported by AQI, and the Owesats, apparently ended with the surrender of the Owesats to AQI.[660]

~~(S/NF)~~ Senior leaders from the Albu Julib tribe also ordered their tribesmen to capture any AQI fighters found traversing their tribal area south of Ramadi. The Albu Julib tribal leaders had supported the December 2005 Iraqi elections, resulting in a number of their tribal leaders being assassinated by AQI. Together with the Albu Dhiab and the Albu Fahd tribes, the Albu Julib was now one of several Ramadi tribes undertaking anti-AQI measures, though rogue elements within the tribe disagreed with this view.[661] The tension between the Julib tribe and AQI undermined the latter's efforts to persuade Harakat Islamiyah's Ramadi leader (b)(6) to assist the group in carrying out attacks on Coalition forces in Hit.[662]

---

[656] [| Military | 30 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060730 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[657] [| Military | 18 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060718 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[658] Ibid.
[659] [| Military | 01 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060801 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[660] Ibid.
[661] [| Military | 04 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060704 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[662] [| Military | 31 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060731 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Fighting also broke out between the Albu Fahd tribe and pro-AQI elements of the Albu 'Ubayd tribe on August 11 after the latter kidnapped Sheikh Salam Ahmad Khalif Alwan al-Fahdawi, the son of an important Albu Fahd tribal leader. Armed with RPGs, mortars, and machine guns gathered from Iraqi weapons caches, Albu Fahd tribesmen led by Jaysh al-Fatihin leader (b)(6) (b)(6) attacked the AQI Albu 'Ubayd tribesmen, killing eight AQI fighters at the cost of five of their own. In an effort to avert further conflict, the AQI leadership promised to release Sheikh Salam the following day, leading to negotiations between AQI leader (b)(6) (b)(6), Sheikh Salam's brother Sheikh Mahmud Ahmad Khalif Alwan al-Fahdawi, and Jaysh al-Fatihin leader (b)(6) at a mosque in an Albu 'Ubayd village on August 18. During the negotiations, the AQI leader stated that the group kidnapped Sheikh Salam because they believed he had purchased weapons from bandits that had been stolen from AQI for use by Jaysh al-Fatihin. Moreover, Sheikh Salam had rejected AQI's attacks on Iraqi civilians and informed on AQI fighters to the Coalition.[663]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Albu Fahd tribal leaders scarcely needed a reason to fight AQI since they still blamed the group for the killing of Sheikh Nasser (see Chapter 6a). After its tribal militia was forced to disband under pressure from AQI, many of the former Fahdawi militia members had continued to join anti-AQI SAR groups like 1920 Revolution Brigade or Jaysh al-Fatihin. The former group attempted to seize the opportunity provided by the conflict to renew its war against AQI, declaring that AQI's tactics showed a disregard for innocent life and that the group was responsible for the killing of a number of prominent Fallujans including Sheikh Muhammad Sharqi, Sheikh Umar, Sheikh Ali Hussein, and Sheikh Abd al-Alim. Despite these statements by the 1920 Revolution Brigade leadership, the group was far too weak to do anything other than condemn AQI for its actions.[664]

~~(S/NF)~~ This renewed tribal violence against AQI resulted in the death of Diya Shakir Farhan, who was murdered in a dispute over money by his own tribesmen after agreeing to come to a meeting west of Ramadi to settle their differences. With the death of Diya, his brother (b)(6) assumed command of his Saqlawiyah-based network, which stretched into both Fallujah and Ramadi.[665]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the end of August, anti-AQI tribes began to reach out beyond their own members to form a more general anti-AQI organization. Representatives of the Albu Dhiab, Albu Assaf, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Julib, and Albu Risha tribes met on August 31 as part of a precursor for a larger tribal conference that would discuss security and stability in Ramadi.[666]

The Growth of the Anbar Revolutionaries

~~(S/NF)~~ This meeting would have crucial consequences in September. By late August, many of the anti-AQI vigilante groups in Anbar had begun to organize around the banner of the Anbar Revolutionaries, which was now led in Ramadi by Humid and Hamid Farhan Khais and Iraqi police

[663] [| Military | 25 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060825 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[664] Ibid.
[665] [| Military | 30 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060830 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[666] [| Military | 31 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060831 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6) The group had decreased its day-to-day operations in Ramadi in August due to Operation VALDEZ REVENGE, and reverted back to basic security and neighborhood watch duties in order to maintain security for their families during the operation. While the Anbar Revolutionaries remained quite small, and like earlier vigilante groups such as the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade it was only capable of carrying out isolated attacks against AQI fighters, its slow growth represented a reenergized effort to fight AQI on the part of Anbari tribes and SAR insurgent groups.[667]

~~(S)~~ One of the leading minds behind this shift in strategy was (b)(6) who intended to develop a cooperative agreement between the Iraqi security forces, his own 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Harakat Islamiyah against AQI with the help of Sunni religious leaders. (b)(6) planned to return to Ramadi to meet with Governor Mamoun and persuade Anbari tribal leaders to publicly disassociate themselves from AQI. (b)(6) also intended to request money and weapons for members of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat Islamiyah so that their members could work to drive AQI out of Ramadi. While (b)(6) disliked Governor Mamoun, he and his SAR allies believed that the governor was extremely weak and that it was best to deal with him now because of his influence with the Iraqi security forces even as they plotted to remove him later. His intent was for members of both groups to actively participate in the Iraqi police in order to legitimize their presence in Ramadi and help to build public confidence in the Iraqi security forces.[668]

~~(S/NF)~~ To demonstrate his bonafides as a viable figure for political engagement, (b)(6) had Harakat Islamiyah fighters in Ramadi assassinate AQI leaders Rafa Abd al-Salam (Abu Salih), Bassim al-Suwaydawi, and Abu Musab al-Saudi, circulating news of their demise throughout the Iraqi expatriate community in 1.4b. Harakat Islamiyah was able to target the AQI leadership in Ramadi so effectively because the group had a greater knowledge of the AQI command structure and many of its fighters saw the group as a threat to their personal safety and the safety of the Sunni community in Ramadi. As the leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat Islamiyah, (b)(6) was able to leverage his status as a well-respected political and religious leader in Ramadi to target AQI despite its superior position in the city. (b)(6) had told Sheikh Muwafuq Abd al-Razzaq at the August 14 meeting in 1.4b that he planned to mobilize up to 3,000 loyalists against AQI in Anbar in order to stabilize the province and enable the transfer of local and regional security to Sunni Iraqi forces.[669]

Approved for Release

[667] Ibid.
[668] [| Military | 01 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060901 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[669] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Steps Toward Creating a Shadow Government

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite these signs of a growing dissatisfaction with the group, AQI continued its attempt to impose its vision of an Islamic state on the people of Anbar. Because it is law and public behavior that are viewed as the most important issues in their Islamic state, AQI – as in the past – expended much time and energy in forcing Iraqis to conform to its notions of correct Islamic behavior. Thus, when AQI took over the Women and Children's Hospital in Ramadi, hospital staff was separated by gender by AQI fighters who claimed that allowing men and women to work together would lead to carnal activities. Patients were beaten for drinking and Shi'a were denied treatment.[670]

~~(S)~~ The creation of a shari'ah court in Karmah was a further sign of AQI attempts to create a state within a state. Presided over by Imam Araf Muhammad Ubayd of the Ali ibn Talib mosque in Gnather north of Karmah, the court had the power of life and death over "collaborators." If Araf accepted the pleas of the collaborators, they would live, if not they were killed by AQI.[671]

~~(S)~~ By the end of August, Shajariyah (a village east of Ramadi and one of AQI's primary headquarters in the area) was referred to by members of the group as "the center of the Islamic Caliphate in Anbar."[672] All the effort expended by AQI to create a state in Iraq were about to come to fruition, and the group was merely awaiting orders from AQSL to permit the official declaration of an Islamic state of Iraq.

Attack Data (May – August 2006)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the middle trimester (May to August 2006). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was sharply higher than the previous period, particularly within AO Topeka, and continued to increase throughout the period. The first few weeks of the period, through early June, showed attack levels at a stable level, then after a brief lull in mid-June, the attack levels jumped to a higher tier that increased through the end of the period. This pattern was most closely mirrored within the dominant Direct Fire data, but is also evident within the IED and Complex Attack data. The pattern of Indirect Fire attack levels was somewhat independent of the other types, and remained relatively stable throughout the entire period.

Approved for Release

---

[670] [| Military | 21 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060621 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]; [| Military | 27 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 27 Jul 06 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[671] [| Military | 25 Jul 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060725 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[672] [| Military | 30 Aug 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060830 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Complex Attacks





Approved for Release

Snapshot of the Insurgency: End of Summer 2006

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The insurgency at the end of the summer of 2006 was thus trending in two quite different directions. One the one hand, AQI could not have seemed stronger: intimidating and murdering almost at will, it imposed its vision of *shari'ah* on any areas over which it had influence in preparation for the declaration of its Emirate. Ramadi had fallen even further into AQI's hands, Hit and Haditha seemed hopeless, and other areas of Anbar, including Zaidon and most small villages throughout the province, were apparently firmly under their thumb.

~~(S/NF)~~ Yet, on the other hand, there was one sign that something quite different was happening underneath the surface. There were clear indications that tribal resistance to AQI was not simply fading away and that certain sheikhs were not giving in to AQI's murder and intimidation. What had started as the actions of one tribe—the Albu Mahal—had grown to include more than a dozen tribes and subtribes, all fighting AQI for reasons of their own (b)(6) initiatives and the new Anbar Revolutionaries promised a chance to organize this resistance if only the right mix of leadership and vision could be found.

Approved for Release

September to December

~~(S/NF)~~ *At the end of the summer of 2006, AQI remained the predominant insurgent group in Anbar, but resistance to the group, in the form of Harakat al-Islamiyah and the Anbar Revolutionaries, was growing. One explanation for this was the decision by* (b)(6) *to soften AQI's basic interaction with Anbaris and to attempt to win "hearts and minds." While AQI retained its' influence over the population of Anbar throughout the fall,* (b)(6) *new direction allowed anti-AQI groups to reemerge in Anbar for the first time since the early spring of 2006.*

~~(S/NF)~~ *Unfortunately, attempts to exploit the rise of anti-AQI groups in Anbar were hampered by internal Iraqi factional feuding that continued to be a major impediment to Sunni participation in the Iraqi government. AQI also attempted to Iraqify itself by announcing the creation of an Islamic Emirate of Iraq in the early fall of 2006. The leadership of the Emirate was, with one exception* (b)(6) *entirely Iraqi, putting an indigenous face on what was an essentially foreign institution.*

AQI's Status, End of Summer 2006

~~(S)~~ Throughout August and September, AQI had dramatically stepped up its activity in western Anbar, including an increase in mass casualty attacks in Fallujah while keeping the overall murder and intimidation campaign against Iraqi police and government officials steady throughout the province.[673]

~~(S)~~ The rise in AQI activity in western Anbar was largely due to additional manpower: local recruits, foreign fighters, and AQI fighters relocated to Anbar from Bayji. In addition, a limited number of AQI fighters moved from Ramadi to the Hit-Haditha corridor, although there was no major influx of AQI fighters from other parts of the province. Meanwhile, a number of AQI cells that had once operated in al-Qaim now became active in the Rawah-Anah area and across western Anbar.[674]

---

[673] [| Military | 02 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061002 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[674] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ AQI also put renewed focus on the area between Hit and Rawah. Eight members of the Mujahideen Shura Council were tasked by AQI leadership to recruit, finance, and direct attacks to give Hit in particular a higher media profile as part of the broader AQI strategy of reinvigorating its influence throughout the entire western Euphrates River valley. In Haditha, the cooperation facilitated by the Haditha Mujahideen Shura enabled AQI and its allies to triple their attacks after mid-July in order to thwart the creation of an Iraqi police in the area. In Anah, AQI exploited the absence of Coalition forces to suppress their IIP rivals. In Rutbah, the influx of AQI fighters from Ramadi resulted in an increased number of IED attacks in the city, though carrying out any attacks beyond that was problematic due to AQI's limited manpower inside the city. AQI mortar, sniper, ambush, and swarm attacks in this area were modeled after tactics that the group had used to establish itself as the most powerful insurgent group in Ramadi.[675]

~~(S)~~ The Fallujah area continued to harbor dangerous if somewhat disorganized (see Chapter 6b) AQI cells that planned to take advantage of the shift of Coalition forces. When the Coalition carried out operations outside Fallujah, AQI fighters returned to the inner city in order to avoid capture while other elements of the group facilitated the movement of foreign fighters throughout the Fallujah area. Infiltrating into Fallujah by using legitimate or counterfeit identification cards, sometimes with assistance from corrupt Iraqi police, AQI was able to continue its murder and intimidation campaign against Fallujah residents. Because Fallujah was an important symbol for AQI, its leadership wanted to maintain pressure on the Fallujah security forces and did not intend to miss any opportunity to wreak havoc inside the town. With its pressure on the Iraqi police in Amariyah supported by the infighting amongst the Albu Issa subtribes, AQI was able to continue to exert considerable influence over the populations of Amariyah, Ferris Town, Karmah, and Saqlawiyah through murder and intimidation.[676]

~~(S)~~ In Habbaniyah, Julaybah, and Ghazwan, AQI cells operating between RCT-5 and 1/1 AD were responsible for more than a third of the attacks along the Ramadi-Fallujah corridor, including IDF attacks on Taqaddum Airfield. In addition to being a venue for attack, this area of Anbar served as a center for AQI arms caches as well as a perceived area of safe harbor for some of the most prominent members of the group's leadership.[677]

~~(S)~~ In Ramadi itself, AQI had completely disrupted the provincial government, severely inhibited the development of the Iraqi police or rendered it ineffective, and thoroughly intimidated the population. No less than 850 AQI operatives were active in Ramadi. Breaks in their normal level of activity serving resulted either from 1/1 AD's successful counterinsurgency operations or as part of AQI's normal operational tempo.[678]

AQI Comes Under Assault, September-October 2006

Tribal Fighting in Ramadi and Amariyah

[675] Ibid.
[676] Ibid.
[677] Ibid.
[678] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The one serious challenge to AQI rose from within the tribes, although it would not be obvious until later in September. In the meantime, the tribal fighting between the Albu Ali Jassim and AQI fighters from the Albu 'Ubayd that began with the death of Sheikh Khalid Araq Ataymi al-Illiyawi, the leader of the Albu Ali Jassim tribe, escalated throughout the fall of 2006. Local religious and political leaders from both tribes attempted to defuse the situation, by negotiating the right for the Albu Ali Jassim to kill the individuals who were directly involved in the murder of Sheikh Khalid. Religious and tribal leaders from the Albu Ali Jassim tribe had, however, already told residents of their tribal area to kill any non-members. The Albu Ali Jassim were supported against the AQI Albu Ubayd members by the Albu Zayn and Albu Fahd tribes, since the latter continued to hold AQI responsible for the murder of Sheikh Nasser (see Chapter 6a) and the kidnapping of Sheikh Salam Ahmad Khalif Alwan al-Fahdawi, the son of the current Albu Fahd sheikh.[679]

~~(S/NF)~~ This tribal fighting was the subject of a meeting in early September between AQI (b)(6) (b)(6) and his counterparts (b)(6) (b)(6). A former security officer in the Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein, (b)(6) had served as an AQI financier before becoming AQI amir for the Albu Ubayd tribal area of the Jazira. During the meeting, (b)(6) stated that he had no plans to release Sheikh Salam because he was a traitor and an apostate. Further, he was planning an offensive against a number of Anbari tribes including the Albu Soda, the Jumaylis, the Albu Julib, Albu Jahash, and the Albu Fahd if they continued to oppose AQI.[680]

~~(S/NF)~~ The strength of AQI in the Jazira area was due to the influx of fighters from Ramadi proper, yet this did not go unchallenged. The presence of so many outsiders generated a backlash, leading to the formation of neighborhood watches and tribal militias from the Albu Dhiab, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Nimr, Albu Risha, and even the Albu Farraj to guard against further AQI incursions. In most cases, AQI fighters were superior to their tribal or nationalist counterparts, but they still felt threatened by Sheikh Khalid and therefore determined to kill him as quickly as possible. Given the opposition that AQI was once again confronting in Ramadi from 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah, the group likely believed that it had to send a message to local tribal leaders to prevent them from supporting their opposition.[681]

~~(S/NF)~~ The tribal feuding even began to create problems within the expanded AQI. In early September 2006, AQI leader (b)(6) used fighters from the Albu Ubayd tribe to assassinate Ramadi AQI leaders Abu Uthman, (b)(6) and senior AQI leader (b)(6) All three AQI leaders were former members of the Abu Harun Group that had a long-standing feud with AQI fighters from the Albu Ubayd tribe and their leader (b)(6) dating back to the beginning of 2006 (see Chapter 6b). The death of Abu Uthman in particular eliminated a senior AQI operative who had been involved in multiple operations for the group in the Jazira area, forcing (b)(6) to take up Abu Uthman's duties in addition to his own.[682]

Approved for Release

---

679 [| Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
680 [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
681 [| Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
682 [| Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ By September 7, 2006, (b)(6) and his followers were also engaged in fighting with the Albu Julib tribe in Jabha that resulted in the capture of AQI operative (b)(6) (b)(6), who was turned over to Brigadier General Ahmad Sadiq Battah al-Julibawi for release on the grounds that there would be more trouble for the Albu Julib tribe if they refused to release him.. The brigadier was the brother of the Julibawi tribal leader Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq Battah al-Julibawi, who was killed by AQI for his involvement with the Anbar People's Committee. While many tribes in Ramadi and the Jazira area resented AQI's influence, the Albu Julib decision not to kill a known AQI operative shows the brutal effectiveness of the group's murder and intimidation campaign.[683]

~~(S)~~ The situation in Amariyah mirrored these tribal issues. In early September, AQI resumed fighting with Albu Issa tribal militias in the town after business owners refused to pay tribute to AQI. Yet, with the return of Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi to the Fallujah area, an increasing number of Albu Issa tribal leaders were willing to stand up to AQI members within their own tribe. As a result, the tribe split between pro- and anti-AQI elements within the various subtribes, resulting in the murder of two of Sheikh Khamis's bodyguards by fellow Albu Issa tribesmen after they voiced disapproval of AQI. The fighting within the Albu Issa tribe was now between a core of loyalists who followed Sheikh Khamis and resisted AQI and members of a not-insignificant number of subtribes that supported AQI, effectively subverting the unity of the Albu Issa tribe.[684]

~~(S)~~ The Zobai tribe would become involved in the internal Albu Issa split because they had traditionally been allied with the Albu Fuhaylat subtribe. Salafist members of the two tribes, led by AQI (b)(6) fought the Albu Nasir subtribe because of its support for the Iraqi government, killing three Iraqi police officers and an unknown number of tribesmen. In the aftermath of the initial fighting, tribal leaders unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a cease-fire between the two sides.[685]

~~(S/NF)~~ Because of the traditional alliance between the two tribes, the Zobai AQI leadership was able to establish cells among the Albu Fuhaylat and exploit existing tensions within the Albu Issa to create a significant level of influence over Amariyah and Ferris Town.[686] They were aided by another phenomenon that created tensions between sections of the Albu Issa and with the Zobai. The subtribes of Amariyah and Ferris Town were relatively wealthy in comparison to the Albu Issa subtribes and agrarian Zobai tribe of Zaidon. Many members of the poorer tribes were persuaded by AQI promises of money and power to support the group against members of the more privileged tribes. As a result, the Fuhaylat and Olyhat subtribes of the Albu Issa as well as the Zobai tribe supported AQI while the Manasir and Albu Hadir subtribes of the Albu Issa supported the Coalition.[687]

~~(S/NF)~~ The theoretical head of the Albu Issa, Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi, actively supported the Coalition, but since the attempts on his life in the summer of 2005 (see Chapter 5b) both he and the

[683] [| Military | 15 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060915 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[684] [| Military | 07 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060907 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[685] [| Military | 19 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060919 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[686] Ibid.
[687] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

ruling Aifan family of the Albu Issa had lost considerable influence and as a result were powerless to mediate or end the conflict. The absence of effective senior tribal leadership ensured that AQI remained the primary beneficiary of the inter-tribal fighting as large concentrations of Salafists from the Zobai tribe and Fuhaylat subtribe were recruited into the group and pledged bayat to (b)(6) as their amir. By perpetuating tribal unrest, AQI was able to dilute the authority of the Iraqi security forces in Amariyah while strengthening its position in the Fallujah peninsula whether or not their Fuhaylat, Olyhat, and Zobai allies were able to actually prevail in Amariyah.[688]

~~(S)~~ At least some of the AQI fighters operating in the Albu Issa tribal area apparently had the benefit of training at foreign terrorist camps. For instance, Fuhaylat AQI leader (b)(6) was a Sudanese national who had received at least sixteen months of training at the Sudan National Defense Camp, including forty-five days at the Islamic Jihad Combat Camp where he was taught how to use Hawn-60 rockets, RPGs, RPKs, and 9mm pistols. (b)(6) led a group of AQI fighters that reportedly numbered as high as 250, including a significant number of foreign fighters from 1.4b Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.[689]

~~(S)~~ By the end of September, the situation had deteriorated so far that five Amariyah sheikhs requested a stronger Coalition presence in Amariyah to protect the city from AQI. Not only were their tribal fighters unable to fend off their AQI-supported tribal rivals, but the local police were overwhelmed by AQI's superior firepower and numbers. Adding to the problem, at least nine police officers in Ferris Town had deserted to join AQI but kept all their weapons and documentation.[690]

(b)(6) Assassination Campaign

~~(S)~~ Further problems for AQI were caused by (b)(6) who continued his assassination campaign against AQI operatives in the Tamim and Sufia districts of Ramadi through Harakat al-Islamiyah. The group killed AQI leader Abu Khattab as well as Hazim Samarra, Ra'id Madiha, Safa Hamid, and Mullah Khattan's lieutenant Hamid al-Jaburi in the Jarayshi area of Ramadi. Harakat al-Islamiyah gunmen also killed Muhammad Kurdi Rashid al-Muhanna al-Alwani, an Ansar al-Sunna leader operating in the Albu Alwan tribal area. (b)(6) operatives justified their activities through a *fatwa* issued by Iraqi expatriate religious leader Muwafuq Abd al-Razzaq (see Chapter 6b) that authorized action against AQI to protect the Sunni community. By late August, more than one hundred copies of Muwafuq's *fatwa* had been distributed on CD to Harakat al-Islamiyah members in Ramadi.[691]

~~(S)~~ The Harakat al-Islamiyah group that conducted these assassinations had been founded by (b)(6) at some point after the fall of Saddam Hussein, but the group had disbanded after the December 2005 elections as part of (b)(6) plan to demonstrate his bonafides as an Iraqi politician. Like other groups associated with (b)(6) Harakat al-Islamiyah had been targeted by AQI in 2005 and its leaders Muhammad Turki Muslih al-Faraji and Hajji Shu'ayb had been assassinated. Despite this, following the group's disbandment many of its former members joined AQI in order to continue attacking the

---

[688] Ibid.
[689] [| Military | 08 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061008 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[690] [| Military | 26 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[691] [| Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Coalition. Those members of the group who agreed to join AQI included a number of individuals who also held dual membership in the Abu Harun Group including Ghazi Ahmad Sharmut (Abu Bakr), 'Abd al-Hadi Ismail al-Dulaymi, Natham Hamid Rashid (Abu Uthman), and Mahmud Husayn Abdullah Fadal (Abu Rasul).[692]

~~(S)~~ In the spring of 2006, (b)(6) was able to reform Harakat al-Islamiyah with the help of Sheikh Abdul Sattar under the leadership of the brothers (b)(6) The evolution of these brothers shows one of the significant changes within AQI since the death of Zarqawi. Perhaps influenced by an AQSL desire to exert more control and centralization over its far-flung associate groups, AQI began to demand that members swear *bayat* to its leadership. The (b)(6) brothers had earlier been associates of AQI leader (b)(6) but when they refused to accept AQI leader (b)(6) offer to swear *bayat* to (b)(6) AQI began targeting the brothers' home in the Albu Jdayi tribal area of the Jazira with IEDs. Other Harakat al-Islamiyah leaders such as (b)(6) accepted (b)(6) offer, providing information on the locations of Harakat al-Islamiyah members to AQI. In late May, the brothers were forced to flee to 1.4b after Salah was shot by AQI.[693]

Divisions Within 1920 Revolution Brigade

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) reliance on Harakat al-Islamiyah rather than his own 1920 Revolution Brigade to target AQI was due largely to the fact that by August 2006 the group had splintered into four distinct factions. The first split occurred in April 2006 over the issue of whether or not to engage the Iraqi government, with two factions loyal to (b)(6) and his estranged second-in-command (b)(6) (b)(6) supporting political engagement and entering into negotiations with the Iraqi government even while differing with one another over the issue of sectarian violence (see Chapter 6a). They were opposed by two other factions, one made up of members of the group loyal to (b)(6) (who sided with AQI on tactical grounds) and the other of those loyal to AMS members Sheikh Ibrahim Mudaris and (b)(6) (who supported the Iraqi National Dialogue Front or INDF). While the followers of (b)(6) generally stopped attacking the Coalition, their opponents continued to develop and implement attacks.[694]

~~(S/NF)~~ By August 2006, some of these divisions had healed even as new ones evolved. Followers of (b)(6) called for continued attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq while those loyal to AMS members Sheikh Ibrahim Mudaris and (b)(6) traveled to 1.4b and joined forces with (b)(6) who they believed shared their outlook for the future of 1920 Revolution Brigade. In the end, those 1920 Revolution Brigade members who opted to join (b)(6) in plotting a coup essentially ceased to be part of their original organization.[695]

~~(S/NF)~~ While (b)(6) served as a nexus of Iraqi Sunni political and social movements including factions of both the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP) and the international Muslim Brotherhood, it

[692] [| Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[693] Ibid.
[694] [| Military | 04 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060904 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[695] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

would be a mistake to regard him as the operational leader of 1920 Revolution Brigade. Because of his diverse connections to the Sunni political, insurgent, economic, religious, and academic elite (b)(6) was seen as one of the few Iraqi Sunnis capable of providing both unity and leadership for the community. However, his influence was beginning to wane in Anbar as the result of his quasi-exile status that limited his ability to exercise any real control over the 1920 Revolution Brigade and similar insurgent factions.[696]

~~(S/NF)~~ Simultaneously, former Iraqi intelligence chief (b)(6) led a small group of 1920 Revolution Brigade members who were part of the Muslim Brotherhood into 1.4b including Lieutenant General Hamid Shaban and Major General Adnan al-Hadithi.[697] Those members who did not follow (b)(6) remained in Baghdad to carry out attacks on Coalition forces under the leadership of (b)(6) and his subordinates.[698]

~~(S/NF)~~ The fractious divisions within the once-powerful 1920 Revolution Brigade reflected the contentious squabbling among Iraqi and Anbari Sunni elites. The divisions demonstrated the increasingly weakened state of those Sunni leaders like (b)(6) that continued to advocate further political participation but had nothing to show for their efforts. Regardless of the goals of (b)(6) nd his SAR allies, they found themselves checked at every turn by an absolute Shi'a majority in parliament and a growing tide of sectarian violence. Similarly, (b)(6) rivals who continued to advocate armed resistance were increasingly confronted with the futility of their efforts as their once-robust nationalist groups were subsumed or marginalized by AQI, their attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces failed to yield any definitive results, and the Shi'a militias continued to grow stronger.[699]

Attempts to Enlist 1.4b Support

1.4b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

[696] Ibid.
[697] [| Military | 04 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060904 | (S/NF) |]
[698] Ibid.
[699] Ibid.
[700] [| Military | 04 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060904 | (S/NF) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b, (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite the willingness of anti-Coalition Sunni leaders to solicit 1.4b support to ensure the security of the Sunni population and to facilitate the expulsion of Coalition forces, their desire to work with 1.4b was not shared by the majority of either the Iraqi Sunni population or the groups that these leaders represented. This explains why they met with the 1.4b and why none of them would discuss their plans openly. Their fears of the negative fallout from exposure would prove correct when these plans later served as ammunition for attacks on their legitimacy as Sunni leaders by pro-Coalition sheikhs.[702]

~~(S)~~ At almost precisely the same time as these attempts to enlist 1.4b support were occuring, representatives from AQI, Jaysh al-Fatihin, Ansar al-Sunna, and 1920 Revolution Brigade attended a meeting in 1.4b where emissaries from the 1.4b were present. These emissaries reportedly offered financial aid to any Sunni group that agreed to hunt down and eliminate a list of Sunni leaders that the 1.4b wanted dead. Of the groups that attended the meeting, only AQI agreed to the 1.4b proposal, creating a rift between AQI and a number of the SAR groups formerly allied with AQI against the Coalition.[703]

AQI on the Offensive, September-October 2006

AQI vs. Khalid Araf al-Hathimi al-Dulaymi

~~(S)~~ In response to tribal and rival insurgent challenges and to their loss of authority in certain Anbari cities, AQI attempted to reassert its influence and to regain the initiative in the province. Thus, in response to the earlier killing of AQI operatives by the Anbar Revolutionaries (see Chapter 6b), a group of AQI fighters led by Abu Bakr attacked a group of SAR insurgents led by Major General Khalid Araf al-Hathimi al-Dulaymi, killing Khalid, his son Husam, and Khalil Ibrahim al-Hathimi al-Dulaymi. In response to these killing, local tribesmen began searching for (b)(6) the purported amir for AQI in Anbar.[704]

AQI Attempts to Regain Influence in Fallujah

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, AQI stepped up their attacks in the city of Fallujah, already the special object of AQI murder and intimidation operations. AQI operatives assassinated Jaysh al-Mujahideen leader Abdul

Approved for Release

---

[701] Ibid.
[702] Ibid.
[703] [| Military | 09 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20061109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[704] [| Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] (b)(6) was based in the Jazira area, operating in the Albu 'Ubayd, Albu Hazim, and Albu Bali tribal areas through a combination of local support and a vicious murder and intimidation campaign. (b)(6) prefered the Albu 'Ubayd tribal area because AQI had safe houses in the area that were used to hide and interrogate hostages. Saddamiyah in particular was preferred because it was perceived as abandoned by the Coalition and had a network of tunnels that were used by AQI to hide and execute hostages. [| Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 24 Oct 06 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Salam al-Jumayli in Fallujah because he had spoken out against "Takfiris."[705] Also murdered by the group was Brigadier General Ahmed Dera al-Jumayli, the disgruntled chief of traffic police in Fallujah.[706] Finally, AQI assassinated Fallujah city council chairman Najm Abdullah Saud al-Issawi and his son Erfan. This last assassination was a blow to the Fallujah leadership, as it had been chairman Najm, vice chairman Abbas, and former Fallujah mayor Sheikh Dhari who had revitalized the Fallujah city council after the murder of Sheikh Kamal in February 2006 (see Chapter 6a).[707]

~~(S)~~ As an attempt to provide carrots to match the overwhelming sticks of its campaign against the Iraqi police, AQI posted flyers at gas stations near the village of Sitcher and in the Nazal district of Fallujah offering police officers the opportunity to avoid being targeted. They were instructed to turn over their badges, weapons, and uniforms to AQI operatives who worked at the gas stations. After the police had done so, they were taken into the desert to meet with mid-level AQI leaders and given a white dishdasha to symbolize that they had been cleansed of their sins.[708]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI targeted too the religious leadership of Fallujah, particularly Sheikh Abd al-Minim al-Fayyad al-Kubaysi of the Sheikh Khalid al-Fayyad mosque in the Kubaysayat district of Fallujah. Sheikh Abd al-Minim had preached anti-AQI sermons and told residents not to follow AQI but was now intimidated into silence. AQI also murdered Fallujah imam Marwan Jabbar Husayn for refusing to preach pro-AQI and anti-Coalition sermons. Despite this targeting of Fallujah religious leaders, many of the senior imams that had fled into exile in 1.4b after the November 2005 murder of Sheikh Hamza now expressed a desire to return with the help of former mayor Sheikh Dhari.[709]

~~(S)~~ AQI's murder and intimidation campaign in Fallujah was organized around a list of one hundred prominent figures that were considered priority targets. Each individual listing described the action to be taken against them by AQI operatives (assassination, kidnapping, etc.). Among those targets known to have been killed by AQI in September 2006 was Sami Ubayd Farhud, a member of the Arab Nationalist Movement who served on the Fallujah city council. A highly respected member of both the community and city council, Sami had frequently spoken out against AQI at meetings and criticized local imams he believed supported the group. His death marked the first assassination of a Fallujah city council member since the death of Sheikh Kamal in December 2005 and was significant loss to Fallujah.[710]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI collected intelligence on the Fallujah city council activities and the contracting process through (b)(6) a former contractor. (b)(6) reported the names of any individual awarded a major contract to local AQI leaders along with the cash value so that AQI extortion cells could determine the appropriate amount of money to demand from a given contractor without derailing the project.[711]

Approved for Release

---

[705] [| Military | 09 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060909 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[706] [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[707] [| Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[708] [| Military | 19 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060919 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[709] [| Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[710] [| Military | 15 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060915 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[711] [| Military | 12 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060912 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ One of AQI's most highly-placed intelligence agents in Fallujah was (b)(6) (b)(6) a former 1920 Revolution Brigade member who had since joined AQI. Using his old contacts in the 1920 Revolution Brigade, he provided AQI with intelligence on Fallujah city council meetings and Iraqi government meetings on the national reconciliation plan. More alarming, however, was that (b)(6) used his long-time friendship with Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zobai to obtain information for AQI on how the Iraqi government planned to de-escalate sectarian tensions and defeat the insurgency. All this information was reported to AQI senior leader (b)(6) (b)(6) and used by the AQI leadership to adapt their tactics and strategy in order to undermine the Iraqi government in Anbar.[712]

~~(S)~~ Fallujah city council vice chairman Qassam Muhammad Abdul Sattar, the head of the town's Democratic and Human Rights Studies Center, also retained ties to AQI, reportedly providing money to AQI financier (b)(6) to be dispersed to the group's various cells in Fallujah.[713]

~~(S)~~ AQI also intensified its condemnation of the IIP in Fallujah, with propaganda flyers in the Nazal district of the city claiming that the IIP had taken the path of evil works, betrayed the people of Iraq, and was now an agent of the infidels. While AQI operative (b)(6) had attempted to engage the IIP in negotiations in the Fallujah area, the differences between the two had proved impossible to overcome because the IIP continued to side with the Coalition and the Iraqi security forces rather than with AQI.[714]

AQI vs. IIP in Anah and Rawah

~~(S)~~ The attacks on the IIP in Fallujah were part of a broader campaign against the group carried out throughout Anbar by AQI. The campaign was especially intense in the Anah and Rawah areas, towns that had already experienced significant violence between the two groups. At the beginning of September, the fighting escalated, leading residents to flee the area for safer locations. AQI's brutal tactics and the public nature of IIP, allowed AQI to identify and kill IIP members and to gain the upper hand in the town. At the same time, because Coalition patrols could not distinguish between armed groups, IIP militia fighters (see Chapter 6b) were just as likely to be engaged by the Coalition as their AQI enemies.[715]

~~(S)~~ To build up popular support in Anah, AQI fighters gave local business owners advance warning of attacks they planned to carry out close to their homes and businesses in the hopes of lessening the number of civilian casualties.[716] For the IIP and their supporters, however, AQI intended no such mercy, killing IIP prominent members such as Sarhan Abed Yusif and leaving their heads in

Approved for Release

[712] Ibid.
[713] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[714] [| Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[715] [| Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[716] [| Military | 17 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060917 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

front of mosques in the town. After a failed assassination attempt against Anah IIP leader (b)(6) (b)(6) all Anah city council members went into hiding and (b)(6) fled the town.[717]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the end of September 2006, both Iraqi Vice President Hashemi and Governor Mamoun expressed serious concerns to Coalition officials about the situation in Anah. In particular, they were worried by reports that local SREs, Iraqi AQI fighters displaced from Husaybah, and foreign fighters were transporting weapons to Anah from Rawah and ousting Anah residents. (b)(6) (IIP secretary-general) and Mamoun (also an IIP member) also argued that they could not just stand idly by while AQI beheaded IIP members in Anah.[718]

~~(S)~~ Their concerns were well-founded. On September 22, the IIP disbanded in Anah as a result of AQI pressure, removing the last major obstacle to the group in the town. The uncontested AQI presence in Anah allowed the group to expand into Rawah despite the killing of its cell leader Saddam Shihab. These implications were also not lost on the Rawah police, with only eight of the thirty showed up for work on the day of the Anah IIP's dissolution. While the closing of the IIP offices in Anah and the dissolution of the party in the town was a blow to its prestige in Anbar, IIP remained the dominant party in the province with over ninety different chapters spread out across Iraq. In the short-term, however, the dissolution of the IIP meant that AQI had the run of Anah.[719]

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile as the fighting between AQI and the IIP spread from Anah, residents of Rawah became hesitant to oppose AQI. In an effort to prevent a repeat of the violence that had occurred in Anah, AQI ordered all IIP members in the town to turn in their weapons. Yet AQI again worked diligently to gain the favor of members of the local business community by providing them with advance warning of attacks and attempting to reduce collateral damage by placing IEDs between buildings in order to minimize damage to them.[720]

~~(S)~~ AQI's murder and intimidation campaign in Rawah resulted in the city council abandoning their responsibilities, with the defunct council's members telling residents to direct their concerns to the police instead. This further eroded the confidence of Rawah residents about the ability of the Coalition and Iraqi security forces to bring stability to the city and placed additional stress on the embattled Iraqi police.[721]

AQI Recruitment of Foreign Fighters Evolves

~~(S)~~ As AQI intensified its murder and intimidation campaigns throughout Anbar, their patterns of foreign fighter recruitment also changed. The primary facilitation hub for foreign fighters was in 1.4b and incorporated a complex network made up of multiple safe houses designed to facilitate the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq. The cell first made contact with potential recruits through e-mail, with prospective recruits contacting the cell via the internet and then receiving a response that included detailed instructions on meeting locations in 1.4b and methods for

[717] [| Military | 20 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060920 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[718] [| Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[719] [| Military | 27 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060927 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[720] [| Military | 20 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060920 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[721] [| Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

signaling cell members. After the initial contact, recruits were moved between safe houses for both indoctrination and operational security. After this was completed, the recruits were moved to 1.4b 1.4b for an average of one and a half months before being moved to 1.4b from which they were transported into Iraq.[722]

~~(S)~~ Once inside Iraq, the foreign fighters were often smuggled to the Hasiyah and Khawabra areas of Karabilah. A majority of the Albu Khawabra subtribe were Wahhabis who supported AQI and allowed foreign fighters to stay in their home for one or two nights before moving on. Another popular destination for foreign fighters entering Iraq was Ribat, where residents benefited financially from the smuggling of foreign fighters from 1.4b[723]

~~(S)~~ The 1.4b GSPC, which had pledged bayat to AQSL in early September 2006, now became heavily involved in the smuggling of trained GSPC fighters and other 1.4b Islamists into Iraq. After the GSPC swore bayat, (b)(6) took steps to link the two groups' facilitation networks, increasing the number of Algerian foreign fighters coming to Iraq to serve as suicide bombers. The 1.4b recruits were sent to an AQI facility in 1.4b that doubled as a hotel and restaurant, from which AQI operative (b)(6) aided their entry into Iraq.[724]

1.4b, (b)(6)

AQI Financing: Foreign Funding

1.4b

Approved for Release

[722] [| Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[723] [| Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[724] [| Military | 19 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060919 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[725] Ibid.
[726] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b

~~(S/NF)~~ Although AQI financiers continued to rely on front companies and bank accounts under assumed names, a large number of the transactions occurred person-to-person, with those retrieving the funds abroad physically transporting the money back to Iraq. For instance, 1.4b NGOs supplied money to AQI through Hajj pilgrims.[728]

1.4b

~~(S/NF)~~ In addition, 1.4b sources reportedly provided the group with $2-3,000,000 a month. Wealthy 1.4b donors and other AQI and AQAM supporters in the Middle East and Europe continued to provide financial support to the group, but AQI was increasingly adept at raising money inside Iraq through kidnapping, vehicle theft, extortion, and oil smuggling operations that guaranteed the group's continued financial survival and vitality even in the event that the Iraqi government was able to curtail or eliminate its external funding.[730]

AQI Financing: Oil

(b)(6), 1.4b

~~(S/NF)~~ Because of rivalry with other expatriates in 1.4b (b)(6) kept his connections with the Minarat Biladi Oil Company secret, for fear that his opponents would alert the Coalition to his activities or attempt to extort money from him. He may also have wanted to keep the Iraqi government or the general Iraqi public in the dark about his rather shady business dealings.[732]

[727] [| Military | 22 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060922 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[728] Ibid.
[729] Ibid.
[730] Ibid.
[731] [| Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[732] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) owned the Ahil al-Iraq Security and Protection Company that protected trucks and tankers for the al-Shira al-Abiyad and al-Fawl oil companies that traveled from Bayji to 1.4b The al-Shira al-Abiyad Company was, of course, owned by AQI operative (b)(6) and his associates through the Ebkitar Investment Group, a company that was in turn heavily involved in both legal and illicit export activities and maintained a legitimate contract with the Iraqi ministry of oil (see Chapter 6a and 6b).[733]

~~(S/NF)~~ As in the past, corruption at the Waleed border crossing was used to facilitate AQI's siphoning off Iraqi oil from a pipeline in Tikrit. The Waleed border guards were paid off or threatened by AQI to look the other way while they transported the oil across the border in trucks to processing plants in 1.4b where the oil was resold for $40 a barrel and used to fund AQI operations against the Coalition. The AQI member responsible for this oil smuggling operation was (b)(6) a former Iraqi colonel from Khalidiyah who was now based in 1.4b.[734]

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, the complex smuggling network run by AQI cells in Ramadi took oil from the Bayji oil refinery and distributed it throughout Anbar via the black market (see Chapter 6a-b). The money made from the oil smuggling was then funnelled to AQI and allied cells such as the Abu Alla Group (whose member (b)(6) worked as the manager of the southern Bayji oil refinery) that purchased vehicles to be used in VBIEDs.[735]

~~(S)~~ There was an interesting relationship between AQI's oil smuggling industry and its VBIED manufacturing. AQI recruited (b)(6) the executive officer for the 2nd Strategic Infrastructure Battalion to carry out a VBIED attack against an oil pipeline near Bayji. This attack decreased the supply of oil and increased the demand for black market petroleum, with the increased demand ensuring high black market fuel profits that financed AQI activity throughout Anbar.[736]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Iraqi government realized that they were losing control of their oil resources and attempted to find a solution to this serious problem. In late September, the Iraqi oil ministry formed a committee to investigate the September 16 disappearance of 1,500,000 liters of kerosene. Bayji refinery distribution direction (b)(6) (see Chapter 6b) was identified by the committee as one of the employees under investigation for facilitating the theft of the kerosene. While the committee asked the oil ministry operations center that (b)(6) be arrested, he continued to work at the facility (despite having been fired by oil minister Shahristani in August 2006). High-ranking oil ministry officials, including a deputy minister, put pressure on the Iraqi government to close the case for fear of AQI's wrath and also because they were unwilling to forsake the ill-gotten money that they received from (b)(6) activities.[737]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite (b)(6) protestations of his own innocence to the committee, he had been involved in black market fuel dealings in Bayji since at least July 2005 and had assisted AQI since at

[733] Ibid.
[734] [| Military | 17 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060917 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[735] [| Military | 29 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060929 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[736] Ibid.
[737] [| Military | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

least the beginning of 2006. The failure of the oil ministry to move against him was due to the fact that the ministry itself was a bastion of corruption and that the deputy minister who supported (b)(6) was himself being paid $35,000 a month in return for his cooperation in oil smuggling operations. Prime Minister Maliki's lack of confidence in oil minister Shahristani's abilities, combined with the disdain of oil ministry bureaucrats who resented Shahristani's attempts at reform, made it extremely difficult for the Iraqi government to adequately address the corruption that pervaded the Bayji refinery, the Northern Oil Company, and the oil ministry itself.[738]

The Oil Man of Ramadi

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's attempt to use oil to enrich itself was somewhat complicated by the situation in Ramadi. There the oil distribution director (b)(6) had successfully created a situation that made him virtually indispensable for both the provincial government and AQI. Having served as a worker at the Ramadi oil distribution center under Saddam Hussein, (b)(6) had been dismissed from his position in early 2003 and then forced to flee the country. He returned from exile after the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty and was allowed to assume the position of oil distribution director under the Iraqi de-Ba'athification program. By late 2004 and early 2005, (b)(6) had exploited his in-depth knowledge of the Anbar fuel distribution network to enrich himself by using Saddam-era distribution system's built-in mechanism for fraud in order to defy accountability and responsibility.[739]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) initial insurgent partner was al-Nu'man Brigade leader (b)(6) whose fighters were used by (b)(6) to coerce or intimidate his subordinates at the Ramadi oil distribution center into cooperating with his corruption. (b)(6) profits from the corruption enabled him to build several new homes in Ramadi and to buy a wide array of vehicles. After (b)(6) was captured by the Coalition in May 2005 (see Chapter 5a), AQI amir (b)(6) attempted to install himself as (b)(6) new insurgent partner only to be rebuffed. Outraged, (b)(6) used a combination of intimidation and assassination attempts on Governor Mamoun to force him to replace (b)(6) with (b)(6) collaborator (b)(6) When the oil ministry refused to accept (b)(6) kidnapped Governor Mamoun's son. When the governor convinced (b)(6) that he was unable to install (b)(6) the AQI leader relented and agreed to release his son after a ransom was paid.[740]

~~(S/NF)~~ Using (b)(6) as an intermediary, (b)(6) was now able to convince (b)(6) to return to his old job in Ramadi, where he was subjected to AQI intimidation and forced to cooperate in dispersing fuel to (b)(6) Ramadi four gas stations, allowing (b)(6) to reap a profit of $90,000 every day his gas stations received a tanker load of benzene. For unknown reasons, in 2006 (b)(6) and demanded $50,000 in ransom before agreeing to a compromise deal of the same amount in goods, weapons, and automobiles in return for (b)(6) Fearing further AQI attacks, (b)(6) fled with his family to 1.4b only to return to Ramadi over the summer to resume work. After (b)(6) was killed by the Anbar

738 Ibid.
739 Ibid.
740 Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Revolutionaries in September 2006, (b)(6) served as (b)(6) new liaison with AQI to control the distribution of fuel throughout Ramadi.[741]

The Coalition and Iraqis Strike Back

The Capture of (b)(6) and Death of Nasayf Jassim al-Mawali

~~(S/NF)~~ On September 7, Coalition forces captured (b)(6) in the Abu Ghraib area while he was traveling to Karmah to meet with (b)(6) AQI network was primarily made up of members of the Abu Harun Group (see Chapters 5a-5b) and was based in the Jazira area north of Ramadi with a strong presence in Ramadi and the surrounding areas. Retaining its old organizational structure from the Abu Harun Group, the group was divided into two sections that oversaw the Albu Ali Jassim and the Albu Dhiab tribal lands of the Jazira area. Following the capture of (b)(6) (b)(6) he was succeeded by (b)(6) his top lieutenant in the Albu Dhiab tribal lands.[742]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) capture, along with the death or capture of so many mid-level AQI leaders in August and early September by the Anbar Revolutionaries, was apparently of concern to (b)(6) (b)(6) He notified Sufia district amir (b)(6) that he was to succeed him as the leader of AQI in Ramadi in the event of his death or detention.[743] The killing of so many senior AQI leaders had an adverse affect on the group's ability to conduct attacks in Ramadi, resulting in an average of eleven attacks per day from September 5-10; a major reduction from the ninety day average of eighteen attacks per day.[744]

~~(S)~~ On September 25, AQI leader Nasayf Jassim Mawali was killed along with his son Marwan during Coalition operations in the Jazira area near Ramadi. As noted in Chapter 6b, Nasayf was a high-ranking AQI amir who commanded the group's murder and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi police in the Jazira area. The deputy of AQI leader (b)(6) Nasayf was nicknamed "Police Killer" for his merciless attacks against the Iraqi police. A former police officer himself, Nasayf had implemented a ruthless campaign to capture or kill Iraqi police, using his old contacts to obtain intelligence on current officers as well as money from corrupt police officials. In addition to his murder and intimidation campaign, Nasayf also took part in VBIED construction, recruiting suicide bombers, facilitating foreign fighter movement, and criminality. After his death he was succeeded by (b)(6) once again illustrating AQI's ability to replace captured or slain leaders.[745]

The Anbar Emergency Council

~~(S/NF)~~ A more serious threat to AQI developed with the organization of Anbari tribal leaders into a formal anti-AQI alliance. In early September 2006, sheikhs and tribal leaders from the Rishawi,

---

[741] Ibid.
[742] [| Military | 08 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060908 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[743] [| Military | 10 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060910 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[744] [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[745] [| Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Hardan, Dhiabi, Ubayd, and Iliyawi tribes throughout the Ramadi area met in the city to announce the formation of an emergency council to fight terrorism and replace corrupt officials in the Anbar provincial government. Displeased with the provincial government's inefficiency at providing security and fighting terrorism and corruption in the province, the sheikhs drew up a letter to the Iraqi interior ministry requesting its permission to replace Governor Mamoun. During the meeting, Sheikh Hamid Fahan Hayis al-Dhiabi was elected head of the Anbar Emergency Council, the political manifestation of the Anbar Awakening movement.[746]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Anbar Emergency Council consisted of forty-one sheikhs of various ranks from seventeen Anbari tribes, with the tribes of the greater Ramadi area making up a substantial majority. Nine sheikhs hailed from western Anbar, including the powerful Albu Mahal and Albu Nimr. Only two sheikhs from Khalidiyah were represented and there was no representation from the tribes east of the Thar Thar Canal such as the Zobai or the Albu Issa.[747]

~~(S/NF)~~ The idea of this sort of emergency council was not new; a number of sheikhs had entertained the notion at least as far back as November 2005. The formation of other grassroots political groups, such as the Anbar Central Council, led to the creation of several competing organizations made up of tribal leaders determined to secure their personal power in the new provincial political climate. In addition to this problem, Sunni intransigence, sectarian divisions, the dubious constitutionality of the Anbar Emergency Council, and the continued strength of AQI in Anbar were all considerable challenges facing the Council.[748]

~~(S/NF)~~ The self-appointment of the Council members also estranged them from the existing government, making it difficult for the Shi'a blocs, who feared Ba'athist resurgence and supported Prime Minister Maliki, to grant it any real legitimacy. As a practical matter, Anbar had no viable provincial governance by September 2006, although the Anbar Central Council tried to provide financial, economic, military, and political advice to Governor Mamoun. It operated, however, from 1.4b without legitimacy as a political entity.[749]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the Anbar Emergency Council had a political agenda very like that of the Anbar Central Council, it was suspicious of the other group's long-term goals. The Emergency Council saw the Central Council as a collection of technocrats intent on marginalizing the traditional Sunni tribal leadership in the Iraqi government. The Anbar Central Council, meanwhile, thought that its rivals in the (b)(6) family were behind this new initiative and so opposed it, making it difficult for Prime Minister Maliki to support the Anbar Emergency Council. As a national unity leader, Maliki relied on Sunni political parties such as IIP and Tawafuq Front to support his reconciliation initiatives. Recognizing the tribal power of Sunni leaders would undermine both IIP and Tawafuq Front, SCIRI was willing to support a measure that would see the latter party diminished.[750]

Approved for Release

---

[746] [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[747] [| Military | 21 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060921 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[748] [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[749] Ibid.
[750] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The constitutionality of the Anbar Emergency Council was rather dubious, but the Council argued that its appointment could be legitimized by the Prime Minister under a particular section of the Iraqi constitution. Essentially, the Anbar Emergency Council wanted Prime Minister Maliki to delegate federal authority to the Council so that they could appoint themselves.[751]

~~(S/NF)~~ The divisions between the two Councils were reflected in separate meetings that occurred within days of each other. On September 12, the official Anbar provincial council held a meeting to appoint Ali Abbud Awad Hatimi as the province's new deputy governor. Two days later, on September 14 near the Jazira police station north of Ramadi, Sheikh Abdul Sattar held his own meeting of the Anbar Emergency Council made up of Anbari tribal sheikhs from the Albu Nimr, Albu Dhiab, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Risha, Albu Julib, and the Albu Faraj tribes disillusioned with the provincial government. At the meeting, the sheikhs planned to establish a new governing body for Anbar with forty-eight members. Sheikh Abdul Sattar was elected the new governor of Anbar, Sheikh Hamid Farhan al-Heis was made the new chairman of the provincial council, and Brigadier General Hamid Hammad Shawka of the Albu Dhiab tribe was made the new provincial police chief. The Anbar Emergency Council then drew up a plan for establishing security in Anbar that was sent on to Prime Minister Maliki and the interior ministry for approval.[752]

~~(S/NF)~~ The creation of the Anbar Emergency Council was largely motivated by the desperation of the tribal leaders to rid Ramadi of AQI. In their view, AQI's ruthless attacks and violence had ripped apart the fabric of Anbari society including the authority and influence of the tribal sheikhs. Moreover, the money that had traditionally gone to the sheikhs was now flowing directly to AQI. They feared that if left unchecked AQI would cripple the traditional tribal system throughout Anbar and therefore directed their anger against Governor Mamoun and the Anbar provincial government, whom they regarded as corrupt and incapable of curtailing AQI in Ramadi. These same sheikhs intended to use the Anbar Emergency Council to install themselves as the new provincial government in order to rehabilitate their prestige, ensure their personal security, rehabilitate government institutions, and most importantly eject AQI from Ramadi.[753]

~~(S/NF)~~ By mid-September 2006, representatives of the Anbar Emergency Council traveled to Baghdad to meet with national security minister of state Shirwan al-Waili, provincial minister Saad al-Hardan, and deputy parliament speaker Khalid Attiya to raise their complaints about Anbar's provincial government. Khalid Attiya assured them that the Iraqi parliament would give him favorable consideration to any measures that the Anbar Emergency Council believed were appropriate. It was through this meeting, as reported by the *New York Times*, that Governor Mamoun first learned of the Anbar Emergency Council.[754]

The Origin of Sheikh Abdul Sattar

~~(S/NF)~~ Among the members of the Anbar Emergency Council was Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bezia Ftaykhan Albu Risha, who had been linked in the past to fuel smuggling ventures operated by

[751] Ibid.
[752] [| Military | 18 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060918 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[753] Ibid.
[754] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

members or allies of the al-Nu'man Brigade (see Chapters 5a-6a) such as (b)(6) Sheikh Rafa al-Rawi, and (b)(6) This was during the period when these individuals had operated on the basis of FRE or SAR ideologies. Sheikh Abdul Sattar was not ideologically tied to AQI or any of his past business associates, and was instead most interested in a pursuit of profit and willing to turn on his former colleagues if offered a better deal.[755] For instance, he had been actively involved in (b)(6) prior to its dissolution.[756]

~~(S/NF)~~ Certain events were, however, to transform (b)(6) from a man interested primarily in profit, to something much larger. Born in 1971, (b)(6) had completed high school and served in the Iraqi army in 1991, only to desert in the wake of the Gulf War and serve six months in prison as a consequence. A family man with one wife and four children, he worked as a Coalition contractor in 2003, relying on his friendly ties with the Coalition to beat out the competition when it came to smuggling goods from Iraq to neighboring states. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, (b)(6) (b)(6) and his (b)(6) stole military hardware from abandoned Iraqi arms depots and began collecting weapons for their own purposes.[757]

~~(S/NF)~~ It was (b)(6) oil smuggling operations that led him to cooperate with members of the al-Nu'man Brigade. Using corrupt Iraqi officials in Bayji and at the Walid border crossing, (b)(6) (b)(6) was able to turn a handsome profit smuggling Iraqi oil into 1.4b but his collaboration with the al-Nu'man Brigade in this venture was motivated purely by money.[758]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) served as his chief advisor and confidante. As a result, he participated in many of (b)(6) weapons purchasing and smuggling operations at the Walid border crossing at least as far back as August 2004. During this period, he came into contact with a kidnapping and extortion cell at the Walid border crossing run by (b)(6) and pulled strings to obtain the release of one of (b)(6) men to keep the family business running.[759]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) who in July 2004 had been a lieutenant colonel in the Ramadi police force, commanding the fifty-man undercover police unit. Like many of the Ramadi police during this period, (b)(6) was a corrupt individual who had conspired with another officer to inflate the number of Iraqi police on the official rosters and then kept the additional salary money for themselves. Nevertheless, he protected the men in his unit, in particular during an attack by then-provincial police chief (b)(6) an FRE insurgent supporter. By November 2005, (b)(6) had risen to the position of deputy police chief for Anbar province and was considered for the position of director of military intelligence for Anbar and Karbala provinces.[760]

~~(S/NF)~~ It was at this point that events would conspire to change (b)(6) life. His father, Sheikh Bezia Ftaykhan, had been the leader of the Albu Risha tribe since before the beginning of

[755] [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[756] [| Military | 18 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060918 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[757] Ibid.
[758] Ibid.
[759] Ibid.
[760] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

OIF.[761] Sheikh Bezia Ftaykhan had maintained an amicable relationship with the Coalition, hosting officials at his house for tea in Ramadi. AQI regarded this as evidence of collaboration, and Sheikh Fawzi was killed by the group on November 6, 2004 during the height of Operation AL FAJR. With Sheikh Fawzi dead and his eldest son Abdullah Bezia killed by AQI (then JTJ) in August 2004, (b)(6) became the head of the Albu Risha tribe.[762]

~~(S/NF)~~ Soon afterward, now-Sheikh Abdul Sattar began paying Anbaris to transport weapons to his home in Ramadi under the pretext that he had been ordered by the Coalition to collect weapons for disposal. While this was false, when he presented the Coalition with the weapons he had accumulated in October 2005 on his own initiative he was told to keep them safe until they could be properly retrieved. His lavish villa outside of Camp Ramadi became a veritable fortress with a wall three meters high and several observation towers guarded by members of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's family or loyal Rishawi tribesmen.

~~(S/NF)~~ To protect himself, Sheikh Abdul Sattar began traveling with a security detail of no less than fifty armed men. Given that his father had been killed by AQI operatives who dragged him from his car and shot him on the side of the road, he considered these precautions more than warranted. After ascending to the leadership of the Albu Risha, he continued to seek out Coalition contracts and thus was a major target for JTJ. In late May 2004, Sheikh Abdul Sattar received a letter from then-Governor Burjis threatening him and his brothers unless they ceased collaboration with the Coalition. As a result, the brothers spent most of the summer of 2004 to the summer of 2006 under the constant threat of death from AQI, which now regarded the entire Bezia family as Coalition informants.[763]

~~(S)~~ As AQI grew stronger in Ramadi throughout the latter half of 2005, Sheikh Abdul Sattar agreed to join (b)(6) and other Ramadi tribal leaders in the formation of the Anbar People's Committee. Most of the Committee's key leaders were assassinated, but Sheikh Abdul Sattar managed to survive due to his personal security detail. Because of their late father's good relationship with the Coalition, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his brothers never became radicalized against the Coalition and by October 2006 were now the most powerful figures in Anbar, having helped to create and lead the most promising pro-Coalition organization in Anbar since the beginning of OIF.[764]

(b)(6) Support for the Anbar Emergency Council

~~(S)~~ Not surprisingly, given his earlier activities in the Anbar People's Council, 1920 Revolution Brigade leader (b)(6) supported the formation of the Anbar Emergency Council, attending its meetings and informing the assembled tribal leaders that Governor Mamoun and the current provincial government had to be replaced through legal means. He also intended to have members of Harakat al-Islamiyah (which he regarded as being more personally loyal to him as opposed to the now-schismatic 1920 Revolution Brigade) join the Iraqi police and army in order to provide stability for Anbar and stated that he was considering returning to Ramadi in order to promote the Anbar

[761] His uncle Sheikh Fawzi was also a prominent figure within the tribe.
[762] [| Military | 19 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[763] Ibid.
[764] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Emergency Council. The Council members received (b)(6) favorably, believing that he was a powerful man who could help them bring peace back to the province.[765]

~~(S)~~ Despite his involvement in the insurgency, (b)(6) was a pragmatic individual who, following his defeat at the hands of AQI in early 2006, was now far more aware of the need to work with the Iraqi government and the Coalition as well as the need for Iraqi Sunnis to coexist peacefully with the nation's Shi'a majority. He had also come to a realistic assessment of the unlikelihood of his SAR fighters defeating AQI without Coalition or Iraqi government assistance given the large disparity in money, manpower and unity between the two groups.[766]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) gradual shift towards support for the Coalition (or at least opposition to AQI) represented a considerable change from his earlier vehement opposition to the Coalition and Iraqi government. While (b)(6) remained unrepentant for his earlier actions, he recognized that the only way he could ever regain his former prominence in Ramadi was to defeat AQI. Because of the Anbar Emergency Council's ability to attract outside support (and kill AQI fighters using the Anbar Revolutionaries), it was a far more successful vehicle for (b)(6) than the Anbar People's Committee and (b)(6) had a good relationship with Sheikh Abdul Sattar from their shared time on the organization. Through his continued ability to influence 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah, both (b)(6) and Sheikh Abdul Sattar were determined to make certain that the defeat of the Anbar People's Committee was not repeated.[767]

~~(S)~~ The Anbar Revolutionaries also accepted (b)(6) support. As a group whose propaganda argued that AQI unjustly killed key Iraqi leaders and shed the blood of the people of Anbar, the Anbar Revolutionaries made a distinction between "the resistance" (insurgent groups that supported the Anbar Revolutionaries) and "the terrorists" (AQI and its allies) that they believed had slain innocent Muslims, cynically used religious rhetoric for their political agenda, and whose actions served the goal of a foreign power.[768]

~~(S)~~ As a result, the membership of the Anbar Revolutionaries was now drawn not only from Iraqi police and army officers and local tribesmen, but also from insurgent groups, including the remnants of Jaysh al-Haqq, al-Nu'man Brigade (al-Rahman Brigade), and (b)(6) own 1920 Revolution Brigade. In keeping with their national origins in late 2005 under the leadership of the Baghdad-based (b)(6), all members of the Anbar Revolutionaries were sworn to secrecy about their identities or their pasts to prevent AQI from obtaining detailed information about their group under torture.[769]

Anbar Revolutionaries and Harakat al-Islamiyah Against AQI

Approved for Release

[765] [| Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[766] Ibid.
[767] Ibid.
[768] [| Military | 29 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061029 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[769] Ibid. During that period in 2005, the group had been led in Anbar by Iraqi police colonels Akil and Khalid Sharhuth al-Darraji under the name of Jama'a al-Dhubat Aharar before the two had been assassinated by AQI in February 2006.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ The Anbar Revolutionaries continued to target AQI in Ramadi, killing nearly a dozen members of the group, including five AQI fighters at the Tamim mosque as well as (b)(6) deputy Nabil Khalaf Salah while he was finishing prayers at the Abdul Rahman mosque in the Malaab district. Because Malaab was a known center of AQI influence, the Anbar Revolutionaries' ability to penetrate the district and kill an AQI lieutenant showed the group's growing willingness to challenge AQI in areas where it was known to be strong.[770] Not surprisingly, AQI fought back by killing members of the Anbar Revolutionaries and delivering their bodies to the Women and Children's Hospital.[771] The Anbar Revolutionaries responded in kind, killing AQI vehicle theft, IED, and assassination leader Khalid Hardan (Muhanna).[772]

~~(S)~~ Harakat al-Islamiyah also continued to target AQI, in particular attempting to capture AQI leader (b)(6) in the Malaab district. A former lieutenant to (b)(6) (b)(6) (see Chapter 6b), (b)(6) had risen to the status of amir within AQI and was (b)(6) (b)(6) second-in-command in addition to being responsible for carrying out IED attacks throughout the Malaab district. In an effort to demonstrate the differences between Harakat al-Islamiyah and AQI to Ramadi residents, while Harakat al-Islamiyah kidnapped suspected AQI members, the group did not torture them and promptly released them if they were deemed innocent of AQI ties.[773]

~~(S)~~ AQI responded by assassinating Harakat al-Islamiyah leader Major General Muhammad Thumayl Jarbawi al-Fahdawi at a checkpoint between al-Nasif and Sajariya. The former head of the security subcommittee of the Anbar People's Committee, Major General Muhammad had reformed Harakat al-Islamiyah into the powerful anti-AQI force it later became. (b)(6) and Major General Mohammad had hoped that this force would gain the trust of residents and present a credible alternative to AQI.[774]

~~(S)~~ Despite AQI's move against the Anbar Revolutionaries, the group continued to grow by absorbing several of the smaller anti-AQI groups (see Chapter 6b for descriptions). The group was organized into militia, intelligence, propaganda, and assassination units and its propaganda campaign encouraged the use of the names Justice Group, Punisher Brigade, Anger Militia, and Right Truth in place of Anbar Revolutionaries when claiming attacks in order to make AQI believe that it had more enemies than it actually did. A majority of its recruits were drawn from the immediate families of victims of AQI attacks, former Iraqi intelligence or interior ministry officials, and SAR insurgents who had become disenchanted with AQI. Members of the Anbar Revolutionaries who served in the Iraqi police force were allowed to continue their professional careers, while unemployed members of the group were encouraged to join the Iraqi police in their own hometowns. The group also received the support of more than thirty tribes in western Iraq and even some individual cooperation from the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, the Anbar Revolutionaries were wary of

Approved for Release

[770] [| Military | 17 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060917 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[771] [| Military | 19 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060919 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[772] [| Military | 21 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060921 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[773] [| Military | 20 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060920 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[774] [| Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

government corruption and preferred not to be endorsed by any particular ministry; thus its members always remained anonymous when dealing with Iraqi officials.[775]

~~(S)~~ The activities of the Coalition, the Anbar Revolutionaries, and Harakat al-Islamiyah pushed AQI attacks in Ramadi even lower, a trend that began with the capture of (b)(6) and the death of Abu Uthman. The number of daily attacks dropped from forty-five during the first week of September to twenty-three during the last week of the month. The number of IEDs also dropped from thirty-three to twenty-four, although the number of DF attacks increased from forty-nine to eighty-seven. This shift towards DF rather than IED attacks was a temporary measure by AQI until new IED components could be assembled and new funds became available to the group's new leaders in Ramadi.[776]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the actions of the Anbar Revolutionaries and Harakat al-Islamiyah eliminated a number of AQI leaders, the group was still more than capable of reasserting control of the city through intimidation tactics. The AQI leadership did not intend to abandon Ramadi because they believed that any withdrawal from Ramadi would be seen as a sign of defeat in Baghdad and an abandonment of their strategic support position at a time when Baghdad had become their central focus.[777] Simply put, AQI was determined to dominate Ramadi no matter the cost.

~~(S/NF)~~ Recognizing the growth of the Anbar Revolutionaries and the Anbar Emergency Council, Iraqi finance minister Bayan Jabr agreed to release $38,000,000 to Governor Mamoun, or roughly 40% of the money that the Iraqi government had budgeted for reconstruction in Anbar (see Chapter 6a). This money was intended to help reduce tensions between the Anbar Emergency Council and Governor Mamoun, allowing the latter to mollify the former by dispensing reconstruction funding to tribal sheikhs either directly or through contracts. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi also intended to schedule meetings between Governor Mamoun and the Anbar Emergency Council so that the two sides could reach an agreement to improve security prospects for Ramadi.[778]

Anbar Revolutionaries' Media Campaign

~~(S/NF)~~ The efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries would be given a significant boost at the end of September, when the Iraqi satellite television station al-Iraqiyya received an exclusive agreement with the Anbar Revolutionaries, a result of the efforts of al-Iraqiyya (b)(6) (b)(6) invited a number of Anbar Emergency Council representatives to Baghdad to discuss his intent to weaken AQI by providing positive coverage of the Anbar Revolutionaries' actions in Ramadi. Because of their distrust of the Iraqi government, the leadership of the Anbar Emergency Council was initially hesitant to participate, but they eventually consented. This resulted in a deal under which an undercover al-Iraqiyya reporter was allowed to embed with the Anbar Revolutionaries and cover their activities. To demonstrate its good intentions to the Anbar Emergency Council, al-Iraqiyya also produced coverage of the ongoing meetings between the Anbar Emergency Council sheikhs and the Iraqi government. The station planned to continue covering the

Approved for Release

[775] [| Military | 27 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060927 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[776] [| Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[777] [| Military | 02 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061002 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[778] [| Military | 27 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060927 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

battle that the Anbar Revolutionaries were waging against AQI in other provinces in the hopes of inspiring local Sunni sheikhs and community leaders to organize their own efforts against AQI in neighboring provinces.[779]

~~(S/NF)~~ The result of the al-Iraqiyya coverage was that the Anbar Revolutionaries' anti-AQI crusade in Ramadi attracted support from a wide range of Anbari Sunnis, Baghdad residents, tribal leaders in other provinces, and Iraqi politicians. This support was highly unusual in its unanimity, but should have been expected, given the almost universal hatred of AQI. Unlike contentious issues such as sectarian death squads or the status of Kirkuk, the story of the Anbar Revolutionaries was universally attractive to the average Iraqi regardless of race, sect or religion because it involved Sunnis attacking Sunni extremists in a Sunni province. This allowed the Kurds and the Shi'a, who had been the primary victims of AQI, to cheer on the Sunnis while at long last giving the Sunnis a reason to express solidarity with their fellow Iraqis.[780]

~~(S/NF)~~ This was a win-win scenario for the Anbar Emergency Council, bringing them more support from provincial and national Sunni leaders and from the national Shi'a-dominated government. The UIA leadership in fact viewed it as even more beneficial because it allowed those Iraqi officials who had made public declarations of support for the Anbar Revolutionaries a chance to look good in the eyes of the Sunni population while doing little more than saying a few kind words. Al-Iraqiyya also benefited from the coverage, helping to make the station a clear favorite and boosting its image among the wider population.[781]

Anbari Sunnis and the National Scene

~~(C/NF)~~ This ray of hope was needed, because sectarian violence and talk of civil war continued unabated throughout much of Iraq as did the vitriolic political debates over federalism, the status of Kirkuk, oil, and review of the constitution, all of which continued to fuel fears of Iraq's dissolution. The Sunni leadership continued to believe that these issues were not likely to be decided in a way that would give them an acceptable and viable stake in the Iraqi government. Despite Maliki's support of national reconciliation, many Anbaris believed that their province was being marginalized just as it had been under Maliki's predecessor Jaafari. This was because of Maliki's reputation as a hard-core anti-Ba'athist and his role as the head of the de-Ba'athification commission. The sectarian violence that plagued Iraq also was being played out in a larger Arab regional context: it was seen as unlikely to subside, since neither 1.4b nor Saudi Arabia was willing to give in to the other.[782]

~~(S)~~ Regardless of what occurred, Iraqi Sunnis believed that they were the losers in the new Iraq because they lacked the ability to unite in order to leverage their collective interests over those of the UIA. In addition, there was little room for the Shi'a or Kurdish blocs to compromise on any of the major issues, so that no concessionary legislation could be implemented to lessen Sunni fears, let alone any legislation that would return even a fraction of their lost status and power. While 76% of

[779] [| Military | 04 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[780] Ibid.
[781] Ibid.
[782] [| Military | 20 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060920 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the Shi'as had supported the Iraqi government in September 2005, less than 20% of the Sunnis did and by September 2006 the latter number had dropped to nearly 0.[783]

~~(S)~~ All this left Iraqi Sunnis with few options. They could accept their fate under a consolidated Shi'a-led Iraq, but most were unwilling to do so. The other option, open war with the Shi'a in the hopes of regaining control of the country, had little chance of success, given their disunity, minority population, and lack of anything resembling a conventional military force. As a result, much of the Anbari Sunni leadership opted to continue its current strategy of participating in the Iraqi political process, blocking what legislation they could while continuing to directly or indirectly support the insurgency. While this path was unlikely to lead to success, its goal was to prevent the Shi'a from consolidating control of a functioning Iraqi state.[784] It is this pessimistic view of Iraq and its future that would be deeply affected by the actions of the Anbar Revolutionaries, by the decision of ordinary Sunnis to turn against AQI and by Iraqiyya television coverage of both of these phenomena.

(b)(6) Coup Plot: General Command of the Secret Armed Forces

~~(S/NF)~~ Another alternative to this bleak picture was offered by (b)(6) While (b)(6) had originally intended his INDF to be a nationalist bloc within the Iraqi parliament that could pressure Prime Minister Maliki to initiate non-sectarian reforms, by September 2006 he had actively organized a "shadow government" (see Chapter 6b). This government would overthrow Maliki by force in coordination with (b)(6) using the INDF's military wing General Command of the Secret Armed Forces led by (b)(6) Most of the INDF leadership was kept ignorant of the military wing's existence and that its actions were coordinated by (b)(6) (b)(6) [5]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) intended the INDF to request in the parliament that the current Iraqi government be dissolved. If his effort succeeded, then a new Iraqi government would be formed led by INDF and no coup would be necessary. If it failed, however, (b)(6) would begin planning to launch a military coup in February 2007. While neither (b)(6) possessed the necessary power to actually carry out such a coup, both men intended to use the threat to highlight their political and coercive power.[786]

~~(S/NF)~~ By the end of September, (b)(6) had secured support for his coup from leaders of several insurgent groups, including Jaysh al-Fatihin, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh Muhammad, and 1920 Revolution Brigade. (b)(6) contacts within these groups all pledged to provide fighters and support to the General Command of the Secret Armed Forces as soon as the actual coup was executed. While the number of fighters that leaders of these groups pledged to (b)(6) were wild exaggerations (in excess of 100,000), the fact that he was able to gain such pledges illustrates that a significant number of SAR groups continued to support a change in the current Iraqi government.[787]

Approved for Release

---

[783] Ibid.
[784] Ibid.
[785] [| Military | 24 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060924 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[786] Ibid.
[787] [| Military | 08 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061008 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) failure to execute a coup was due in part to an inability to secure similar pledges of support from the United States or Britain. He had erroneously believed both countries would find his junta preferable to the current UIA majority government. Unwilling to risk a coup without support from a major power, (b)(6) put his plans on hold while he attempted to redirect his focus to obtaining support from neighboring Arab states. He instructed his followers to remain on alert for the possibility of an opportunity in Iraq that would allow the overthrow of the current government, such as a significant Coalition withdrawal or a decision by the Coalition to push for early elections. After again being rejected by 1.4b (b)(6) attempted to set up meetings with politicians from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union to enlist their support for his plans.[788]

~~(S/NF)~~ Part of the rationale for (b)(6) enlistment of foreign support was the dire state of his domestic fortunes. Iraqi MP (b)(6) and senior INDF political advisor (b)(6) were both in talks to discuss his removal as INDF chairman through a vote of no confidence, believing him to be completely disconnected from the real difficulties facing the INDF in Baghdad. Even those INDF leaders who supported the coup plot believed that (b)(6) was too dictatorial and were against his assumption of the sole executive office. While Ba'athists, AMS, and some disaffected Sunnis supported (b)(6) polarizing popularist rhetoric, the Tawafuq Front coalition resented his attacks on the Sunni political establishment and the Shi'a and Kurds both regarded him with disdain. A classical Arab nationalist, (b)(6) was a racist when it came to the Kurds but was married to a Shi'a woman and was willing to cooperate with secular Shi'a politicians such as former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and members of his Iraqi National List opposition bloc. Despite the fact that his coup plot was checked, (b)(6) continued to develop a shadow government, attract former Ba'athists and other Maliki critics, appeal to neighboring Arab states for funds, and press forward with his plans to change the current Iraqi government through any means necessary.[789]

The Mashtal Massacre

~~(S)~~ Just at this critical moment on September 21, about a dozen Anbaris attending a wedding in the religiously mixed Mashtal neighborhood of Baghdad were kidnapped and murdered by members of Mahdi Army and their bodies delivered to the Baghdad Morgue. Iraqi Advisory Task Force leader Sheikh Ali al-Hatim Abdul al-Razzaq Ali Suleiman al-Assafi al-Dulaymi called an emergency meeting of the Anbar Emergency Council to discuss a response to this atrocity. Proposals by the attendees focused on reprisals, ranging from killing every Mahdi Army fighter their tribesmen could find, to demanding one hundred dead Mahdi Army fighters for every Sunni victim of the incident.[790]

~~(S/NF)~~ As the acting head of the Dulaymi tribal confederation after its two co-leaders fled to 1.4b Sheikh Ali Hatim was a privotal figure in tribal and political initiatives. He had been involved in proposals that the Fallujah reconstruction money be paid out to tribal sheikhs, in the compilation of candidates for the Anbar provincial elections before they had been scheduled, and in discussions of placing limitations on Anbari imams in order to stop the rise of Islamist parties. Sheikh Ali was

Approved for Release

[788] Ibid.
[789] Ibid.
[790] [| Military | 22 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060922 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

able to exert a moderating influence on the enraged Anbari tribal leaders, enabling Anbaris to retaliate against the Shi'a under the auspices of AQI. While convincing Anbaris to assist AQI in sectarian attacks in Baghdad may not appear to be much in the way of moderation, it should be understood that were Sunni tribal leaders who wanted instead to carry out tribal attacks under the banner of the Sheikh Ali and the Dulaymi confederation, which would have significantly escalated the level of sectarian violence. The result, then, was sizable but not uncontrolled reprisals against the Shi'a rather than all-out civil war.[791]

Anbar and Sectarian Violence

~~(S)~~ This is not to say that there had been no increase in the sectarian violence, much of it in Anbar driven by Sadr's Mahdi Army and AQI. Since early September, the Babylon Sakhr subgroup of the Mahdi Army had attempted to displace the Sunni population of Hamiyah, telling all the Janabi tribesmen in the city to leave or they and their families would be killed. The actions of Babylon Sakhr were designed to allow the Mahdi Army to expand its influence into religiously mixed areas of Iraq in order establish itself as the dominant influence of the Shi'a residents while expelling the Sunnis.[792]

~~(S)~~ The 900,000 member Janabi tribe became the focus of Babylon Sakhr for several reasons. First, it was one of the twenty most influential tribes in Iraq, with its members roughly 60% Sunni and 40% Shi'a. Second, because so many of its Sunni members were loyal to AQI or Ansar al-Sunna, the Janabi tribe was regarded as an AQI tribe and had become entwined in the ongoing Iraqi sectarian conflict being driven by the Mahdi Army on one end and AQI on another. Babylon Sakhr and other Mahdi Army subgroups regarded it as their duty to evict Sunnis from Shi'a areas in order to expand the group's regional influence and suppress the threat of AQI and its allies from Anbar province. The Mahdi Army's complete disregard for Sunni collateral damage resulted in Sunni families fleeing west into the Haditha area in an internal displacement pattern similar to that which occurred after the February 22 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra (see Chapter 6a).[793]

~~(S)~~ Following vicious Mahdi Army attacks on Sunni neighborhoods, AQI targeted Shi'a mosques, which fueled more Mahdi Army activity and created a spiraling cycle of violence.[794] This territorial feud between the two sides accentuated existing Sunni-Shi'a divisions, and increased riots and sectarian attacks throughout Baghdad province by pressuring residents to choose sides despite a lack of prior sectarian conflict.[795]

~~(S)~~ By late October, Shi'a militias were setting up checkpoints in the al-Thuru and al-Talibi districts of Baghdad as well as along Palestine Street to prevent Sunnis from traveling from Ramadi and other Anbari cities to the capital. Because of the poor quality of medical care in Anbar, many Sunnis

Approved for Release

---

[791] Ibid.
[792] [| Military | 28 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060928 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[793] Ibid.
[794] AQI's reprisal attacks against the Mahdi Army were directed by the Fallujah-based AQI leader (b)(6) (b)(6) who commanded a force of AQI fighters recruited from the Fallujah, Tuwaytha, and Arab Jabour regions against Mahdi Army fighters in Zafaraniya, Baghdad.
[795] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

were compeled to travel into Baghdad for any medical needs. The establishment of Shi'a militia checkpoints led to many Sunnis refusing to undertake the journey for fear of being murdered.[796]

~~(S)~~ These actions by Shi'a militias were themselves a response to an earlier wave of Sunni attacks as part of a vicious cycle of sectarian violence. On October 13, the MNF-I DCS-INT Extra-Judicial Killings Task Force reported that the total number of victims killed and executed in Baghdad between October 7-13 was 481, a 46% increase in the level of sectarian violence from the previous week. As a result of the sectarian unrest, Baghdad's death rate alone during the course of 2006 was estimated at more than 25,000, a figure that may have been understated because of the number of bodies not found by the Coalition or not reported by the Iraqi security forces.[797]

AQI Responds to the New Resistance

AQI's Continuing Shift Towards Rawah-Anah

~~(S/NF)~~ With the dissolution of the IIP in Anah and the city council in Rawah, AQI leaders from Haditha, Hit, and Anah met in late September 2006 to discuss ways to alleviate pressure on Haditha from Coalition forces. A decision was made to shift operations away from Haditha towards the Rawah-Anah corridor by placing IEDs along the roads to Haditha. Their goal was to interrupt Coalition supply lines and ultimately bring about a Coalition withdrawal from Haditha.[798]

~~(S)~~ By consolidating their leadership and resources in the Rawah-Anah corridor, AQI believed that it could direct heavier operations in Haditha while simultaneously minimizing its exposure to Coalition concentrations in the Haditha area. Local AQI fighters in Haditha feared that the RIP between 3/3 and 2/3 was in fact a reinforcement of Coalition forces in the Haditha area.[799]

~~(S)~~ The architect of this plan was former Brigadier General Sa'id Ali Huwayr al-Hayyani, who had overseen the training of the Saddam Fedayeen prior to OIF and had been recruited by Zarqawi in its aftermath to serve as one of his senior commanders in the Hit-Haditha corridor. A key AQI facilitator, Sa'id had ties to AQI fighters across western Anbar as well as connections with AQI elements in Ramadi and Bayji.[800]

AQI Communications Control

~~(S)~~ Perhaps in support of these operations, in late September 2006 AQI began destroying internet cafes in Rawah in the belief that residents were using them to view pornography and send information to the Coalition. This was also part of AQI's continued effort to control as much of the communications spectrum as possible in the areas where the group operated. This was somewhat counter-intuitive; however, as AQI supporters were managing the wireless routers at the time of

Approved for Release

[796] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[797] Ibid.
[798] [| Military | 29 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060929 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[799] Ibid.
[800] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

their destruction and thus able to monitor the server traffic of individuals on the internet using commercial software.[801]

~~(S)~~ For instance, AQI destroyed the land-line telephone switch in Haditha earlier in 2006 in order to deprive residents of the Coalition-sponsored "tip line." Because of the tip line's success, after the group had destroyed the telephone switch the local AQI intelligence cell began to plant informants at internet cafes to identify Coalition supporters who might e-mail information on AQI and to target them for assassination. The only alternative for Coalition supporters was to visit the Coalition physically, but Coalition bases were monitored by AQI operatives to identify potential informants and execute them.[802]

Abu Sarah Group and Islamic Army of Iraq

~~(S)~~ The AQI ally Abu Sarah Group continued to be active in western Anbar, by early October 2006 the group had expanded its operational reach all the way from the 1.4b border to Baghdad, taking part in vehicle theft, robbery, and sectarian attacks. Former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq led by (b)(6) who were now loyal to AQI cooperated with the Abu Sarah Group, both of whom agreed not to attack, kidnap, or steal from any Iraqi Sunni except those who were members of the army or police. Instead, they focused their efforts on targeting Shi'a and 1.4b truckers who were transporting weapons or commercial goods into Iraq.[803]

~~(S)~~ The primary objectives of (b)(6) Islamic Army of Iraq members in western Iraq, most of whom were now loyal to AQI under the banner of the Joint Committee of the Jihad Platoons of Anbar Province, was to fight foreign (meaning Shi'a) influence in Iraq by supporting attacks against the Mahdi Army and by targeting Shi'a in Anbar. They were aided by like-minded Islamic Army of Iraq members in Ramadi and Fallujah in targeting Shi'a civilians. In contrast to those members of Islamic Army of Iraq who had remained loyal to their national leadership and become Jaysh al-Fatihin, (b)(6) goal was now to fight Shi'a Islam and rid Iraq of 1.4b by supporting sectarian violence in Anbar and other parts of Iraq.[804]

Anti-AQI Forces Continue Their Fight

AMS and the Sunni Endowment

~~(S/NF)~~ In an effort to reduce the influence of AMS on Saudi and general Sunni Arab perceptions of the situation in Iraq, a 12-man delegation from the Iraqi al-Waqf al-Sunni (Sunni Endowment) led by Sunni Endowment secretary-general Dr. Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i traveled to Saudi Arabia in early October to attend the Saudi-sponsored Iraqi reconciliation conference. Dr. al-Samarra'i hoped that he could persuade the Saudi government to view the Sunni Endowment rather

Approved for Release

[801] [| Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[802] Ibid.
[803] [| Military | 01 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061001 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[804] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

than AMS as the official voice of the Iraqi Sunnis because of its responsibilities and more realistic worldview.[805]

~~(S/NF)~~ As the quasi-governmental body responsible for the funding and upkeep of Sunni mosques and imams throughout Iraq, the Sunni Endowment was traditionally the official mouthpiece of the Iraqi Sunni community. Under Saddam Hussein, the Sunni Endowment had been tightly controlled by the Iraqi state and following his overthrow many of its former members reorganized into AMS, which claimed the same responsibilities (though for different mosques) as well as the membership of individuals as diverse as SAR leader (b)(6) and Zarqawi associate Sheikh Abdullah Janabi.[806]

~~(S/NF)~~ Dr. al-Samarra'i was a former member of AMS secretary-general Harith al-Dhari's inner circle who had broken with him in early 2005 in disillusionment over the failure of the Sunni boycott of the Iraqi elections that ensured the absence of a signficant Sunni influence on national Iraqi politics throughout 2005 and had a measureable impact on Anbar as result ever since. Since then, al-Samarra'i and his predecessor Adnan al-Dulaymi (see Chapter 5a) had endorsed Sunni political participation and formed the General Conference of the Iraqi People (GCIP) in 2005. Led by Adnan, GCIP was one of the three major parties in the Tawafuq Front coalition and al-Samarra'i secretly met with Coalition officials.[807]

~~(S/NF)~~ In contrast to AMS, the Sunni Endowment was a far more responsible organization whose imams were far less likely to be harsh in their criticisms of the Coalition or the Iraqi government. While Harith al-Dhari and AMS enjoyed modest support among Sunni hardliners and SAR insurgents as well as wide appeal internationally as the recognized "Iraqi voice" on the Arab street. Within Iraq, Harith was essentially the religious equivalent of secular populist (and coup plotter) (b)(6) whose party received 20% of the Sunni vote in the December 2005 Iraqi elections. Harith's modest support was still enough to influence the outcome of Sunni opinion in Iraq and regardless of whether the individual fortunes of AMS and the Sunni Endowment rose or fell, their rivalry was unlikely to manifest itself through violence in contrast to the Shi'a feud between the (b)(6) and (b)(6) families. As a result, it was local Iraqi rather than Saudi support of the Sunni Endowment over AMS that was needed to make a difference in terms of raising Sunni support for political participation.[808]

(U) The outcome of the Saudi reconciliation conference was the so-called "Mecca Document" against sectarianism that was endorsed by Sunni and Shi'a Iraqi representatives and embraced by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The only mechanism that could make the agreement hold, however, was for its circulation and acceptance to occur within the broadest circle of religious leaders.[809]

~~(S/NF)~~ While it was heartening that Shi'a-Sunni dialogue was still occurring despite the mounting sectarian violence, neither the reconciliation conference nor the Mecca document led to a cessation

[805] [| Military | 02 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061002 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[806] Ibid.
[807] Ibid.
[808] Ibid
[809] [| Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

of sectarian violence. This was in part because the attendees of the reconciliation conference were altogether influential and because the political figures with the authority to implement the proposed policy fared poorly at implementing it. While the Sunni delegation included Sunni Endowment secretary-general Dr. Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarrai and AMS leader (b)(6) the Shi'a delegation was only made up of low-level clergy. Furthermore, Harith al-Dhari undermined the outcome of the conference by stating that he had no faith in the ability of the other religious leaders who attended the conference.[810]

~~(S/NF)~~ Even so, (b)(6) had lost influence over the course of 2006 due to his unchanging opposition to involvement in Iraqi politics despite the shift throughout the entire Sunni political leadership to do just that. And while Grand Ayatollah Sistani attempted to limit Shi'a involvement in retaliatory attacks as a result of his religious authority and the adoration of the masses, since the bombing of the Golden mosque he had been unable exercise his ability to restrain the Shi'as to the same degree that he had. As a result, the Mahdi Army and Muqtada al-Sadr grew in stature through demagoguery and extremism at the expense of Sistani, though the latter was still respected and adored by the masses as the highest religious authority in Iraq. Despite this, (b)(6) remained a fixture of the Iraqi Sunni perspective in the Arab media and all leading Shi'a politicians still visited Sistani to ensure his approval of key issues.[811]

Anbar Central Council and Anbar Emergency Council

~~(S/NF)~~ With the formation of the Anbar Emergency Council, both Sheikh Abdul Sattar and former Anbar governor Faisal al-Gaoud attempted to reach out to members of the Anbar Central Council (see Chapter 6b), only to be rebuffed due to their belief that the two men were now being supported by SCIRI. Faisal in particular was regarded as being too close to (b)(6) and the Anbar Central Council believed that (b)(6) supported the creation of a Sunni militia in order to give SCIRI an excuse to retain its own Badr Corps. The expatriates embodied in the Anbar Central Council were far more likely to support (b)(6) than the Anbar Revolutionaries, though they did offer some grudging support to Governor Mamoun as well.[812]

~~(S/NF)~~ After the end of September 2006, the Anbar Central Council's activities were stalled due to a lack of money because those members who had been expected to finance its organization had not done so. Anbar Central Council leader Sheikh Tariq Khalaf al-Halbusi, for instance, was far more preoccupied with his own business holdings rather than with the Council's activities despite the fact that he had been elected to lead the Council largely on the basis of the belief that he would allocate a portion of his substantial personal financial resources to support its activities. Through his spokesman Dr. Ali al-Hadithi, Sheikh Tariq voiced his opinion that the fighting now occurring between tribes represented in the Anbar Emergency Council and AQI was "old news" and that the former did not represent the true opinions of Anbaris in contrast to more "acceptable" voices like (b)(6)[813]

Approved for Release

[810] Ibid.
[811] Ibid.
[812] [| Military | 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061005 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[813] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Further Negotiations with the Insurgency

~~(S)~~ A number of SAR insurgent groups continued their negotiations with the Coalition. Jaysh al-Fatihin, which by this point had resumed the use of their earlier name of the Islamic Army of Iraq (but will still be referred to as Jaysh al-Fatihin to distinguish between the national group and its members in Anbar loyal to AQI), continued to be interested in rapproachment with the Coalition and the Iraqi security forces. On October 5, a jihadi website posted an audio interview with Jaysh al-Fatihin spokesman Dr. Ibrahim al-Shammari who stated that negotiations between his group and the Coalition were possible but contingent on two key points: withdrawal of Coalition from Iraq and recognition of the "Iraqi resistance" as the sole legitimate representatives of the Iraqi people.[814]

~~(S)~~ By October 18, these demands had been modified following dialogue between the Coalition and Jaysh al-Fatihin to encompass a timetable for Coalition withdrawal from Iraq, the trial of all post-Saddam government officials suspected in complicity with death squads or financial and administrative corruption, and the recognition of all insurgent groups save AQI as legitimate representatives of the Iraqi people. Iraqi Vice President Tariq Hashimi attempted to mediate between the Coalition and SAR insurgents on behalf of the Tawafuq Front.[815]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite its name, Jaysh al-Fatihin remained not an SRE but rather a fanatically nationalist SAR insurgent group that had been created in mid-2003 by FREs to defend Sunni interests and to expel Coalition and 1.4b from Iraq. Despite its continued attacks on Coalition forces, Jaysh al-Fatihin had supported Sunni political participation since late 2005 and opposed attacks on Iraqi civilians. While the group was willing to cooperate tactically with AQI, its national leadership consistently condemned the latter group. As the largest of the remaining SAR insurgent groups, the Coalition believed that persuading Jaysh al-Fatihin to renounce violence and enter the political arena would persuade the national leadership of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh al-Mujahideen to adopt similar moves, though the groups' unrealistic criteria for negotiation and perceived need to retain street credibility against AQI through both rhetoric and continued attacks slowed down the process considerably.[816]

Effects on AQI's Relationship with Ansar al-Sunna

~~(S)~~ As noted, the rise of (b)(6) and the new policies pursued under his leadership were focused in Anbar around building popular support for AQI and reaching out to other insurgent groups. This in turn led to a stronger relationship between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, whose national differences had been primarily focused around animosity between Zarqawi and the Ansar al-Sunna leadership. With Zarqawi dead, it was now far more equitable for Ansar al-Sunna amirs to ally with their AQI counterparts.

~~(S)~~ By early October 2006, AQI (b)(6) had taken over responsibility for a number of AQI groups in Ramadi and Hit with his (b)(6) having direct control over five

[814] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[815] Ibid.
[816] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

AQI cells in Ramadi and two AQI cells in Hit. While this was not an unusual arrangement for AQI, what was particularly interesting about Qasim's network was that another of his (b)(6) (b)(6) was the leader of Ansar al-Sunna's IED cell in Ramadi. Qasim's network, which operated in Rutbah, Hit, Ramadi, and Zaidon, was made up of both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members including (b)(6) Nor was Qasim's network atypical, as AQI and Ansar al-Sunna were now actively working together in Anbar to smuggle money and foreign fighters into Iraq, with their operational cells banding together in order to increase one another's capabilities. Because of their shared allegiance to AQSL and global jihad outlook, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna were able to compliment one another's activities and enhance their shared ability to combat counter-insurgent operations.[817]

The Politics of Anbar

~~(S)~~ By October 2006, there was no Sunni political strategy and their leaders had failed to develop any kind of vision to further Sunni interests in the new Iraq. Widening divisions among Sunni leaders further debilitated them as a political force and eliminated their ability to develop a clear vision of their place in the new Iraq. Only on the national stage was the Sunni parliament vote a catalyst for meaningful compromise as Sunni parties attempted to exploit divisions in the UIA to turn themselves into a more decisive swing vote. Their only coherent agenda item, constitutional reform, was finally introduced in parliament in late September 2006, and then only as a counter-measure against SCIRI's proposal for the formation of federal regions.[818]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the Tawafuq Front coalition remained intact, there were serious strains within its members parties of Tariq Hashemi's IIP, Adnan al-Dulaymi's Iraqi People's Gathering, and Jaysh al-Fatihin leader (b)(6) Iraqi National Dialogue Council. Salih Mutlaq's entirely reactionary INDF was effectively shut out of any ministerial positions and bitterly denounced government activities at every turn. Finally, AMS remained opposed to any cooperation whatsoever with the Iraqi government and supported a variety of insurgent groups including 1920 Revolution Brigade, working beneath the surface of Iraqi politics to exert influence over Sunni political thought. Because Anbar rejected the Iraqi constitution by more than 97%, it was within a climate of rejection that the province's national leaders sought to unite themselves in order to salvage something from the central government.[819]

~~(S)~~ In Anbar itself, the Iraqi political process hardly existed due to a combination of ambition, external actors, and most notably the actions of AQI. The Anbar provincial council had been elected by less than 4,000 voters in January 2005 and the IIP received twenty-nine of forty-one seats with the remainder going to the Independent Iraq (nine seats) or Liberation (three seats) parties. The IIP was unable to pursue its legislative agenda because the provincial government had been rendered virtually non-existent by AQI. Governor Farhan was killed by AQI before he could really assume office and his successor Governor Mamoun was chosen because he was the only eligible candidate available. By October 2006, the AQI murder and intimidation campaign had rendered the provincial council completely ineffective, forcing them to meet in Baghdad rather than in Ramadi.[820]

Approved for Release

---

[817] [| Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[818] [| Military | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[819] Ibid.
[820] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ By 2006, all the other insurgent groups in Anbar had suffered devastating losses at the hands of AQI during the first half of 2006 including Jaysh al-Fatihin, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Muhammad, and Harakat al-Islamiyah. Ansar al-Sunna was the only remaining insurgent group of any size, but this was largely due to the willingness of some of the group's leaders to cooperate with AQI. While some SAR groups such as Jaysh al-Fatihin continued to carry out attacks against the Coalition, they generally eschewed attacks on the Sunni Iraqi security forces.[821]

~~(S)~~ As a result of this situation, the Anbari elite had no good options for dealing with the central government. Despite the fact that political non-participation was proven counter-productive to Sunni interests by the events of 2005, the threat of withdrawal from the parliament remained one of the very few Sunni political weapons available because it could discredit Maliki's claims of a national unity government. As a result, Sunni political efforts remained focused around salvaging their influence in Baghdad and slowing the consolidation of Shi'a political power.[822]

~~(S)~~ This created an unprecedented crisis for the Anbari leadership, complicating efforts to build a stable society and played directly into the hands of AQI. All Anbaris, like much of the Sunni Islamic world, was struggling to balance new ideas like representative democracy with their religion and traditions. Although the majority of Anbaris were essentially religious moderates, a few were committed Salafists who supported AQI. Further tension was created among Anbari elites by those who saw tribal leaders as an archaic aristocracy that long ago outlived its usefulness and those who saw sheikhly status as an authentic ancient tradition. Other divisions existed between those who sought a society based around individualism compared with those that favored a "soft authoritarianism" and client-patron relationships. Rivalries also existed between the expatriate elites that fled abroad and those that remained in the country. Because of these factors, Anbar's traditional leaders found themselves unable to unite despite the brutal AQI insurgency.[823]

Reactions to the Trial of Saddam Hussein

~~(S/NF)~~ These rivalries and cleavages were demonstrated in reactions to the ongoing trial of Saddam. Although Anbari Sunnis did not ascend to as a high level of Iraqi government and the Ba'ath Party as did their Tikriti counterparts, many of them served in senior military or security service positions and the sheikhs of many of the larger tribes benefited enormously from Saddam Hussein's patronage. While there was not a popular desire to see Saddam Hussein restored to power, a majority of these individuals would likely rush to his side were he released from prison and absolved of involvement in any past atrocities.[824]

~~(S/NF)~~ Many SAR insurgent groups manipulated the likelihood of an unfavorable verdict to aid in their recruiting and fundraising operations. Even so, Jaysh al-Fatihin, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and SRE groups like Ansar al-Sunna were very far from wholehearted supporters of Saddam Hussein. Of these groups, a purported Jaysh al-Fatihin spokesman attempted

[821] Ibid.
[822] Ibid.
[823] Ibid.
[824] [| Military | 30 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061030 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

to pledge allegiance to Saddam Hussein and Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, only to later have it denounced by the same organization. While some tribal leaders who had been patronized by Saddam Hussein called for his return, a majority of SAR insurgents regarded Saddam as "incapable of leading Iraq."[825]

~~(S/NF)~~ As for AQI, while the group's ideology was inherently incompatible with the secular socialism of Ba'athism, the group was willing to feign sympathy for Saddam Hussein to exploit Sunni dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government. The Anbar Salvation Front (Sahwa al-Anbar or SAA) that now served as AQI's primary enemy in Anbar, by contrast, was pragmatic enough whatever their opinions of Saddam Hussein to refrain from deviating from their anti-AQI platform and refrained from any actions that the group's leadership believed would endanger Iraqi government, army, or Coalition support.[826]

~~(S)~~ Only in Rawah and Fallujah was there any substantial pro-Saddam sentiment, with some residents believing that Saddam's dictatorship was preferable to the current violence in the country. These residents adopted a conspiratorial view of the insurgency, believing that the Coalition was intentionally drawing insurgents into towns so that they could kill innocent Iraqis. For these residents, 1.4b was now in control of the Iraqi government and the entire trial was the work of the 1.4b security services. That some pro-Saddam sentiment would linger in Rawah is not surprising since a large percentage of the town's population was drawn from the Ba'ath Party or retired Iraqi military personnel, while the protests in the Fallujah were part of a neo-Ba'athist propaganda campaign.[827]

City Stories (October 2006)

Ramadi

~~(S)~~ Despite the assassination of high-profile AQI leaders in Ramadi by (b)(6) the city remained extremely unstable and a large number of AQI operatives remained active.[828] (b)(6) (b)(6) the AQI amir for the Tamim and 5 Kilo districts of the city, was considered powerful enough by local contractors that no work could take place in the area without his approval, which usually came with the condition that he would receive up to 50% of the profit. Qutayba's situation was the norm and AQI extortion of Iraqi contracts was the standard practice in Ramadi and throughout much of Anbar. Under the new policies set down since the rise of (b)(6) AQI operatives refined their method of extortion to demanding protection money in return for "guaranteeing" that new contracts were allowed to occur free of insurgent attacks.[829]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Jazira Propane Factory continued to be used as meeting site, arms cache, hostage holding area, and IED factory by AQI fighters loyal to AQI amir (b)(6) While multiple Coalition raids on the factory failed to produce any significant findings, this was because the guards

[825] Ibid.
[826] Ibid.
[827] [| Military | 08 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[828] [| Military | 07 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060907 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[829] [| Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

at the factory gave AQI fighters advance notice of Coalition movements in the area, just as the guards had done at Ramadi General Hospital during the summer of 2006.[830]

~~(S)~~ Anbar oil distribution director-general (b)(6) (see Chapter 6b) continued to both support and facilitate AQI's black market fuel activities in Ramadi by supplying AQI with both money and gasoline that was then sold on the black market. AQI leader (b)(6) (b)(6)) continued to serve as (b)(6) primary contact with AQI and together the two men earned $50,000 and $40,000 a day in black market fuel sales. Because (b)(6) had held his position as director-general for oil distribution in Anbar under Saddam Hussein, he was able to apply his complex knowledge of the situation to help AQI control gasoline distribution in Ramadi. Working with (b)(6) AQI fighters were placed in control of Ramadi gas stations and paid $300 a day with money provided by the Iraqi government.[831]

~~(S)~~ By virtue of his connections with (b)(6) AQI amir (b)(6) was able to maintain AQI's control over Ramadi gas stations and both the price and distribution of gasoline for local generators. Owners of private generators were only able to receive fuel with the verified permission of the local AQI leader in charge of the fuel distribution center. This enabled AQI to finance its operations inside Ramadi while influencing the population through a means that was far less direct but just as effective as the group's regular murder and intimidation campaign.[832]

~~(S)~~ The Anbar Revolutionaries continued their assassination campaign against AQI leaders in Ramadi, killing Hilal Dayih al-Suwaydawi in the Tamim district and Akram al-Assafi in Zangora. Of the two, the death of Hilal was more significant, as he had been a long-time Zarqawi lieutenant, involved in the assassination of Iraqi police captain Layith Farris Abd al-Karim al-Mahalowi in 2004 before relocating to Ramadi from Husaybah in late 2005 to overseen an assassination cell. The death of Hilal sent a minor shockwave through mid-level AQI leaders in the Tamim district, causing a number of them to go into hiding for fear of being targeted by the Anbar Revolutionaries.[833]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) continued to finance his 1920 Revolution Brigade loyalists from his HQ in 1.4b laundering $180,000 through the businesses of A'id, Majid, and Mahid Ibrahim Hammad to his followers in Ramadi. In addition to 1920 Revolution Brigade, (b)(6) followers were also drawn from (b)(6) and former members of his old friend (b)(6) Brigade (al-Rahman Brigade), which had disbanded following the Coalition's detention of (b)(6) [834]

~~(S)~~ The Coalition also continued operations against AQI's allies. On September 5, the Coalition captured (b)(6), the leader of pro-AQI Islamic Army of Iraq faction in the Tamim district of Ramadi. (b)(6) had been opposed by (b)(6), the Ramadi leader of Jaysh al-Fatihin.[835]

---

[830] [| Military | 12 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060912 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[831] [| Military | 02 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061002 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[832] Ibid.
[833] [| Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[834] [| Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[835] [| Military | 05 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060905 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ With the loss of a number of lesser AQI leaders to the Coalition, Harakat al-Islamiyah, and the Anbar Revolutionaries, the leadership and administration of AQI in Ramadi now depended on the leadership of (b)(6) all of whom were among the original seven founding members of JTJ in Ramadi. (b)(6) was the main financier of AQI and was involved in raising money for the group through smuggling, kidnapping, and vehicle theft ventures. (b)(6) was a trained sniper served as AQI's Ramadi operations chief, coordinating complex attacks, overseeing the day-to-day administration of the group's infrastructure in Ramadi, and serving as the head of AQI's ruthless intelligence and internal security cell in the city.[836]

~~(S)~~ Other replacement AQI leaders were brought into Ramadi from Rutbah under the cover story that they were "construction workers." (b)(6) (see Chapter 6a), (b)(6) (b)(6) relocated to the 35 Kilo area west of Ramadi to direct vehicle theft, robbery, and assassination west of Ramadi in order to raise funds for AQI operations. (b)(6) formerly the head of AQI in Rutbah charged with facilitating the movement of foreign fighters from 1.4b now recruited fighters from Rutbah to carry out operations against the Coalition in Ramadi. Akram was formerly the leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq fighters in Rutbah who were loyal to AQI, while (b)(6) had been the leader of al-Asa'ab al-Iraq in Rutbah.[837] Additionally, during a meeting of the AQI leadership at the Salaam Mosque in the Jazira area, a decision was made to appoint (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ There are also indications that other branches of AQI assisted the Ramadi leadership in reconstituting their organization. For instance, AQI's senior Mosul bombmaker (b)(6) who was himself connected to AQI's Mosul amir (b)(6) used his connections to the Bayji fertilizer plant to ship explosives from Mosul to Ramadi along with cars for use as VBIEDs. AQI also continued to operate in the vicinity of Lake Thar Thar, establishing checkpoints and targeting cargo and tanker trucks contracted by the Iraqi government to transport goods to 1.4b.[839] AQI murder and intimidation coordinator (b)(6)) operated out of the Lake Thar Thar area, overseeing the kidnapping and murder of First Lieutenant Muhammad Abd Hamdan.[840]

~~(S)~~ AQI stepped up its campaign against schools in the Tamim and Hay al-Dhubat districts of Ramadi, threatening to kill any student seen attending an education facility and warning that there would be no academic year for anyone in the city unless the Coalition removed its checkpoints. The goal of this intimidation was to force the population into pressuring the Coalition to remove the checkpoints that inhibited AQI's access to its safe houses, recruiting centers, and weapons caches. It was also a reaction to the Anbar Revolutionaries' assassination of Ahmad Frayh Ahmad al-Faraji, the AQI amir charged with overseeing Anbar University in order to preserve the institution as an AQI enclave by intimidating the students and faculty.[841]

Approved for Release

---

[836] [| Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[837] [| Military | 04 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[838] [| Military | 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061005 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[839] [| Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[840] [| Military | 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061005 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[841] [|Military | 09 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061009 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ Anbar University continued, however, to act as a center for AQI in the city. Faculty members (b)(6) recruited and propagandized for AQI on campus. Of the three, (b)(6) also served as the imam of the al-Husayn Mosque and delivered anti-Coalition sermons in the 5 Kilo district of Ramadi. He was also a member of the Baghdad Salafist organizations Iraqi Sunni Shura Council and Higher Committee for Guidance and Legal Opinion.[842]

~~(S)~~ The Qatana district of Ramadi and 17th Street were major centers of AQI activity throughout October 2006 as the group intimidated the local population and conducted regular attacks on Coalition patrols. AQI checkpoints were set up to prevent members of the Albu Risha, Albu Nimr, and Albu Ali Jassim tribes from entering the Qatana district and the group conducted meetings and stored weapons at the al-Zawah and al-Gara schools. The absence of Coalition fixed positions along 17th Street allowed AQI fighters uninhibited freedom of movement through the area.[843]

Lake Thar Thar

~~(S)~~ On September 6, 2006, the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion conducted Operation CHOKEHOLD in southern area around Lake Thar Thar near Saddamiyah to confirm or deny the presence of foreign fighters. While the area around the lake was relatively vacant, Coalition forces discovered shooting ranges and an insurgent meeting location, indicating an AQI presence (see Chapter 6b for AQI training around Lake Thar Thar). This area had been used by AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) and Sheikh Nazar Sa'adi Zahir to train fighters, but Operation CHOKEHOLD in early October temporarily disrupted their operations in the area.[844]

~~(S)~~ The operation also succeeded in killing Khalid Ibrahim Mahal, a former member of the Abu Harun Group allied with AQI who had carried out IDF, IED, and DF attacks against Coalition forces in the Jazira area and the Tamim district of the Ramadi. An associate of AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) had been the immediate superior to the late Nasayf Jassim, the so-called "police killer" whom Khalid had made his second-in-command as a result of his ruthless attacks on Iraqi security forces. Following the death of Khalid, his relatives and friends held a prayer ceremony for him in the Tamim district where they were targeted by plainclothes Iraqi police (possibly Anbar Revolutionaries) who opened fire at the group, killing six mourners.[845]

~~(S)~~ Operation CHOKEHOLD also discovered an AQI torture house with bloodstained walls that contained Iraqi police uniforms, handwritten notes by torture victims and a log book with interrogation notes. The bodies of Iraqi police officers were also recovered in the Thar Thar Canal near Japanese Bridge, further confirming that AQI used the Saddamiyah-Lake Thar Thar area to interrogate and then murder police.[846]

Approved for Release

---

[842] [| Military | 10 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[843] [| Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[844] [| Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[845] [| Military | 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061005 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[846] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Khalidiyah

~~(S)~~ AQI continued to mount a vigorous assassination campaign against Iraqi security forces, murdering Anbar intelligence director Colonel Ibrahim Hamaad Hilaal near Khalidiyah.[847] A number of individuals in the Khalidiyah area were also beheaded by order of an AQI *qadi* (religious judge).[848] Killed too by AQI in Khalidiyah were Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Abdullah, Sheikh Abd al-Karim Hamid, and Imam Nihad Mukhlif Ali, supporters of the Iraqi government who had participated in the December 2005 elections.[849] AQI operatives in Khalidiyah were typically men between the ages of 18-30 who traveled in groups of 2-3 vehicles to plant IEDs. In keeping with (b)(6) efforts to build popular support for AQI in Anbar, cells in the area gave local business owners advance notice when they planned to carry out IED attacks in order to reduce collateral damage. Government officials, Iraqi security forces, and residents who attempted to oppose AQI publicly were tortured or assassinated, making Khalidiyah residents extremely wary of cooperating with either the local government or the Coalition.[850]

~~(S)~~ In the Husaybah-Sharqiyah area 10 kilometers northwest of Khalidiyah, AQI fighters led by Durayd Daham (Hanash) forced the 1920 Revolution Brigade and al-Fatih al-Mubrin (a local SAR group allied with 1920 Revolution Brigade) groups to disband, giving their members the option of joining AQI, fleeing the area, or remaining in the area but agreeing not to reform their organizations. 1920 Revolution Brigade leader (b)(6) fled the area after AQI kidnapped and beat several of his followers, leaving his successor (b)(6) with little option but to disband and attempt to join AQI. Young men throughout the area were pressured to join AQI, whose fighters killed an imam who preached that beheadings were against the teachings of Islam.[851]

~~(S)~~ Fighting broke out in the Albu Ubayd tribal area north of Khalidiyah between insurgent factions loyal to the Habbaniyah-based Khalid Mukhlif Daham (Abu Walid) and the Jazira-based Ali Siyagha over the issue of whether Iraqi army and police officers should be killed, which Ali supported and Khalid decried. This led to a clash between the two groups that left both men dead.[852]

~~(S)~~ These divisions were due to the fact that Khalid Mukhlif Daham had never sworn bayat to AQI or joined the Mujahideen Shura Council. He was a high-ranking IIS officer who had served as the leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq in Khalidiyah, carrying out attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces as well as suspected collaborators. Like many Islamic Army of Iraq leaders in Anbar, Khalid had allied himself with AQI over the course of early 2006 (see Chapter 6a) but had never truly embraced the group's agenda or ideology. Ali Siyagha, by contrast, had assumed the mantle of AQI's amir in Khalidiyah after his predecessor had been killed in Fallujah during Operation AL FAJR, preaching from Khalidiyah's al-Faruq Mosque and issuing fatwas against Khalid for his perceived reluctance to kill Iraqi Sunnis. As a result, after Khalid disagreed publicly over the killing of Iraqi

Approved for Release

[847] [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[848] [| Military | 21 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060921 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[849] [| Military | 30 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061030 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[850] [| Military | 21 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060921 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[851] [| Military | 12 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060912 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[852] [| Military | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

police, Ali had him assassinated, only to be killed himself in a reprisal attack by former Islamic Army of Iraq fighters.[853]

~~(S)~~ The AQI associate group Ghazwan Group (see Chapter 6a) was active in the Jazira area north of Khalidiyah under the leadership of (b)(6) who had since joined AQI and become the leader of the group in Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah. He was assisted by the Ghazwan Group's intelligence chief (b)(6) who used a false ID card to gain access to the interior ministry headquarters in Baghdad to collect information on police working in the Jazira area. (b)(6) had originally relied on former Habbaniyah police officer (b)(6) to provide him with intelligence on the Iraqi police, but had been forced to find other means after (b)(6) was detained by the Coalition. The Ghazwan Group was primarily involved in murder and intimidation, vehicle theft, robbery, sectarian violence, and IED attacks.[854]

~~(S/NF)~~ In response, the Anbar Revolutionaries established a chapter in Khalidiyah, posting bounties for AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6). The Anbar Revolutionaries' entry into Khalidiyah was facilitated by an October 5 meeting of deputy governor Ali Aboud Awad with prominent members of the Iraqi police and army to discuss ways to restore security in Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah. Anbar Revolutionaries propaganda from this period made much of the fact that AQI had murdered Fahdawi tribesmen and former generals Khalil Muhammad Abed and Muhammad Thumayl, both of whom were leaders within the Anbar Revolutionaries. Before this, they had spent the last few years organizing SAR insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah corridor.[855]

Habbaniyah

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) was one of AQI's facilitators in Fallujah, maintaining weapons caches in Shubaihat village near Habbaniyah while taking part in local kidnapping and robbery ventures. Also operating in Shubaihat village was (b)(6), who now served as the successor for (b)(6) (b)(6).[56] Somewhat ironically, the Anbar Revolutionaries relied on the ferry crossing in Habbaniyah and Saqlawiyah to target AQI, exploiting many of the same locations that had previously been used by AQI fighters to coordinate kidnapping operations with the aid of local boatmen who ferried passengers up and down the Euphrates River.[857]

Karmah

~~(S/NF)~~ On August 31 and September 1, AQI leaders Sheikh Nazar Sadi Zahir, (b)(6) (b)(6) held an AQI leadership meeting in Karmah to coordinate operational and logistical planning for renewed attacks against Iraqi security forces in Karmah. (b)(6) had overseen the now-concluded training of Iraqi and foreign fighters in the

Approved for Release

[853] Ibid.
[854] [| Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[855] [| Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[856] [| Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[857] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Saddamiyah area. The meeting was focused on how best to employ his fighters.[858] Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi also attended the Karmah meeting along with his brother (b)(6) (b)(6) As the AQI regional logistics chief for the Fallujah area, Sheikh Abdallah was responsible for ensuring that all AQI cells were adequately equipped with foreign fighters for use as suicide bombers and with weapons.[859]

~~(S)~~ In contrast to Fallujah, AQI cooperated with Jaysh al-Mujahideen in Karmah, working with the other insurgent group to intimidate residents of the city by warning them of the consequences of working for the Coalition, doing business with Shi'a, smoking, eating vegetables in vinegar, and using ice water. To demonstrate the consequences of violating their edicts, the two groups distributed a video of them beheading Iraqi army soldier Ra'ad Sabah Musa. While most of Karmah's 40,000 residents regarded the insurgents as criminals, those who defied them met with increasingly swift reprisal.[860]

~~(S)~~ The security situation in Karmah was not helped by the fact that Iraqi police officer (b)(6) and former police officer (b)(6) worked for AQI, convincing other Karmah police to turn over their badges and weapons to AQI members and surrender. Once a member of the police had agreed to do so, AQI took them to a facility near Lake Thar Thar where they surrendered their badges and were given a formal document informing other AQI members that they had been cleansed of their sins and were now safe from attack along with their entire family.[861]

~~(S)~~ AQI's policy of allowing Iraqi police to surrender in return for their lives and those of their families was duplicated throughout Fallujah, Amariyah, Saqlawiyah, and Ferris Town. The appeal of this policy for many police is not surprising given that twenty police had been assassinated by AQI in the Fallujah area alone between July and October. Even more alarming was AQI's ability to recruit former police into their ranks: of the nine Iraqi police who had officially resigned in the Fallujah area in June by October all of them were now AQI operatives in Amariyah and Ferris Town.[862]

~~(S)~~ While fighting continued among the Albu Issa subtribes in the Amariyah area, as we have seen, divisions also emerged among the Minasil and Oaasat subtribes in Karmah that resulted in some of the tribesmen turning against the 1.4b AQI fighters and their Fuhaylat allies. This was a significant development because the leaders of the Oaasat subtribe were bigoted xenophobes who hated Shi'a and Kurds and so had been receptive to AQI propaganda in the past.[863]

Approved for Release

[858] [| Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[859] [| Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[860] [| Military | 09 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060909 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[861] [| Military | 04 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[862] [| Military | 04 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[863] [| Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Fallujah

~~(S)~~ Although the Fallujah AQI cells remained without an amir, (b)(6) served as a high-ranking AQI leader for the group throughout the greater Fallujah area, even surpassing (b)(6). He had previously been detained by the Coalition at Bucca Prison, but was released on July 8, 2006 and resumed his participation in the insurgency. Organizing multiple VBIED attacks against Coalition targets, (b)(6) sought to unite as many other insurgent groups as possible under AQI's banner with the assistance of (b)(6) (b)(6). Operating from the Ahmad Garage Complex in Sitcher village, (b)(6) coordinated vehicle theft activity and manufactured VBIEDs.[864]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) was one of the primary financiers of AQI in Fallujah. A former lieutenant to Jolan district amir (b)(6) led with his superior to 1.4b following Operation AL FAJR to evade capture. After (b)(6) was captured by the Coalition in December 2005, (b)(6) assumed charge of his operations, basing himself in a village outside 1.4b where he received $90,000 payments from tribal and religious figures who worked for Islamic NGOs. One of (b)(6) primary contacts was (b)(6) who dispersed money to (b)(6) from (b)(6) then had this money returned to various AQI cells in Fallujah to cover the purchase of vehicles and weapons.[865]

~~(S)~~ Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi al-Halbusi was another financier, facilitator, and operational planner for a network of AQI cells in Fallujah, Saqlawiyah, Amariyah, Habbaniyah, and Karmah, using a corrupt Fallujah police officer to facilitate weapons shipments into the Nazal district of the city. Through his ties to members of the Mujahideen Shura Council, Sheikh Abdallah was able to plan and carry out complex attacks against Iraqi police and army officers in the Fallujah area.[866]

~~(S)~~ To combat AQI a group of one hundred Sunnis agreed to form a non-sectarian militia with the intention of removing AQI and foreign fighters from the city. Many of the members of this group were formerly members or supporters of the Sheikh Hamza al-Issawi Brigade, which had dissolved soon after the reassignment of Fallujah police chief Brigadier General Salah to Baghdad. Members of the militia requested that the Coalition supply it with weapons, vehicles, and salaries so that they could continue the fight against AQI.[867]

~~(S)~~ The split in the Albu Issa tribe between pro and anti-AQI factions continued to affect the Fallujah area. In the al-Nasaf area southwest of Fallujah, as many as 500 Albu Issa tribesmen loyal to AQI set up checkpoints throughout the Albu Issa tribal area to search for members of the pro-Coalition Albu Alwan tribe as well as pro-Coalition subtribes of the Albu Issa.[868]

~~(S)~~ Corruption within the Iraqi army hindered security efforts in the Fallujah area. Commanding General Khalid Juad Khadum of 2nd Brigade of the 1st Iraqi Army Division engaged in fraudulent

[864] [| Military | 09 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061009 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[865] [| Military | 15 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061015 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[866] [| Military | 04 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060904 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[867] [| Military | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[868] [| Military | 17 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061017 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

recordkeeping, embezzling, counterfeiting, racketeering, weapons facilitation for Mahdi Army, and theft solely for profit. In addition, General Khadum used his access to Coalition fuel stores to steal fuel from Camp Fallujah and resell it in Abu Ghraib for money.[869]

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile Sheikh Abdullah Janabi associate Sheikh Abd al-Sattar Abbas Hudafa agreed to help Brigadier General Salah Khalil Hammadi keep the Fallujah police safe in return for an agreement that he would remain in power and receive a regular shipment of weapons. The two men had maintained a personal and professional relationship during the time that Salah had served on the Fallujah city council. After Salah was transferred to Baghdad in the summer of 2006 (see Chapter 6b) that agreement became irrelevant. Instead, Sheikh Abd al-Sattar forwarded money and weapons to the Albu Issa tribe to assist them in their fight against AQI, though he still regarded Coalition forces as "crusaders" involved in a conspiracy against Islam and sanctioned attacks against them.[870]

Amariyah

~~(S)~~ So bad had the situation in Amariyah become by the end of September 2006 that when Fallujah district police chief (b)(6) went to visit the Iraqi police stations in Amariyah and Ferris Town he was met by the sheikhs of five subtribes in the area who threatened to pull their support for the police. The attacks on the Iraqi police and their supporters in Amariyah and Ferris Town were now far more complex than they had ever been before, with 200 AQI fighters arrayed against them from their base in the Fuhaylat village and more than 500 in the Zobai tribal area. These AQI fighters were armed with heavy weapons, anti-aircraft artillery, and PKCs and had successfully augmented their numbers by recruiting from local criminal elements.[871]

~~(S)~~ Help was, however, on the way. Although most Anbar Revolutionaries targeted AQI leaders in Ramadi, a number of fighters shifted their focus toward Amariyah using the same well-established lines of communication that AQI had set up along the Euphrates River between Habbaniyah, Fallujah, Amariyah, and Yusufiyah. One such riverside AQI node was located at (b)(6) (b)(6) home in Subayhat village where (b)(6) cell of 10-15 AQI fighters with charged with watching kidnap victims for AQI cells in Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Karmah for AQI regional amir Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi Salih al-Halbusi.[872]

~~(S)~~ Many of the AQI fighters that now operated in Ramadi had been organized in the area between Amariyah and Yusufiyah, where they had been organized in the hundreds by the spring of 2006. The historic ties of AQI fighters to the Amariyah area meant that the group intended for some of its elements to relocate there were they ever pushed out of Ramadi by the Anbar Revolutionaries or the Coalition.[873]

~~(S)~~ Sheikh Abdallah's AQI network stretched from Ramadi to Yusufiyah continued to facilitate kidnapping, weapons storage, smuggling, and attacks on nearby cities. Kidnapping victims from as far afield as Baghdad were held in AQI safe houses between Amariyah and the Euphrates River

[869] [| Military | 26 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[870] [| Military | 16 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060916 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[871] [| Military | 27 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060927 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[872] [| Military | 10 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061010 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[873] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

before being transported to additional holding locations north and south of the town. AQI weapons caches north of Amariyah and south Fallujah were also transported using the same network and used to support ongoing AQI activities in Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, and Karmah.[874]

Nasser Wa Salaam

~~(S)~~ In the Nasser wa Salaam area, (b)(6) (b)(6) was the mid-level leader for AQI and former members of 1920 Revolution Brigade. (b)(6) alliance with the former 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters was due to his association with (b)(6), a former Iraqi counter-intelligence officer who was now supported by (b)(6) the primary AQI financier for the area between Nasser wa Salaam and Baghdad. (b)(6) also received financial support from his contacts in 1.4b [75]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) maintained too connections with AMS through (b)(6) and 1920 Revolution Brigade spokesman (b)(6) While (b)(6) was the secretary-general of AMS, he was also imam of the Umm al-Qura Mosque in Baghdad and used his position in AMS and as imam of the mosque to provide logistical support to (b)(6) network as part of the effort by AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups to strengthen their network coordination between cells operating in Anbar, Salahaddin, Baghdad, Nineveh, and al-Tamim provinces.[876]

Zaidon

~~(S)~~ There was very little information from Zaidon in the autumn of 2006, almost certainly because it had fallen so far under AQI influence. AQI leader (b)(6) conducted mortar and rocket attacks against Coalition and Iraqi military installations in the vicinity of Fallujah, planning and coordinating mortar attacks in Zaidon, Fallujah, Fuhaylat, and Saddamiyah. Abu Hamza's fighters were trained to fire mortars in Zaidon by (b)(6) [877]

Al-Shubaihat

~~(S)~~ In the small village of al-Shubaihat, AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) received munitions shipments from 1.4b agents that were intended to help prolong the insurgency in Iraq. While cooperation between 1.4b agents and AQI fighters might seem odd given the latter group's pronounced anti-Shi'a views, the 1.4b agents had apparently reached an agreement with at least some AQI leaders in Anbar to supply the group with munitions from southern Iraq. Neither side, however, had any illusions that this relationship was going to last and each made it clear to the other that their disagreements over religion remained and would be settled once the Coalition withdrew from Iraq.[878]

---

[874] Ibid.
[875] [| Military | 20 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[876] Ibid.
[877] [| Military | 23 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061023 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[878] [| Military | 10 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060910 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Hit

~~(S)~~ AQI continued to effectively control fuel distribution at Hit gas stations, with fighters keeping customers orderly in line and distributing a portion of the fuel to residents while saving the remainder for sale on the black market. Because fuel was only delivered sporadically to Hit, residents were desperate to obtain fuel, enabling AQI to sell it at up 700% higher than market value. The Kutayshat subtribe opposed AQI and the two fought several battles for control over of fuel distribution in southern Hit in late August 2006 that resulted in the death of a locally-feared Algerian AQI fighter.[879]

~~(S)~~ Al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal was still active in Hit under the leadership of its founder (b)(6) The nephew of high-ranking Ba'athist and former IIS director (b)(6) had been presumed dead in 2004 but had survived and continued to operate in Hit, Baghdadi, and Nuwayim under the name (b)(6) A one-time member of Hizb al-Awda, Junayd had gradually become radicalized and shifted his loyalty away from the Ba'ath Party to first Ansar al-Sunna and then AQI. Despite this shift in ideologies, (b)(6) targeted the Coalition exclusively and took part in the August 1, 2005 ambush of a 3/25 Sniper Team in Haditha that killed the entire team.[880]

Senjick, Albu Hyatt

~~(S)~~ The Coalition carried out an airstrike against AQI leadership meeting in Senjick, killing AQI leaders Aqaba Nafah Bedawi, Muhannad Jamal Muhammad, and Ahmad al-Sakrari along with six others. As noted previously, Aqaba was a senior AQI leader in the Haditha area while (b)(6) was the leader of an AQI cell in Barwanah. Both prior to and after the death of Aqaba, both Senjick and Albu Hyatt served as a refuge for AQI fighters in the Haditha area. AQI used boats to transport fighters, weapons, and supplies along the Euphrates River. A large number of AQI weapons caches were located in Senjick and Albu Hyatt, with Operation RED BULL and RED BULL II uncovering more than 200 arms caches in the area. Most of these weapons had been recovered as a result of the looting of Dulab after the fall of Saddam Hussein.[881]

~~(S)~~ AQI was able to conduct limited training at a milling facility in Wadi Sakran near Albu Hyatt. This area was particularly favored by AQI because of the absence of a sustained Coalition presence. It provided the group with a refuge where its members could rest, train, and refit with minimal risk due to the rural terrain and complicity of local residents. Wadi Sakran was also connected to the village of East Sakran, which was seventeen kilometers from Barwanah and served as part of a network of villages along the western shore of Lake Thar Thar that facilitated AQI activity between Bayji and the Haditha area. Because it was common knowledge that the Coalition patrolled the main roads into the Haditha area, AQI was able to bypass Coalition checkpoints by smuggling weapons to Wadi Sakran and other rural areas on the eastern shore of the Euphrates River so that they could be distributed by boat throughout the Haditha area.[882]

---

[879] [| Military | 07 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060907 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[880] [| Military | 09 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[881] [| Military | 12 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061012 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[882] [| Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Haditha

~~(S)~~ Since mid-July, senior AQI leaders had been concerned about the formation of a local Iraqi police force in Haditha and had sought to counter it through an escalating campaign against the police. This concern was apparently warranted: since their formation in early August 2006, the Haditha police had successfully apprehended sixty-three suspected insurgent fighters. Relocating from Haditha proper to Sakran, mid- and high-level AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders continued to direct attacks against the Iraqi police in addition to mounting an aggressive propaganda campaign aimed at legitimizing the insurgency.[883]

~~(S)~~ Ansar al-Sunna in the Haditha area was led by Mohammad Flayyih Hassan al-Ma'zid (Abu Radwan, Abu Nur, Abu Aleam, Abu Sayf), who led three cells of roughly one hundred fighters each in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah. Yassir Taha al-Mutna al-Hayan was the leader of the Haditha cell who purchased vehicles to support the group's VBIED attacks, while Abd al-Razzaq al-Jughayfi specialized in IED attacks. Unlike other insurgent groups that relied on criminal or commercial enterprises to fund their activities, Ansar al-Sunna adopted a more rural approach to fundraising in Haditha. The group received some of its finances from 1.4b donors via the sheep smuggler (b)(6) (b)(6), allowing the group a regular shipment of $50-60,000 every 4-5 months.[884]

~~(S)~~ The local AQI leadership in Haditha was under pressure from its provincial superiors to increase attacks in the area and take any action necessary to prevent the establishment of an Iraqi police force. To emphasize the need for this measure, AQI threatened to cut funding to all its allied groups in the Haditha area if they failed to comply with this directive. This was a particularly effective threat given that the unemployment rate in western Anbar ranged from 70-75% in the first half of 2006, leaving AQI with a large pool of potential recruits that it could use to expand operations or replace lackluster fighters.[885]

~~(S)~~ The anti-American al-Zawra'a satellite network released news stories about fictional engagements between Coalition forces and insurgents in Haditha that were widely believed by many semi-educated residents of the area despite the fact that they did not in fact occur.[886]

~~(S)~~ In late September 2006, AQI perpetrated one of the worst atrocities against the Haditha police, beheading ten officers near Bayji while they were on leave including the nineteen year-old brother of Haditha police chief (b)(6)[7] Faruq then recruited volunteers from the Jughayfi, Abu Humayd, and Hayb tribes as well as local bedouin and former SAR insurgent fighters into the Haditha police. His goal was to unite as many of the tribes as possible in order to evict AQI from Haditha by force. The inclusion of the Jughayfi tribesmen was significant because this tribe had a long history of smuggling and other criminal activities in the Haditha area that assisted AQI.[888]

---

[883] [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[884] [| Military | 16 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[885] [| Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[886] [| Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[887] [| Military | 26 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060926 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[888] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Through (b)(6) efforts, about 200 police recruits from Haditha graduated from training in mid-October.[889]

~~(S)~~ Haditha area AQI and Ansar al-Sunna leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) moved to Bayji to avoid capture by the Coalition. This was not surprising, as Haditha area insurgent leaders often fled to Bayji or the small villages north of Lake Thar Thar when fearing capture by the Coalition. This method of escape was first established during Operation RIVERGATE and enabled insurgent fighters to easily disperse from the Haditha area only to return three-four months later.[890]

~~(S)~~ Bayji and the small desert villages west of Lake Thar Thar also served as the primary sites for weapons caches. Goods stolen from tractor trailer trucks in Bayji were used to support the Haditha Mujahideen Shura and there was a regular flow of goods, weapons, and fighters into the Haditha area from Bayji that served as a contributing factor in the increase in AQI activity. Most of the weapons smuggled into the Haditha area from Bayji or Hit were sent to Barwanah, moved along small trails through the desert to avoid Coalition checkpoints.[891]

~~(S)~~ The coordination of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna activities in Haditha, al-Qaim, and Kirkuk was overseen by (b)(6) who may have been the head of the Haditha Mujahideen Shura (see Chapter 6b). While (b)(6) resided in Kirkuk, he also had residences on Huwayji Island near Haditha and in al-Qaim that he traveled to periodically to visit members of his family and local AQI leaders. Through these trips, (b)(6) was able to issue orders and establish himself as a figure of great prominence within AQI. In addition to having been the mayor of Haditha in 2005, (b)(6) had also served as Zarqawi's "war counsel" prior to his death and advised the late AQI leader on virtually all AQI operations in Anbar. He apparently retained this role under (b)(6) rising to the rank of fourth-in-command for AQI.[892]

~~(S)~~ Much of (b)(6) funding came from collecting payroll checks for services that he no longer performed, such as payments for oil protection services from the T-1 company and the K3 oil refinery. (b)(6) was also able to generate a great deal of internal funding through extortion, theft, and ransom demands made against the people of Haditha and the surrounding cities.[893]

~~(S)~~ AQI documents uncovered in a raid included a report stating that the group had met with Haditha mayor Imad Jawad Hamza as well as city council member Abd al-Mutallib Fahkri and head physician (b)(6) on February 22, 2006. As a result of the meeting, Imad agreed to divert to AQI a portion of the $8,000,000 in reconstruction money that had been awarded to Haditha. A former Iraqi air force pilot and Ba'ath Party member, Imad Jawad Hamza's loyalties originally lay with FRE and FRL insurgent groups, but he was forced to become a virtual puppet of AQI in order to become mayor. While Imad did not subscribe to AQI ideology, a detained senior

[889] [| Military | 01 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061001 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[890] [| Military | 04 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061004 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[891] Ibid.
[892] [| Military | 09 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061009 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[893] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

AQI member stated that he did help to broker an agreement between AQI and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in Haditha in November 2005 under which the two movements would pool their resources to evict the Coalition from Haditha. This agreement, like other AQI-SAR relations, became more tenuous as AQI grew more powerful.[894]

~~(S)~~ Imad continued to walk a fine line during his tenure as mayor, allowing AQI access to power and influence in the Haditha area in return for the group's protection and support. In October 2006, however, Imad left Haditha and hid in Bani Dahir, essentially dissolving the local government in Iraq's third largest city. The catalyst for Imad's flight was that the strengthening of the Iraqi police in Haditha had blunted AQI's original plan to infiltrate the police from within. This left Imad in something of a quandary, since he was so closely associated with the Haditha police, even though he had no real control over their campaign against AQI. As a result, AQI murdered several of Imad's assistants and threatened to kill him unless he agreed to rein in the Haditha police.[895]

Haqlaniyah

~~(S)~~ In the nearby town of Haqlaniyah, the Coalition detained former city council member (b)(6) (b)(6) had been involved in facilitating corruption and insurgent activity in Haqlaniyah at least as far back as June 2003. By 2005, he had joined AQI and helped to coordinate the group's propaganda and intelligence activity in Haqlaniyah and Bani Dahir with the support of Haditha mayor Imad.[896]

Barwanah

~~(S)~~ The situation in Barwanah was even worse, with residents unwilling to speak with the Coalition unless faced with the prospect of detention due to AQI's murder and intimidation campaign. The poor security situation allowed for criminal gangs to thrive, with some supportive of the insurgency and others simply taking advantage of the security situation. With the city council no longer meeting, there was no municipal government in Barwanah and residents were too afraid to come to the civil affairs building to address their concerns. Some tribal leaders assisted their tribesmen in resolving small inter-tribal disputes, but otherwise they were little more than figureheads.[897]

~~(S)~~ The Barwanah gas station continued to be run by AQI and Ansar al-Sunna members, who determined who was allowed to purchase gasoline in the city. While the two groups had formerly been involved in a dispute with one another over control of the gas station, by September 2006 they had reached an agreement to divide the profits in half in order to fund their respective activities in Barwanah. By mutually supporting one another, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna were able to make both of their operations more effective in Barwanah. AQI used the gasoline in part to pay local fishermen who helped them to transport fighters and supplies along the Euphrates River.[898]

Approved for Release

---

[894] [| Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[895] Ibid.
[896] [| Military | 18 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060918 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[897] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[898] [| Military | 11 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060911 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ AQI maintained a makeshift training and medical facility capable of housing 15-20 fighters south of Barwanah at the home of (b)(6) Since emergency treatment of AQI fighters for battle injuries at public hospitals was considered risky, members of the group stole medical supplies in addition to foodstuffs and other goods from local commercial routes and used them to treat injured fighters.[899]

Baghdadi

~~(S)~~ Having long sought revenge against Baghdadi police chief (b)(6) AQI fighters led by amir (b)(6) kidnapped, tortured, and murdered three of his cousins, including his first cousin Hussein Allawi Za'ee'lee al-Ubaydi. They were killed in Sahiliyah, an area known for AQI checkpoints. (b)(6) had already attempted to mount an embargo against Baghdadi for its continued support of the 200-strong police force, informing merchants in Haditha that anyone who sold goods in Baghdadi would be killed. AQI now maintained checkpoints in Sahiliyah, Zakikah, and Kasraq areas between Hit and Baghdadi where fighters led by (b)(6) (b)(6) oversaw the killing of Baghdadi police and the intimidation of residents.[900]

~~(S)~~ While the Baghdadi police had been successful at increasing the ability of the Iraqi security forces to control Jubbah, Baghdadi, and Dulab in order to disrupt insurgent capabilities, AQI continued to intimidate and rob Iraqis through its checkpoints between Baghdadi and Hit.[901] The AQI fighters who ran these checkpoints stopped all vehicles and cross-referenced the occupants' ID cards with a list of "collaborators" from the 'Ubaydi and Jubbah tribes. If an occupant was determined to be a "collaborator," they were taken prisoner, interrogated, tortured, and eventually murdered.[902] The activities conducted at these checkpoints intimidated the population, destabilized the area, and were used by AQI as a means to generate revenue for further operation between the two.[903] Food and other basic supplies were unable to reach Baghdadi residents, many of whom had sunk into hopelessness in the belief that the Coalition was unable to secure a 25-30 kilometer stretch of road.[904] As a result, there was an ongoing battle between the Baghdadi police and AQI for influence over the populations of Baghdadi and Jubbah.[905]

~~(S)~~ On October 3, AQI attacked (b)(6) while he was on patrol, injuring him and killing his second-in-command Lieutenant Colonel Salim. AQI attempted to exploit this incident as a propaganda victory to encourage the Baghdadi police to quit, but the survival of (b)(6) encouraged the police not to abandon their posts and to stand firm against AQI murder and intimidation.[906]

~~(S)~~ AQI continued to wage an effective murder and intimidation campaign against Baghdadi residents, maintaining a substantial level of influence over the population despite the earlier success

Approved for Release

---

[899] [| Military | 08 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060908 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[900] [| Military | 10 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060910 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[901] Ibid.
[902] [| Military | 12 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060912 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[903] [| Military | 10 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060910 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[904] [| Military | 12 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060912 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[905] [| Military | 10 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060910 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[906] [| Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

of the police. Local merchants were so intimidated by AQI that they would not do business with the police while they were in uniform. Baghdadi also continued to be plagued by fuel shortages since the only gas station in the town was not operating. Fuel shipments to Baghdadi were intercepted by AQI or stolen from residents by the group.[907]

~~(S)~~ As part of AQI's new emphasis on building popular support, AQI amir (b)(6) (b)(6) (the AQI amir for Baghdadi, Hit, and Dulab) sent his brother (b)(6) to speak with Sheikh Basim Abdullah Hamad Mirhij al-'Ubaydi, who had become the leader of the Albu 'Ubayd tribe in Baghdadi after the death of his father in 2003. (b)(6) told the Sheikh that he would be allowed to import vegetables from Hit to the markets in Baghdadi and Jubbah without fear of interdiction or harassment from AQI. AQI's willingness to negotiate with Sheikh Basim was interesting, because he had supported the rise of the unofficial Baghdadi police under the leadership of (b)(6) and helped them to grow until they posed a serious threat to AQI (see Chapter 6a). In May 2006, Sheikh Basim himself was the target of an AQI suicide bombing.[908]

~~(S)~~ AQI's desire to explore alternative ways to address the group's problem with the largely successful Baghdadi police was due in part to the ability of the group's checkpoints to affect trade in Baghdadi and Jubbah, allowing (b)(6) and his followers to exert influence over the population. As a result, (b)(6) believed that he was in a strong enough position to try and forge a beneficial relationship with Sheikh Basim that would allow him to provide residents with fresh produce (improving both the quality of life and Sheikh Basim's standing within the Albu 'Ubayd tribe) in return for Sheikh Basim agreeing to renounce the Baghdadi police. By establishing economic ties with a successful community leader, the Baghdadi AQI leadership sought to regain the ground that the group had lost in the area with the establishment of the police.[909]

Approved for Release

[907] [| Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061003 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[908] [| Military | 11 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061011 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[909] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Rawah

~~(S)~~ According to documents recovered from a Salafist arms cache near the Euphrates River, AQI displayed an increasing level of sophistication in Rawah, making payments to members of the organization classified as full or part-time fighters, martyrs, and those detained by the Coalition. The primary AQI units in Rawah were 1st through 5th 'Ubaydi Battalions, with full-time members of the 4th and 5th 'Ubaydi Battalions being paid regular salaries, with martyrs and those detained by the Coalition being paid more. The salary of individual AQI members was adjusted to compensate for the longevity of service in the organization as well as the number of dependents. All the pay rosters used abbreviated names or aliases to allow members of AQI to conceal their identities.[910]

~~(S)~~ These 'Ubaydi Battalions apparently formed part of the AQI command and control center known as the Ajjamiyah network. The network, which had its headquarters in Rawah, directed AQI operations in Anah, Bayji, and Ramadi and existed as far back as July 2006. The network cooperated with AQI leader (b)(6) network to facilitate the smuggling of foreign fighters from the 1.4b border to the villages of Samsiyah, Husayniyah, Aumriyah, Ajjamiyah, Mahdyah, and Safrah near Rawah.[911]

~~(S)~~ AQI leader (b)(6) who had formerly been based in Ramadi, was the head of the Ajjamiyah network. (b)(6) was the group's operational leader and (b)(6) was its operations chief. Through these individuals, the network was able to coordinate the actions of AQI cells in Ramadi, Anah, and Bayji through lieutenants active in each city. For security purposes, each cell within the network was unaware of the existence of the others. To preserve the network as well as to adhere to (b)(6) new philosophy of building popular support, AQI operatives in the Rawah-Anah corridor were instructed to provide local business owners with advance warning of attacks and ensure that attacks were carried out in open areas to mitigate the risk of civilian casualties.[912]

Anah

~~(S)~~ By late August 2006, the security situation had grown so dire in Anah that acting head of the city council Ja'arallah Fihan Musikh was ordered by the provincial government in Ramadi to disband the city council for his own safety. The deterioration of the situation in Anah was due in part to the withdrawal of the 4/14 Cavalry for Baghdad, which left the IIP in Anah vulnerable to attack by AQI. Since the Anah city council was responsible for addressing municipal and political issues in Anah, the absence of the council further stalled economic and government services improvement in the beleaguered town.[913]

~~(S)~~ In early September, some AQI fighters relocated from Ramadi to Anah via Rawah in the belief that the Coalition was preparing a major operation against the city. The milling areas in and around Anah housed many of these insurgents, with the primary AQI command and control nodes

[910] [| Military | 16 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061016 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[911] [| Military | 17 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061017 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[912] Ibid.
[913] [| Military | 13 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060913 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

operating out of the villages of Ajjamiyah and Bubiyah. Within Anah proper, the insurgents were concentrated in the Sishan section of the town, which was used as a base for kidnapping and vehicle theft operations against pro-Coalition residents of al-Qaim.[914]

~~(S)~~ Hopes that the dissolution of the IIP in Anah would end the violence in the city were short-lived. AQI fighters wearing *yashmagh*s patrolled the city, intimidating residents and threatening to kill them. Despite the fact that the IIP had met AQI's demands, members of the party were still actively targeted by the group to prevent it from reconstituting. The Shishon district was the center of AQI activity in Anah, and most of the fighters in the district were Iraqi AQI members from further west in Anbar who had been displaced from their homes in towns like Husaybah during the course of 2005.[915]

Al-Qaim

~~(S)~~ The major driving factor in al-Qaim remained the fight between the Albu Mahal and AQI. AQI leader (b)(6) attempted to open negotiations with Albu Mahal tribal leader Sheikh Sabah in 1.4b requesting that Albu Mahal police officers resign in order to allow AQI operatives access to Husaybah as an organization point. (b)(6) goal was to form a AQI cell called "the Assault Unit" to conduct operations in Husaybah using VBIEDs, IEDs, and assassinations to break the will of the Iraqi police and Iraqi army in the city. While he negotiated with the Albu Mahal on behalf of AQI, (b)(6) secretly planned to target the tribe in any event because they had opposed AQI.[916]

~~(S)~~ The involvement of an AQI leader as high-ranking as (b)(6) in these sorts of negoatiations was rather unusual and indicative of the efforts by (b)(6) to build up popular support for AQI. Sheikh Sabah, however, was far from impressed since he stood to benefit from continued Albu Mahal participation in the Iraqi government in Husaybah. To accept (b)(6) offer would be to allow AQI the opportunity to regain power in al-Qaim, resulting in a loss of power by the Albu Mahal.[917]

~~(S)~~ This attempt at negotiations must be contrasted with the September 9 kidnapping, by AQI fighters, of Sheikh Umran of the Umm Qarah Mosque in Husaybah. Despite his anti-Coalition rhetoric and sermons about the triumph of Islam over Christianity, Sheikh Umran was targeted because he had sent a warning to AQI to stop dumping the bodies and body parts of the group's victims into the Euphrates River because it provided water to the people of Husaybah.[918]

~~(S)~~ Al-Qaim regional council economic advisor and IIP member (b)(6) served as an asset for 1.4b ntelligence, passing information back to 1.4b and AQI through Abd al-Ayish al-

Approved for Release

[914] [| Military | 05 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060905 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[915] [| Military | 03 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060910 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[916] [| Military | 07 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060907 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[917] Ibid.
[918] [| Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6) an AQI operative who financed one of the group's cells in Husaybah through smuggling.[919]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) top lieutenant in al-Qaim was (b)(6) his chief representative for all of western Anbar and responsible for transporting weapons and foreign fighters from al-Qaim to the Haditha area. (b)(6) who had now relocated to Kirkuk, facilitated many of (b)(6) activities in Haditha, Bayji, and Kirkuk.[920]

~~(S)~~ The communities around al-Qaim were also slowly being penetrated by AQI once again. Karabilah police chief (b)(6) was detained along with five other police for involvement in AQI activities. He had allowed AQI to use his home as a safe haven and encouraged his subordinates to listen to AQI propaganda while on duty. (b)(6) also used his position to protect his son (b)(6) who headed an AQI IED cell in Karabilah. To prevent the Coalition from learning of his activities, (b)(6) largely detained only low-level AQI fighters as well as random civilians.[921]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) served as the AQI leader and primary facilitator for the Husaybah-Sharqiyah area. (b)(6) second eldest son (b)(6) was responsible for coordinating mortar and missile attacks against Camp Habbaniyah, conducting mortar, RPG, SAF, and IED attacks against Coalition patrols, facilitating the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq, and overseeing the AQI murder and intimidation campaign. One of Umar's top financiers was the (b)(6) (b)(6) the former head of an IIS unit in Tikrit under Saddam Hussein.[922]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) of the Kothar gas station in Husaybah-Sharqiyah was an associate of (b)(6) (b)(6) who used his gas station to support the AQI, though by October 2006 he had been stripped of AQI membership due to his involvement in the kidnapping of local children. Kothar gas station owner (b)(6) who had formerly served as a corrupt judge in Tarmiah also supported AQI.[923]

Rutbah

~~(S)~~ By mid-August 2006, the AQI leadership had appointed (b)(6) (b)(6) as the new amir for Rutbah, believing that he could revive AQI activities in the town because of his track record of successful kidnappings and beheadings of Rutbah residents. Upon assuming his position, (b)(6) accused AQI leaders in Rutbah of delinquency and urged them to increase the level of attacks, kidnappings, and robbery in the town. Cultivating (b)(6) (b)(6) as his deputies, (b)(6) escalated the level of kidnapping and vehicle theft along rest stops and gas stations along the highway.[924]

[919] [| Military | 03 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060903 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[920] [| Military | 09 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061009 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[921] [| Military | 15 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061015 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[922] [| Military | 17 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061017 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[923] [| Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[924] [| Military | 06 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060906 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ The AQI associate organization Abu Sarah Group was active between Rutbah and the Waleed border crossing, mostly engaging in criminal and vehicle theft. Despite being a primarily criminal organization, the Abu Sarah Group murdered any Shi'a its members encountered. The Abu Sarah Group had connections to the al-Hamdani tribe, which itself had multiple connections to AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and the Islamic Army of Iraq.[925] The Abu Sarah network was led by (b)(6) (b)(6) until his capture by the Coalition on October 24.[926]

Signs of Weakness within AQI

Lack of Spiritual Guidance

~~(S)~~ Despite these clear signs of AQI consolidating its power across Anbar. There were other events and issues that suggested all was not well with the organization. The death of AQI spiritual leader Sheikh Abd al-Rahman on June 7 created a vacuum in AQI's strategic, ideological and religious guidance that proved difficult for (b)(6) to fill. In August 2006, (b)(6) requested the appointment of a religious advisor from AQSL, perhaps as a sign of their support for him as well as of his obeisance to their leadership. As a result, AQSL members (b)(6) (a recognized Islamic scholar) and (b)(6) traveled to Iraq from 1.4b on September 23 to provide critical religious and strategic guidance to the AQI senior leadership in preparation for a new wave of AQI attacks between September and October 2006.[927]

~~(S)~~ The absence of spiritual leadership may have hindered AQI's decision-making process. Like Soviet commissars, religious leaders within groups like AQI ensured ideological purity and unity, and their absence could create at least temporary confusion over motivation and ultimate goals. In this particular instance, the result of no religious leadership within AQI was to prevent a reconciliation of AQI's tactics with the global objectives of AQSL. AQSL believed that targeting fellow Muslims was inappropriate regardless of sectarian difference and that this jeopardized their broader strategic plans to unite the Islamic world against the Coalition presence in Iraq. Meanwhile AQI leadership continued to embrace Zarqawi's strategic legacy of conducting attacks against the Shi'a, although the group now attempted to do so in order to increase Sunni support rather than to simply target Shi'a.[928] Moreover, the absence of religious authority made it very difficult for (b)(6) to organize a cohesive response against emerging anti-AQI Sunni groups such as the Anbar Revolutionaries at a time when he was still struggling to reorient AQI following the death of Zarqawi.

AQI Recruitment of Female Fighters

~~(S)~~ AQI also took the somewhat bizarre step of forming a branch of female fighters for its organization in al-Qaim under the leadership of (b)(6) While the use of women as suicide bombers or participating in AQI facilitation was not uncommon in Anbar, (b)(6) group also

Approved for Release

[925] [|Military | 19 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060919 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[926] [| Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[927] [| Military | 26 Sep 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20060926 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[928] [| Military | 05 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061005 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

appears to have been involved in the fighting at a street level, contributing fighters to AQI operations in Anah in early October.[929]

~~(S)~~ The decision to incorporate females into AQI was made by Zarqawi prior to his death, a decision that (b)(6) supported and sought to exploit in order to use females as fighters, suicide bombers, and smuggling facilitators. AQI's major limitation regarding its use of female operatives, however, lay in its ability to recruit them. While the use of female operatives by AQI remained relatively uncommon for this reason, they continued to be employed by the group as couriers and suicide bombers.[930]

(U) Because there are clear prohibitions in the hadith and Islamic law against women participating in warfare, their appearance in jihads around the world (e.g. Chechnya) is generally a signal of weakness within the insurgency. The use of women in al-Qaim in particular, suggests that AQI was having difficulty recruiting men for their fight in this area.

AQI's Use of Child Soldiers

~~(S)~~ The use of children in warfare suggests a similar problem for AQI as a whole. Since early 2006, a number of insurgent groups (including Ansar al-Sunna, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh Muhammad, and particularly AQI) had been recruiting young teenagers (12-17 years old) to conduct small attacks, such as planting IEDs. By October 2006, AQI recruiters were regularly visiting Anbar high schools to recruit students willing to participate in the insurgency for money. In general, AQI targeted poor teenagers who could be enticed by cheap thrills and even cheaper wages. The money earned from aiding the insurgency provided these poor teenagers with all the motives needed to carry out attacks, particularly when their families lacked sufficient sources of income.[931]

~~(S)~~ AQI recruiting efforts for these teenagers included paying them a lump sum of $27 per operation with the option of earning a monthly salary of up to $400. This recruitment may have been motivated by the belief that the Coalition would not suspect that teenagers would be assisting AQI, but it may also have been another indication of weakness, since recruiting children for operations is typically a sign of poor recruitment of military aged males within an insurgency. To ensure the compliance of the recruits, AQI operatives intimidated and coerced members of their family if they did not comply with their assigned tasks. For instance, AQI coerced the student body and faculty of a Ramadi high school into leaving the school in order to create a greater pool of teenagers from which to recruit.[932]

~~(S)~~ Teenagers recruited by AQI were generally used for menial tasks that did not require much skill or sophisticated training, such as the placement of IEDs, surveillance of prospective targets, or early warning operations. In the Haditha area, teenage recruits were used to conduct IDF and small arms fire attacks against Coalition forces. Other teenagers in Fallujah and Rawah were coerced or deceived by AQI into becoming suicide bombers, just as occurred in Mosul and Baghdad. Some Iraqi AQI members were even radicalized enough to recruit their own children to use as suicide

[929] [| Military | 29 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061029 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[930] [| Military | 06 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[931] [| Military | 16 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061016 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[932] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

bombers. While the examples of the latter occurring were rare and extreme cases, they underscored the level of religious extremism that was now dominant within the membership of AQI.[933]

Continued Developments Within Anti-AQI Forces (October)

The SAA Is Created

~~(S/NF)~~ In early October, the Anbar Emergency Council renamed itself the Anbar Salvation Front (the SAA) and continued its efforts to obtain sanction from the Iraqi central government for its activities. Prime Minister Maliki, Vice President Tariq Hashemi, and Governor Mamoun responded with an effort to form another tribal council made up of IIP members. This was not altogether surprising, since Governor Mamoun was a member of the IIP and Vice President Hashemi's was the leader of the party. The result was a series of meetings between Maliki, Mamoun, and Hashemi with IIP members of the Albu Alwan, Albu Fahd, and Albu Issa tribes that Hashemi held up as an IIP tribal council that negated the need for the SAA. The SAA responded with a respectful letter to Prime Minister Maliki stating that they had no intention of "joining hands" with the IIP and particularly with Governor Mamoun and stressed that their goal was to fight AQI, not take part in politics. To illustrate their point, the SAA held rallies to highlight their anti-AQI activities as well as their frustration with Governor Mamoun.[934]

~~(S/NF)~~ When Prime Minister Maliki did meet with representatives of the SAA, he stated that Governor Mamoun told him that Ramadi's public services were functional, that security was prevailing throughout Anbar, and that his efforts to expel AQI from the provincial capital were succeeding. Maliki also stated his intention to open dialogue with the Anbar Central Council members in 1.4b who were on good terms with the Iraqi political establishment, rather than with the SAA.[935]

~~(S/NF)~~ It appeared that Iraqi politics would once again trump common sense. Both Vice President Hashemi and Governor Mamoun took a personal interest in the IIP conflict with AQI, but they were also committed to mitigating any political challenges to IIP dominance. While AQI certainly posed a larger threat to the Anbari political establishment than the SAA, IIP politicians were pleased over the killing of AQI leaders by the SAA's military wing and now saw the Salvation Front as the greater challenge to their authority. As for the SAA, its leaders' claims that they were above politics was not quite honest, since the group appeared to regard Governor Mamoun and the Anbar provincial government as only slightly less of a menace to Anbari society as that posed by AQI.[936]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite these developments, success against AQI was in the interest of both the SAA and the national government, and the SAA's activities and the positive media coverage they generated were already leading to imitators and offshoots in neighboring provinces such as Babil. Attempts by the IIP to marginalize the SAA from politics only served to alienate the group from the government,

Approved for Release

933 Ibid.
934 [| Military | 09 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061009 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
935 Ibid.
936 Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

while attempts by the SAA to remove Governor Mamoun were not going to be embraced by the national government.[937]

~~(S)~~ In an effort to reconcile the SAA and the provincial government, the Coalition facilitated an October 10 meeting at Camp Ramadi between Governor Mamoun and Sheikh Abdul Sattar. Prior to the meeting, al-Iraqiyya Television broadcast footage of an SAA rally that was intended to send a message to Governor Mamoun of the SAA's level of dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government. At the rally, Sheikh Abdul Sattar denounced efforts by Vice President Tariq Hashemi to set up an alternative pro-IIP tribal organization, stating that the IIP did not represent anyone in Anbar but its members, party, and leadership. Given this context, there were many heated words exchanged at the meeting, yet common ground was found in the two men's shared desire to oppose AQI. Governor Mamoun attempted to make it clear to Sheikh Abdul Sattar that he regarded him as a valid partner in establishing security in Anbar and went to great lengths to distance himself from the IIP. The meeting concluded with a mutual agreement for the provincial government and the SAA to cooperate in reconstruction and security efforts.[938]

~~(S/NF)~~ The meeting between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and Governor Mamoun helped to ease the concerns of Iraqi police officials in Anbar, many of whom feared that they might have to choose sides in the event of a power struggle between the two men. Senior police officials correctly believed that SAA would almost certainly prevail in such a struggle since they had the support of the Ramadi police and all their tribal leaders.[939]

~~(S/NF)~~ Governor Mamoun's distancing himself from the IIP at the meeting ingratiated him to the SAA, but it also carried with it the risk that Vice President Hashemi would remove him from office and replace him with a more partisan IIP member. A consummate politician, Governor Mamoun believed that he had an understanding with the Anbar IIP leadership that if the party was to have a future in the province that some compromise with the opposition was required. The result of the meeting between the two sides was a cessation of accusations of ineptitude against Governor Mamoun and of ulterior motives against Sheikh Abdul Sattar.[940]

~~(S)~~ Nevertheless, some tensions between the SAA and Governor Mamoun continued. This was illustrated in the controversy over the potential appointment of Sa'ad Hamad Sharqi al-Alwani as the first mayor of Ramadi. Governor Mamoun insisted that Sa'ad had to join the IIP if he wanted to be involved in the Ramadi municipal government. Sa'ad refused because he did not accept the group's Islamist platform and believed many of its leaders to be corrupt. As a result, no mayor of Ramadi was appointed and Sa'ad became an ally of Sheikh Abdul Sattar, introducing him to other community leaders in Ramadi.[941]

~~(S/NF)~~ Politics aside, the SAA continued its fight against AQI through the Anbar Revolutionaries. On the same day of the meeting, members of the group's militia drawn from the Albu Ali Jassim

[937] Ibid.
[938] [| Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[939] Ibid.
[940] Ibid.
[941] [|Military | 15 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061015 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

tribe seized an AQI weapons cache, killing the AQI fighters and turning the weapons over to the Coalition. By the end of October, the Anbar Revolutionaries had killed nearly forty AQI fighters, including the brothers Salam and Ra'ad al-Kubaysi who had coordinated the establishment of checkpoints to capture or kill Iraqi police or Shi'a. On the evening of October 12, the Anbar Revolutionaries attacked a contingent of AQI fighters along the Ramadi highway, leading to the capture of thirteen AQI fighters and recovery of eight stolen trucks.[942]

~~(S)~~ The continued success of the Anbar Revolutionaries enabled the group to absorb several smaller anti-AQI vigilante groups through negotiations with its SAA political wing. Among these was the Secret Army, a vigilante group made up of off-duty Iraqi police officers.[943] The leadership of (b)(6) (b)(6) also encouraged tribal leaders in the Jazira area to screen prospective police recruits from their tribes for possible AQI infiltrators.[944]

~~(S)~~ Indicative of SAA's efforts are statements by Sheikh Abu Farris, Sheikh Abu Yassir, and Sheikh Abu Sattar, tribal leaders from the vicinity of the Waleed border crossing, who informed the Coalition after attending a meeting of the SAA that they were willing to do everything in their power to help (b)(6) and General Saber against AQI. Soon afterwards, a chapter of the Anbar Revolutionaries was established in Rutbah and began threatening local members of AQI.[945]

~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(6) was also aware of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's growing fortunes. After the meeting with Governor Mamoun, (b)(6) sent Sheikh Abdul Sattar a warning that he had one month to support AQI in Anbar or he would be killed. Sheikh Abdul Sattar responded that (b)(6) should order his followers to leave Anbar or they would be killed.[946] AQI also engaged in black propaganda efforts to disrupt cooperation between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and Governor Mamoun, distributing fliers purported to be from the Anbar Revolutionaries that threatened to kill IIP members unless they renounced their party membership.[947]

Brigadier General Hamid

~~(S)~~ The SAA gained a major political victory in early October 2006 when Brigadier General Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa was appointed Anbar police chief for a 90-day trial period. A respected sheikh from the Albu Dhiab tribe, Brigadier General Hamid had been a senior member of the Anbar Revolutionaries since their formation, had attended the initial meetings of the Anbar Emergency Council, and was a senior member of the SAA's military coordination committee that oversaw the planning and execution of the Anbar Revolutionaries' anti-AQI committee. A political moderate, Hamid supported compromise with the IIP and the provincial government to achieve the group's security objectives.

Approved for Release

[942] [| Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[943] [| Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[944] [| Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[945] [| Military | 15 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061015 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[946] Ibid.
[947] [| Military | 20 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ Hamid had been considered for the position of Anbar police chief in December 2005 and had planned to order the recall of all Anbar police officers and the reopening of their police stations had he been given the position. Any officers that failed to show up for duty would have been fired and their replacements selected on the basis of the recommendations from tribal and city leaders. Hamid had also been involved in the December 2005 Iraqi elections while still a colonel, serving as the chairman of the Independent Iraqi Election Commission for the Albu Dhiab tribal area.[948]

~~(S)~~ While it would not be hard for Hamid to be better than his predecessors given their unimpressive if not criminal track records, his affiliation with the SAA and its military wing Anbar Revolutionaries led to friction with Governor Mamoun and the provincial council. The Iraqi interior ministry's decision to grant Sheikh Abdul Sattar permission to "destroy terrorism" in Anbar was regarded by tribal and city leaders outside of Ramadi as an attempt by Sheikh Abdul Sattar to usurp their authority.[949]

SAA Consolidates Support

~~(S/NF)~~ To solicit the support of the Anbar Central Council for the SAA's effort to fight AQI, Sheikh Abdul Sattar's brother (b)(6) contacted a senior member of the former group. The Anbar Central Council responded that it would support anti-AQI efforts but not what it regarded as the SAA's efforts to usurp the legitimate provincial government of Anbar. In an effort to gain the Anbar Central Council's support, (b)(6) told his contact that he was empowered by the office of the prime minister to help the Council nominate 3,000 individuals for employment in the First and Seventh Divisions of the Iraqi army in Anbar. While the Council was still lukewarm on the SAA, they agreed to meet in early November 2006 to discuss his offer. When combined with the Iraqi interior decision to appoint Brigadier General Hamid as the new provincial police chief, the discussions between Ahmad and the Anbar Central Council were part of the growing indications that the Shi'a-led Iraqi government, the Amman-based Anbar Central Council, and the IIP-dominated provincial government were all increasingly inclined to cooperate with the SAA.[950]

~~(S)~~ With one of their leaders now in charge of Anbar police, the Anbar Revolutionaries began setting up a mechanism under which AQI members could surrender to authorities by turning themselves in at the Jazira police station, giving up their weapons, and returning to their homes with the understanding that they would not be given a second chance to surrender if they were encountered again on the battlefield. The Jazira police personnel were all drawn from the Albu Assaf, Albu Ali Jassim, and Albu Dhiab tribes, all of which were represented in the SAA.[951]

~~(S/NF)~~ With the Anbar Revolutionaries now operating openly as the military wing of the SAA, the group threatened to kill anyone caught moving Coalition checkpoints. Ramadi residents were actively encouraged by the group to assist the Coalition in the hope that the Coalition would openly support the Anbar Revolutionaries against AQI. As part of this effort to legitimize itself, the Anbar

Approved for Release

[948] [| Military | 13 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061013 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[949] Ibid.
[950] [| Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[951] [| Military | 20 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Revolutionaries' leadership went to great pains to apprehend suspected AQI fighters and turn them over to the Coalition instead of having them shot on sight.[952]

Operation QATIAT ALMAZ (October 13-19)

~~(S)~~ The Coalition was doing its part to disrupt AQI as well. In response to the rise of AQI activity in Anah, the Coalition and Iraqi forces mounted Operation QATIAT ALMAZ with the goal of restoring securing to the town. The operation resulted in the capture of AQI leader (b)(6) (b)(6), though Mujahideen Shura Council member and AQI's Rawah-Anah corridor amir Abu Abdallah al-Hanbali managed to escape to 'Ubaydi. An associate of (b)(6) had coordinated attacks against Coalition forces in Husaybah, 'Ubaydi, Anah, and Rawah.[953]

~~(S)~~ The immediate effect of Operation QATIAT ALMAZ was to restore a sense of security in Anah and most residents welcomed the Coalition. The overriding concern among residents, however, was that the Coalition would soon leave and in so doing abandon the population to face AQI's wrath. While former Iraqi police were willing to return to duty and ten to sixteen tribal leaders were active in the city, most of these tribes numbered as few as one hundred members and most the town's notables were waiting to see what happened before they committed themselves. Anah city council member Jarallah Fihan Musikh was very upbeat about the situation in the city, but he cautioned the Coalition that residents still feared they would leave, allowing AQI to return and seek vengeance against them. As a result, while Anah residents were now hopeful for the future of their city, they remained neutral towards openly supporting the Coalition until they were confident that security had been restored.[954]

~~(S)~~ With the successful degradation of AQI in Anah due to Operation QATIAT ALMAZ, the IIP reemerged in the town and more than one hundred current and former IIP members began arming themselves to travel to Rawah and fight AQI. While these IIP members were not pro-Coalition, they sought Coalition support in evicting AQI from Rawah in the belief that they could regain their status as the dominant political party in the region.[955]

Ansar al-Sunna Relations with AQI

~~(S)~~ In the meantime, AQI's closest ally Ansar al-Sunna was rethinking its ties with the larger insurgent group. Following the theft of Ansar al-Sunna weapons, munitions, and money by members of AQI in Haditha, senior leaders of Ansar al-Sunna in the Haditha area agreed to meet with leaders of the 1920 Revolution Brigade and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party to discuss how AQI's brutal murder and intimidation campaign had tarnished popular support for the insurgency and threatened the groups' international images as popular resistance organizations. The catalyst for the Ansar al-Sunna attendance at this meeting was an earlier September 2006 meeting of the Haditha Mujahideen Shura to discuss a common strategy for defeating the Coalition. The meeting was a failure due to the arrogance of the AQI representatives and created a rift between a number of SAR groups and AQI.

Approved for Release

[952] Ibid.
[953] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[954] Ibid.
[955] [| Military | 07 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

While Ansar al-Sunna did not break with AQI in Haditha, it did reinvigorate its propaganda campaign in Haditha and Haqlaniyah as part of an effort to retain its independence.[956]

~~(S)~~ Not all Ansar al-Sunna leaders were so sanguine about cooperation with AQI. By early October 2006, Ansar al-Sunna's military and medical support chief (b)(6) and religious advisor (b)(6) drew up a written document that concluded that AQI was losing its base of support among Iraqi Islamists, and that AQI followed a Takfiri ideology contrary to that of Ansar al-Sunna. He also noted that AQI disagreed with Ansar al-Sunna's view that suicide bombings should only be used in extreme circumstances such as an opportunity to assassinate senior Iraqi officials.[957]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) therefore sought to open a dialogue with the Coalition despite a lack of success at the group's earlier attempts to use intermediaries in 1.4b (b)(6) and (b)(6) were now prepared to draw up terms for a full cessation of hostility between the Coalition and Ansar al-Sunna and were even considering entering into negotiations with their long-time enemy President Jalal Talabani. Elements of Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Saraya Jaysh al-Islami all expressed similar interest in joining Ansar al-Sunna's negotiations, believing that 1.4b was now a greater threat to Iraq than the Coalition. It should be noted that both (b)(6) and (b)(6) had long been critical of Ansar al-Sunna's alliance with AQI, with (b)(6) producing a formal study as far back as 2004 intended to document the evils of working with AQI. (b)(6) meanwhile (falsely) claimed that Ansar al-Sunna did not share AQI's philosophy of fighting the United States or participating in global jihad.[958]

~~(S)~~ The sentiments of (b)(6) ran counter to the policies of Ansar al-Sunna leader (b)(6) who had been willing to align with AQI despite their differences at least as far back as late February 2006. Exploiting the anger of Ansar al-Sunna leaders in the Haditha area, (b)(6) were able to destroy the relationship between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in Haditha.[959]

AQI's Cross-Provincial Ties and the Creation of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq

AQI Transit Between Anbar and Salahaddin

~~(S)~~ Despite these clear signals that not everything was going its way, AQI continued to act as if it were still in control of events in Anbar. With the approach of winter, Saqlawiyah-based 1.4b AQI leader (b)(6) led his group of forty fighters to the Saddamiyyah area around Lake Thar Thar while he prepared to assume a position of greater authority in Salahaddin province. (b)(6) and his followers had been responsible for mortar, IED, and VBIED attacks, assassination, vehicle theft, fuel smuggling, and money laudering.[960]

Approved for Release

---

[956] [| Military | 16 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061016 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[957] [| Military | 25 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061025 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[958] Ibid.
[959] Ibid.
[960] [| Military | 18 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061018 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ There were strong ties between the AQI organizations in Anbar and Salahaddin province. Much the profit made off of oil smuggled from the Bayji refinery and sold on the Anbar black market was used to finance VBIED attacks in both Anbar and Salahaddin. AQI senior leader (b)(6) (b)(6) network spanned all the way from al-Qaim into Haditha, Bayji, and Kirkuk. The AQI presence in Kirkuk was supported by AQI networks in Anbar that extended into 1.4b Salahaddin, and al-Tamim. AQI leader (b)(6) also continued to maintain his network of contacts with other cell leaders in Salahaddin.[961]

~~(S)~~ The AQI network based in Anbar stretched across Salahaddin, al-Tamim, and Nineveh provinces. This network enabled fighters to transit rapidly from one area to another with little difficulty. For instance, in response to Operation RIVERGATE AQI shifted from Hit to Bayji and the small villages north of Lake Thar Thar in order to escape Coalition pressure. AQI leaders were also able to transit rapidly between Rutbah, Ramadi, Haditha and Bayji. After Coalition pressure was reduced, the AQI fighters generally returned to their point of origin. Following the Askariyya bombing, AQI fighters traveled to Baghdad province in an effort to support other AQI and other Sunni elements fighting against Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.[962]

~~(S)~~ Since the Mahdi Army's offensive against AQI now extended into Salahaddin province, the AQI leadership believed that its network north of Baghdad was under threat and was transferring experienced fighters from Anbar to address it. As a result, the pattern of AQI movement from Anbar and into Salahaddin was both to confront and avoid potential threats. This was because AQI believed that the area between Samarra and Lake Thar Thar had a lower level of Coalition activity that would give the group more freedom to conduct operations while it fought against Mahdi Army efforts to expand its operations into the Sunni Triangle.[963]

AQI Support in Anbar from Southern Iraq

~~(S)~~ AQI also relied on smugglers from the Shurayfat and Zagharid tribes to bring weapons into the province from An Najaf and Karbala through Rahaliyah. From Rahaliyah, the weapons were smuggled by boat across Lake Razzazah (Bahr al-Milh) to Ramadi. AQI's reliance on smugglers in southern Iraq was due to the fact that the group's traditional smuggling routes in western Anbar were becoming increasingly problematic for its networks in eastern Anbar and western Baghdad, forcing them to rely instead on the northern route through Nineveh province. As a result, AQI cells in Fallujah and Ramadi were forced to supplement their operational support using smuggled supplies and fighters from Najaf and Karbala provinces. Although both provinces were largely controlled by Mahdi Army fighters, as in Baghdad some Shi'a arms dealers decided to turn a profit by selling weapons to both Shi'a and Sunni fighters, though no large-scale arms sales occurred.[964]

The Islamic Amirate of Iraq

[961] Ibid.
[962] Ibid.
[963] Ibid.
[964] [| Military | 09 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The ultimate expression of AQI's belief in its future dominance of Iraq came in October. One month earlier, AQSL second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri sent a message to (b)(6) to create the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. In order to demonstrate that the Islamic Amirate was an Iraqi organization rather than a foreign entity that had been forced upon them, al-Zawahiri instructed (b)(6) to appoint an Iraqi leader as the group's amir. As a result, (b)(6) chose native Iraqi Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi to become the amir of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq.[965]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQSL envisioned the Islamic Amirate of Iraq as an entity that would be subordinate to AQI the same way that AQI and JTJ had been subordinate to AQSL. The Mujahideen Shura Council and elements of the formerly SAR insurgent groups that were now loyal to AQI (including Jaysh Muhammad, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Taif al-Mansoura, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Islamic Army of Iraq) were all incorporated into the new Amirate. AQSL also ordered the new state to create a Central Tribal Council that would unite Sunni tribes loyal to AQI against both Shi'a tribes and the SAA. In the same way that Saddam Hussein created and financed sheikhs who were loyal to his regime, AQI intended to support those tribal leaders who agreed to swear *bayat* to Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi as the leader of the new Iraqi state. Many tribal leaders in Anbar and other Sunni areas of Iraq such as Mosul agreed to do so, either out of fear of AQI's wrath or due to the promise that every tribe that took part in the Islamic Amirate of Iraq would receive the organization's protection as well as its financial and material support.[966]

(U) One of the tribes that pledged loyalty to the group was the al-Buaz tribe, whose leader posted an October 6, 2006 public statement swearing *bayat* to the Mujahideen Shura Council. Other tribal leaders appear to have made similar, though less public, pledges of support. In an October 12, 2006 statement by the Mujahideen Shura Council, the group announced that it had formed a ceremonial alliance (the Mutayyabin) between tribal leaders loyal to AQI and a number of insurgent groups, patterned after an alliance that had occurred during the time of Muhammad.[967]

~~(S/NF)~~ In addition to specific tribal leaders, the Central Tribal Council of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq succeeded in winning the outright loyalty of the Albu Ubayd, Albu Farraj, and Albu Fahd tribes, members of which swore *bayat* to UBL as their amir. AQI's ability to win the loyalty of the Albu Fahd tribe was especially significant, as this was (b)(6) own tribe that had been a key element of his earlier bid for political engagement through the SAA. Ordering these tribesmen to fortify the Sufia and Aziziyah districts of Ramadi, the AQI leadership began drawing up plans to attack the Albu Risha, Albu Assafi, and Albu Mahal tribal areas as part of (b)(6) plan to destroy the SAA.[968]
~~(S)~~ In general, the western tribes of Ramadi now supported the Coalition while their eastern counterparts supported AQI. The Albu Risha and Albu Assafi tribes were now solidly pro-Coalition, providing a significant portion of Anbar Revolutionaries fighters. The Albu Dhiab, Albu Ali Jassim, and Albu Nimr assisted the Albu Risha and Albu Assafi, providing them with an additional force of one hundred fighters. While the Albu Mahal in Ramadi was a subtribe of the Albu Farraj, on the issue of supporting AQI it broke with its parent tribe.[969]

---

[965] [| 1.4c, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[966] Ibid.
[967] [| Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[968] [| Military | 25 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061025 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[969] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ While some members of almost every tribe supported AQI to one degree or another, the Albu Farraj, Albu Fahd, and Albu Ubayd tribal leaders were so intimidated by AQI that their leaders were now forced to support the group for fear of retaliation. That the Albu Fahd was now bowing to AQI pressure was especially worrisome given that its leader Sheikh Nasser had been a key player in (b)(6) Anbar People's Committee.[970]

~~(S)~~ On October 18, to celebrate the creation of the Amirate, AQI fighters and supporters dressed in white held rallies throughout Ramadi, hosting demonstrations at a number of mosques and at Anbar University.[971] The main demonstration consisted of roughly sixty AQI fighters on the north side of 17th Street brandishing AK-47s, PKC machine guns, RPGs, IGLA rockets, and Dimitrov anti-aircraft guns. The north side of 17th Street was chosen as the site of the demonstration because it was where the Mujahideen Shura Council met and as such was perceived by AQI as an area where the group could move about freely. AQI also organized demonstrations in support of the new Amirate in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Bani Dahir, Rawah, and Rutbah, with additional demonstrations planned for Fallujah and Amariyah. In Rutbah, the AQI demonstration was particularly geared towards responding to a threat from the Anbar Revolutionaries that AQI fighters should leave the town or they would be killed.[972] At every demonstration a statement from the Mujahideen Shura Council was read, demanding that the Coalition withdraw from Iraq immediately.[973]

~~(S)~~ The establishment of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq was a major boost to AQI morale after the losses that the group and its supporters had sustained at the hands of the SAA. The Mujahideen Shura Council's reconciliation initiatives as originally formulated by (b)(6) (see Chapter 6a) were now creating support for an Islamic state among Sunni tribes and insurgent groups. The theme of "AQI as defenders of the Sunni" was persuasive for the various tribes and insurgent groups that decided to support AQI, enhancing its ability to recruit and fueling anti-government sentiment. (b)(6) also issued a statement on behalf of the AQI leadership, stating that he would give the sheikhs who had joined the SAA a chance to repent of their actions until the end of Ramadan, at which time they would face AQI's wrath.[974]

~~(S)~~ A similar AQI propaganda campaign was mounted throughout the Hit-Haditha corridor by AQI leader (b)(6) His primary message was that the insurgents were making a "limited-time offer" for residents and other insurgents to "repent" during Ramadan and to join the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. This propaganda campaign attempted to wrap the mantle of religious authority around AQI, targeting local businessmen that were suspected of working with the Coalition. An AQI propaganda flyer recovered by Iraqi police in Baghdadi summarized much of the group's efforts:[975]

Approved for Release

---

[970] Ibid.
[971] [| Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[972] [| Military | 23 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061023 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[973] [| Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[974] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[975] [| Military | 23 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061023 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ "To those who joined the police and sold their religion and faith for petty drachmas, and are content to be bound to serve the Americans, who killed our Muslim brothers. To whoever has become a shield for them against the mujahedin, to the traitors and renegades, to those who joined the Islamic Party, to all who accept contracts against them, we warn you in the precious month (Ramadan) to turn to God and ask forgiveness and penitence, turning to the mujahedin's amir, Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, for whom we ask victory from God. Your penitence is more interesting to us than killing you."

~~(S)~~ Nor were these claims merely rhetorical. Residents perceived the entire Haditha area as being entirely under the control of AQI. Fearful of both Coalition and AQI checkpoints, residents would not travel to other cities and were also intimidated by the fighting between AQI fighters and the Coalition into staying away from the markets in Haqlaniyah and Bani Dahir. Many residents of Haditha had by this point lost all faith in the Coalition, instead believing that their only hope was with Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the SAA in Ramadi. Only in the Hay Albu Assaf and Wadi Albu Hyatt neighborhoods were the al-Hayyani and al-Ghariri tribes willing to stand up to AQI fighters.[976]

~~(S)~~ For Haditha residents, the declaration of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq was announced on local television and radio stations followed by celebratory gunfire. In the days that followed the announcement, AQI fighters armed with AK-47s distributed chocolates and bottles of Pepsi-Cola to residents in Bani Dahir, telling them to celebrate the formation of a Sunni Islamic state.[977]

~~(S)~~ All the AQI parades and demonstrations in Ramadi, Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Bani Dahir, Rawah, and Rutbah encountered no resistance from the Iraqi police, the Coalition, or the general population. Not only did this further intimidate the general population, but it also increased the confidence of AQI fighters by showing the group's ability to organize demonstrations even in areas where police or other anti-AQI groups were known to be active.[978]

~~(S)~~ AQI held additional parades in Ramadi on October 18, 19, 21, and 22, some of which lasted for several hours. These demonstrations were the group's response to anti-AQI rallies organized by the SAA on October 9 and 15, during which Ramadi sheikhs and police officers openly spoke out against AQI and in support of the Iraqi government. As a result, the series of AQI parades in Ramadi during which its fighters displayed their weapons were intended as a show of force and gave many residents the impression that the group was now in control of the city.

(U) The Mujahideen Shura Council attempted to portray its announcement as a move on behalf of Sunnis and a response to steps toward federalism by the Kurds and the Shi'a. In addition, the group claimed that it was instituting *shari'ah* throughout Anbar province by popular demand. Not all reaction to the group was positive, however. The SAA immediately denounced the Islamic Amirate of Iraq as "an association of terrorists." AMS also denounced any talk of partitioning Iraq along sectarian lines as "grand treason," stating that only AMS spoke for the entire Iraqi Sunni community.[979]

---

[976] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[977] Ibid.
[978] [| Military | 23 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061023 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[979] [| Military | 19 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061019 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ Those groups that resisted the formation of the Amirate soon found themselves on the receiving end of AQI's wrath. As soon as preparations for the creation of the Amirate began, Mujahideen Shura Council member (b)(6) directed AQI cells to organize death squads to attack all groups who refused to swear loyalty to the new organization, specifically members of the various factions of 1920 Revolution Brigade.[980]

~~(S)~~ The formation of death squads was part of AQI's attempt to confront anti-AQI sentiment throughout Anbar and in particular the SAA. The death squads targeted members of any SAR insurgent groups, government officials, and community leaders with the goal of coercing acquiescence to AQI presence and operations in the province. Because Anbar was an important center for AQI facilitation and recruiting, the creation of the SAA was seen as a serious threat to the group's influence in the province. AQI's assassination campaign caused an increased violence between the Ramadi area tribes that formed the core of the SAA and forced AQI to dedicate additional resources to secure the area.[981]

~~(S)~~ AQI had already moved to set up *shari'ah* courts in the areas where the group had the most influence. According to documents recovered by G Co 2/3 during a September 25 raid in Haqlaniyah, a regional AQI *shari'ah* court collected information on a wide variety of topics ranging from criminal activity to political affiliations, residents' relationships with the Coalition, residents' relationships with AQI, and alleged violations of *shari'ah*.[982]

~~(S/NF)~~ This *shari'ah* court was an extension of an earlier body that had existed in the Hit-Haditha corridor and was disrupted as a result of Operation RIVERGATE (see Chapter 5b). All its documents were written in an official and legalistic tone in an effort to establish the court's legitimacy as a sanctioned body within the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. Information gathered by AQI's internal security wing on alleged apostates, police, and others who gained employment with the Coalition were presented to a *qadi* (religious judge) who then determined the proper *hadd* punishment. Sentences in the recovered documents range from intimidation to kidnapping to assassination. The *shari'ah* court was primarily concerned with "traitors," i.e. those working for the Coalition or who were believed to be giving information on AQI activity to the Coalition. Of secondary concern to the court was the issue of apostacy: those who did not conform to the *qadi*s' views of how Muslims should act under *shari'ah*.[983] One result of this concern was that women in Barwanah began to wear the niqab like their counterparts in Haditha and Haqlaniyah.[984]

~~(S)~~ Among those who were considered apostates were individuals who acted in the name of jihad either as a cover for criminal activity or without proper authorization from AQI. The courts concerned themselves too with political parties that it believed held objectionable ideologies. Non-Salafist political parties had the potential to rally public opinion and as such had to be monitored by AQI's internal security wing. Not surprisingly, this *shari'ah* regime resulted in an increase in

Approved for Release

[980] Ibid.
[981] Ibid.
[982] [| Military | 20 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061020 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[983] Ibid.
[984] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

assassinations against the Haditha police force. Twenty-nine officers were killed between September 23 and October 7 even before the declaration of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq.[985] All these efforts were intended to set the stage for the creation of a totalitarian Salafist theocracy as soon as the Coalition withdrew from Iraq.[986]

(b)(6)

~~(S)~~ While Iraqis living in the Haditha area were relatively secular and preferred to live under conditions less restrictive than those set up by AQI's *shari'ah* courts, security remained the most pressing concern for many residents and they were forced to accept, at least passively, any system of government that provided them with some measure of security. At the same time, rather than accept a theocratic police state or face AQI wrath, a number of Haditha area residents left the area for parts of Anbar less affected by AQI's influence.[988]

AQI Endures in Ramadi

~~(S)~~ It would be a mistake, therefore, to overstate the influence of the Anbar Revolutionaries in Ramadi at this point. While AQI was on the defensive in the city, its fighters were still able to sustain a vicious murder and intimidation campaign as well as checkpoints in the Malaab, Tamim, and Hay al-Dhubat districts. Each checkpoint was manned by twenty AQI fighters armed with AK-47s, RPKs, RPG-7s, pistols, and sniper rifles who regularly targeted Iraqi security forces. Residents from the Tamim district wearing Western-style clothing were increasingly targeted and the more the Anbar Revolutionaries grew, the more AQI beat and kidnap members of the other groups' tribes in the belief that they supported the Coalition.[989]

~~(S)~~ AQI's amir for the Tamim district was (b)(6), an associate of (b)(6) (b)(6) and former lieutenant colonel who operated in Ramadi under the cover of being a pharmacist. A wealthy man, he helped to finance the construction of the al-Quds Mosque that AQI fighters regularly frequented. In keeping with the collaboration between elements of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, a number of (b)(6) members belonged to both organizations.[990]

~~(S)~~ On a particular day during Ramadan, which Muslims believe is particularly auspicious, AQI attempted unsuccessfully to carry out major attacks in Ramadi. The sequencing of these attacks illustrated that AQI retained a complex and coordinated command and control infrastructure in the city despite the efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries to assassinate the group's leadership. Every Coalition static position in Ramadi was attacked simultaneously half past each hour between 1330

[985] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[986] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[987] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[988] Ibid.
[989] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[990] [| Military | 31 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061031 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

and 1730. Although firepower defeated the attacks against some positions, AQI fighters continued the series of attacks until they were killed or ran out of ammunition.[991]

~~(S)~~ The AQI fighters were personally commanded by AQI Ramadi ami (b)(6) from a vehicle with his signature mounted Dimitrov gun. The planning for this attack may have been organized in the Hay al-Dhubat Thanya district, where safe houses for AQI's foreign fighters, as well as a VBIED factory, were located on B Street in Al Andalus.[992]

~~(S)~~ AQI leader (b)(6) also decided that the time was ripe to move against Sheikh Abdul Sattar. Despite his public offer for members of the SAA to "repent," by mid-October (b)(6) had reportedly made the decision to order the death of Sheikh Abdul Sattar in the belief that this would shatter the SAA. (b)(6) order to kill Sheikh Abdul Sattar, preferably on Eid al-Fitr (October 26), coincided with two VBIED attacks south of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's home on October 16 and October 22.[993]

AQI Recruiting Within Islamic Amirate of Iraq

~~(S)~~ With the establishment of the Islamic Amirate, AQI intensified its recruiting efforts, including for the first time background investigations and surveillance of potential members. AQI recruiters used local markets to scout out young men between the ages of 15-25 who were poor, without family support, or dissatisfied with their current status in life. Once identified, the recruiters kept an eye on the potential member to observe their daily habits and routines over a period ranging from several days to one week. After determining that the potential member was not cooperating with the Coalition, the AQI recruiter offered them both a salary and the opportunity to become a "true follower" of Islam.[994]

~~(S)~~ Once the recruit agreed to join AQI, the recruiters met with their families, photographed them, and collected information on their place of employment and the location of any relatives in the city. This information was used both to locate other potential recruits and to retain control over the recruits should they be tempted to collaborate with the Coalition. The indoctrination of new recruits was media-intensive: recruiters provided them with DVDs and newsletters containing footage of attacks against Coalition forces, alleged abuses carried out by the Coalition or Shi'a, verses from the Qu'ran, and in some cases Western news articles stating that the Coalition had failed in its mission to stabilize Iraq.[995]

Ba'athist Collaboration with AQI

~~(S)~~ Despite the declaration of the Emirate, which was a clear sign that AQI planned to create a theocratic state once the Coalition left, collaboration between Ba'athist elements and AQI in Anbar continued uninterrupted through November. Cooperation was particularly close between AQI and the Saddam Fedayeen group that operated in Tikrit, Bayji, and Baghdad in addition to Anbar. This

[991] [| Military | 22 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061022 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[992] Ibid.
[993] [| Military | 24 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061024 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[994] [| Military | 29 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061029 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[995] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

group of the Saddam Fedayeen was led by (b)(6) (b)(6) who coordinated their activities with other insurgent groups in Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Tikrit, Bayji, Rawah, al-Qaim, and Husaybah.[996]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) were linked to Ba'athist leader Major General Muhammad Jassim Talib al-Zayna (Abu Uthman), a key (b)(6) through former Saddam bodyguard (b)(6) Major General Muhammad had ties to Ba'athist cells in Husaybah, al-Qaim, Rawah, Mosul, and Tal Afar. On August 11, 2006 Major General Muhammad's (b)(6) attended a meeting with a number of insurgent leaders, sheikhs, and Ba'athists in the village of Owja south of Tikrit to discuss reestablishing Ba'athist cells in Salahaddin province under the leadership of AQI. Because of Saddam Hussein's ties to Tikrit, there was still some support for Ba'athism in Salahaddin, even though formal insurgent structures had collapsed, and Rijab hoped to recreate these structures through collaboration with AQI.[997]

~~(S)~~ As in early 2006, the upper-level coordination between AQI and former Ba'athists led the Saddam Fedayeen in Anbar to align themselves with AQI due to its well-established command structure and large number of followers. This made possible collaboration between former Ba'athists and AQI fighters against the Coalition during the course of Ramadan and into early November 2006 as part of a bid to influence the outcome of the United States congressional elections.[998]

~~(S/NF)~~ The remaining Ba'athists were not, however, unified despite (b)(6) efforts to consolidate control over the Party. Since mid-September 2006, a number of the more pragmatic Ba'athists were considering denouncing Saddam Hussein, (b)(6) and continuing resistance to the Coalition. The continuing rivalry between (b)(6) and (b)(6) in particular left the Ba'athists considerably weaker and unable to conduct attacks against the Coalition.[999]

~~(S)~~ Former regime financiers also continued to assist AQI. Since 2004, Sheikh Abdul Kareem Abdul Razzaq al-Tikriti had financed AQI cells in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad as well as Ba'athist cells in Kirkuk using money obtained from Saddam Hussein's daughters Rana and Raghad. In addition, Sheikh Razzaq's financial network acted as a means through which AQI supporters in 1.4b and the 1.4b could send money to the organization on a regular basis. While not all this support went to AQI (the 1920 Revolution Brigade in Haditha was also a beneficiary of 1.4b financiers), the group received more than enough in addition to its already self-sufficient funding to support its operations. Even Saddam Hussein participated in this facilitation process, having his lawyer (b)(6) pass on his orders to surviving senior Ba'athists in Iraq and 1.4b [1000]

~~(S)~~ The collaboration between the Ba'athists and AQI did not result in the latter adopting a better view of the former. On the contrary, AQI documents recovered from a weapons cache in Haqlaniyah by the Coalition listed the Ba'ath Party and Hizb al-Awda in the same category of "Spies

[996] [| Military | 30 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061030 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[997] Ibid.
[998] Ibid.
[999] Ibid.
[1000] [| Military | 21 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

and Traitors" as the Badr Corps and the Da'wa Party. Such cases reflected the fact that foreign and domestic amirs of AQI differed in their view of the usefulness of the Ba'ath Party and Ba'athist groups to the global jihad. Under the new strategy adopted by (b)(6) more local amirs were able to make ideological compromises in order to harness the collective efforts of large numbers of insurgent fighters regardless of their backgrounds, motivations, or ideology.[1001] Such a strategy had been recommended to Zarqawi by AQSL Ayman al-Zawahiri as far back as the summer of 2005 (see Chapter 5b).

AQI Chemical Weapons Efforts

~~(S)~~ Just at this point, earlier work done by AQI in chemical warfare would begin to bear fruit. On October 21, 2006 AQI incorporated chlorine gas tanks into an SVBIED attack against a police checkpoint in Ramadi, but the chlorine did not cause any casualties. Nine days later, AQI attempted a SVBIED chlorine attack against the Waleed border crossing which also failed. While the failure of the chlorine component of the attack stemmed from the excessive amount of explosives used, improper integration, and the small size of the chlorine cylinder in the VBIED, it represented a new AQI tactic that would later become more common in the beginning of 2007.[1002]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR)~~ The decision to begin using chlorine and other industrial chemicals in AQI bombmaking came about as the result of a letter issued by (b)(6) to his subordinates in late September 2006.[1003] The letter stated that once AQI members had acquired the necessary industrial chemicals that they were to be sent to Yusufiyah, a town that had long served as (b)(6) base of operations. (b)(6) planned to use the industrial chemicals in explosives similar to those used in the 1998 embassy bombings against Kenya and Tanzania.

~~(S)~~ AQI's quest for chemical weapons was not a new ambition. Former Iraqi chemical weapons engineer (b)(6) was one of the leaders in AQI's chemical weapons efforts. Based in al-Muth Hariya, (b)(6) and his associates had long sought to create warheads capable of delivering lethal chemical rounds that would affect the central nervous system, and create skin lesions and burning sensations in the eyes. As with Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh al-Fatihin, AQI also maintained a crude chemical weapons research and development program. While AQI chemists (like their Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh al-Fatihin counterparts) successfully created chlorine and mustard gas as well as some nerve agents, their attempts to incorporate these agents into the group's standard munitions all met with failure. The group's chemists simply did not possess the necessary knowledge and technical expertise.[1004]

~~(S)~~ The main technical problem was the ineffectiveness of AQI delivery platforms. The primary methods to deploy chemical agents were direct bulk delivery, such as through crop-dusting aircraft or munitions. While AQAM had earlier planned to use remote-controlled planes to attack American embassies, this method was not duplicated by AQI because of a lack of aircraft and chemicals. Because munitions delivery used only a small quantity of chemical agents and relied on an explosive

[1001] [| Military | 09 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1002] [| Military | 31 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061031 | ~~(S/NF)~~]
[1003] [| 1.4c, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507]
[1004] [| Military | 4 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

charge to create a larger kill zone, AQI and other Iraqi insurgent groups tended to favor this means.[1005]

~~(S)~~ In some cases, AQI used old Iraqi chemical munitions or small quantities of agents procured from corrupt elements in the 1.4b militaries for use in IDF and IED attacks. In every case these chemical munitions were so degraded that there were no adverse effects on Coalition forces. AQI also worked to modify existing mortars and rockets to deliver chemical agents, but these improvised munitions were ineffective for a variety of reasons. For instance, the munitions used for delivery were not designed for such purposes and therefore the chemicals used were consumed in the explosion.[1006]

~~(S)~~ The second reason was that AQI had only small quantities of chemical agents with degraded potency. Iraqi chemical munitions produced during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s have been found and sold on the black market since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Most of these rounds recovered by the Coalition contained only trace amounts of the chemicals that they had originally been filled with and even those that remained intact had so degraded that they were a minimal threat even if used properly. In cases where AQI was able to obtain small amounts of chemical agents from corrupt elements of the 1.4b military, they lacked a reliable platform to employ them effectively.[1007]

~~(S)~~ Finally, the semi-autonomous nature AQI and other insurgent cells left them lacking the necessary expertise to create their own chemical munitions. While AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and Jaysh al-Fatihin all attempted to hire former Iraqi chemical weapons experts, many of these endeavors failed and in some cases the groups appear to have been deliberately scammed. For instance, an individual named (b)(6) made his living since 2003 conning insurgent groups into believing that he was an Iraqi chemical weapons scientist only to deliberately fail. As a result of these failings, AQI was unable to produce effective chemical weapons or effective delivery platforms with which to use them.[1008]

~~(S)~~ Many of these problems were overcome in the chlorine bombs used in October. Because chlorine tanks were standard parts of Iraqi water treatment plants with little security, AQI was able to obtain significant quantities of the chemical. The chlorine used in the first SVBIED attack was probably taken from the four chlorine cylinders that AQI operatives stole from the Karkh water treatment plant ten kilometers north of Taji. The mastermind of this theft was (b)(6) (b)(6) a self-employed car salesman who served as the AQI amir of Tarmiyah and had ties to both Baghdad amir (b)(6) Detained in May 2004, (b)(6) was released in June 2006 and resumed his prior position within AQI.[1009]

~~(S)~~ Chlorine gas cylinders could easily be ruptured by explosives, which had the ability to generate a potentially hazardous chemical plume. Despite the lethal nature of chlorine gas, their effectiveness in

[1005] Ibid.
[1006] Ibid.
[1007] Ibid.
[1008] Ibid.
[1009] [| Military | 31 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061031 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

VBIED and SVBIED attacks were highly localized because the potency of the gas depended on its concentration. As a result, anyone close enough to a VBIED or SVBIED to be killed by chlorine gas would probably have already been killed by the initial blast from the explosives payload of the vehicle. In the case of the October bombings, most of the chlorine was consumed by the explosion, severely limiting its effectiveness.[1010]

The Anti-AQI Movement in Late October-November

Iraqi Fatwa Commission

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile, in an effort to diminish the religious authority of both AQI and AMS, Sunni Endowment director Dr. Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i formed the Iraqi Fatwa Commission (IFC) and solicited the support of thirty Sunni scholars and religious leaders for this effort. These included disaffected members of AMS who were displeased with AMS's political focus and its constant efforts to criticize the Iraqi government and defend the insurgents. While the IFC was not intended to openly challenge AMS, it was intended to issue fatwas through consensus rather than through the fiat of Harith al-Dhari as often occurred with AMS. At the same time, IFC fulfilled Dr. Ahmad's long-held desire to form a religious body that would openly counter AQI's claims to religious authority.[1011]

Difficulties in the Anti-AQI Front

~~(S)~~ Despite the SAA's efforts to unite and focus insurgent efforts against AQI (as opposed to the Coalition), some subordinate cells of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen disagreed with the very concept of a cease-fire against the Coalition. This independence, as well as the criminal nature of many SAR cells, severely hindered the effectiveness of cease-fire agreements between the Coalition or the Iraqi government and SAR leaders.[1012]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) attempted to use his control over part of the 1920 Revolution Brigade to convince elements of Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen to agree to a general cessation of attacks against Coalition forces.[1013] This cease-fire, known as the Abu Ghraib initiative, did not lead to any measurable decline in attacks.[1014] In Saqlawiyah and Ramadi, a few tribal leaders did turn from attacking the Coalition to attack AQI under the name of Jaysh al-Tahrir, posting a hit list of ninety AQI figures it intended to target, but this group seems not to have lasted.[1015]

~~(S/NF)~~ The difficulty in convincing Jaysh al-Fatihin to turn from attacking the Coalition to anti-AQI activity may have been due to the stance of its political leader and Tawafuq Front MP Khalaf Alayan, who was very active within the insurgency. It should be noted that his position on the insurgency was not shared by fellow Tawafuq Front leaders Adnan al-Dulaymi (who supported

---

[1010] Ibid.
[1011] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1012] [| Military | 25 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061025 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1013] [| Military | 26 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061026 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1014] [| Military | 30 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061030 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1015] [| Military | 26 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061026 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

political engagement and Prime Minister Maliki's reconciliation plans) or (b)(6) (who was adamantly anti-AQI and supported negotiations between the SARs and the Iraqi government). Of the other Sunni political leaders, Salih al-Mutlaq and Harith al-Dhari also supported Sunni insurgents against the Coalition.[1016]

~~(S/NF)~~ To encourage SAR insurgent entry into the political process, Iraqi vice president Tariq Hashimi met with 1920 Revolution Brigade spiritual leader (b)(6) in 1.4b in late October 2006. At the meeting, (b)(6) explained that the 1920 Revolution Brigade had now split between those who accepted his leadership and those who supported Harith al-Dhari and AMS. (b)(6) stated that he wanted to depose Harith al-Dhari as AMS secretary-general with support from IIP or to break with AMS altogether and form a new clerical organization. After this, Harith al-Dhari's followers within 1920 Revolution Brigade accused Tariq Hashimi of betraying the Sunni resistance by meeting with (b)(6) Efforts by (b)(6) and other 1920 Revolution Brigade leaders aside, a significant element of the group now served as the de facto military arm for Harith al-Dhari and his son due to their ability to provide strategic direction to the group.[1017]

~~(S)~~ Some tribal leaders who were members of the SAA now began to reconsider their anti-AQI stance. With the establishment of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq and the Central Tribal Council, the AQI leadership in Ramadi began to negotiate a cease-fire with tribes in the SAA, arguing that an AQI victory would pose no threat to the tribal leaders or their authority. By uniting with AQI, the Ramadi tribes could become part of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq once the Coalition had been defeated. This adoption of a more pragmatic view of its opposition by AQI was due to the guidance of AQSL members (b)(6) both of whom relayed orders directly from UBL for the AQI leadership to begin brokering deals with tribal leaders.[1018]

~~(S)~~ In an effort to blunt an anti-AQI effort like the SAA from being established in the Haditha area, AQI stepped up its murder and intimidation campaign against residents in general and the Jughayfi tribe in particular. The Haditha area was regarded by the AQI leadership as important to their operations because it served as a key line of communication between the group's networks in Ramadi, Bayji, Mosul, and Kirkuk.[1019]

Cooperation between the Iraqi government and the SAA

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite these setbacks, the SAA saw some significant successes in late October and November. Because of smooth cooperation between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the Iraqi national government, the Front was able to legitimize its activities against AQI. Ever since his initial Baghdad meeting with Prime Minister Maliki, Sheikh Abdul Sattar had cultivated ties with Minister of State for National Security Sirwan al-Waili (a Shi'a Da'wa member) and deputy parliament speaker Khalid Attiya (a Shi'a independent). He had made a case that Governor Mamoun had failed to adequately fight AQI in Anbar, and provided evidence of the SAA's popular support to both Khalid Attiya and

[1016] [| Military | 08 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1017] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1018] [| Military | 25 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061025 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1019] [| Military | 26 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061026 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Prime Minister Maliki. By late September 2006, interior ministry Major General Rashid Fulayyih told the press that "If the chieftains and the people of al-Anbar ask for the help of the national police, then we are ready to be the first to offer it after an official decision is issued by the prime minister. The national police will be at the disposal of al-Anbar's people."[1020]

~~(S/NF)~~ In mid-October, Anbar interior ministry representative Major General Ahmad al-Jaburi wrote a letter approved by interior minister Jawad al-Bolani that gave Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the SAA significant control over provincial security, appointing Sheikh Abdul Sattar as counterterrorism director for Anbar and Sheikh Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa as provincial police chief. On October 17, Sheikh Abdul Sattar stated on al-Iraqiyya TV that he had received a pledge of 200-300 volunteers to fight AQI from every member tribe in the SAA, volunteers that would be paid by the interior ministry.[1021]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Tawafuq Front that was the bulk of Anbar's Sunni political establishment, by contrast, opposed the SAA at nearly every turn, as did members of the Anbar Central Council. This opposition was headed by Iraqi vice president Tariq Hashimi (the IIP leader who feared the rise of the SAA as a political force) and Khalaf Alayan, who accused Sheikh Abdul Sattar of fomenting sedition.[1022]

Approved for Release

[1020] [| Military | 29 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061029 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1021] Ibid.
[1022] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Cooperation between SAA and 1920 Revolution Brigade

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) also attempted to support the efforts of the SAA, directing his loyalists within 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah to collect intelligence on AQI operatives that could be relayed to the SAA. (b)(6) and Sheikh Abdul Sattar now spoke on the phone several times a week. (b)(6) hoped that his cooperation with the SAA would allow him to gain amnesty for his followers and legitimacy within Coalition and Iraqi government circles. Because of the splintering of 1920 Revolution Brigade due to AQI defections, internal divisions, and most recently a schism between spiritual leaders (b)(6) had little influence over the group's activities outside of Ramadi.[1023] Thus (b)(6) used his influence with 1920 Revolution Brigade members in Fallujah to persuade them to join forces with local tribes and Jaysh al-Fatihin fighters against AQI, but could not deter them from continuing attacks against the Coalition.[1024]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the leadership of the SAR insurgent groups detested AQI, each group had different goals, methodologies, and patrons from the street level to the senior leadership. As a result, funding and weapons from AQI often outweighed the intangible benefits of unity against them, preventing a consensus from emerging among the remaining SAR groups. Even so, many SARs opted to join the SAA as well as the legitimate Iraqi army and police forces. Sheikh Abdul Sattar hoped to use (b)(6) influence to strengthen his position to convince other SAR leaders and more importantly their street level fighters to join the Iraqi security forces.[1025]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the end of October, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the SAA leadership reached an agreement with (b)(6) SAR allies not to detain or attack SAR insurgents as long as they did not carry out any attacks against Iraqi police, Iraqi army soldiers, or Iraqi civilians. This understanding was formalized at a meeting in the Jazira, in which Sheikh Abdul Sattar agreed to help a number of SAR insurgent leaders secure the release of those members of their groups who had in the past targeted Coalition, but not Iraqi forces. Before the release occurred, SAR fighters had to agree to join the "honorable insurgency" of the SAA and help it to defeat the "outsiders" and "Takfiris." This was in keeping with SAA rhetoric, which held that members of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Harakat al-Islamiyah, and Jaysh al-Fatihin could only be forgiven for their past actions by renouncing their former activities and joining the SAA. The actual release was secured by (b)(6) an Iraqi police chief in the Ramadi area loyal to the SAA and Sheikh Abdul Sattar.[1026]

The SAA's Strike Force

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Abdul Sattar and provincial chief General Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa now began planning a police strike force designed to target AQI. The proposed force would consist of three battalions (a total of 750 police) commanded by (b)(6) (Ramadi proper), (b)(6) (the Shamiyah area between the 5 Kilo district of Ramadi and Hit), and (b)(6) (the Habbaniyah area between Ramadi and Fallujah). The headquarters of the force would be Camp Ramadi and General Hamid planned to conduct anti-AQI operations in

[1023] [| Military | 06 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1024] [| Military | 09 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1025] [| Military | 06 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061106 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1026] [| Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

concert with the 7th Brigade of the Iraqi Army that was also located at the camp. Cooperation between the police battalions and the 7th Iraqi Army Division was welcomed by the unit's commander Major General Murthi Mushin Rafa Farhan, who had attended Sheikh Abdul Sattar's first meeting with Governor Mamoun and been cultivated by him as an ally ever since. Through Major General Murthi, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was also able to gain some support from former Anbar governor Faisal al-Gaoud, who was now a member of SAA.[1027]

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraqi defense minister Abdul Qadir al-Mufraji strongly supported the establishment of a positive relationship between the Iraqi army and the SAA, ordering the 1st and 7th Iraqi army divisions to provide support to Sheikh Abdul Sattar if he requested it. This led to meetings between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the defense minister in which Sheikh Abdul Sattar agreed to help recruit 2,000 Sunni troops for the Iraqi army.[1028]

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Abdul Sattar scheduled a meeting with Prime Minister al-Maliki and interior minister Jawad al-Bolani to obtain approval for his proposed strike force. During a preliminary meeting, interior minister al-Bolani assured Sheikh Abdul Sattar and General Hamid that they had his full support so long as the Iraqi government approved of their activities and gave Sheikh Abdul Sattar a letter of appointment as counterterrorism director for Anbar. As for Sheikh Abdul Sattar, he was determined to work within the auspices of the Iraqi government rather than implementing his ideas on his own authority.[1029]

~~(S/NF)~~ On October 30, Prime Minister Maliki met with representatives of the SAA including Sheikh Abdul Sattar to discuss equipping battalions. During the meeting, Sheikh Abdul Sattar stated candidly that he was not receiving support from the Iraqi government due to the destruction of government administration at the local level by AQI, the ineffectiveness of the provincial government, AQI's creation of the Central Tribal Council that enabled the group to infiltrate the Anbari tribal system and further entrenched the group within the province, and Baghdad's current distrust of Anbar. While the leadership of the SAA preferred to receive government support and manage their own anti-AQI campaign, they were also willing to accept the presence of an interior ministry advisory committee mandated by Prime Minister Maliki.[1030] In late 2006, recognizing the value of these anti-AQI forces, al-Maliki gave the Iraqi army approval to provide weapons directly to the SAA.

~~(S/NF)~~ Even before this approval, General Hamid had recruited the 750 men for the battalions, as well as 2,000 more volunteers. Hamid's recruits were drawn from the ranks of former Iraqi soldiers who required little training. For instance, (b)(6) had held a similar military post pre-OIF. Pending Iraqi government approval, the battalions were dispersed to various police stations throughout Ramadi, though they were answerable only to their battalion commanders and not local police commanders. While legally the highest-ranking police official in Anbar, as a member

[1027] [| Military | 28 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061028 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1028] [| Military | 18 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1029] [| Military | 28 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061028 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1030] [| Military | 01 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

of the SAA and the leader of the Anbar Revolutionaries, General Hamid was Sheikh Abdul Sattar's de facto top lieutenant.[1031]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite initial skepticism from some observers, Sheikh Abdul Sattar demonstrated that he was an adept decision-maker who had successfully consolidated his leadership of the SAA. With the support of key allies in the provincial government, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was also able to improve an often tense relationship with Governor Mamoun. Sheikh Abdul Sattar managed, for instance, to persuade Governor Mamoun to name SAA leader Sheikh Wisam Hardan Albu Issa as his special assistant for customs and border affairs. A working relationship between the SAA and the provincial government now replaced their earlier rivalries and as a result the Iraqi government essentially placed Anbar's entire police establishment in Sheikh Abdul Sattar's hands. With the continued targeting of AQI by the Anbar Revolutionaries, this trust began to pay off for both the SAA and the Iraqi government. By respecting the rule of law, the SAA had, with the full support of the Iraqi government, gained political power and increased confidence to challenge AQI.[1032]

~~(S/NF)~~ Just as importantly, the sheikhs and tribes that had joined the SAA continued to demonstrate a publicly united front against AQI. While there were huge divisions within the Anbar Central Council, INDF, and the Iraqi government itself, no such divisions existed between Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his subordinates in the SAA. This was due in part to the ever-present threat posed by the prospect of AQI retaliation, but was also due to Sheikh Abdul Sattar willingness to share both power and the spotlight with his lieutenants.[1033]

Anti-AQI Efforts against (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ The power of the growing anti-AQI sentiment in Anbar was demonstrated in early November 2006. AQI leader (b)(6) was forced to abandon the Iraqi border area near Ar Rabit after being threatened by residents who informed him that they would no longer permit him to move foreign fighters through their area. (b)(6) was forced to shift his activities north toward the border crossing at Rabiyah northwest of Mosul. (b)(6) was also under suspicion within AQI for having embezzled $35,000,000 during his tenure as the group's logistics amir, yet he remained active in al-Qaim, hoping perhaps to regain the confidence of the AQI leadership by restoring its pre-2006 access to the al-Qaim border region.[1034]

The Capture of Mullah Humaydi and the Death of Rafa Abd al-Salam

~~(S)~~ The Coalition in turn struck a major blow against AQI on October 30 with the capture of Mullah Humaydi, the former mayor of Haditha who served as "war counsel" to both Zarqawi and (b)(6) advised the AQI shura majlis on all operations that occurred in Anbar, and was considered fourth-in-command for AQI. Mullah Humaydi's network was responsible for much of the foreign fighter and weapons smuggling between al-Qaim, Kirkuk, and Mosul. As the architect of AQI's strategy to

[1031] [| Military | 28 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061028 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1032] Ibid.
[1033] Ibid.
[1034] [| Military | 14 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

win popular support in Anbar, his capture at a time when the group was seeking to regain ground against the SAA was a major success.[1035]

~~(S)~~ On November 1, the Coalition also killed AQI leader Rafa Abd al-Salam (Abu Salih, Abu Taha) with a Hellfire missile. Rafa was a notorious AQI leader whose network spanned from Ramadi to Khalidiyah. The former second-in-command for AQI Ramadi amir Methat Ibrahim Hussein al-Fahdawi (Abu Mustafa), Rafa had succeeded his uncle after he was captured by the Coalition in June 2006 (see Chapter 6b) and was named amir of Ramadi by the Mujahideen Shura Council. Since then, he had coordinated AQI activities throughout the Ramadi area alongside (b)(6) (b)(6)[1036]

Dissension within AQI Grows

~~(S)~~ By October 2006, there was growing dissension among some of AQI's Iraqi leaders over the large number of senior commanders who had been killed or detained since (b)(6) had assumed command. The dissension was probably driven in part by followers of Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, who believed that he rather than (b)(6) should have been given command of AQI (see Chapter 6b). These Iraqi AQI leaders disliked (b)(6) strict style of discipline and believed that he was out of touch with the needs of their fighters. (b)(6) meanwhile took a dim view of Iraqi nationalist jihadists, regarding them as little better than Ba'athists and sought to indoctrinate recruits with AQI's global jihadist ideology. This dislike of (b)(6) by some Iraqi leaders was also caused by his close ties with AQSL that resulted in a number of senior leadership posts in AQI belonging to foreign fighters even though Iraqis were given positions of power in the Mujahideen Shura Council and the Islamic Amirate.[1037]

~~(S/NF)~~ Dissent was also driven in part by the evolving situation on the ground in Anbar and other parts of Iraq. The sectarian violence so desired by Zarqawi had plunged the Sunni inhabitants of Baghdad into an existential struggle for survival against Shi'a militias, making AQI's agenda for global jihad and restoration of the caliphate irrelevant to many Iraqi Sunnis in comparison with the need for day-to-day security. The relationship between AQI and its former SAR allies remained fluid, with rifts between the two now a common phenomenon in Anbar and other Sunni areas of Iraq. As far as the dissenters within the AQI leadership were concerned, there was now an increasing grassroots Sunni opposition to overcome in addition to their daily combat against the Coalition and Shi'a militias. As a result of the establishment of the SAA, AQI was on the defensive in Ramadi, a situation that some AQI leaders believed would never have occurred under Zarqawi.[1038]

~~(S)~~ The death or detention of numerous senior AQI leaders by the Coalition, these AQI dissenters believed, meant that even though the group still had more than enough fighters, it lacked clear direction for near-term operations. The removal of mid-level AQI leaders such as (b)(6) (b)(6) also could not be easily offset. They were often replaced with

Approved for Release

[1035] [| Military | 02 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1036] [| Military | 01 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1037] [| Military | 07 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1038] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

leaders who were less experienced, did not enjoy the same level of acceptance from other AQI members, and did have the same financial connections as their predecessors.[1039]

~~(S)~~ To compensate for these losses, (b)(6) reached out to former Ba'athist leaders and placed them in positions of regional authority within AQI. While this decision seemed a reasonable solution to a leadership problem, it created serious dissent within the group. The 1.4b Ba'athists had strong ties only to the al-Qaim and Haditha areas of Anbar, and most of their support was concentrated in Tikrit, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Bayji. In an effort to closer ally the Ba'athists with AQI, (b)(6) held meetings in Haditha to develop a strategic partnership with both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna.[1040] In response, (b)(6) shifted some of the group's command and control functions towards Tikrit rather than Ramadi. As part of this shift in AQI command and control, Saqlawiyah-based 1.4b AQI leader (b)(6) was sent to Salahaddin province to assume command of AQI operations.[1041]

~~(S)~~ The continued reliance of AQI local cells on brutality to extract the necessary funding for their operations in Anbar, created its own set of problems, by fueling anti-AQI sentiment in the province. This resentment in turn helped the Anbar Revolutionaries to grow from their center of operations in Ramadi to Saqlawiyah and even as far west as Rutbah. Often, AQI reprisal attacks such as the killing of twenty-nine members of the Haditha police force only stiffened the resolve of their targets, in this case, resulting in the capture of (b)(6)

(~~S/REL TO USA AUS GBR CAN~~) In an effort to provide a greater degree of strategic direction to his followers, in late November 2006 (b)(6) reportedly delivered a major policy speech to AQI leaders at the al-Risala Mosque in the Albu Fahd tribal area. During the speech, (b)(6) declared Ramadi a "city of jihad" similar to Kirkuk, Mosul, Samarra, and Baghdad and stated that all Islam would be in jeopardy and the Arab nation weakened if the Coalition and the current Iraqi government defeated AQI. In response, (b)(6) announced the formation of a ministry of war and a ministry of information for the Islamic Amirate of Iraq to oversee more coherent policies for the new state.[1042]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) also attempted to build popular support, but the loss of (b)(6) meant that the effort was clumsy and often contradictory, and had little chance of winning over large numbers of Anbaris to the cause of global jihad. Even as AQI leaders marked down fuel prices for supporters or forced taxi drivers to give cheap rides to the poor, its fighters pillaged medical supplies, intimidated hospital employees, closed down local schools, and beheaded suspected collaborators in the street. (b)(6) also had to mount an aggressive military response to the SAA or risk being severely degraded by the Ramadi area tribes. As a result, many Anbaris were not swayed by AQI's new "hearts and minds" campaign, though they were willing to exploit it when it suited them to do so.[1043]

Tribal and Governmental Anti-AQI Efforts

[1039] [| Military | 10 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1040] [| Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1041] [| Military | 10 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1042] [| 1.4c, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507 | 20061124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1043] [| Military | 12 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Albu Issa vs. Albu Alwan, Round 1

~~(S)~~ A sudden flaring of tribal warfare in November shows the difficulties (b)(6) faced when attempting to win over Anbaris to his cause. Following the murder of Ramadi police captain Jabr Albu Alwan by AQI, the Albu Alwan tribal leadership requested permission to join the SAA to exercise *tha'r*. As a result, factions and subtribes within the Albu Issa loyal to AQI and their Islamic Amirate of Iraq began setting up checkpoints in an effort to kill any Albu Alwan tribesmen who were members of the IIP. The pro-AQI Albu Issa tribesmen also planned to use car bombs to destroy the Usama bin Zayd Mosque that served as the primary mosque for the Albu Alwan tribal area.[1044]

~~(S)~~ Fighting now broke out in Ramadi between AQI and the Albu Alwan tribe, which was supported by fifty fighters drawn from the ranks of 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen. The center of the fighting was in the Albu Alwan tribal areas and the Tamim district of Ramadi. While the Albu Alwan as a whole remained ambivalent towards the Coalition, the threat against their tribe by AQI and their Albu Issa allies forced them to begin conducting patrols and preventing AQI fighters from entering their territory. Another reason for the Albu Alwan's shift against AQI was Sheikh Abdul Sattar's efforts to have Sa'ad al-Alwani appointed as mayor of Ramadi. As a result, the Albu Alwan tribe, which had resisted the efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries in the past, became openly anti-AQI.[1045]

~~(S)~~ The Albu Alwan tribal leader Sheikh Hamid Rashid, who resided in Amman for fear of AQI, was himself a member of the SAA and supported this shift in the tribe's opinion. On November 12, Albu Alwan tribal leaders opened the al-Warrar police station in the Thaylat district of Ramadi with Coalition assistance. Backed by Sheikh Abdul Sattar, the Albu Alwan were now determined to evict AQI fighters from their area.[1046]

~~(S)~~ The primary architect of the AQI campaign against the Albu Alwan was Arkan Fayyad Muslih, the leader of an AQI IED cell that operated in the Halabsa tribal area with the support of pro-AQI members of the Albu Issa tribe. These pro-AQI Albu Issa tribesmen told Arkan which areas he was allowed to carry out attacks, acting as an intermediary between the tribe and AQI fighters operating in East al-Nasaf and Amariyah. Arkan's efforts were financed by Shakir Ahmed Mujbal, who stole cars from the Saqlawiyah area and resold them in Baghdad.[1047]

The Albu Issa Rapproachment

~~(S)~~ While their involvement in this tribal feud might seem to seal the Albu Issa as firmly pro-AQI, nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact the tribe was still divided between pro- and anti-AQI factions, some of which were still fighting each other. When the Albu Alwan joined the SAA, the pro-AQI Fuhaylat subtribe of the Albu Issa, fearful of coming under attack by the combined

[1044] [| Military | 07 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |
[1045] [| Military | 08 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1046] [| Military | 14 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1047] [| Military | 12 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

tribes of the SAA, agreed to pay 280,000,000 Iraqi dinars ($186,000) in blood money to the rest of their tribe as restitution for the killing of sixteen Iraqi police officers in Amariyah and Ferris Town.[1048]

~~(S)~~ The rapproachment among the Albu Issa subtribes enhanced the security of the beleaguered Iraqi police in Amariyah and Ferris Town as well as ending the fighting between the pro-AQI Fuhaylat and the anti-AQI Manasir and Albu Hadir in Amariyah. Because the Coalition had such a limited presence in the region, the sheikhs that had stood up to AQI were at a severe risk of succumbing to the group's pressure when the rapproachment occurred. Even so, the involvement of Albu Issa tribesmen in AQI's attack on the Albu Alwan made it very difficult for the tribe to join the anti-AQI alliance.[1049]

Unified Efforts to Establish Security in Anbar

~~(S)~~ In early November, the burgeoning cooperation between SAA and the Iraqi government began to pay off. Anbar interior ministry deputy commander General Ahmad Muhammad Khalaf al-Jaburi directed the Iraqi police to enter Ramadi under the command of General Hamid and begin arresting AQI fighters with support from Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the 7th Brigade of the Iraqi army. These efforts to establish security were supported by residents who regarded the Iraqi police as a legitimate institution and were eager to be free of AQI's murder, intimidation, and criminal campaigns.[1050]

~~(S/NF)~~ As part of the plan to establish security in Ramadi, the Coalition instituted a new detainee release procedure. In the past detainees from Ramadi had been released and left to find their own ways home. Now detainees were taken from the detention facilities to police stations closest to their tribal areas. At the police stations, they were met by tribal leaders who told them that the situation in Ramadi has now changed and that those who supported AQI were no longer welcome in the province. A handful of the detainees were also brought before Sheikh Abdul Sattar or his brother Sheikh Ahmed to demonstrate their goodwill toward former AQI members who agreed to join the SAA.[1051]

~~(S)~~ The Coalition meanwhile captured several major AQI figures. In a raid on the Iraqi Ministry of Health in Ramadi, (b)(6) were detained. (b)(6) who was seized while trying to flee the scene of the raid with money and documents, had been the head of the Facilities Protection Service in Anbar and misused his position to funnel money to AQI. (b)(6) used his position as the vice president of the department of health in Anbar to provide money and vehicles to the insurgency.[1052] On November 22, Coalition forces captured AQI amir Sharuk Marfua Abdallah (Muhammad Mahmud) in Rawah. Sharuk, who had worked for AQI at least as far back as November 2004, had been involved in the

Approved for Release

[1048] [| Military | 14 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1049] Ibid.
[1050] [| Military | 08 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1051] [| Military | 14 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1052] [| Military | 17 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

group's vehicle theft, murder, IED, and VBIED activities in western Anbar alongside (b)(6) (b)(6) and Anwar Araq.[1053]

~~(S)~~ While it would be a mistake to state that AQI's position was diminished in Ramadi at this stage, the group's freedom of movement had been reduced. Outside the Qatana district, the establishment of the 17th Street security station prevented fighters from moving freely in that district. Aggressive operations by the Coalition, Iraqi police, and the Anbar Revolutionaries continued to attrite the group's leaders and fighters in the city, while the discovery of the group's weapons caches at Anbar University and the Jazira hindered AQI's ability to reconstitute its operations. The Albu Alwan and Albu Soda were now openly anti-AQI, and both tribes conducted patrols and worked with the Coalition to prevent AQI from entering their territory. On November 16, the Coalition and Iraqi police carried out Operation TINIAN, which removed AQI's command and control node at the Women and Children's Hospital.[1054]

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Abdul Sattar's biggest success in expanding the SAA came after a November 2006 meeting in 1.4b, where the leaders of the Albu Anah, Albu Assaf, Albu Julib, Albu Dhiab, Albu Issa, Albu Janab, Albu Jabur, Albu Jughayf, Albu Mahal, Albu Nimr, and Albu Risha signed an agreement to cooperate with the SAA against AQI. At a meeting in Jubbah soon afterwards, they were joined by elements of several other western tribes. These tribes spanned Anbar and the SAA could no longer be dismissed as just a Ramadi organization.[1055]

Developments within AQI's Rivals

The Crisis within Jaysh al-Fatihin

~~(S)~~ Efforts to establish security in Ramadi degraded groups other than AQI. By mid-November 2006, increased Iraqi police presence that targeted the group's leaders and fighters forced Jaysh al-Fatihin to cease operations in Zangora. Because Zangora was a stronghold of the Albu Risha tribe and the home of SAA leader Sheikh Abdul Sattar, Jaysh al-Fatihin could not replenish its losses through recruitment for fear of infiltration. Still the largest SAR group in Iraq, Jaysh al-Fatihin maintained a presence in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and many of the population centers along the Tigris-Euphrates rivers. However, because the group's decentralized command structure put heavy emphasis on regional amirs to conduct operations, individual cells were forced to rely on kidnappings, donations, and criminal activity to generate funding. In Anbar, this meant using the group's control of the inactive al-Naf gas station in the Jazira area to regulate the amount of fuel that residents received and charging exorbitant amounts for gas. Armed with sticks rather than guns, Jaysh al-Fatihin fighters beat residents and damaged their vehicles if they refused to comply with their demands.[1056]

~~(S)~~ According to preliminary Coalition studies, Jaysh al-Fatihin in Anbar carried out 0.4% of the VBIED attacks, 7% of the IED attacks, 14% of the IDF attacks, and 14% of the sniping attacks,

[1053] [| Military | 22 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1054] [| Military | 21 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1055] Ibid.
[1056] [| Military | 16 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

placing its role within the Ramadi insurgency in its proper proportions. In general, Jaysh al-Fatihin leaders refused to carry out VBIED attacks to avoid high levels of Iraqi civilian casualties. On a national level, the group was also responsible for producing the infamous "Juba, Sniper of Baghdad" video that inflated the sniper threat and created a fictitious "superhero" for their supporters.[1057]

~~(S/NF)~~ Since at least 2004, Jaysh al-Fatihin (then Islamic Army of Iraq) had been led nationally at the operational level by the 1.4b Abu Khadijah al-Janabi with Tawafuq Front MP Khalaf Alayan its political leader. While Abu Khadijah was able to solicit some funding for the group from Saudi and 1.4b donors, he had little control over the daily operations of the group and, like Khalaf Alayan, opposed cooperation with the Coalition.[1058]

~~(S/NF)~~ By contrast, Jaysh al-Fatihin security chief for Anbar (b)(6) favored a ceasefire with the Coalition, having met with Iraqi vice president Tariq Hashimi in Baghdad on several occasions in late October 2006 to discuss a ceasefire arrangement. Though annoyed over Hashimi's disclosure of the plan to the media, (b)(6) broached the idea to Ansar al-Sunna political chief Muhammad Hussein al-Jaburi, giving him a copy of Hashimi's proposed ceasefire plan. Despite (b)(6) willingness to "sell" Hashimi's cease-fire plan to various leaders of Ansar al-Sunna, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen, Abu Khadijah had the final say on whether such a cease-fire would be implemented.[1059]

~~(S/NF)~~ These efforts by (b)(6) would bring about no change in attacks. While (b)(6) claimed that this was due to AQI perfidy, the truth was that the ceasefire was not honored by senior leaders of Jaysh al-Fatihin including the group's de facto commander-in-chief (b)(6) (b)(6) Baghdad military amir (b)(6)[1060]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite the group's animosity towards AQI, (b)(6) was in fact virtually alone among the Jaysh al-Fatihin leadership in supporting collaboration with the Coalition. This is not to say that the group did not cooperate with other insurgents. In September 2006, for instance, Jaysh al-Fatihin supported 1920 Revolution Brigade against AQI following the latter group's assassination of General Khalil Muhammad Abed al-Fahdawi, one of the top Jaysh al-Fatihin leaders in Anbar. Interestingly, propaganda distributed by the Anbar Revolutionaries in Khalidiyah in October extolled General Khalil as a martyr. (b)(6) of Jaysh al-Fatihin political leader Khalaf Alayan and the group's military chief in Anbar, refused, however, to cooperate with the Coalition despite his father's public support for national reconciliation.[1061]

~~(S)~~ The alliance with 1920 Revolution Brigade shows that the decentralized structure of Jaysh al-Fatihin, and the autonomous nature of local leaders, enabled the group to shift rapidly between alliances with other insurgent groups at the local level. While this cooperation was taking place, limited cooperation between Jaysh al-Fatihin and AQI also occurred on a local level in Ramadi due to the personal relationships between the local leaders of both organizations. It is worth recalling

[1057] [| Military | 19 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1058] Ibid.
[1059] Ibid.
[1060] Ibid.
[1061] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

that many local AQI leaders in Ramadi were themselves former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq that had joined AQI (see Chapter 6a) and thus retained their personal ties to their former comrades. Although the Jaysh al-Fatihin national leadership identified AQI as their primary threat, many local cells in Anbar were unable to resist AQI's influence. Such cells continued to carry out attacks against the Coalition as their *raison d'etre*, often with support from their counterparts in AQI.[1062]

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, Jaysh al-Fatihin found itself cut out of major sources of funding by AQI's dominance of Anbar's black market fuel smuggling and heavy involvement in kidnapping rackets. This forced many Jaysh al-Fatihin cells to become dependent on AQI for funding, which, combined with AQI's recruitment of detained Jaysh al-Fatihin fighters at Coalition facilities, enabled AQI to build up its own operational capabilities at Jaysh al-Fatihin's expense by siphoning away its most experienced operatives. Despite propaganda claims that Jaysh al-Fatihin numbered between 6-46,000 members, as of late 2005 the group's size had in fact numbered closer to 1,050 core members in contrast to Ansar al-Sunna with 2,950 core members and AQI with 5,495 core members. This gave the group a robust capability to conduct IED, SAF, and IDF attacks against Coalition forces, but also meant that it was only one fifth the size of AQI.[1063]

~~(S)~~ As a result, Jaysh al-Fatihin cell leaders in Anbar were unable to follow the directives of their central leadership absent a substantial amount of support for fear that their fighters would defect en masse and join AQI. This situation, along with successful targeting by the Coalition and Iraqi security forces, led to the organization's slow decline in Ramadi, making the group unable to operate without substantial support from AQI. Recognizing this situation, the national leadership of Jaysh al-Fatihin began reducing its efforts in Anbar to refocus on Samarra, Tikrit, and Mosul.[1064]

~~(S)~~ This shift was due in part to the fact that Jaysh al-Fatihin was the strongest in Baghdad, North Babil, Mosul, Samarra, and Tikrit, with its presence in Anbar mostly focused in Ramadi. While Jaysh al-Fatihin did operate in Abu Ghraib, its presence in Fallujah, Amariyah, and Karmah was minimal and the group's number of actual operatives in eastern Anbar was small. Jaysh al-Fatihin cells also existed in Haditha, al-Qaim, and Rutbah, though many of these were of questionable loyalty since many of the Islamic Army of Iraq cells had agreed to cooperate with AQI under the banner of the Jihad Platoons of Anbar (see Chapter 6a) without actually joining the former organization.[1065]

Approved for Release

[1062] [| Military | 16 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1063] [| Military | 19 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1064] [| Military | 16 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1065] [| Military | 19 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |] For instance, AQI associate group leader Akram Mahmud Rashid (Abu Muhammad) of the Abu Sarah Group claimed during interrogation that his loyalties were to Islamic Army of Iraq rather than AQI.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

The Crisis within Jaysh Muhammad

~~(S/NF)~~ Jaysh Muhammad, meanwhile, had reached its operational zenith in 2004 and ever since the conclusion of Operation AL FAJR and the January 2005 Iraqi elections the group had dwindled substantially as many of its leaders were killed or captured and its rank-and-file members defected to join other, more powerful insurgent groups. As a result, by November 2006 the activities of Jaysh Muhammad in Anbar were largely restricted to the Fallujah area, with only sporadic actions in the western cities of the province. While some of the Jaysh Muhammad national leadership remained loyal to the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, mid and low-level leaders did not adhere to Ba'athist ideology and cooperated with a number of groups opposed to Ba'athism, including AQI.[1066]

~~(S/NF)~~ The continued survival of Jaysh Muhammad can largely be attributed to the continued patronage of Saddam Hussein's eldest daughter Raghad, who was a financial facilitator for the surviving Ba'athists due to her access to between $19,000,000 and $17,000,000,000 in former regime funding. Using family lawyers and shuttling between 1.4b Raghad was able to distribute money to former Ba'athist leaders such as (b)(6) As a result, while Saddam Hussein was still regarded as the titular head of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party by his much-reduced followers, their financial backbone lay with Raghad just as their ideological direction lay with (b)(6) and his clique. Interestingly, Raghad refused to mediate between (b)(6) instead providing support to both in the hope that one or the other would succeed. Support for Ba'athism, however, had already deeply declined across Iraq by early 2006 and even in Tikrit there was no popular desire for a restoration of Ba'athist rule.[1067]

The Evolution of Jaysh al-Mujahideen

~~(S)~~ Jaysh al-Mujahideen was undergoing a similar evolution. Originally formed as a consolidation of the smaller Fallujah SRE groups by Sheikh Abdullah Janabi in response to Operation AL FAJR, Jaysh al-Mujahideen's ranks included both Iraqis and foreign fighters dedicated to the goal of expelling the Coalition from Iraq and establishing a Sunni-dominated state ruled by *shari'ah* law. Allied with both Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh al-Fatihin, the group had been led by (b)(6) (b)(6) until his capture in 2005 (though Sheikh Abdullah Janabi remained the group's ideological and spiritual leader) at which point he was succeeded by (b)(6) (b)(6) Jaysh al-Mujahideen's former political chief and a member of AMS. The group was divided into regional commands encompassing Baghdad, Mosul, Bayji, and Anbar with Hajji Abu Khalid serving as the group's top leader in Anbar. Despite the strong ties between Jaysh al-Mujahideen's spiritual leader Sheikh Abdullah Janabi and AQI, Abu Sayf believed that AQI's actions were counter-productive to the insurgency and supported the consolidation of SAR insurgent groups against them.[1068]

Approved for Release

[1066] [| Military | 23 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061123 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1067] Ibid.
[1068] [| Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Ba'athist Efforts to Reconstitute

~~(S/NF)~~ In the meantime, the Iraqi Ba'athists in 1.4b continued their efforts to regroup. By early October 2006, Ba'athist leader (b)(6) had reestablished the General Security Directorate (GSD, one of many Ba'athist security services aimed at rooting out internal dissent) under General Sadun Sabri Jamal, (b)(6) appointing (b)(6) (the brother of insurgent financier (b)(6) as their new leader. The goal of the new GSD was to extend its influence throughout Iraq in order to bring about the resurgence of the Ba'ath Party. Towards that end, General Sadun invited a number of former GSD officers to Aleppo to persuade them to join his restored organization.[1069]

~~(S/NF)~~ The location of the revived 1.4b was due to the former city's appeal to SREs. Since at least the middle of 2005, Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi had lived in the area and with a large pool of Iraqi expatriates already living in the city, the Ba'athists evidently believed (incorrectly) that they could exploit the expatriates in order to quickly raise manpower or money.[1070]

~~(S)~~ In an effort to regain their momentum, former Iraqi Ba'athist leaders held meetings with SAR insurgent commanders in Amman and at the Dead Sea Resort to merge the shattered SAR insurgent cells into a single organization. These same Ba'athist leaders believed that only by creating a single organization could they successfully negotiate with the Coalition in order to reestablish the Ba'ath Party in Iraq. These meetings may have been organized by Saddam Hussein by proxy in the hopes of reestablishing Ba'athist influence inside Iraq.[1071]

~~(S)~~ Ba'athist discussion of possible cooperation with the Coalition was largely a reaction to the rise of anti-AQI sentiment in Anbar and no realistic effort to enact such cooperation ever occurred. Instead, the Ba'athists believed that they could persuade the Coalition to reestablish Ba'athist rule in Iraq. In any event, the Ba'athists continued to lose their ability to control SAR insurgent organizations and therefore their plan was doomed to failure.[1072]

~~(S/NF)~~ By mid-November 2006, a number of Ba'athist leaders including Ba'ath Party External Political Affairs chief Manah Abd al-Rashid (former IIS director), former IIS officer (b)(6) and Ba'athist leaders (b)(6) were willing to negotiate with the United States in order to facilitate their entry into Iraqi politics. While this represented a change in Ba'athist views, it was based around (b)(6) delusional belief that the declining security situation in Iraq would pave the way for the restoration of Ba'athist rule in Iraq once the Coalition departed. Whil (b)(6) second-in-command, whether or not this statement was true was irrelevant since his intentions were disingenuous and the 1.4b Ba'athist leadership continued in its fruitless attempts to carry out independent attacks inside Iraq with the goal of restoring themselves to power. The latest of these plots involved an elaborate plan by (b)(6)

[1069] [| Military | 31 Oct 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061031 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1070] Ibid.
[1071] [| Military | 26 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1072] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6) to instigate civil strife in Mosul, Tikrit, Baquba, Ramadi, and Karbala in December 2006. Even if (b)(6) offer of negotiation was genuine, his conditions for them were the same as those of (b)(6) September 2006 demands that the Coalition end all counter-insurgency operations, release all detainees, reestablish the Saddam-era security services, recognize the Sunni insurgency as the sole legitimate political authority in Iraq, and withdraw from Iraq completely.[1073]

~~(S/NF)~~ It should be noted that despite frequent populist anti-government diatribes to the Arab satellite media, most of the Sunni political establishment had little love for the institutional leadership of the Ba'ath Party, since most of them were either exiles or out of favor during the rule of Saddam Hussein. Fallujah-born Tawafuq Front leader (b)(6) lived in exile from 1994-2003, parliament speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani was arrested twice by Saddam Hussein due to his participation in a coup plot, and Vice President Tariq Hashimi was never a member of the Ba'ath Party. Harith al-Dhari spent most of Saddam Hussein's rule abroad and even the pro-Ba'athist Salih Mutlaq was expelled from the Ba'ath Party in 1978 for a perceived slight against Saddam Hussein. While many Sunnis were far less inclined to oppose the Ba'ath Party than their Shi'a or Kurdish counterparts, this was largely due to their nostalgia for the days of Saddam Hussein when they had a favored status in Iraqi society. In Anbar, neither the IIP nor the SAA had any interest in the return of the Ba'ath Party.[1074]

~~(S)~~ As a result, Ba'athist influence inside of Iraq was now almost exclusively restricted to finances. Apart from its payments to cadres of clients and ideologues, the Ba'ath Party had nothing resembling its former dominance over Iraqi politics, making its leaders' dreams of restoring Ba'athist rule of Iraq little more than a collective delusion.[1075]

AQI and Ansar al-Sunna Attempt to Push Back (November 2006)

The Battle of the Sufia District

~~(S)~~ By late November 2006, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna were determined to annihilate the armed Albu Soda tribe and the Iraqi police stations in the Sufia district of Ramadi. The Albu Soda were singled out for attack because they were seen as the weakest member of the SAA and, if they were defeated, the alliance would collapse just like the Anbar People's Committee. Towards this end, a force of 200-300 AQI and Ansar al-Sunna fighters was assembled to attack the Albu Soda, with some volunteers coming from as far afield as Samarra in Salahaddin province. Their goal was to overwhelm the tribe in the Sufia district by attacking police stations in waves.[1076]

~~(S)~~ The Iraqi police and Albu Soda tribesmen became aware of this plan through their own intelligence networks, resulting in the November 25-26 "Battle of Sufia" in which Iraqi police and Albu Soda tribesmen successfully repelled the joint AQI-Ansar al-Sunna effort.[1077] The AQI-Ansar al-Sunna force crossed the Euphrates River, drove through Julaybah and then proceeded to assault

[1073] [| Military | 11 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061211 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1074] Ibid.
[1075] Ibid.
[1076] [| Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1077] [| Military | 5 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the Sufia district and the Albu Soda tribal area in a series of successive waves.[1078] At least fifty-five Albu Soda tribesmen were killed in the defense of SAA leader Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Salih's home, which was eventually destroyed by AQI and several of Sheikh Jassim's brothers were killed.[1079] While the AQI-Ansar al-Sunna attack was defeated, numerous AQI atrocities occurred during the course of the battle.[1080] With their failure to dislodge with Albu Soda from the Sufia district, a number of AQI members under (b)(6) relocated to Julabyah as a staging area from which they could regroup and then carry out future attacks in Ramadi.[1081]

Ansar al-Sunna Expands in Ramadi

~~(S)~~ The dependence on Ansar al-Sunna during this battle shows that AQI had been significantly weakened in Ramadi. In response, Ansar al-Sunna began to expand its operations in the city. Sufia district resident and former Arab Lawyers' Association member (b)(6) was the group's amir in Ramadi (supported by former IIS (b)(6) and his lieutenant (b)(6) and (b)(6)). With AQI's access to 17th Street somewhat impeded, (b)(6) began organizing many of the attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces along 17th Street with the assistance of the infamous (b)(6) family.[1082]

~~(S)~~ Nevertheless, the Iraqi police and Coalition forces directed every bit as much pressure against Ansar al-Sunna as against AQI. On November 27, they captured (b)(6) the Ansar al-Sunna operations chief for Ramadi who had carried out attacks from 17th Street to the Sufia district. At (b)(6) direction, Ansar al-Sunna cells had carried out IED and sniper attacks against Ramadi General Hospital. In addition, he had led the Ansar al-Sunna contingent of the attack on the Albu Soda tribe.[1083]

***Shari'ah* Established in Haditha**

~~(S)~~ Even as Ansar al-Sunna and AQI began to lose control of the situation in Ramadi, Haditha seemed even more securely theirs. Since AQI's declaration of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq, male residents refrained from smoking in public while women adopted increasingly conservative Islamic dress. Civil government had almost completely dissolved as a result of the AQI murder and intimidation campaign, tribal sheikhs were unable to exercise their traditional authority, and beheadings, which were without precedent under both Iraqi judicial and tribal laws, now occurred regularly. In a very real sense, the old Iraqi social order had been abolished by AQI in Haditha and a totalitarian Salafist theocracy had taken its place.[1084]

~~(S)~~ AQI had long planned to establish *shari'ah* in the Haditha area (see Chapter 5b), since the group saw this as the only acceptable legal system. Despite the traditional view of *shari'ah* as derived from

[1078] [| Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1079] [| Military | 13 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061213 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1080] [| Military | 5 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 2006125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1081] [| Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 2006126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1082] [| Military | 23 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061123 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1083] [| Military | 29 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1084] [| Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the Qu'ran, the Haditha, the *ijma* (consensus) of Islamic scholars, and *qiya*s (analogy), AQI's *shari'ah* courts, particularly those run by former Ba'athists, were set up by individuals who were ignorant of key aspects of the Islamic faith and hence often issued their judgements by the plaintiffs' degree of agreement and cooperation with AQI rather than on the merits of the case itself.[1085]

~~(S)~~ In addition to handing down penalties, *shari'ah* courts were also designed to provide education on Islamic principles to the general populace, forcibly indoctrinating otherwise secular Iraqis with an extreme religious worldview. While AQI was supported by many secular or formerly secular Ba'athists, most members of the group were themselves extreme religious zealots who sought to convert others to their worldview. Even so, AQI did not want to alienate potential Ba'athist or Iraqi army support for their objectives and among the acts undertaken by the *shari'ah* court was the assignment of plots of land to all former Iraqi soldiers in fulfillment of a promise that Saddam Hussein had made to them in 2000.[1086]

~~(S)~~ According to captured AQI documents and thumb drives, AQI leaders implemented *shari'ah* and other aspects of their totalitarian theocracy on the basis of directions received from the uppermost echelons of the organization. In keeping with standards that may well have been inherited from the tradecraft of the Ba'athist secret police, AQI maintained extremely meticulous records on the activities of the Haditha areas inhabitants at least as far north as Kubaysah.[1087]

AQI Recruiting at Coalition Detention Facilities

~~(S)~~ AQI also sought to expand its imposition of *shari'ah* to Coalition detainees. Because AQI and foreign detainees were not separated from their other Iraqi counterparts, they were able to preach their views of Islam to the other prisoners. Dealing with Iraqis who had received little formal religious education under Saddam Hussein, AQI members were so persuasive that one tribal sheikh estimated in October 2006 that as many as 30% of those who entered Coalition detention facilities as secular Sunnis left as adherents of AQI's version of Islam.[1088]

~~(S)~~ At the detention facilities at Camp Cropper, Abu Ghraib, and Camp Bucca, AQI recruited new members and maintained anti-Coalition sentiment. At Camp Cropper, AQI members formed a group called the Sharayeen that taught courses in Islamic law to detainees, claiming that they wanted them to learn more about *shari'ah*, the Qu'ran, and being good Muslims. Those who disagreed with the Sharayeen's interpretation of Islam were threatened. The Camp Cropper AQI detainees also formed a *shari'ah* committee that encouraged members of the group to conduct daily physical exercises to keep themselves in shape, offered guidance on counter-interrogation techniques, and practiced excellent OPSEC to avoid detection by the Coalition. The *shari'ah* committees at Camp Cropper and other detention facilities indoctrinated prospective AQI members through a five-class curriculum intended to educate detainees into becoming SREs, educating ten detainees at a time. Once a detainee decided to join AQI, they were forced to pledge bayat to UBL and recite a daily pledge of allegiance to AQI and their own willingness to die for UBL and (b)(6) As a result of this

[1085] Ibid.
[1086] [| Military | 10 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061210 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1087] [| Military | 1 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061201 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1088] [| Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

recruiting program, AQI was able to successfully recruit from other insurgent groups even while its members were held in Coalition detention facilities.[1089]

~~(S)~~ AQI also made an active effort to provide its fighters with rudimentary counter-interrogation techniques intended to delay or deflect the interrogation process. High-ranking members of the group displayed far more aptitude at counter-interrogation consistent with that found in the Manchester Manual, an AQAM document seized by British police in May 2000 at the home of an AQSL.[1090]

~~(S)~~ The main counter-interrogation instructions of the Manchester Manual are as follows:[1091]

- Develop a cover story;
- Refuse to answer repeat questions;
- Answer questions as vaguely as possible;
- Provide names of dead colleagues and name them as leadership figures;
- Never divulge information about your true mission;
- Provide support to and strengthen fellow inmates;
- Recite the Qur'an during questioning;
- Avoid looking into the eyes of the interrogator;
- Deny anything mistakenly divulged during earlier interrogations;
- Claim torture to invalidate information provided;
- If necessary, self-inflict wounds to provide the appearance of torture;
- Never trust the interrogator—never forget he is your enemy;
- Refuse to confirm or deny anything;
- Confronting the interrogator and defeating him is part of your jihad;
- It is better to die a martyr than provide information to the interrogator.

~~(S)~~ While only a limited number of insurgents had undergone extensive AQAM counter-interrogation training, many of these techniques were passed through word of mouth from higher-ranking members of AQI to mid-level and local leaders or obtained through the internet.[1092]

The Assassination Attempt on (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ On November 4, AQI decided to begin a serious counter-offensive against the SAA and its backers. In Zabadani, 1.4b a member of one of the group's Ramadi cells shot (b)(6) five times. (b)(6) was taken to a hospital in Damascus where he barely survived the attack. While (b)(6) had been marked for death by AQI since late 2005, the disbandment of the Anbar People's Committee in early 2006 and the splintering of the 1920 Revolution Brigade made AQI believe that he was so

[1089] Ibid.
[1090] [| Military | 23 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061123 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1091] Ibid.
[1092] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

weak that an attempt to kill him was unnecessary despite his continued in involvement in anti-AQI activities. The rise of SAA may have changed their opinions about (b)(6) influence in Iraq.[1093]

~~(S/NF)~~ At the same time, since the rise of the reformed Anbar Revolutionaries and other anti-AQI groups in August 2006, AQI had made an intensive effort to identify and track the movements of SAR insurgent leaders who were active in 1.4b Even so, the group was reluctant to target them directly for fear of incurring the wrath of the 1.4b security services. While elements of the 1.4b government were willing to a degree to harbor and facilitate AQI attacks in Iraq, major attacks against SAR leaders in 1.4b would indicate an absence of 1.4b control over its own territory.[1094]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the brazen AQI attack on (b)(6) was a blow to the Anbar Revolutionaries, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his lieutenants had already gained legitimate positions of provincial authority, organized a successful anti-AQI campaign, and successfully cultivated a network of support among provincial, national, and media officials that made it far more difficult for AQI to decapitate the group the way it had the Anbar People's Committee.[1095] Moreover, while (b)(6) possessed the necessary experience and connections to serve as a senior leader of the Anbar Revolutionaries, the same was also true for the group's founder (b)(6) Brigadier General Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa, and Sheikh Abdul Sattar himself.[1096]

~~(S)~~ As part of their counter-offensive against SAA, AQI leader (b)(6) began kidnapping and murdering Iraqi police officers near the Abra Bridge in Saqlawiyah while posing as a member of the Anbar Revolutionaries. AQI also began distributing black propaganda, committing atrocities while posing as Anbar Revolutionaries, and attempting to infiltrate the organization and undermine it from within.[1097]

~~(S)~~ Rutbah-based AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) also planned an assassination attempt against Sheikh Abdul Sattar, possibly using the Abu Sarah Group or former members of the Islamic Army of Iraq who had either allied with AQI or who were angry because Sheikh Abdul Sattar's activities cut down on their smuggling operations. Their plot, which was never carried out, called for the use of 52mm rockets against Sheikh Abdul Sattar's home.[1098]

The Triumph of the SAA

SAA vs. AMS

(U) Another attack on SAA came from a completely different direction. On November 10, AMS secretary-general (b)(6) stated on al-Arabiyah television that "A group of outlaws does not like the resistance, which opposes its crimes and diminishes its ambitions. Therefore, the government, or certain parties in it, has begun to use this group to counter the resistance."

[1093] [| Military | 10 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1094] Ibid.
[1095] Ibid.
[1096] [| Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1097] [| Military | 21 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1098] [| Military | 22 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Reflecting the stronger relationship between AQI and AMS since the death of Zarqawi, Harith al-Dhari stated that AQI was taking part in "the resistance" and criticized al-Arabiyah for limiting its coverage to Anbar. On November 12, Sheikh Abdul Sattar sent a statement in response to Harith al-Dhari's remark to al-Iraqiyah TV:[1099]

(U) "The al-Anbar Tribes Awakening Conference [i.e. the SAA] would like to respond to the claims made by Harith al-Dhari, agent of the Persians and the European Union through the French Ambassador, with whom he held meetings. We say to you that you know bandits better, as you have a long experience in this regard... Who are you to make such statements, which show your defeat on the battlefield? You are visiting countries to beg for donations for the Takfiris and hired killers. Decent resistance washes its hands of you and your actions. The sons of tribes stand up today, wearing the uniform which you can see on television screens, to say to you that you represent only yourself and the hired Takfiris who follow you."

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Abdul Sattar also mentioned his grandfather, the "hero of the March 1941 Revolution," a reference to the 1941 military coup by pro-German Iraqi army officers against the British-supported Hashemite monarchy that was a source of pride for Iraqi nationalists. By evoking the memory of his own grandfather in Iraqi history, Sheikh Abdul Sattar sought to blunt the ability of Sheikh Harith al-Dhari to use the mantle of his own grandfather, who participated in the 1920 uprising against the British. The animosity between Harith al-Dhari and Sheikh Abdul Sattar was due to the fact that the two men represented different sides of the same Sunni coin, with Sheikh Abdul Sattar attempting to demonstrate to Sunnis that working with the Iraqi government could pay off and Harith al-Dhari fearing that his anti-government message was now being countered. Moreover, Harith al-Dhari was involved in a business relationship with Sheikh Tariq Khulayf, the president of the Anbar Central Council who had refused to cooperate with the SAA.[1100]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite Harith al-Dhari's influence, won by his vocal opposition to the Coalition and the Shi'a-led Iraqi government, he had engaged in little or no constructive activity on behalf of the Sunni community. Moreover, many of the SAR insurgent groups that he had influence over were splitting between moderate factions that wanted to assist the SAA and hardliners that remained committed to fighting the Iraqi government and the Coalition. By contrast, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was an active tribal leader supported by the people of Ramadi. While Sheikh Abdul Sattar had no religious credentials, he and his fellow tribal leaders had encouraged Anbari tribesmen to join either the Iraqi security forces or the Anbar Revolutionaries to fight AQI in Ramadi, giving heart to Sunni tribal leaders in neighboring province. He also secured a major success by convincing the pro-AQI Fuhaylat subtribe of the Albu Issa to pay restitution to the rest of the Albu Issa.[1101]

~~(S/NF)~~ On November 16 Iraqi interior minister al-Bolani issued an arrest warrant for Harith al-Dhari on the charge of "inciting terrorism and violence among the Iraqi people." This was the second time that al-Dhari had been subject to an arrest warrant - in February 2006, then-interior minister Bayan Jabr issued an order for his arrest on the grounds that he had been involved in the

[1099] [| Military | 13 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1100] Ibid.
[1101] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

kidnapping of an Italian journalist, forcing Harith al-Dhari to flee to 1.4b In early March 2006, the interior ministry dropped the warrant because a number of the judges assigned to review it were threatened. Since his initial flight, Harith al-Dhari had resided primarily in Amman, since the 1.4b authorities were unlikely to extradite him and the Iraqi government was unlikely to ask them to do so. As a result, even if Harith al-Dhari regarded the warrant as genuine he was still confident in his ability to persuade the Iraqi government to withdraw it or the judiciary to reject it just as they had done earlier.[1102]

~~(S/NF)~~ Even so, the warrant had the temporary effect of bringing together moderate and hardliner factions within AMS, forcing (b)(6) to publicly denounce it despite his earlier efforts to depose Harith al-Dhari as the secretary-general of AMS in favor of a leader more receptive to the Iraqi government. Al-Dhari's rival (b)(6) also put his plans to set up a parallel religious authority on hold for the time being and the 1920 Revolution Brigade suspended their negotiations with the Iraqi government (though not the Coalition) in protest.[1103]

~~(S/NF)~~ While Harith al-Dhari was a supporter of the Sunni insurgency, his arrest warrant was criticized on the grounds that the Shi'a still had a standing warrant out for the arrest of Muqtada al-Sadr for the 2003 murder of Shi'a religious leader Sayid Abdul Majid al-Khoei. Thus, Sunni leaders believed that Harith al-Dhari was being persecuted because he was a Sunni while Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shi'a, was allowed to remain free. Moreover, even though al-Sadr was seen as the greater threat to the Iraqi government it was seen as acceptable for more than thirty MPs to be affiliated with his office. As a result, the SAA was forced to make tenative statements of opposition to the arrest warrant for Harith al-Dhari even as it retained an amicable relationship with the Shi'a Iraqi army units in Ramadi.[1104]

(U) On November 18, Sheikh Abdul Sattar pushed the rivalry with AMS back to the forefront, by making a statement to al-Iraqiya TV calling for Harith al-Dhari's removal as secretary-general of AMS in favor of Sheikh Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i. In the statement, Abdul Sattar described al-Dhari as a murderer and a kidnapper and stated that he did not represent the people of Anbar. Abdul Sattar further called upon the Zobai tribe to determine its stance towards Harith al-Dhari and his actions or they too would be targeted and requested that Sheikh Abd al-Malik al-Sa'di and (b)(6) return to Iraq to better provide spiritual guidance to the people of Anbar.[1105]

~~(S/NF)~~ The core dispute between the two men had now escalated to the point of a test of wills as to which vision would prevail in Anbar. Many Anbaris identified with Harith al-Dhari's demands for Coalition withdrawal and harsh criticism of the Shi'a-led Iraqi government. This, however, did not preclude them from supporting the SAA, which made no secret of its desire for aid from the Coalition, Iraqi police, and Iraqi government. As a result, for SAA members, Harith al-Dhari's

[1102] [| Military | 17 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1103] Ibid.
[1104] Ibid.
[1105] [| Military | 21 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

attacks on Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his organization were seen as attacks on the tribes that had joined the Anbar Salvation Front.[1106]

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Abdul Sattar's suggestion that Sheikh Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i assume the position of AMS secretary-general was supported by Sheikh Ahmad himself, who had met with Coalition officials and sought to limit the influence of AMS as long as Harith al-Dhari was the leader of the organization.[1107]

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Abdul Sattar's challenge to the Zobai tribe of which Harith al-Dhari was the most recognized national figure was recognition that the tribe had supported the Sunni insurgency from the beginning and that many of its members hated the Iraqi government and the Coalition. This had less to do with Harith al-Dhari, however, and far more to do with the tribe's isolated geography, rampant unemployment, and predisposition to extremist interpretations of Islam. As long as this state of affairs endured, most of the Zobai tribe would support the insurgency despite Sheikh Abdul Sattar's threats.[1108]

~~(S/NF)~~ Both of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's preferred Anbari spiritual leaders Sheikh Abd al-Malik and (b)(6) had supported the insurgency in the past. Sheikh Abd al-Malik was the former imam of the Hadra al-Muhammadiyah Mosque in Fallujah who had supported Zarqawi from January until November 2004 and the conclusion of Operation AL FAJR. Sheikh Abd al-Malik's collusion with Zarqawi, however, was pragmatic rather than ideological and he was far from alone in this collaboration - even the late Fallujah mufti Sheikh Hamza Abbas al-Issawi collaborated with Zarqawi when he controlled the city. While Sheikh Abd al-Malik had certainly been involved in FRE and SAR insurgent activities he, like Sheikh Hamza Abbas al-Issawi, was one of many respected Fallujah religious leaders who had agreed to support Zarqawi prior to Operation AL FAJR when the prospect of AQI victory in Anbar was perceived to be imminent, only to turn against him later.[1109]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) by contrast, was one of the "founding fathers" of AMS who had lived as exile in the UAE during the rule of Saddam Hussein, only to return to Iraq after his overthrow and be forced to leave once again after delivering an inflammatory sermon at a Baghdad mosque sanctioning attacks on Coalition forces. Back in the UAE, (b)(6) maintained extensive ties to the SAR insurgency by facilitating and financing attacks. (b)(6) however, eventually persuaded (b)(6) of the value of working with the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi government, and even the Coalition. In addition, (b)(6) was respected by a majority of the Iraqi Shi'a and could easily be used as a bridge between the two sects. (b)(6) moderation was displayed in a September 2006 interview, in which he denied that President Bush, the United States, or Israel had declared war on Islam and stated that those now using the slogan of a "war against Islam" were themselves not true Muslims.[1110]

Approved for Release

[1106] Ibid.
[1107] Ibid.
[1108] Ibid.
[1109] Ibid.
[1110] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Even after making these remarks, Sheikh Abdul Sattar claimed that he did not intend to move against AMS, recognizing the importance of maintaining a common front among Anbaris against AQI. By restricting his criticism only to the person of Harith al-Dhari and not to AMS, 1920 Revolution Brigade, or al-Dhari's SAR allies, Sheikh Abdul Sattar kept the door open for AMS moderates and 1920 Revolution Brigade members who wished to break with Harith al-Dhari and join SAA.[1111]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the Sunni political establishment did not appreciate Harith al-Dhari's constant criticism of their participation in the Iraqi government, they nevertheless criticized his arrest warrant in an effort to promote Sunni solidarity. The Anbar Central Council also supported Harith al-Dhari, with Sheikh Abdul Sattar's uncle Sheikh Fawzi even going on al-Jazeera television on November 20 to criticize both Harith's arrest warrant and the SAA, stating that Sheikh Abdul Sattar did not represent the Albu Risha tribe. Anbar Central Council president Tariq Khulayf and its business leader Khamis Khanjar also supported Harith, with both men hoping to secure political support from AMS and other Iraqi Sunni tribes in order to counter the rise of SAA.[1112]

~~(S/NF)~~ While the Iraqi government was forced to walk a thin line concerning its criticism of Sunni elites, neighboring states, and even Shi'a radicals in order to preserve its national unity government, the fact that Sheikh Abdul Sattar was not Shi'a, Kurdish, or a member of the Sunni political establishment meant he felt free to criticize Harith al-Dhari. Moreover, he now had the support of the Iraqi government, many Anbari tribal leaders, and much of the Anbari public. This ingratiated Sheikh Abdul Sattar with the Iraqi national leaders and helped to embolden more moderate elements within AMS.[1113]

SAA Expansion into Hit, Husaybah, Amariyah

~~(S)~~ Just a few weeks later, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was able to use his growing popular support to expand the SAA into western Anbar. On November 26, Sheikh Hekmat Jubayir al-Gaoud was selected by the tribal leadership to assume the office of mayor of Hit, reconstituting the city council for the first time since August 2006. Sheikh Hekmat was the cousin of Albu Nimr tribal leader Sheikh Hatem Abdul Razzaq (b)(6) and the son of Sheikh Jubayir Anad who handled the day-to-day running of the tribe's business holdings.[1114]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Albu Nimr held a special significance within both SAA and Anbar Revolutionaries, since it was the only one of the original five founding tribes of the former organization that was not based in the Ramadi area. The (b)(6) family to which Sheikh Hekmat belonged was one of the wealthiest families in all of Anbar and was generally pro-Coalition. While the tribal members of the (b)(6) family resided in Iraq, their wealthier counterparts, such as the brothers Hamid and Jalal lived in Amman. Former Anbar governor Faisal (b)(6) was the most prominent member of the family to publicly support Sheikh Abdul Sattar, but he was not welcomed by the rest

[1111] Ibid.
[1112] Ibid.
[1113] Ibid.
[1114] [| Military | 26 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

of his family and only maintained minimal influence within the SAA due to his status as the former governor of the province.[1115]

~~(S)~~ Ultimately, the fight against AQI was a popular one for the Albu Nimr tribe and both Sheikh Hekmat and Brigadier General Hamid were able to present a united front against the group in Hit.[1116]

~~(S)~~ The Anbar Revolutionaries also expanded its anti-AQI activities to encompass Husaybah-Sharqiyah, Amariyah, and Ferris Town. Forming an alliance with the pro-Coalition subtribes of the Albu Issa, the Anbar Revolutionaries sought to resolve local tribal disputes in order to prevent AQI from gaining a foothold in the area. This led to the November 24 decision by the pro-Coalition Albu Issa subtribes (Albu Harimat, al-Manasir, Albu Dahir, Albu Ghrati, and Albu Jassim) to join the SAA, though anti-Coalition Albu Issa subtribes such as the Fuhaylats continued to support AQI.[1117]

IIP Support for Security in Amariyah

~~(S)~~ The entry of SAA into Amariyah was helped by strong anti-AQI sentiment in the town. The pro-Coalition Albu Issa subtribes in the area were supported by a small force of civilian guards who were members of the IIP militia (see Chapter 6b) and supported by local IIP leader Ali Farhan Ramadan. By paying 500,000-750,000 dinars ($330-500) a month to members of the IIP militia, Ali Farhan was able to dissuade them from joining AQI and convince them to carry out joint operations with the local Iraqi police. Using additional money funneled by the IIP to the Albu Issa subtribes, Ali Farhan was able to coordinate with Iraqi police in Amariyah and Ferris Town in order to provide a greater degree of security to the area.[1118]

~~(S)~~ While the IIP guards in Amariyah and Ferris Town did not support the Coalition, they clearly considered AQI to be a greater threat. As in Anah, AQI fighters actively targeted IIP members, demanding that they go to mosques run by pro-AQI clerics and publicly renounce their affiliation with the party. AQI also kidnapped at least two IIP members who refused to do so and the Coalition received fragmentary reports of fighting between AQI-Ansar al-Sunna and the IIP militia in the area.[1119] These constant attacks on the IIP would eventually push the organization into a closer collaboration with the SAA, allowing Sheikh Abdul Sattar to spread his influence into the Amariyah area.

~~(S)~~ In the meantime, Albu Issa tribal leader Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi had become a member of the SAA and supporter of the Anbar Revolutionaries, which he planned to use to help spread the organization beyond the Ramadi-Saqlawiyah corridor where most of the Anbar Revolutionaries resided. Anbar Revolutionaries leaders told Sheikh Khamis that they would very much like to do so,

Approved for Release

[1115] Ibid.
[1116] Ibid.
[1117] [| Military | 30 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM |20061130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1118] [| Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1119] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

but that they were currently tied down fighting AQI in Ramadi and the Jazira area and lacked the necessary funding, resources, and manpower needed to assist Albu Issa tribe.[1120]

~~(S)~~ To help him in the meanwhile, the Anbar Revolutionaries assisted Sheikh Khamis in setting up two tribal militias in Amariyah and Ferris Town to operate in conjunction with the Iraqi police and the existing IIP militia. Each tribal militia had forty fighters armed with AK-47s, though they had little in the way of ammunition, rank, or hierarchy. These militias were subject to Sheikh Khamis's newly-formed Revolutionary Council, which was intended to develop cohesion among the Albu Issa subtribes so that they could better oppose AQI. Yet was primarily the wealthier subtribes in Amariyah and Ferris Town that supported Sheikh Kamis and the Revolutionary Council; many of poorer rural subtribes such as the Fuhaylats and Owesats remained hotbeds of support for AQI.[1121]

AQI Attempts to Regain the Initiative

Dissension within AQI

~~(S)~~ One of the consequences of the rise of the SAA was that a number of FREs who had joined AQI as much out of a desire to regain their lost power and status as out of ideology were now considering switching sides in return for advisory posts in the Iraqi army. Foremost among these were Major General Khaddam Muhammed Farris al-Fahdawi and (b)(6) (b)(6) both of whom had served in Saddam Hussein's army as well as the Iraqi National Guard before joining AQI.[1122]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) had been General Khaddam's executive officer during their time in the ING and like many in the unit joined him in defecting to AQI. Since joining AQI he had operated out of Ramadi, administering the AQI's smuggling, IDF, and mortar activities in the city.[1123]

~~(S)~~ Despite the involvement of General Khaddam, (b)(6) and other members of the 60th Brigade who had joined AQI in the insurgency, they now recognized that security situation in Anbar was now quite different from what it had been in late 2004. For them, the successes of the SAA were the writing on the wall and they now believed that they could reap broader benefits from working with them to defeat AQI, creating dissension within the organization in Anbar at a time when it was seeking to redouble its efforts against Sheikh Abdul Sattar.[1124]

(b)(6) Refocuses AQI Priorities

~~(S)~~ On November 14 (b)(6) traveled to the Albu Ubayd tribal village in the Jazira area of Ramadi to meet with Mujahideen Shura Council members Abu al-Harith (the amir of Salahaddin) and Thamir Hamad Nahir al-Rishawi al-Dulaymi (the Ramadi amir). During the meeting, (b)(6) appointed (b)(6) (b)(6) to assist Thamir with managing AQI operations in Ramadi.

[1120] [| Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1121] Ibid.
[1122] [| Military | 27 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061127 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1123] Ibid.
[1124] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6) made the destruction of the SAA and any other organization that opposed AQI as the group's top priority in Anbar, ordering (b)(6) to send fighters and suicide bombers from Salahaddin to Anbar and to increase the number of attacks against the Coalition in Salahaddin to draw their attention away from Anbar.[1125]

~~(S)~~ In particular (b)(6) wanted AQI in Ramadi to increase IDF attacks against the Coalition while they prepared for a major attack against one of their bases similar to that which had occurred against the Abu Ghraib prison in 2005 (see Chapter 5a), in the hopes that it would shatter Coalition resolve in Anbar. At the conclusion of the meeting, (b)(6) departed for Bayji to meet with other regional AQI leaders while developing the next phase of his plan for Salahaddin province.[1126]

AQI Reorganizes

~~(S)~~ As a direct response to this meeting, AQI began preparing for its move against the SAA in Ramadi. (b)(6), the head of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Ramadi, sent signed messages to senior members of the Albu Soda tribe in the Sufia district of Ramadi demanding that the tribe abandon their security checkpoints or he would use chemical or biological weapons against the Albu Soda tribe and assassinate their leaders. Because there seemed little likelihood of AQI using chemical or biological weapons against the Albu Soda, this threat only served to further inspire Albu Soda resistance against the group.[1127]

~~(S)~~ Spearheading the new AQI campaign in Ramadi was (b)(6) (b)(6), who had been a member of AQI (then JTJ) since at least 2004. The owner of the Ramadi Transport Company, (b)(6) carried out sniper and IED attacks while facilitating weapons smuggling from Baghdad to Ramadi. Although (b)(6) was not a high-ranking member of AQI in Ramadi, the cumulative effect of the loss of (b)(6) (b)(6) eft the group scrambling to find experienced Ramadi leadership, resulting in the promotion of individual cell leaders to fill leadership positions.[1128]

~~(S)~~ AQI was also seeking to redouble its efforts in Fallujah, where leaders (b)(6) and (b)(6) held a meeting of all AQI leaders in the city at the heavily-guarded La'min Laboratory in the Sina'a district of Fallujah to discuss how to make the group's efforts in the insurgency more effective. (b)(6) was unhappy with the state of attacks against the Coalition, prompting (b)(6) to argue that attacks were becoming more effective. While both (b)(6) (b)(6) were based in the Zobai tribal area, they entered Fallujah through the Nu'aymiyah area.[1129]

~~(S)~~ The meeting in Fallujah occurred around the same time as other AQI leadership meetings in Haditha and Rawah, in which members of the group's provincial and national leadership stressed the need to increase the precision and effectiveness of attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces because of the rise of anti-AQI sentiments in Ramadi. By stressing that AQI fighters should focus

[1125] [| Military | 18 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061218 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1126] Ibid.
[1127] [| Military | 15 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1128] Ibid.
[1129] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

on killing Coalition and Iraqi government personnel rather than civilians, the group's leadership hoped to combat this sentiment.[1130]

~~(S/NF)~~ A major element of AQI reorganization was the internal rotating of amirs. For instance, in early November 2006, Sheikh Abu Dawud, who had finally emerged as the amir of the Fallujah-Khalidiyah-Saddamiyah corridor (see Chapter 6b for a discussion of the internal struggle for the position of Fallujah amir) was rotated to Habbaniyah and replaced by (b)(6) (b)(6) due to the fact that he had become too well-known in Fallujah. As the leader of the force of up to 300 fighters, Sheikh Abu Dawud's position was highly sought after within AQI.[1131]

AQI Recruiting

~~(S)~~ As part of the reorganization process, AQI sought to thoroughly train all new recruits. This must be contrasted with its earlier method of allowing natural selection to take its course before any training was provided. The group also developed a uniform standard for training recruits to carry out IED and sniper attacks. As before, AQI recruiters targeted men between the ages of 25-40, though older recruits were preferred to be groomed as leaders because they were seen as more likely to keep the group's secrets. Despite its religious rhetoric, AQI recruiters were aware of the economic situation in Ramadi and were quite capable of recruiting young men by appealing to their desire for money, power, a new car, and cheap fuel. In addition to these professional recruiters, individual AQI members were encouraged to recruit friends to join the group. Under (b)(6) new standards, however, AQI members were told to avoid using force or threat of force to persuade potential recruits to join in order to prevent them from later becoming disloyal to the organization.[1132]

~~(S)~~ After prospective recruits had pledged to join AQI and sworn bayat, they were invited to their recruiter's home, shown video propaganda, and told that they would be given $1,000 for every successful videotaped attack. The recruiter stressed the financial incentives for working for AQI (see Chapter 6a). After that, the recruit was take to a safe house or training camp and tutored in the construction of IEDs starting with most basic (command-detonated artillery rounds) and working up to the most complex (base station IEDs). Accompanying the IED training was an intense ideological indoctrination that the Iraqi police were the greatest threat to AQI because they were able to identify the insurgency in a way that the Coalition could not. During this tutoring process, recruits were screened for intelligence and loyalty to the organization, with the top 4-5 recruits taken into the desert to be trained as snipers.[1133]

AQI in Zaidon, Saqlawiyah and Against the Albu Alwan

~~(S/NF)~~ Although the majority of AQI efforts were now aimed at Ramadi, AQI also attempted to regain the initiative in other parts of Anbar. Following the murder of at least nineteen AQI fighters at the hands of armed groups in Fallujah (likely Anbar Revolutionaries or 1920 Revolution Brigade)

[1130] Ibid.
[1131] [| Military | 25 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1132] [| Military | 29 Nov 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1133] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

and the declaration circulated by city residents that AQI fighters must renounce their affilition to the group or be killed, a majority of the foreign fighters that had operated in Fallujah relocated to the Zaidon area under the leadership of (b)(6) While this was in part because the foreign AQI fighters were more identifiable than their Iraqi counterparts, it was also because (b)(6) had overseen AQI's campaign against 1920 Revolution Brigade in Fallujah and other AQI leaders in the city may have believed that his temporary relocation could ease tensions with residents.[1134]

~~(S)~~ In an effort to gather new recruits from tribes that refused to join SAA, AQI fighters in the Zaidon tribal area began distributing propaganda and recruiting from their base of operations in the village of al-Anaz. This effort was overseen by (b)(6) high-ranking AQI leader operating in the area between Abu Ghraib and Zaidon and had sought to implement *shari'ah* there following the declaration of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq. Residents who smoked cigarettes had their fingers cut off, while those that wore improprer clothing or beards were killed. (b)(6) regarded these penalties as too harsh and feared that they would lead to popular resentment, prompting him on November 11 to remove (b)(6) from a position of leadership and to have him focus on recruiting instead.[1135]

~~(S)~~ Ta'alia village also served as an AQI node, deliberately cordoned off by more than 150 fighters so that it could serve as a broadcast site for al-Zawraa satellite television (see below). Al-Anaz village, by contrast, served as the headquarters of (b)(6) and was referred to as (b)(6) by residents, in reference to the large numbers of foreign fighters in the area. Because the Coalition was absent from the Zaidon area, AQI and its allies had a protected zone from which to conduct attacks against Coalition forces in Fallujah and then fall back to regroup.[1136]
~~(S)~~ In Saqlawiyah, local AQI leaders (b)(6) (b)(6) began actively pooling their efforts to coordinate attacks in Saqlawiyah in general, and along the Japanese Bridge northeast of Habbaniyah in particular. As the primary means of AQI access in and out of the Albu Shijil tribal area, the Japanese Bridge was a center of AQI activity, as its fighters killed Iraqi police officers and threw their bodies from the Bridge into the Thar Thar Canal.[1137]

~~(S)~~ In late November and early December, AQI also attempted to again take on the Albu Alwan, this time by threatening Iraqi police at the al-Warar station. The station had been established on November 12 by Coalition forces, Iraqi police, and local Albu Alwan tribesmen backed by Sheikh Abdul Sattar.[1138] Police from al-Warar station supported the Coalition during Operation TINIAN, and AQI leaders in Ramadi decided to attack the station both to punish them for this support and to prevent the Albu Alwan from becoming even more closely aligned with Sheikh Abdul Sattar's anti-AQI activities, particularly the SAA's "insurgent rehabilitation" program aimed at preventing recidivism.[1139]

Approved for Release

[1134] [| Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1135] [| Military | 30 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1136] Ibid.
[1137] [| Military | 1 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061201 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1138] [| Military | 4 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1139] [| Military | 5 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ Ansar al-Sunna joined AQI in their attacks on the Albu Alwan. The group's Ramadi membership was drawn heavily from Albu Alwan tribesmen who lived in the al-Hawz, Sufia, and Sharqiyah districts of the city in contrast to the bulk of their tribesmen that lived in the Hay al-Dhubat district. Furious over the support for the SAA by the Albu Alwan tribal leaders, Ansar al-Sunna used former Albu Alwan tribal leader Sheikh Adnan Khamis Jamal Alwani as their courier to the Albu Alwan leadership, threatening to kill them if the al-Warar police station was not closed. When the Albu Alwan refused, Ansar al-Sunna first attempted to make good on their threats by attacking the homes of the tribal leaders in the Hay al-Dhubat. After those attacks were repelled by the Iraqi police, Ansar al-Sunna began using IDF attacks to injure the tribal leaders' family members.[1140]

~~(S)~~ The reason for Albu Alwan resistance to both AQI and Ansar al-Sunna was due in part to the strong leadership of Sheikh Abdul Sattar in contrast to his predecessor Sheikh Adnan Khamis Jamal, who was a weak leader and easily intimidated by AQI. As long as he was perceived as powerful, the Albu Alwan police officers would continue manning the al-Warar police station and the tribe itself would remain steadfast against all AQI or Ansar al-Sunna attempts at threats and intimidation.[1141]

Ansar al-Sunna Reorganizes

~~(S)~~ Like AQI, Ansar al-Sunna decided that events in Anbar were forcing it to reorganize. In early December 2006, the Ansar al-Sunna leadership began planning to restructure and decentralize their organization following the capture of key leaders in November and December 2006. This effort was pioneered by senior leader (b)(6) who held meetings with the Ansar al-Sunna *shura majlis* in Baghdad together with Baghdad amir (b)(6) At the meetings, (b)(6) (b)(6) decided to divide Ansar al-Sunna's fighters into several autonomous brigades that could operate with greater freedom under the leadership of an amir.[1142]

~~(S)~~ To ensure that these brigades remained under Ansar al-Sunna control, the group opted to appoint a commander-in-chief or "amir of the brigades" who would be responsible for the fighters and answerable only to the group's supreme leader (b)(6) (b)(6) was considered for the position of amir of the brigades, but the Ansar al-Sunna leadership preferred to appoint someone with bonafide international jihadist credentials, preferably someone who had conducted a significant attack in which large numbers of Coalition forces were killed.[1143]

~~(S)~~ The reason for this move lay in the fact that Coalition forces had made a number of impressive captures of senior Ansar al-Sunna leaders in the sixty days prior to the meeting. Among the group's losses were Afghan-trained inter-cell coordinator, financier, and secretary (b)(6)

(b)(6)

[1140] [| Military | 17 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061217 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1141] Ibid.
[1142] [Military | 10 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061210 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1143] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6)

(b)(6) While these captures did not dissolve Ansar al-Sunna's operational cells, the absence of their leadership severely limited coordination between separate cells and the Ansar al-Sunna leadership, forcing the group to reestablish its disrupted command structure in order to continue attacking the Coalition. Prior to this meeting, Ansar al-Sunna had been a multi-tiered pyramidal organization with each element of the group answerable directly to the senior leadership.[1144]

~~(S)~~ The restructuring and decentralization of Ansar al-Sunna was a clear indication that Coalition operations had disrupted the surviving leadership, leaving the remaining leaders with the heavy burden of initiating a wholesale restructuring of their own organization in the middle of an insurgency. While the national leadership continued to command a large and deadly organization, the loss of senior leaders coupled with the group's reorganization adversely affected its operational capabilities in the Ramadi-Haditha corridor as loyalties shifted and operational starvation occurred.[1145]

~~(S)~~ In Anbar, many Ansar al-Sunna cells regularly shared resources such as weapons caches and VBIED factories with their AQI counterparts, particularly in Ramadi, Haditha, and Hit areas. While this cooperation benefited both organizations, it now represented a vulnerability for Ansar al-Sunna as multiple cells operating absent a strong leadership found themselves open to AQI recruiting, leading to an expansion of AQI's influence in cities and towns where the Coalition had degraded Ansar al-Sunna. Moreover, since the Ansar al-Sunna cell leaders often maintained financial and facilitation connections, individual cells had difficulty maintaining cohesion following the loss of their local leader.[1146]

~~(S)~~ Ansar al-Sunna was also at something a crossroads due to the fact that its members were increasingly divided into pro- and anti-AQI as well as Arab and Kurdish factions, leading to a rift between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna in Salahaddin. In Anbar by contrast, AQI and Ansar al-Sunna coordinated their activities, relied on the same weapons smugglers and foreign fighter facilitators, and shared the same enemies in the form of the SAA. As a result, the internal restructuring of Ansar al-Sunna at the national level did little to diminish the group's threat to the Coalition in Anbar.[1147]

Al-Zawraa

~~(S)~~ The efforts by both insurgent groups to regain the initiative in Anbar were assisted by the al-Zawraa Arabic satellite channel. This station was created in October 2005 by Sunni MP Mishan al-Jaburi using misappropriated government funds (Mishan was reputed to have skimmed $600,000 a month off the salaries of the strategic infrastructure battalions during his time as security coordinator between the defense and oil ministries), though it did not begin broadcasting until September 2006. Because of its vehemently anti-Shi'a, pro-insurgent message it was ordered shut

[1144] Ibid.
[1145] Ibid.
[1146] Ibid.
[1147] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

down by the Iraqi government, only to resume broadcasting from an unknown location on November 18.[1148]

~~(S)~~ Al-Zawraa founder (b)(6) was a Sunni MP who founded the three-seat Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc (RLB) in the Iraqi parliament. RLB's platform called for the integration of former Ba'athists into the government and the expulsion of the Coalition from Iraq. As a result of his activities, on October 8, 2006 the Iraqi parliament stripped (b)(6) of his immunity, forcing him to flee to 1.4b in order to escape arrest. Despite his exile, (b)(6) ontinued to lead his parliament bloc in absentia.[1149]

~~(S/NF)~~ An opportunistic and unrepentant Ba'athist, (b)(6) had attempted as far back as July 2003 to falsely claim to Mosul's political establishment that he had the support of the Coalition and therefore should be respected and feared. In February 2004, he became the editor of the anti-Coalition newspaper al-Itijah al-Akhar and worked with 1.4b intelligence to use his publication as a vehicle to refute Coalition allegations of 1.4b support for the insurgency. Between November 2004 and April 2005, he had attempted to convince members of the Dulaymi tribal confederation in Anbar that he would reestablish the old Iraqi military if they agreed to vote for him in the December 2005 elections.[1150]

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite his track record, (b)(6) was able to use al-Zawraa as a very effective propaganda tool for the insurgency, constantly reporting massive Coalition defeats that resulted in no insurgent losses. The station was popular among Iraqi police in Ferris Town as well as some residents of Fallujah who perceived it to be credible as an "Iraqi" news station that was not government-controlled. AQI appears to have actively supported the station, with the group's strongholds in the Zobai tribal area serving as broadcast sites for al-Zawraa. While (b)(6) lacked the personal appeal of (b)(6) , his station was a major success due to its ability to paint the Coalition as enemies of the Sunnis. Lincoln Group surveys between August and September 2006 indicated that a majority of Anbaris continued to support attacks on Coalition forces. While this figure declined somewhat with the rise of the SAA, the continued reception of al-Zawraa indicated that anti-Coalition sentiment remained prevalent in the province.[1151]

The Coalition Maintains the Initiative

Operation MAJID

~~(S)~~ Despite these attempts by AQI to reorganize and regain the initiative, the Coalition and anti-AQI forces in Anbar managed to continue to take the fight to the insurgents. In late November, Coalition forces began Operation MAJID to clear the Haditha region of AQI and affiliated insurgents. With the movement of the Coalition into Barwanah, Haqlaniyah, and Haditha, high-ranking AQI leaders fled the larger cities for Khaffajiyah, Albu Hyatt, and Anah to hide until it would be possible to regroup and return to the Haditha area once Coalition forces had departed.

[1148] [| Military | 7 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1149] Ibid.
[1150] Ibid.
[1151] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Low and mid-level AQI fighters, by contrast, remained in the area using false identification cards, operating clandestinely and carrying out periodic kidnappings and murders of suspected collaborators.[1152]

~~(S)~~ Coalition forces then proceeded into Wadi Sakran, discovering a major AQI arms cache and training facility. As noted before, Wadi Sakran and Albu Hyatt were major centers of AQI activity as a result of their seclusion from Coalition forces and Iraqi police. Aggressive operations were also conducted in Bani Dahir, which had been subjected to a heavy AQI presence as well as the murder and intimidation campaign that went with it.[1153]

~~(S)~~ The immediate consequence of Operation MAJID for the insurgency in the Haditha area, apart from dispersal, was that a power struggle erupted between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna, with Ansar al-Sunna burning cars belonging to AQI.[1154] As had occurred during previous Coalition operations such as Operation RIVER GATE in 2005 (see Chapter 5a), a large number of insurgent fighters dispersed from the Haditha area at the onset of Operation MAJID, dispersing to Hit, the Rawah-Anah corridor, Bayji, and Ubaydi. This was intended as a temporary shift, however, and AQI fighters planned to filter back into the Haditha area once they perceived that the threat posed by Coalition forces had returned to an acceptable level.[1155]

~~(S)~~ With AQI dispersed from Haditha, the Coalition established checkpoints, conducted patrols inside the city, and created a secure area on the outskirts of the city in an effort to prevent AQI fighters from returning.[1156] A similar situation occurred in Haqlaniyah, where AQI activity was virtually non-existent after the majority of the group's operatives in the town fled at the beginning of Operation MAJID. Coalition, police, or Iraqi army personnel searched every structure in Haqlaniyah, with residents being very receptive to their presence.[1157]

~~(S)~~ This positive shift in atmospherics were not seen in Barwanah, where residents remained distrustful of the Coalition due to fear of the Shi'a militias, paranoia over 1.4b, a belief that the Coalition was not committed to their security, and intimidation by the insurgency. The severely weakened Albu Nimr tribal leadership in Barwanah continued to oppose both participation in the Iraqi army or police, while many residents believed that the Coalition would soon leave the town and the insurgency would return unless competent Iraqi security forces were established.[1158] In an effort to achieve this, Haditha police chief (b)(6) conducted an IO campaign in support of Operation MAJID aimed to persuading residents to accept Coalition-imposed security measures. With the arrival of more than one hundred newly-trained Iraqi police in the Haditha area by mid-November 2006 and another 126 scheduled to arrive at the end of December 2006, the presence of the Iraqi police in Haditha continued to grow.[1159]

Approved for Release

[1152] [| Military | 27 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061227 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1153] [| Military | 8 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1154] [| Military | 12 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061212 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1155] [| Military | 17 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061217 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1156] [| Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1157] [| Military | 11 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061211 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1158] [| Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1159] [| Military | 7 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

The Death of Abu Abdallah

~~(S)~~ On December 1 a Coalition airstrike resulted in the death of Abu Abdallah, the head of AQI's Ajjamiyah network. This network operated across the western Euphrates River valley from Rawah to al-Qaim, providing logistical support and foreign fighter facilitation to AQI cells throughout western Anbar. Made up of experienced and dedicated fighters, the Ajjamiyah network was responsible for a significant portion of the AQI attacks between Rawah and al-Qaim. An example of the network's access to weapons can be seen in the October 8, 2006 discovery of one of the network's arms caches that contained heavy machine guns and ammunition, ordinance and IED manufacturing components, and SA-7 MANPADS.[1160]

~~(S)~~ Even before the death of Abu Abdallah, the Ajjamiyah network had suffered a number of major setbacks as a result of renewed fighting between AQI and the revived Hamza Battalion in al-Qaim. Iraqi police operations in the western Euphrates River valley had also resulted in the capture of Abu Abdallah's top lieutenant (b)(6) and Coalition operations in the Rawah-Anah corridor killed many Ajjamiyah network operatives and forced others to minimize or abandon their activity in the area. With Abu Abdallah's demise, the group's ability to recover from its setbacks in the Rawah-Anah corridor or al-Qaim was greatly reduced.[1161]

Approved for Release

[1160] [| Military | 3 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061203 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1161] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Other Insurgent Organizations Open Negotiations (December 2006)

Jaysh al-Fatihin Negotiations with Vice President Hashimi

~~(S/NF)~~ At the end of November 2006, national leaders of Jaysh al-Fatihin expressed a willingness to enter at least some form of negotiation with the Iraqi government. Mid-level Jaysh al-Fatihin leader (b)(6) traveled to Baghdad to meet with Sunni planning minister and IIP politburo member (b)(6) in the hopes of arranging talks between Jaysh al-Fatihin and Vice President Hashimi in an effort to mend ties between the two (Jaysh al-Fatihin spokesman (b)(6) had criticized Hashimi on November 4) and strengthen the relationship between Jaysh al-Fatihin and the IIP in the hopes of forming some kind of political coalition.[1162]

~~(S/NF)~~ The relationship between Jaysh al-Fatihin and the IIP was an interesting one. During the December 2005 elections, Jaysh al-Fatihin (then Islamic Army of Iraq) members had supported the Tawafuq Front coalition of which both their political leader (b)(6) and then-IIP secretary-general Tariq Hashimi were members. Members of the Islamic Army of Iraq apparently believed that Hashimi would give them jobs in the Iraqi government after he became vice president, but Hashimi apparently reneged on any agreement that existed between the two. By October 29, 2006 Vice President Hashimi told Ambassador Khalilzad that he was on a Jaysh al-Fatihin "hit list," but this was an exaggeration and Jaysh al-Fatihin had no intention of killing Iraq's ranking Sunni politician.[1163]

~~(S)~~ In Anbar, some Jaysh al-Fatihin and former Islamic Army of Iraq moderates began integrating themselves into SAA security units, although the Jaysh al-Fatihin organization itself was not yet willing to align itself with the SAA. As a result, Sheikh Abdul Sattar entered into negotiations with the Jaysh al-Fatihin provincial leadership to persuade them to adopt a ceasefire and incorporate their fighters into existing anti-AQI units as well as legitimate security forces. This initiative occurred separately from that which Jaysh al-Fatihin was pursuing with Vice President Hashimi due to the latter's continued IIP partisan attempts to undermine the influence of SAA.[1164]

1920 Revolution Brigade Negotiations

~~(S/NF)~~ The 1920 Revolution Brigade now doubled its efforts to integrate with the Iraqi political process. In late December 2006, 1920 Revolution Brigade emissary (b)(6) met with the leaders of the SAA to see if they would sponsor the integration of members of 1920 Revolution Brigade into the Iraqi police and army in Anbar so that they could support anti-AQI operations. This was supported by the SAA platform, which called for former SAR insurgents to renounce their past actions and join the SAA to fight AQI. This had the intended side effect of undercutting the likelihood of recidivism.[1165]

Approved for Release

[1162] Ibid.
[1163] Ibid.
[1164] Ibid.
[1165] [| Military | 26 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ While 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah members loyal to (b)(6) were already supporting the Anbar Revolutionaries in their efforts against AQI, (b)(6) was in regular contact with Sheikh Abdul Sattar prior to his assassination attempt) (b)(6) efforts signified that (b)(6) s followers were willing to continue their efforts to join the political process despite the near-death of their leader. By late December 2006, (b)(6) views had been adopted at the national level by 1920 Revolution Brigade politburo chief (b)(6) who wanted to negotiate a settlement with the Coalition as soon as possible in order to better defend the Sunni community. While the group had previously attempted to negotiate with Vice President Hashimi, all its emissaries had been arrested and its members had been discouraged from further dialogue with the Iraqi national government.[1166]

~~(S)~~ Unfortunately, the criteria set by the SAA for former insurgents to join their group involved pledging allegiance to the Iraqi national government, making a public denunciation of AQI, and agreeing not to carry out any attacks against the Coalition. While this arrangement was possible for (b)(6) followers among 1920 Revolution Brigade and Harakat al-Islamiyah, it was far from clear as to whether this would be adopted by other factions of the 1920 Revolution Brigade - certainly it was not adopted by the pro-ceasefire elements within Ansar al-Sunna or Jaysh al-Fatihin.[1167]

The Anbar Salvation Front and the Anbar Revolutionaries Organization

~~(S/NF)~~ By the beginning of December 2006, the SAA had expanded from its original core of five tribes centered in the Ramadi area to more than twenty spread throughout Anbar. While Sheikh Abdul Sattar was the organization's undisputed leader and tribal leaders from the original five tribes dominated the group's leadership positions, all major decisions were determined by consensus. The group's agencies included political, military, and media committees, and by December 2006 it had created an 11-point platform addressing everything from the question of local governance to de-Ba'athification to terrorism to economic recovery. While the SAA lacked the resources to attend to this diverse range of issues, they helped to organize the group at the grassroots level and garnered the interest of national politicians.[1168]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Anbar Revolutionaries, by contrast, were a loose confederation of off-duty police, tribal fighters, and former SAR insurgents that by December 2006 had established chapters in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah, Rutbah, Saqlawiyah, Karmah, Amariyah, and Ferris Town. These chapters did not coordinate their actions but instead served as something of a common banner for residents willing to expel AQI from their area. In many cases, local chapters of the Anbar Revolutionaries were made up of friends and relatives of AQI's victims wearing black masks, armed with AK-47s, and driving privately owned vehicles at night in search of their quarries. Despite the Anbar Revolutionaries' expansion however, the group's widespread cells had no defined regional leadership and were only as effective as their own local logistical capabilities and resources allowed them to be.[1169]

Approved for Release

[1166] Ibid.
[1167] Ibid.
[1168] [| Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1169] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, by December 4, (b)(6) and Brigadier General Hamid Hamad al-Showqa had successfully recruited all the necessary 2,250 personnel for their three Emergency Response Battalions (ERBs) but they still needed weapons, vehicles, and training for their men, who had not been paid since signing on.[1170] AQI took advantage of this delay to infiltrate the ERBs in Ramadi. Due to the group's ample experience at infiltrating the Iraqi police and the sheer size of the ERBs, it was next to impossible for the SAA to screen out all AQI agents given their limited resources.[1171] As in the SAA's original proposal, the ERBs were commanded by (b)(6) (b)(6) in Habbaniyah.[1172]

City Stories (December 2006)

Ramadi

~~(S)~~ The Hay al-Dhubat Thanya district (2nd Officers' District) of Ramadi was the nerve center of AQI in Ramadi as well as the stronghold of AQI Ramadi amir Thamir Hamad Nahar.[1173] Despite the proliferation of COPs and extensive Coalition patrols, AQI retained a significant presence in the district. The group set up safe houses, arms caches, propaganda centers, and command and control nodes at Muhayim High School, Muhayim Elementary School, and the Abd al-Qadir Mosque.[1174] The Qatana district was also a center of AQI and Ansar al-Sunna activity in Ramadi, though much of this activity was concentrated in the eastern part of the district due to the establishment of the al-Warar police station.[1175] In an effort to drive AQI out of the Qatana district, Coalition forces conducted Operation HUE CITY aimed at establishing command operating positions and Iraqi police stations in the northeastern Qatana district and along 17th Street.[1176]

~~(S)~~ On December 15, AQI mounted the largest attack against Coalition forces throughout Ramadi since October 21, 2006. As with that the earlier attack, the intent was largely propagandistic: to demonstrate to residents that AQI was still powerful in Ramadi despite the efforts of the SAA. The complex attack, which consisted of highly visible explosions, prolonged gunfire, and indirect effects on the city such as the closing of the entry control points, was the culmination of lengthy preparation, including massing fighters near Hit and east of the Sufia district of the city. Although the level of coordination and complexity involved in the attack was impressive, it forced AQI to sustain high casualties at no cost to Coalition forces.[1177]

Approved for Release

[1170] Ibid.
[1171] [| Military | 10 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061210 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1172] [| Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1173]
[1174] [| Military | 4 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1175] [| Military | 8 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1176] [| Military | 20 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061220 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1177] [| Military | 17 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061217 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Khalidiyah

~~(S)~~ Education ministry employee (b)(6) was the AQI propagandist and facilitator in Khalidiyah, providing AQI fighters with jobs in the education ministry that enabled them to draw a steady salary in addition to their pay for insurgent participation. These AQI fighters resided near the al-Majid school, which served as their primary meeting place.[1178]

~~(S)~~ The strong presence of the Anbar Revolutionaries in Khalidiyah and their good working relationship with the local Iraqi police had a positive effect on security in the city. Waging an extremely effective propaganda campaign against AQI in the city, the Anbar Revolutionaries began posting the names of purported AQI members in public forums such as at the Khalid ibn al-Walid Mosque. This campaign caused many AQI cell leaders to regard Khalidiyah as untenable for their operations, relocating to Fallujah with their families for fear of attack by the Anbar Revolutionaries.[1179]

~~(S)~~ Despite the heavy presence of the Anbar Revolutionaries, a number of senior AQI leaders continued to operate in the town including Abdallah Ramaya, Abu Marayid, and Kamil Fadhil Latif (Kamil Alladima). While these leaders carried out a variety of activities for the organization ranging from coordinating between cells to facilitating meetings and travel arrangements for senior AQI leaders, with exception of IED manufacturing these leaders had little direct operational impact on security in the city.[1180]

Julaybah

~~(S)~~ AQI maintained an extremely strong influence in the Albu Bali and Albu Hizam tribal areas of Julaybah, with many residents too frightened by AQI to even speak with Coalition officials. This influence was due to the fact that both tribes' leading sheikhs were weak individuals who were unable to check AQI influence. Sheikh Sarhan Fadhil Marayi and Sheikh Sattar Muhammad Abd al-Fadhil of the Albu Bali tribe both fled to 1.4b for fear of AQI, while Sheikh Ayad Muhammad Diwan of the Albu Hazim tribe fled with his family to the Jazira area north of the Euphrates River. In the absence of their leadership, AQI was able to maintain a strong presence in both tribal areas, holding parades in support of the Islamic Amirate of Iraq between the Albu Bali tribal area and Sijaria.[1181]

~~(S)~~ Whenever AQI fighters entered Julaybah, they continually questioned residents concerning the Coalition presence before conducting any activities. AQI also maintained a successful propaganda campaign, convincing residents that the Coalition killed indiscriminately and deliberately planted snipers to murder Iraqi civilians. As a result, while a majority of the Albu Bali tribesmen supported the efforts of the Anbar Revolutionaries, they had no secure way of contacting the group to request its aid or contact its leaders to express their support.[1182]

[1178] [| Military | 4 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1179] [| Military | 5 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1180] [| Military | 27 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061227 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1181] [| Military | 26 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1182] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Karmah

~~(S)~~ In Karmah, residents living in the vicinity of OP Muhammad were forcibly evicted by AQI so that the group could gain a tactical position from which to launch attacks against OPs Muhammad and Omar.[1183] Tribal leader (b)(6) was under heavy pressure from AQI to use his influence to provide recruits for the group, but he was in fact an agent of the Anbar Revolutionaries in Khalidiyah.[1184]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) served as the primary leaders of AQI in Karmah, carrying out IED and VBIED attacks in the area. As the imam of the Muhammad ibn Sareen Mosque, (b)(6) was able to use his position to hold AQI meetings and plan further attack on the Coalition. (b)(6) was detained by Coalition forces on December 10 after sensitive reporting indicated that he possessed information concerning the body of the F-16 pilot who was killed on November 27 when his aircraft crashed northwest of Karmah.[1185]

Saqlawiyah

~~(S)~~ Saqlawiyah was deep in the grip of AQI's murder and intimidation campaign, with armed fighters patroling the market to prevent residents from speaking with Coalition forces. By threatening workers who attempted to fix the city streets, AQI made it much easier for its operatives to plant IEDs inside the town. While AQI was able to continue recruiting young or unemployed men, as in other Iraqi towns the group's brutality had effectively alienated it from the rest of the general population.[1186]

Amariyah

~~(S)~~ As a result of the alliance between the Albu Issa subtribes, the SAA, and the IIP a majority of the residents of Amariyah and Ferris Town were now openly opposed to AQI. As more Albu Issa subtribal leaders agreed to join the anti-AQI effort, they were able to provide legitimacy to the Iraqi police and protect themselves from AQI retaliation.

Hit

~~(S/NF)~~ As in other Anbari cities, many of Hit's politicians and prominent local figures were forced to support AQI for fear of retaliation. The city's senior cleric Sheikh Muflin Yasin publicly supported the Coalition but was forced by younger imams loyal to AQI to extol the insurgency in his sermons. Former Hit city council chairman Khalil Jundi Mahmud served as the top AQI financial facilitator for the Hit area. While the Hit city council had not functioned since roughly August 2005, by late November 2006 mayor Sheikh Hikmat had gained the support of the Albu

[1183] [| Military | 1 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061201 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1184] [| Military | 8 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1185] [| Military | 15 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1186] [| Military | 25 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Nimr, Muhammadi, Furat, and Hay al-Bakr tribes, as well as the 'Ubaydi tribe in Baghdadi through his alliance with SAA.[1187]

~~(S)~~ AQI also maintained an interrogation, detention, and IED manufacturing facility south of the Hit gas station that the group used as part of the murder and intimidation campaign in the city. Among those held at the facility were twenty members of the Albu Nimr tribe that AQI had kidnapped in an effort to secure the release of AQI member (b)(6) from Coalition custody.[1188]

~~(S)~~ With the loss of both Ramadi General Hospital and the Women and Children's Hospital as AQI strongholds, the group's cells in Ramadi were forced to either rely on smaller, local clinics or to take their injured to other hospitals outside the Ramadi area. In addition to Kirkuk and Fallujah, Hit was a particularly attractive destination for injured AQI fighters because the same smuggling networks that the group used to transport fighters, weapons, and equipment from Ramadi to the Sijariya and Jazira areas could be used to transport injured fighters to Hit.[1189]

Anah

~~(S)~~ Anah, where atmospherics had been positive since the completion of Operation QATIAT ALMAZ, experienced a major surge in IED and SAF attacks concentrated in the southern part of the town, particularly in the Shishon district. The population of southern Anah also adopted increasingly anti-Coalition views as a result of an aggressive AQI propaganda campaign spearheaded from the Qatada Mosque, though these views were not accepted in the northern part of town. This increase in Anah attack levels was due in part to the flight of AQI fighters from the Haditha area as a result of Operation MAJID.[1190]

~~(S)~~ Among those AQI fighters who fled to Anah in the wake of Operation MAJID were Ahmad Abd al-Rahman and his followers. Ahmad was killed on December 5 while attempting to plant an IED, which was ironic given that his primary purpose in relocating to Anah was to teach local AQI cells proper IED construction techniques.[1191]

Al-Qaim

~~(S)~~ On December 20, fighting resumed between AQI and the revived Hamza Battalion in the al-Qaim area following the Hamza Battalion's wounding of AQI amir Anwar Araq Ali al-Jughayfi and the killing of his cousin Thari Ruli Musa al-Jughayfi in Uklah village. In retaliation, AQI attacked the Uklah tribesmen, murdering at least five and killing and kidnapping two others as well as killing and kidnapping several members of the Albu Mahal tribe. The Hamza Battalion responded by kidnapping twenty-five members of the Jumayli tribe and holding them for ransom in the hopes of securing the

Approved for Release

[1187] [| Military | 15 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1188] [| Military | 25 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1189] [| Military | 16 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061216 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1190] [| Military | 6 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1191] [| Military | 15 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

peaceful release of their tribesmen. AQI in turn sent the decapitated head of one of the hostages to the village of Samsiyah, indicating that there would be no negotiations.[1192]

Anbari Reactions to Saddam Hussein's Execution

~~(S)~~ It is just at this moment that Saddam Hussein was executed by the Iraqi government. Reactions to the execution varied considerably in Anbar. In Karmah, residents were largely pleased by Saddam's execution since his government had been very cruel to the people of the town. However, they were afraid to show their relief since Saddam's execution had become an Arab nationalist cause and local insurgents regarded the death of Saddam Hussein as an act of war against the entire Sunni Arab world by the United States, believing that anyone who took pleasure in his death was a Coalition supporter and should be killed.[1193]

~~(S)~~ In Haditha and Rawah by contrast, former Ba'athists and retired Iraqi army personnel held demonstrations in support of the dead Iraqi dictator, holding up his portraits and denouncing Muqtada al-Sadr's influence in Iraq. Similar demonstrations had been held in Rawah following Saddam Hussein's initial sentencing on November 6, 2006.[1194]

Attack Data (September – December 2006)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (September to December 2006). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The four months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was the highest sustained level of the entire insurgency, and remained relatively stable throughout the period. While the number of Direct Fire and IED incident counts remained mostly stable, the number of Indirect Fire incidents decreased slightly during the period from a peak in late September. The level of Complex Attacks was significantly lower (less than 5 per week) during October and early November than in the months before and after.

Approved for Release

[1192] [| Military | 26 Dec 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1193] [| Military | 02 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[1194] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Complex Attacks





Approved for Release

Conclusion: Snapshot of the Insurgency

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The creation of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq should have been the culmination of AQI's work throughout the past four years. Al Qaeda senior leadership held the establishment of an Islamic state as one of its central objectives and had already set up an Emirate in northern Pakistan. The announcement of the Emirate in Anbar and other provinces throughout Iraq was accompanied by actions that indicated AQI was developing long-term plans for the country and intended to expand its influence once the Coalition left Iraq. These actions included the declaration and enforcement of *shari'ah* law in Haditha and elsewhere; the setting up of new institutions and a well-articulated bureaucracy in areas that AQI believed it controlled; strengthened connections between AQI cells in the various provinces; and the levying of taxes and military recruits for the new Emirate.

~~(S/NF)~~ Meanwhile, AQI so dominated the insurgency, that most of the remaining independent groups were either forced or coopted into cooperation with the group. To any outside observer, it must have seemed likely that AQI would be able to enforce its vision of Anbar's future—as an Islamic state tied to other states being created by AQSL—once the Coalition departed.

~~(S/NF)~~ Yet there were other forces at work in Anbar that suggested quite a different conclusion could be drawn about the state of the insurgency. The tribal problems that AQI had suffered since at least 2005 had led to the creation of a serious indigenous rival to the group, a rival that had a charismatic and adept leader who was willing to work with the Coalition in order to challenge AQI. SAA's work, combined with a decision by the Coalition to move toward a more counterinsurgency approach to the violence, had already led to early successes in Ramadi, one of the centers of the insurgency. It would, however, remain to be seen if these early signs could be transformed into a province-wide program for rolling back and ultimately defeating AQI throughout Anbar.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Chapter Seven

Rise of the Anbar Salvation Front

(2007)

~~(S/NF)~~ *By 2007, the rise and continued growth of Sheikh Abdul Sattar, the Anbar Salvation Front, and the Anbar Revolutionaries had forced AQI to adapt to a more hostile environment. While AQI was far from crippled, its previous dominance in Anbar was actively challenged at the local level by indigenous groups opposed to AQI's agenda and ideology. This trend would continue throughout 2007, with tribal dynamics playing an increasing role on the nature of the insurgency during the first quarter of 2007.*

~~(S/NF)~~ *While it would thus be a serious mistake to characterize AQI as having been defeated in Anbar, this shift in local atmospherics combined with the movement of AQI personnel away from Anbar to Salahaddin and Diyala provinces represented the Coalition with a unique opportunity in the course of counter-insurgency in Anbar.*

Anti-AQI Efforts Strengthen

Overview of Anbari Tribes after the Formation of the Anbar Salvation Front

~~(S)~~ The formation of the Anbar Salvation Front (SAA) led to a noticeable improvement in security in the greater Ramadi area, as pro-Coalition tribes demonstrated their ability and willingness to band together against AQI. Through the efforts of experienced leaders like Sheikh Abdul Sattar of the Albu Risha, his brother Sheikh Ahmed, Sheikh Hamid Farhan Heis al-Dhiab of the Albu Dhiab, (b)(6) Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Salih al-Suwaydawi of the Albu Soda, and Sheikh Ra'ad Sabah al-Alwan of the Albu Alwan had learned the lessons of MML's Anbar People's Committee (see Chapter 6a) and protected their leaders from AQI reprisal.[1]

~~(S)~~ Because the greater Ramadi area was populated by more than a dozen tribes, the leading sheikhs recognized that no one tribe could hope to defeat AQI on their own. While the communal nature of the SAA was not a fail-safe against assassination, it did ensure that each tribe either succeeded or failed as a group. The founding tribes of the Anbar Emergency Council (see Chapter 6c) wielded a significant amount of authority, but they did not dominate the organization and all tribal leaders who agreed to join the group were rewarded with equal positions of influence and authority.[2]

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in Fallujah, where SAA had difficulty organizing, was far more complex. Amariyah, Ferris Town and the Jezira were dominated by the Albu Issa, Saqlawiyah by the Mohamdi, Zaidon by the Zobai, and Karmah by the Jumayli. The Albu Issa was split between pro- and anti-AQI factions, but the Mohamdi, Zobai and Jumayli were heavily pro-AQI. While the Anbar Revolutionaries were active in Saqlawiyah and the residents of Amariyah and Ferris Town had cooperated with the SAA, IIP, and the Anbar Revolutionaries to establish security, similar efforts did not occur in other parts of Fallujah. In contrast Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah were equally

[1] [| Military | 15 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070115 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[2] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

tribally heterogeneous but had experienced improvements in security because the Anbar Revolutionaries conducted joint patrols with local elements of the Iraqi army and police.[3]

~~(S/NF)~~ The problems in Fallujah were primarily the result of a lack of effective senior tribal leadership, which left lower-ranking sheikhs open to petty rivalries or AQI intimidation. Despite the return of Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi Aifan al-Issawi to Iraq to rally the Albu Issa against AQI (see Chapter 6c), Sheikh Muhammad Samir Hikmat al-Mohamdi, Sheikh Meshan Abbas Muhammad al-Jumayli, and Sheikh Hadi Yousef al-Zobai all remained abroad for fear of their lives, adopting an attitude towards the SAA similar to Sheikh Khamis' prior to his return ("When Sattar falls, I don't want my tribe falling with him").[4]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Albu Mahal tribe in al-Qaim and the Albu Nimr south of Hit were both pro-Coalition tribes with a substantial number of their tribesmen enlisted in the Iraqi police. The Haditha tribes, however, particularly the dominant Jughayfi, were seriously weakened by the influence of AQI's murder and intimidation campaign and their leaders were unable to oppose the group even had they the desire to do so. As in the Fallujah area, many of Anbar's northwestern tribes were unable to adequately oppose AQI. Even in al-Qaim, rivalry between the Albu Mahal, Salmani, and Karbuli tribes dating back to 2005 (see Chapter 5a-b) prevented Albu Mahal leader Sheikh Sabah Sattam Aftan from forming an SAA equivalent even had he the desire to do so.[5]

The Anbar Salvation Front Expands Further

~~(S)~~ The continued growth of the SAA away from its shadow government origins into a legitimate political organization meant that the group's president Sheikh Hamid Farhan Heis al-Dhiabi began to play a more political role in the group. A long-time Anbari tribal leader, Sheikh Hamid had attempted to become involved in Iraqi national politics under the banner of the United Iraqi Alliance. In addition to his role in the creation of the SAA, Sheikh Hamid had also been instrumental in the Albu Dhiab tribe's anti-AQI activities and in December 2006 helped to create the Jazira Council (with (b)(6) (see Chapter 6c), and Anbar University professor (b)(6) b 6 This was the first step in the SAA's efforts to establish local governance in the Jazira area, which would demonstrate to Anbaris that it was capable of addressing the local situation. The azira Council consisted of re resentatives of the Albu Dhiab, b 6 (b)(6) with Sheikh Hamid guiding its first meeting and nominating his brother Sheikh Muhammad as president of the new organization.[6]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Jazira Council was led by Sheikh Hamid's brother Sheikh Muhammad, with Sheikh Tahir Sabar Bedawi of the Albu Ali Jassim as vice president and Sheikh Mizher Hamid Ajaj al-Assafi (a leader of the ruling tribe in the Dulaymi confederation) as assistant vice president. The council's first meeting on December 20, 2006 focused on vetting Coalition-funded projects and prospective contractors and providing security for fuel deliveries. It also encouraged Anbaris to take part in civil society, worked for national government recognition of the Jazira area as a subdistrict of Ramadi,

[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] [| Military | 07 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

held an adult literacy program, and was a mechanism to provide reconstruction support to those tribes that agreed to support the Coalition. A number of technocrats were included on the council to oversee electricity, water, municipality, health, and education and to act as liaisons with the provincial and national government ministries.[7]

~~(S)~~ While a majority of the council's participants were members of the SAA, the Jazira Council was not just an extension of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's movement, and was more concerned with establishing local government. The Albu Risha and Albu Julib tribes, leading members of the SAA, were not involved in the Council because they did not have a presence in the Jazira area. By working with the Coalition to provide electricity, water, employment, and security to the Jazira area, Sheikh Hamid and other SAA leaders hoped to win the hearts and minds of the local population, deprive AQI of an important staging area into Ramadi, and provide an example for neighboring tribes.[8]

~~(S)~~ The creation of the Council was possible because SAA's relationship with Governor Mamoun and the IIP was markedly better than it had been throughout much of late 2006 (see Chapter 6c for details). Sheikh Abdul Sattar came to regard Governor Mamoun as a legitimate partner rather than an enemy despite Mamoun's attempts to prevent the SAA from receiving support from the Iraqi interior ministry until after the next round of provincial elections. Some of this new understanding was due to the fact that, given the security situation in Baghdad, Governor Mamoun's ability to persuade the Iraqi government to agree to anything was extremely limited. As a result of the new partnership, Governor Mamoun met with the SAA leaders on December 23 to hand out reconstruction contracts.[9]

~~(S/NF)~~ To discuss the distribution of the new contracts, Sheikh Abdul Sattar organized a conference on January 10 that was attended by several hundred leading sheiks, contractors, politicians, and Coalition officials from across Anbar; the largest meeting of the SAA since its founding as the Anbar Emergency Council in September 2006. The fact that so many leading Anbaris were willing to attend despite the presence of Coalition personnel indicates that the Anbari elite was now if not fully supportive of the Coalition, at least willing to be seen with Coalition officials in the hopes of garnering reconstruction contracts. As with other SAA events, the conference was very much Sheikh Abdul Sattar's show. The fact that so many leading Anbaris agreed to answer his summons constituted a tacit acknowledgement that he was now the most powerful leader in the entire province and would remain so as long as he continued to deliver on his promises.[10]

~~(S/NF)~~ For Sheikh Abdul Sattar, the primary purpose of the conference was to create a foundation for economic infrastructure improvement in Anbar, increasing employment through mass public works projects (road construction, utilities, repair, etc.). This would counteract AQI's recruitment of disaffected or unemployed Anbaris and build public confidence in the SAA's capacity to bring basic necessities to the province. The secondary purpose was use the possibility of winning contracts to increase the influence of the SAA leadership over other sheikhs by having them publicly display

[7] [| Military | 08 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[8] Ibid.
[9] [| Military | 04 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070104 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[10] [| Military | 12 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

their support for "a new order in Anbar" and the SAA while rejecting AQI. By encouraging local governance and economic initiatives like the Jazira Council, Sheikh Abdul Sattar was also acknowledging that success in Anbar largely depended on the efforts of Anbaris and support from the Coalition, not on uncertain assistance from the Iraqi central government.[11]

~~(S)~~ While Sheikh Abdul Sattar remained the most public and dominant leader of the SAA, lesser leaders such as his brother Ahmed, b 6 and the group's president Sheikh Hamid Farhan al-Heis occupied prominent positions within the organization. Sheikh Abdul Sattar had a significant level of influence over the Albu Risha tribe, but by early 2007 the Albu Risha were only one of many tribes belonging to the SAA. As part of the power-sharing arrangement envisioned by the SAA, all tribal leaders associated with the organization retained some level of influence over the Emergency Response Battalion (now known as Emergency Response Units (ERU)) members from their tribes, providing a balance of power between traditional tribal authority on one hand and the institutional and personal appeal of Sheikh Abdul Sattar on the other. In Ramadi, these tribal loyalties also prevailed among the Iraqi police, particularly in the newer stations, substations, and patrol bases that were manned and led by members of a particular tribe, such as the Albu Alwan tribe that manned the al-Warar police station.[12]

~~(S)~~ Indicative of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's continued appreciation for the Coalition was his declaration that the new Iraqi police station to be built near the White Apartments in the Tamim district was to be named Travis Patriquin Station, after a Coalition officer killed in an IED attack on December 6, 2006 who had was RFCT's liaison to the Ramadi tribe. Because of Captain Patriquin's efforts on behalf of the SAA, Sheikh Abdul Sattar considered the officer to be a member of his own Rishawi tribe. [13]

The Replacement of General Hamid

~~(S/NF)~~ Maneuverings over the replacement of General Hamid show the complex interaction between the SAA and the provincial government. Under the pretext of responding to complaints from the provincial police that Brigadier General Hamid circumvented procedures and was regarded by many police as inept, the SAA agreed to request that he be replaced as provincial police chief by Ramadi police chief Colonel Khalil Ibrahim Hamadi. The subtext of this replacement, however, was that Brigadier General Hamid had attempted to transfer Colonel Khalil to Hit to take over the duties of Hit police chief Brigadier General Hamid Ibrahim Jazza, prompting Colonel Khalil to convince the Ramadi police force to demonstrate in his favor on November 26. On November 27, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his brother Sheikh Ahmed met with Colonel Khalil to calm the situation, resulting in the compromise under which Colonel Khalil would eventually replace Brigadier General Hamid as Anbar provincial police chief.[14]

~~(S/NF)~~ While Brigadier General Hamid was not the leader of Albu Dhiab tribe, he held some influence within it and had been involved in the SAA since its inception. However, he was also a

[11] Ibid.
[12] [| Military | 23 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070223 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[13] [| Military | 02 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[14] [| Military | 29 Nov 06 MNF-W INTSUM | 20061129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

lieutenant to Sheikh Abdul Sattar, to whom the real credit lay for the SAA's rapid growth and as such agreed to the demotion on the condition that he would remain the Albu Dhiab representative for the SAA and thus would save face within his tribe.[15]

~~(S/NF)~~ Hamid managed to retain his position until January 18, 2007 when he was replaced with Staff Brigadier General Abdul Salam Ali Khalil Abdul Qadir al-'Ubaydi. A possible reason for the SAA's initial acceptance of Brigadier General Abdul Salam was a growing perception on the part of the group's leadership that Brigadier General Hamid was somewhat intellectually slow when it came to understanding the duties associated with his new position.[16]

~~(S/NF)~~ The more the SAA learned about General Abdul Salam, however, the less the group came to like about him. As far as the SAA was concerned, General Abdul Salam's affiliation with IIP, his good relationship with Governor Mamoun, and his origins in Haditha were all strikes against him. This led to a February 2, 2007 conversation between Sheikh Ahmed to Prime Minister Maliki in which he stated that the SAA opposed General Abdul Salam's appointment and wanted Brigadier General Hamid reinstated as provincial police chief. Sheikh Ahmed's opinion was moderated however by the tentative support of General Abdul Salam b SAA leaders Sheikh Moyad Ibrahim, Sheikh Hamid Farhan Heis, and [b 6] all of whom agreed to see how General Abdul Salam faired even though they all regarded him as little more than an IIP crony.[17]

~~(S)~~ Sheikh Abdul Sattar's influence, while muted in this interaction, was soon shown to be expanding. In early January 2007, Governor Mamoun appointed Sheikh Abdul Sattar's cousin Latif Ubayd Ayadah al-Julibawi as the new mayor of Ramadi. While Latif had previously been associated with 1920 Revolution Brigade leader MML, he had supported MML's efforts at political engagement with the Coalition and was now dependent on his cousin's generosity for his own survival. Both SAA and the IIP-dominated provincial council regarded this as a demonstration of their influence, but the true winner was Sheikh Abdul Sattar, who had successfully installed an SAA supporter into a key political position. As a result of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's "share the wealth" attitude, providing the Albu Julib with this influential position served to further cement the tribe's loyalty to the SAA.[18]

The Anbar Salvation Front in Khalidiyah and Rutbah

~~(S)~~ The growing strength of the SAA can be seen in the extension of its influence throughout Anbar. As noted in Chapter 6c, Khalidiyah was one of the cities where the SAA were most active against AQI. By January 2007, the group was conducting joint operations alongside Iraqi security forces and expanding the scope of its operations to include areas of Habbaniyah.[19]

~~(S)~~ The SAA was opposed in Khalidiyah by [(b)(6)] an AQI cell leader and facilitator loyal to [(b)(6)] who was involved in trafficking weapons, murder and intimidation, sniper attacks, and planting IEDs in the city. [(b)(6)] was heavily involved in

Approved for Release

[15] Ibid.
[16] [| Military | 25 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[17] [| Military | 4 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[18] [| Military | 14 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[19] [| Military | 25 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

recruiting adolescents to plant IEDs for AQI and his followers distributed propaganda for the Islamic Emirate of Iraq at the Habbaniyah market.[20]

~~(S)~~ The SAA also continued its expansion into Rutbah. Sheikh Abdul Sattar sent letters of appointment from both himself and Albu Alwan leader Sheikh Ra'ad Mukhlif al-Alwani on January 7, 2007 designating Sheikh Hamid Shanduk as the head of the SAA in the town. A pro-Coalition sheikh who had also worked as a Coalition contractor, Sheikh Hamid was a lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi police who had worked at the al-Warar police station in Ramadi during the height of the fighting in late 2006 (see Chapter 6c).[21]

~~(S)~~ While the SAA had been active in Rutbah prior to Sheikh Hamid's appointment (a chapter of the Anbar Revolutionaries had operated in Rutbah since at least October 2006), most of its efforts had focused on patrolling the highways to prevent AQI from stealing cars and from robbing Anbaris traveling between Ramadi and the Anbar border crossings. As a result of these efforts, security was now much improved along highways while Task Force 1.4a provided an increased level of security inside Rutbah.[22]

~~(S)~~ Since November 28, 2006, Task Force 1.4a had been tasked with targeting insurgent and criminal activity in western Anbar. Its actions led to 176 detentions and the discovery of thirteen major arms caches that significantly degraded AQI influence and foreign fighter facilitation in Rutbah. Efforts by the Badran Turki network to reconstitute were disrupted by a January 10 raid on Samhat village that forced network associates (b)(6) to flee abroad. Task Force 1.4a also targeted b 6 associate (b)(6) in Nukayb, which AQI had previously regarded as a safe haven due to the historic absence of Coalition forces in the area.[23]

~~(S)~~ These actions, combined with those of the SAA, led to improvements in Rutbah despite AQI's ongoing murder and intimidation campaign. While Rutbah had yet to establish its own police force, the transfer of sixty Iraqi police to Rutbah from Ramadi met with considerable success in enhancing local security and disru tin the activities of the Abu Sarah Group. Task Force 1.4a also succeeded in capturing (b)(6), an Islamic Army of Iraq financier loyal to AQI. The capture led to the discovery of pro-AQI Islamic Army of Iraq financing operations running from Rutbah to Nukayb to the Ar Ar border crossing.[24]

The Capture of (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ Elsewhere the Coalition also had considerable success in targeting AQI leaders. On December 8, for instance, Coalition forces captured AQI leader b 6 at Bakhit village north of Saqlawiyah. (b)(6) was an AQI leader who had overseen the manufacturing of VBIEDs with the assistance of the largely criminal population of Bakhit village,

[20] [| Military | 2 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[21] [| Military | 12 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[22] Ibid.
[23] [| Military | 13 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070113 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[24] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

and then sending them to Baghdad for use in AQI attacks. (b)(6) was aided in these efforts by (b)(6) a former Jaysh Muhammad leader who oversaw weapons smuggling and IED activity in the Zagharid area. Like much of the insurgent leadership in the Saqlawiyah area, (b)(6) b 6 was a subordinate to b 6 who was the head of a large AQI network based in Saqlawiyah that spanned the Zagharid area as well as the Albu Shijil tribal area.[25]

The Death of Hamud Kanush

~~(S)~~ On December 24, 2006 Coalition forces raided the village of Samsiyah in response to intelligence suggesting that high-level AQI figures Hamud Kanush, Muhammad Talib Ibrahim, and b 6 b 6 were in the area. This raid led to the death of Muhammad, who was killed by the Coalition, as well as Hamud, who detonated a suicide bomber vest he was wearing rather than be taken prisoner.[26]

~~(S)~~ Born in Brudiyah, Iraq in 1953, Hamud had worked as a chemistry teacher and local Ba'ath Party leader prior to OIF. Since at least 2004, he had acted as a leader for AQI's weapons smuggling, foreign fighter facilitation, training, VBIED, and IED cells in western Anbar. He had also become exceptionally adept at evading Coalition capture, altering his appearance and never staying in the same place for more than two nights at a time.[27]

AQI Responds to the Growing Pressure

AQI's Campaign Against the Anbar Salvation Front

~~(S)~~ Despite this pressure, AQI continued its efforts to undermine support for the SAA at every turn. On December 8, 2006, senior AQI leader (b)(6) met with the leadership of the Albu Fleiss tribe in al-Sajarah, ordering them not to allow their tribesmen to join the Iraqi army, police, or SAA or they would be killed. Through police rosters in his possession, (b)(6) knew the names the tribesmen who had already joined the Iraqi police and offered them an amnesty that depended on turning in their weapons and requesting forgiveness. The same offer was extended to Albu Fleiss tribesmen who had participated in the December 2005 elections. (b)(6) meeting, however, was not simply an airing of typical AQI demands. He also insisted that the Albu Fleiss sheikhs begin levying recruits for AQI and assist the group in eliminating "collaborators" (particularly b 6 a Habbaniyah police officer who supported the Anbar Revolutionaries) and in preparing for an upcoming attack on Camp Habbaniyah.[28]

~~(S/NF)~~ As the spiritual leader for AQI and all its allies operating between Ramadi and Habbaniyah, Ali Siyagha exercised considerable authority as a cell leader and facilitator. He had previously been subordinate to AQI leader b 6 and thus had been part of b 6 b 6 network that stretched all the way from Husaybah-Sharqiyah to Ramadi.[29] The (b)(6)

[25] [| Military | 01 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[26] [| Military | 17 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[27] Ibid.
[28] [| Military | 02 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[29] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

family lived in the tribal area of the Albu Ajur subtribe of the Albu Fahd, which was reportedly a member of AQI's Central Tribal Council (see Chapter 6c).[30] After Durayd was killed in the Battle of Sufia (see Chapter 6c), (b)(6) continued to use his network to conduct attacks along the Ramadi-Khalidiyah corridor, though his primary focus remained coercing and intimidating civic, religious, and tribal leaders into supporting AQI. Examples of this included his use of the al-Rahman Mosque in the Albu Hazim tribal area to denounce the IIP and his recruiting of AQI fighters from al-Nassayf village. Through his intimidation campaign, (b)(6) was able to coerce Albu Fleiss tribesmen into attacking the Coalition, Iraqi police, and perceived "collaborators."[31]

~~(S)~~ On January 12-13, Coalition forces killed eight AQI fighters including Umar Daham Hanush, another son of Daham Hanush, who was the amir of his father's Juro cell. The Juro cell was a particularly loathsome group that was involved in the kidnapping, torture, and beheading of suspected Coalition collaborators. His group also assassinated Sheikh Nasser Abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi (see Chapter 6a). Prior to his demise, Umar had been allied with and financially supported by Sheikh Fawaz Daham Hilayil, the former head of the Albu Taha subtribe of the Albu Fahd tribe, who had been a close associate of Saddam Hussein and a member of the defunct Ramadi Shura Council. By February 2007, Sheikh Fawaz had fled to Syria for fear of being detained by Coalition forces.[32]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) also issued fatwas for AQI and its allies as far afield as Ramadi and Habbaniyah. Operating a *shari'ah* court out of Mudiq, (b)(6) preached against the IIP in the Albu Ajur tribal area and al-Nasaf, calling on residents to join AQI.[33] (b)(6) (yet another relative of b 6 see Chapter 3) was one of (b)(6) top lieutenants in the Khalidiyah area.[34]

~~(S)~~ To suppress the growing influence of AQI in this region, establish a permanent present in Julaybah, and gain the support of local tribal leaders, the Coalition conducted Operation CHURUBUSCO in West al-Nasaf and the Albu Musa tribal area from January 16-25. The operation caused many AQI fighters to go underground or flee across the Euphrates River into the Jazira area. Among those AQI members who fled the area was b 6 who fled to the Albu Bali tribal area with the assistance of former al-Nu'man Brigade leader (b)(6)

AQI Reorganization in Ramadi

~~(S)~~ With the loss meanwhile of so many senior AQI leaders in Ramadi to the Coalition and Anbar Revolutionaries in the fall of 2006[36], the group's (b)(6) began an internal

[30] [| Military | 24 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[31] [| Military | 08 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[32] [| Military | 2 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[33] Ibid.
[34] [| Military | 08 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[35] [| Military | 31 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[36] Among the most recent Ramadi AQI losses included Malaab amir (b)(6) detained November 10, and his successor b 6 detained December 8.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

reorganization designed to distribute experienced commanders to as many cells as possible.[37] Among the AQI leaders he appointed was (b)(6) of the Abu Anis Ishaqi cell, who had returned from Syria on December 20, 2006 and had previously been a member of the Abu Harun Group under b 6 An experienced IED planner with a residence in the Malaab district, (b)(6) sought to reinvigorate AQI's IED efforts in that district. Using barriers established by the Coalition to restrict vehicular traffic in December 2006 during Operation SQUEEZE PLAY to provide his cell members with cover, b 6 was able to carry out a more robust AQI IED campaign in southeastern Ramadi. AQI also set up checkpoints and conducted vehicular patrols in the northern part of the Tamim district centered on the Mustafa School.[38]

~~(S)~~ As a result of this reorganization, AQI was able to continue its murder and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi police in Ramadi. Unlike in 2006, however, the failure of major attacks, such as the joint AQI-Ansar al-Sunna assault on the Sufia district, was beginning to affect the group's ability to intimidate residents. As the Iraqi police continued to grow in numbers and capability in Ramadi, more residents were willing to support them and AQI's ability to move within the city diminished.[39]

~~(S)~~ b 6 who had been one of the most notorious AQI leaders in Ramadi since early 2005 and was the overseer for SVBIED attacks throughout Anbar, had since October 2006 relocated to the small town of Ambria near Fallujah for fear of the Anbar Revolutionaries. Although he remained active in AQI operations in Ramadi through his (b)(6) (b)(6) who was entrusted with the care of his family, (b)(6) s new focus was Fallujah, now that the Coalition had turned over control of that city to the Iraqi security forces. With (b)(6) (b)(6) relocation, the AQI hierarchy in Ramadi was divided into three co-equal branches (executive, legislative, and military) that remained under his supervision as the de ut re ional amir. b 6 was the amir of the executive branch with (b)(6) b 6 acting as the respective amirs of the legislative and military branches.[40]

~~(S)~~ Much of the AQI leadership was now based in the Albu Aetha tribal area of Ramadi, which was considered far safer than other parts of the city. A number of the group's new leaders were recruited from this area including b 6 a former car thief who rose to be the Tamim district amir. Under pressure from SAA, (b)(6) pulled his fighters out of the Tamim district and had them relocate first to the village of al-Angur near Lake Thar Thar then to the old barracks of the Saddam-era 26th Special Forces Brigade near Saddamiyah.[41]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) rapid advancement within AQI was thanks to his superior during his time as a car thief, b 6 Because of this connection (b)(6) had met with a number of hi h-rankin A I leaders includin b 6 (b)(6)

Approved for Release

[37] [| Military | 02 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[38] [| Military | 21 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[39] [| Military | 24 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[40] [| Military | 18 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[41] [| Military | 08 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070108 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

This gave him the necessary social connections needed to ascend so rapidly through AQI from a foot soldier to a mid-level leadership role.[42]

~~(S)~~ AQI also continued its close collaboration with Ansar al-Sunna in Ramadi. Cooperation between AQI and Ansar al-Sunna was overseen by AQI military branch amir for Ramadi Salah b 6 (b)(6) who coordinated with Ansar al-Sunna amir (b)(6) to integrate their two organizations in Ramadi on a leadership, financial, and operational basis.[43] b 6 (b)(6) who had previously was the AQI amir for the Hay al-Dhubat district, was now the Ansar al-Sunna amir for Ramadi, coordinating joint AQI-Ansar al-Sunna attacks against al-Warar police station. While Dhakir was captured by Coalition forces in a January 15 raid, the collaboration between the two groups continued under his successor (b)(6) However, the rise of (b)(6) was something of a fluke as it had occurred after both o (b)(6) (op b 6 b 6 were detained by Coalition or Iraqi police forces in December.[44]

1.4b, (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ AQI continued to use Anbar University, though to a lesser degree than the group had prior to Coalition, Iraqi police, and Anbar Revolutionaries activity in November 2006 (see Chapter 6c). Deprived of the campus as a recruiting center, AQI intimidated various deans and faculty members into spying on the student body for them in order to identify Coalition informants. As a result, AQI remained able to exercise a degree of influence over the faculty and student body while on campus, though most of its efforts at recruiting or intimidating students occurred off-campus.[46] To reassert their influence, elements of the Islamic Army of Iraq loyal to AQI issued flyers to female students at Anbar University instructing them to stop wearing Western dress and using cosmetics and to adhere to the *shari'ah* or they would face consequences.[47]

~~S~~ Hamdi ah and the Albu Bali tribal area continued to be centers of AQI activit see Cha ter 6c . (b)(6) (b)(6) was responsible for most of the IDF and SAF attacks against the Coalition in the area using weapons taken from caches along the Euphrates River. Running an extensive intelligence network throughout the area (where he was known as "AQI's security chief"), (b)(6) regularly had residents followed to determine whether or not they were collaborating with the Coalition. If collaboration was verified, the residents were kidnapped, interrogated, and then murdered. AQI was able to operate in the Albu Bali tribal area because residents had come to believe that the Coalition

[42] Ibid.
[43] [| Military | 18 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[44] [| Military | 17 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[45] [| Military | 24 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[46] [| Military | 18 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[47] [| Military | 31 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

was incapable of providing security for their tribesmen. They also saw the absence of a sustained Coalition presence in their area as a sign that the Coalition was afraid of the insurgency. As a result of these perceptions, Albu Bali women provided information to (b)(6) intelligence network on the movement of Coalition forces in their area.[48]

~~(S)~~ The most disturbing part of AQI's reorganization in Ramadi was the rou 's increasing reliance on child soldiers. Prior to his detention on December 26, 2006 (b)(6) b 6 recruited teenagers from Adnan Khirallah High School in the Hay al-Dhubat Thanya district of Ramadi to plant and detonate IEDs and conduct beheadings. As noted in Chapter 6c, in those parts of Ramadi where the SAA was the strongest, AQI was increasingly reliant on the use of younger fighters.[49] AQI also appears to have made an active effort to indoctrinate teenagers in the Anah and Rumallah school systems as well as at the Attaliyah School in Haqlaniyah, the Khaldun School in Fallujah, al-Tayar High School in Habbaniyah among others.[50]

~~(S)~~ The re-organization helped AQI to retain its operational tempo in Ramadi and even increase the scale of some operations. On January 28, the group mounted a chlorine-ladden SVBIED attack against one of the SAA's Emergency Response Units (ERUs) in Ramadi that was the single most catastrophic attack against Iraqi security forces in Anbar since the beginning of OIF. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the VBIED, AQI combined an enormous chlorine tank with 300-350 lbs of bulk explosives.[51]

~~(S)~~ In areas of Ramadi inhabited by pro-Iraqi police members of the Albu Faraj, Albu Alwan, and Albu Soda tribes, AQI fighters were able to invade homes and fire mortars at civilians in the streets in the hopes of breaking their will while attempting to demonstrate the inability of Iraqi security forces to defend them.[52]

~~S/NF~~ Parallel to this effort was an assassination plot overseen by (b)(6) (b)(6) to eliminate Sheikh Abdul Sattar and Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Salih al-Suwaydawi using suicide bombers. Infiltrating agents into Sheikh Abdul Sattar's personal security detail, AQI hoped to get close enough to eliminate him.[53]

AQI's Effort to Win Popular Support in Ramadi

~~(S)~~ Along with their murder and intimidation campaigns, AQI did attempt to win support in Ramadi, b 6 provided residents with fuel at 30-40,000 dinars per barrel, which was considered a bargain price. Most of this fuel was obtained from the gas stations that Thamir controlled throughout Ramadi, though some of it may have been obtained during his November 2006 visit to the Bayji oil refinery to intercept shipments ordered by Sheikh Abdul Sattar that were intended to aid in the SAA's reconstruction efforts. While Thamir hated the population of

[48] [| Military | 23 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070123 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[49] [| Military | 07 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[50] [| Military | 18 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[51] [| Military | 28 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[52] [| Military | 01 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[53] [| Military | 05 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the Iskan district and considered them traitors to the jihad, he recognized the need to mollify at least some residents so that they would continue to tolerate his presence. (b)(6) outreach in the Iskan district paralleled other efforts by AQI's Ramadi leadership since the summer of 2006 to sell gas at reduced prices in the city in the hopes of winning the support of residents. By early 2007, one of the centers of this endeavor was the White Apartments in the Tamim district, where AQI distributed both fuel and propaganda. As a new component to this effort, AQI distributors would claim that they were selling fuel at reduced prices to help their Muslim brothers who had been deprived of basic necessities by the Coalition.[54]

AQI vs. Albu Ghanim

(S) Even as AQI sought to build popular support in Ramadi, the group was once again undercut by the brutality of its murder and intimidation campaign. On January 13, 2007, 14 year-old Sahir Jamal Aysan was kidnapped at an AQI checkpoint and beheaded the following day. His head was then sent to his parents with a fatwa justifying the action and warning the Albu Ghanim tribal leaders to cease cooperation with the Coalition. Sahir's family had a close relationship with the Albu Ghanim tribal leader Sheikh Majid Albu Ghanim, who intended to protect the tribe against AQI attack and seek *tha'r* against the group. As a result of this brutal act, the number of armed Albu Ghanim tribesmen taking part in the tribe's neighborhood watches rose from sixty to 150 and all male tribesmen were ordered to carry weapons. The Albu Ghanim also sought support from the SAA, receiving a pledge of weapons and assistance from Sheikh Abdul Sattar.[55]

(S) The Albu Ghanim neighborhood watches and checkpoints were one of many that were established by local tribes in the Sufia district with the assistance of Task Force 1.4a following the all-out attack on the Albu Soda tribe in November 2006. As a result, the Sufia district tribes were able to rally an unprecedented degree of resistance to AQI's murder and intimidation campaign in their area, further restricting the group's ability to move fighters and equipment.[56]

(S) AQI responded to this show of defiance in early February 2007, killing three more Albu Ghanim youths and sending their heads to the Ramadi General Hospital with a warning. As before, the group's murder and intimidation campaign led to an unprecedented level of resistance from the Albu Ghanim tribe and the establishment of two Iraqi police stations in the Sufia district and Julaybah along with a permanent Coalition presence to deter AQI from mounting an attack against the tribe.[57]

(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI) This cooperation by the Albu Ghanim represented a complete transformation for the tribe. Since 2003, Albu Ghanim tribesmen had been one of the main suppliers, for both residents and insurgents, of forged documents, including Iraqi identification cards, drivers' licenses, Anbar and Baghdad University student identification cards, and passports from Syria, Jordan, and Switzerland. The tribe's shift towards the SAA and the Coalition made the

Approved for Release

[54] [| Military | 01 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070101 | (S/NF) |]
[55] [| Military | 19 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070119 | (S/NF) |]
[56] Ibid.
[57] [| Military | 05 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070205 | (S/NF) |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

tribe less willing to work with AQI and forced the group to intimidate tribesmen in an effort to prevent them from growing closer to the SAA.[58]

~~(S/REL USA AUS CAN GBR)~~ In mid-February 2007, AQI members of the Albu Ghanim traveled to a camp near Lake Habbaniyah to plan the assassination of Sheikh Majid, the head of their tribe. Their plan involved getting AQI members of the Albu Ghanim to secure employment with Sheikh Majid in order to engineer his assassination.[59]

The Fallujah Area Becomes Contested Ground Once Again

Police and the Insurgency in Fallujah

~~(S/NF)~~ The new focus by (b)(6) on the Fallujah area would soon begin to bear fruit. In January 2007, AQI Fallujah a b 6 see Chapter 6a) had only three cells in the city made up of 5-7 operatives each. Relying on corruption among the Iraqi police and army soldiers in Fallujah, (b)(6) was able to bring weapons into the city to support his cells' operations.[60] The small size of AQI in the city did not affect the ability of the group to target the Iraqi police in the greater Fallujah area, however, with the group launching three major attacks against the Saqlawiyah police station, two major attacks against the southwest Fallujah police station, and one major attack against the Nasser wa Salaam police station over the course of January alone.[61]

Approved for Release

[58] [| Military | 23 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070223 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[59] [| Military | 25 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[60] [| Military | 11 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070111 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[61] [| Military | 28 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

The Albu Issa of Fallujah

(~~S/NF~~) There were several factors that gave AQI hope that it would be able to expand its influence in Fallujah. In contrast to the Ramadi-based SAA, the greater Fallujah area had yet to benefit from anti-AQI tribal sentiments (outside of Amariyah and Ferris Town). There were a number of reasons for this, including the fact that most of the assertive tribal leaders who would otherwise have led such a movement had either fled abroad or gone underground for fear of AQI assassination. For instance, Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi Aifan advocated engagement with the Coalition, and had therefore been targeted for AQI in June 2005 and March 2006, after which he fled to Jordan to join other expatriate sheikhs. Only in early 2007 would he feel secure enough to return to Iraq.[62]

(~~S/NF~~) Unfortunately for AQI's hopes, Sheikh Khamis would return more determined than ever to fight the extremists. As noted in Chapter 6c, Sheikh Khamis was instrumental in the reconciliation within the Albu Issa. In early January, however, the settlement agreement between the pro-AQI Fuhaylat subtribe and the rest of the Albu Issa subtribes in Amariyah and Ferris Town collapsed and the fighting resumed.[63]

(~~S~~) The catalyst for the renewed fighting was the January 4, 2007 kidnapping of three AQI fighters in the Albu Hatim tribal area by relatives of Sheikh Khamis. AQI immediately retaliated and fighting soon broke out in the Albu Hatim tribal area between followers of Sheikh Khamis and no less than thirty AQI fighters armed with AK-47s, RPGs, and mortars and aided by the group's local ally Sheikh Hamid al-Jassim. b 6 responded by creating a defensive network around the (b)(6) village with the support of a Coalition sniper team.[64]

(~~S/NF~~) The kidnappings occurred because, despite the efforts of the SAA and Sheikh Khamis to establish security in Amariyah and Ferris Town, AQI retained considerable influence in the area. One sign of this influence were the creation of *shari'ah* courts under the leadership of b 6 (b)(6) a Sudanese national from Darfur), b 6 (b)(6) The courts met at the Dejanna, Ayshah, and Medina Minawar mosques, and were used by AQI to coerce or intimidate residents into swearing bayat to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as the head of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq.[65]

(~~S~~) The establishment of *shari'ah* courts was even further along in the Fuhaylat tribal area (a hotbed of AQI support, see Chapter 6c), where AQI leader Sheikh Ahmad Husayn Ali had long operated a *shari'ah* court out of the Abu Khalid Mosque. As with those set up in the vicinity of Amariyah, these courts issued strict bans on smoking and other behaviors that were enforced with cable lashings. The Fuhaylat tribal area was also the home of (b)(6)

Approved for Release

[62] [| Military | 01 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[63] Ibid.
[64] [| Military | 10 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070110 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[65] [| Military | 12 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070112 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

al-Sattar), who was the AQI regional amir for both Fuhaylat and Amariyah, conducting attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces from Amariyah to Fallujah.[66]

~~(S)~~ The continued efforts of Sheikh Khamis to rally opposition against AQI were complicated by the fact that in addition to the Fuhaylats and their allies, the leaders of the Albu Yusuf, Albu Salih, Albu Khamis, and elements of the Albu Hatim and Albu Aifan subtribes of the Albu Issa in the Fallujah Peninsula were also intimidated by or loyal to AQI as a result of its creation of the Central Tribal Council (see Chapter 6c). Sheikh Khamis was able to oppose them with the Albu Tuhman, Albu Traymish, and his own loyalists within the Albu Aifan and Albu Hatim subtribes, but AQI had already raised a levy of no less than sixty-five fighters from each of its subtribes to fight him.[67]

~~(S)~~ At a meeting with the Albu Issa tribal leadership and the Coalition, Sheikh Khamis and his allies admitted that since 2003 the Albu Issa had turned a blind eye to the insurgency and recognized that the Coalition had been more than patient with them. Now, however, Sheikh Khamis was willing to fight even if it meant Albu Issa against Albu Issa. Despite the efforts of the pro-AQI subtribes to pressure Sheikh Khamis's allies to join the jihad against the Coalition, Sheikh Khamis refused to negotiate with AQI and decided instead to fight.[68] In an effort to avert another round of inter-tribal warfare A I leader Sheikh Ahmad Husayn Ali al-Dashi dispatched (b)(6) (b)(6) to negotiate with the Albu Issa leadership, offering them an opportunity to win Coalition contracts for roads, clinics, and infrastructure improvements without fear of attack. Sheikh Khamis again turned them down and the fighting continued.[69]

b 6 and Zaidon

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite this setback, AQI increased its activities in Fallujah by dominating the small villages surrounding the city. Zaidon in particular remained a center of AQI influence. Although dismissed from operational leadership, senior AQI leader b 6 (see Chapter 6c) continued to operate throughout the Abu Ghraib-Zaidon corridor, including the villages of Ta'alia and al-Anaz. Since his focus was now on recruiting, b 6 and his followers distributed AQI propaganda to Zobai farmers and called upon them to join the organization, claiming that the United States was responsible for their current situation. (b)(6) was able to gain AQI recruits by distributing money to poor farmers and offering further financial incentives if they joined the organization. However, he also enforced *shari'ah* and carry out the *hadd* punishments, kidnapping residents that he believed violated *shari'ah* and ordering sentences carried out.[70]

~~(S)~~ Recognizing the continued role of al-Anaz village to AQI, the Coalition carried out Operation THREE SWORDS from January 21-23 with the support of the Fallujah police force. This resulted in the discovery of an AQI safe house that had been used as a torture facility for Shi'a captives.[71]

Al-Khattab

Approved for Release

---

[66] Ibid.
[67] [| Military | 19 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[68] Ibid.
[69] [| Military | 30 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[70] [| Military | 03 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[71] [| Military | 25 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ AQI influence over Zaidon allowed the group to dominate the mainly Shi'a town of Nasser wa Salaam. (b)(6) was the primary AQI associate group in the village, made up primarily of fighters from Zaidon under the leadership of (b)(6) The group consisted of four IED cells and a kidnapping cell, but was ill-supplied and often in need of ammunition, rockets, AK-47 ammunition, and auto repairs from their superiors in Zaidon. Possibly a splinter group of the 1920 Revolution Brigade's Umar bin al-Khattab Group, b 6 conducted a variety of activities at AQI's behest ranging from IED attacks to intelligence collection to murder and intimidation, kidnapping, and torture.[72]

AQI Efforts in Saqlawiyah

~~(S)~~ As part of its attempt to increase its influence in the Fallujah area, AQI stepped up efforts in and around Saqlawiyah. The group began a pervasive murder and intimidation campaign against residents and Iraqi police operating in the Albu Shijil tribal area to convince them to "repent" and either join AQI or acquiesce to AQI influence in their territory. The death of Diya Shakir Farhan (see Chapter 6b) did not slow this effort, since Diya's older brother (b)(6) simply assumed Diya's position as AQI amir while (b)(6) became the AQI amir for the Albu Shijil tribal area.[73] When, on anuar 21, Ira i olice from Tal Aswad station detained (b)(6) who had been a (b)(6) prior to his death, the brothers b 6 became the leaders of (b)(6) remaining followers in the Albu Shijil and Saqlawiyah areas.[74]

~~(S)~~ From December 27, 2006 onwards, AQI began attacking their last serious insurgent opposition in the Saqlawiyah and the Albu Shijil tribal area: the remnants of Jaysh al-Fatihin. The attacks began because there were a few aysh al-Fatihin members in the area who remained loyal to the group's Anbar security chief (b)(6) had tried to work with the Coalition against AQI and was one of the key architects of the failed Abu Ghraib cease-fire initiative.[75]

The Results of Operation MAJID

Haditha Transforms in the Wake of the Operation

~~(S)~~ The further entrenching of AQI in the Fallujah area must be balanced with gains against the group in Haditha proper. As noted in Chapter 6c, AQI and its allies dispersed from the Haditha area in the face of overwhelming force during Operation MAJID. However, those fighters that remained behind were anxious to conduct attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces to demonstrate the continuing viability of the insurgency in the area. To counter this effort, Coalition officials and Haditha police chief Colonel Faruq began tribal engagement with leaders from the Jughayfi and Simari tribes. When combined with vehicle restrictions and the loss of thousands of pounds of

[72] [| Military | 28 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[73] [| Military | 22 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[74] [| Military | 31 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070131 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[75] [| Military | 19 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

ordnance and weapon to Coalition sweeps during Operation MAJID, AQI was unable to mount an immediate counter-offensive to the Coalition presence in Haditha.[76]

~~(S)~~ Instead AQI fighters sought refuge in Khaffajiyah, using the local power plant as their base of operations. That Khaffajiyah was regarded as a haven by AQI was not surprising, as the group's documents recovered by the Coalition as far back as November 2005 referred to "brother b 6 b 6 the assistant manager at the Department of Electrical Energy" as well as an earlier manager of the Khaffajiyah power plant, (b)(6) flight and (b)(6) ascension as the senior manager of the power plant, AQI was able to follow the same pattern of behavior that it had used at other key facilities to gain influence over critical infrastructure, in this case, the nearby Haditha Railroad Bridge, which was used by AQI fighters to travel back and forth across the Euphrates River.[77]

~~(S)~~ The K-3 pumping facility in Haditha was also something of an AQI bastion, leading some residents to refer to it as "Little Afghanistan," an epithet aided by the fact that the AQI fighters there wore Afghan-style clothing. Many of the K-3 housing facility's occupants were indifferent or hostile to the Coalition and the building had been a refugee for AQI and its allies in the Haditha area during Operation RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE in 2005 (see Chapter 5a). Among the residents was (b)(6) the AQI amir for Haqlaniyah, who used the facility as a base for carrying out IDF and SAF attacks against Coalition forces in Haqlaniyah.[78]

~~(S)~~ The AQI presence at the K-3 housing facility may have been facilitated by b 6 (b)(6), the head of the pumping station security forces, who was the cousin of Haditha police chief Colonel Faruq Tayih Hardan Muhaydi al-Jughayfi. While Khalaf had in the past cooperated with Coalition forces at the Haditha Dam and al-Asad Air Base, this had caused him to be labeled as a traitor to the insurgency. In the end, he began distributing money to AQI and was in fact working with both AQI and the Coalition for personal gain.[79]

~~(S)~~ Another mid-level AQI leader operating out of the K-3 housing facility was b 6 b 6 the amir of an AQI IDF and IED cell in Barwanah. While (b)(6) had joined AQI as a rank-and-file member several years earlier, his status within the group increased dramatically as word spread of the Coalition's efforts to target him. During Operation MAJID, (b)(6) and his cell fled to Bayji to escape capture but returned in January 2007 in the hopes of resuming their murder and intimidation campaign against the general population. Despite rumors of his death at the hands of the Iraqi police or the Anbar Revolutionaries, b 6 continued to operate in the Haditha area by using AQI's established transit routes between Barwanah and Bayji.[80]

Approved for Release

[76] [| Military | 05 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[77] [| Military | 09 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[78] [| Military | 21 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[79] [| Military | 16 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[80] [| Military | 21 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070121 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

AQI Shifts Focus to the al-Qaim-Haditha Corridor

~~(S)~~ The results of MAJID were felt elsewhere in Anbar. In Rawah, the Coalition captured many low-level AQI fighters, while AQI considered Anah unsafe because of the permanent Coalition presence in the city. To reinvigorate the insurgency in western Anbar, AQI appointed twelve new amirs. All twelve of the amirs had fought the Coalition in Mosul and the provincial AQI leadership believed that they could provide much-needed experience for AQI cells in the area.[81] Among these new AQI amirs were Abu Yunis in Brudiyah village, Ahad Sabah in the al-Qaim-Haditha corridor, Nur Karim Mutni in Rawah, and Sinan Anwar Muhammad in Samsiyah.[82]

~~(S)~~ The decision to appoint new amirs was made at a meeting of senior AQI leaders in al-Qaim in which the group also discussed pooling all its resources in Ramadi, Haditha, and Bayji to reestablish a more secure smuggling network along the western Euphrates River valley. Following this meeting, AQI fighters began smuggling sizeable amounts of weapons from Ramadi and Bayji to the group's safe houses and supply caches west of Rawah. AQI fighters were also shifted from northern Iraq and other parts of Anbar to bolster the group's ability to surge in western Anbar.[83]

The Return of al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal

~~(S)~~ AQI made an effort to strengthen itself in Hit as well, focusing on its local ally al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal. b 6 was the leader of al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal in Hit in addition to serving as the amir of AQI in the city. (b)(6) (detained by Iraqi police in late January 2007) was b 6 second-in-command. Formerly led by (b)(6) brother Mahmud Cent (also known as Muhammad Cent, killed in Operation SAYYAD I), al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal worked with AQI and Ansar al-Sunna to conduct IED, sniper, and SAF attacks in Hit as well as weapons smuggling and money laundering. Al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal also maintained a relationship with the Abu Sarah Group (see Chapter 6c) under which funds raised by the Abu Sarah Group's vehicle theft and kidnapping activities were sent primarily to al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal and only secondarily to AQI or former Islamic Army of Iraq cells in other areas.[84]

~~(S)~~ AQI retained a sizeable presence in Hit after Operation MAJID, allowing it to carry out a complex attack against the police station and multiple positions throughout the city on January 12. This attack, similar to the near-simultaneous attacks against the police station and operating positions throughout Hit on December 12, was part of a concentrated AQI effort to prevent the local establishment of Iraqi police.[85] In keeping with AQI efforts to build popular support, area business figures were warned of AQI's VBIED attacks against Iraqi police before they occurred so that the businessmen themselves would be able to escape harm. From the relative safety of the al-Mashtal district, senior al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leader (b)(6) was able to

Approved for Release

[81] [| Military | 11 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070111 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[82] [| Military | 25 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070125 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[83] [| Military | 11 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070111 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[84] [| Military | 02 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070102 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[85] [| Military | 14 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

oversee a variety of activities ranging from facilitating attacks to propaganda to the intimidation of the Hit city council.[86]

~~(S)~~ AQI was opposed in the Hit-Kubaysah corridor by the Anbar Revolutionaries, which established a chapter in the area targeting AQI members throughout the Rutbah and Haditha area.[87] Among the group's targets were al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leaders b 6 and local AQI leader (b)(6) (see Chapter 6a).[88] By early 2007, the SAA was publicly claiming that it had killed seventeen insurgents and detained twenty-five in Hit.[89]

AQI in Anah and Rawah

~~(S)~~ AQI was also not willing to cede their strongholds of Anah and Rawah without a fight. On January 13, an AQI cell in Rawah led by (b)(6) destroyed the government center, which had been a meeting point for the city council. This attack was an extension of earlier AQI efforts in Rawah to destroy key buildings to disrupt the local government and Iraqi police. In February 2005, for instance, AQI fighters had surrounded Rawah in the middle of the night and attacked the police station, capturing most of the police and forcing them to temporarily disband. Despite the January 13 attack, however, the city council continued to meet with the Coalition in an alternate location.[90]

~~(S)~~ AQI fighters in the town were unable to exploit this attack because the Coalition seized a large number of AQI arms caches and captured many of the group's rank-and-file fighters. As a result, AQI cells in the city had to urgently request IEDs, RPGs, and missiles from their regional leadership. A major point of contention among AQI in Rawah was possession of (b)(6) (b)(6) massive weapons cache, which led to fighting between local AQI amirs. Moreover, despite the appointment of the new AQI amirs, many Rawah AQI fighters remained demoralized by the fact that their previous amir b 6 had fled to Syria in December 2006.[91]

~~(S)~~ In Anah, AQI fighters who had fled the Haditha area entered the town in force at the beginning of January 2007, extorting "rent" from forty-two government homes, banning internet access, and enforcing *shari'ah* law. In the ensuing weeks, a Coalition and Iraqi police counter-offensive led to the arrest of more than forty AQI fighters and limited the group's ability to enforce its edicts, leading to a late January decision by AQI to "relax" its ban on internet access so long as there was no home useage, chat rooms, or pornography.[92]

The Development of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq

Approved for Release

---

[86] [| Military | 22 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[87] [| Military | 16 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070116 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[88] Ibid.; Interestingly, Yassir was considered superior in the AQI hierarchy to the group's Hit amir Abu S'ud, though this may have been because much of the AQI activity in Hit occurred under the auspices of al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal rather than Abu S'ud. [Military | 17 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070117 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[89] [| Military | 16 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[90] [| Military | 18 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[91] [| Military | 19 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070119 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[92] [| Military | 30 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070130 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Attempts to Win Over Other Insurgents

~~(S)~~ As the Islamic Emirate of Iraq continued to mature, its leaders began negotiations with other Sunni insurgent groups to persuade them to join the new state. This attempt was bolstered by (b)(6) willingness to enlist former Ba'athists as administrators in the Emirate. In addition, the Islamic Emirate of Iraq was able to appeal to the romanticized image that many Iraqi Sunnis held of themselves as heirs of the golden age of Islamic civilization (c. 750-1250).[93]

~~(S)~~ It was not easy for AQI to convince other Sunni insurgent groups to subordinate themselves to the leadership of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq. The leadership of SAR groups correctly regarded the organization to be AQI in another form, and the Emirate thus inherited SAR criticism of AQI, in particular its disregard for Sunni civilians and the numerous foreigners among its senior leadership. (b)(6) and other AQI leaders apparently recognized the validity of the latter criticism, leading to plans within AQI to set up a separate Iraqi leadership for the Emirate.[94]

~~(S)~~ As part of the effort to garner support for the Emirate, AQI leadership pledged to eliminate those amirs who had committed particularly heinous acts that might have alienated other insurgent groups from joining their new organization. While Ansar al-Sunna leadership continued to express strong reservations despite this action, other AQI allies such as Muhammadi Cell Alpha were less discriminating and swore bayat to b 6 as their amir.[95]

AQI Command and Control

~~(S)~~ AQI infrastructure in the Haditha area provides further insight into the Emirate's development and growing sophistication. The insurgents operated in a decentralized manner, with local leaders granted a high level of operational independence. However, this decentralization was overseen by a hierarchical centralization of the mid- and senior AQI leadership.[96] Intercepted letters from AQI couriers to their subordinates revealed an extremely robust command and control infrastructure not only in the Haditha area but throughout Anbar.[97]

~~(S)~~ For operational security, all classes of AQI leaders changed their kunyas on a regular basis to maintain anonymity and to thwart Coalition targeting. As soon as local residents became familiar with a kunya, it was to be changed. This principle was reinforced by the fact that seized AQI courier letters in the Haditha area referred to both the sender and the recipient by alias to prevent a reader unfamiliar with the individuals involved from learning their identities.[98]
~~(S)~~ One of the key players that emerged in these documents was b 6 a senior AQI leader who was knowledgeable about the insurgency in Bayji, Mosul, and Anbar. b 6 received regular reports from and sent orders to b 6 a senior AQI leader for Anbar in general and the

[93] [| Military | 24 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[94] Ibid.
[95] [| Military | 29 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[96] Ibid.
[97] [| Military | 6 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[98] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Haditha area in particular. As a result, (b)(6) was a regular intermediary through which (b)(6) (b)(6) could communicate with local AQI leaders in Ramadi, Haditha, and western Anbar to receive their reports and issue his own instructions. Among the local leaders that b 6 corresponded with was b 6 an AQI leader from Ramadi who was the military amir for the group in the Haditha area. Although the roles of the local leaders that b 6 corresponded with varied greatly from military to financial, logistical, and media support, all were actively engaged in maintaining a robust and dynamic AQI command and control structure.[99]

(S) Indicative of the degree of professionalism that (b)(6) had imposed upon the AQI leadership since assuming command was the remarkable frankness in the correspondence that enabled information to flow freely from rank-and-file members to the senior leadership while remaining largely uncorrupted in the process. This should be contrasted with the wild claims made by other insurgent groups and AQI's own propaganda campaign that exaggerated the group's accomplishments and resources. According to AQI, inaccurate assessments would not be accepted internally because they affected the group's command and control. Consequently, internal AQI reporting contained no excessively optimistic or excessively pessimistic reporting. Abu Ahmad, for instance, filed weekly reports on the activities of his cells (i.e. grenade, IED, and IDF attacks against Coalition forces). However, he also reported on his "military emergencies" such as the detention of b 6 Nearly all his claims were corroborated by the Coalition's own reporting.[100]

(S) As soon as (b)(6) report, an executive summary was forwarded to b 6 b 6 along with his own assessment. It is particularly interesting that (b)(6) perception of the situation in the Haditha area mirrored that of the Coalition, with references to the vehicle curfew that prevented AQI from establishing a major presence and regular attack tempo in the Haditha area as well as the group's shift towards grenade attacks. He too thought the situation in western Anbar was "bad" because much of the AQI leadership was in hiding and many rank-and-file members were confused and in disarray.[101]

(S) One of the ways AQI maintained accuracy in its internal reporting was to reward local leaders for their diligence and truthfulness by correcting legitimate deficiencies that were brought to their attention. This can be seen in the effort made by (b)(6) a local AQI leader in Ramadi, to compile a detailed inventory of 239 separate items lost to the Coalition. (b)(6) submitted the list to AQI's Ramadi military amir Hisham, who gave it to (b)(6) (the head of AQI logistics for Anbar), who in turn brought it to b 6 instructed b 6 to contact (b)(6) the AQI logistics amir for Ramadi, to make certain that (b)(6) cell received the supplies it needed to compensate for the losses.[102]

(S) AQI leaders relayed information to one another through the use of trusted human couriers. AQI was aware of Coalition intelligence collection capabilities, and thus saw couriers as a relatively secure

[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid. Those few inconsistencies that did occur were largely due to translation errors or an improper conversion of dates between the Islamic and Gregorian calendars.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

and inexpensive way to maintain contact between the group's senior leadership. In addition to thumb drives, AQI used handwritten notes to relay messages. These were unassuming and less likely to attract notice at security checkpoints where Arabic speakers were in short supply. The courier system was relatively efficient, though there were some disadvantages, such as the time between when a note was written and when it was delivered (usually 2-3 days), though there were some cases in which messages were written, delivered, and responded to in less than 24 hours. However, because this level of professionalism appears to have been implemented within AQI with the ascension of (b)(6) the group's command and control system was still an evolving one and there was no reliable mechanism to manage or track the flow of information. In one case, AQI administrator (b)(6) requested missing records from b 6 in order to compile his "bi-annual military report" that was likely intended for the AQI *shura majlis* and possibly AQSL as well. However, because copies of the handwritten documents he sought from b 6 were unavailable, his "bi-annual military report" was likely to be incomplete.[103]

AQI Intelligence Collection

~~(S)~~ The Emirate also showed signs of increasing sophistication in intelligence collection and analysis. According to studies of internal AQI documents, the focus of the group's intelligence collection was almost entirely the local population, with intelligence on Coalition operations and intentions representing a low priority. As a result, AQI maintained a degree of awareness concerning local atmospherics, personalities, and community dynamics that far exceeded that of the Coalition, contributing to the group's ability to interact with local personalities with a great deal of percision and speed.[104]

~~(S)~~ On November 9, 2006, Coalition forces near Barwanah captured an AQI thumb drive containing detailed maps of Khalidiyah and Suraydiyah complete with census-type information on residents. The data on the inhabitants of Khalidiyah and Suraydiah was incredibly detailed, with residents listed by name, tribal affiliation, and occupation along with a short assessment provided by the AQI collector with categories ranging from "good," "very good," "thief," "apostate," and "house wife." In some cases, the AQI census data could be corroborated by Coalition reporting. AQI used this information to support a wide range of activities: from arranging provisions for the moral and financial well-being of "martyred" insurgents to conducting well-planned and targeted campaigns of murder and intimidation.[105]

~~(S//REL TO USA IRQ AND MCFI)~~ For operational intelligence, AQI relied on several techniques to assist the group in planning attacks. First, the group employed children between the ages of 13-15 years old to conduct surveillance on Iraqi and Coalition units, giving them vehicles to drive to checkpoints and telling them to count the number of soldiers, the distance between the soldiers, and the distance to the checkpoint from where they started driving. Once the information was reported back to AQI, the group began using it to plan attacks against checkpoints.[106]

Approved for Release

---

[103] Ibid.
[104] [| Military | 28 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070128 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[105] Ibid.
[106] [| Military | 13 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Second, AQI attempted to infiltrate the Iraqi security forces to gain intelligence on Iraqi and Coalition units throughout Anbar. This allowed the group to gain information on Coalition and Iraqi army activities, relationships between units, informants, and home addresses. Moreover, it gave the group access to the names and addresses of Coalition informants so that they could conduct a murder and intimidation campaign against them while limiting Coalition access to information on their activities.[107]

AQI Training

~~(S/NF)~~ According to AQI documents recovered by Coalition forces, AQI leadership thought the proper training of new recruits was very important, and devoted a substantial amount of manpower and resources to managing and maintaining the group's training program. Correspondence between regional and senior AQI leaders revealed regular updates on the status of the group's training programs, the number of recent graduates, and the suitability of those graduates for additional training or combat operations. In at least some cases, AQI maintained "training directorates" under the supervision of "training amirs" that kept extensive records on each recruit and the amount of training that they had received.[108]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI training programs and training camps in the Fallujah area were structured for a variety of purposes. Their most obvious one was to provide new recruits with a basic proficiency in paramilitary TTPs. According to the Coalition's demographic analysis of captured detainees, the number of insurgents in Anbar with military or security services experience was on the decline as many of those who possessed such experience were captured or killed. This situation increasingly dictated that the AQI leadership provide recruits with some rudimentary training to ensure that they could execute basic tasks. At the same time, the specific needs of each local amir varied considerably. The training courses thus ranged from a basic set covering weapons familiarization, marksmanship, IED construction and employment to more specialized courses on counter-interrogation procedures, surveillance, intelligence collection, and sniper training. The basic training also covered small unit action training such as casualty evacuation, fire and maneuver, and indirect fire. For foreign fighters, training also included culture familiarization courses to help foreigners blend in with their surroundings and camouflage regional accents.[109]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ AQI also sought to instill loyalty, enthusiasm and espirit de corps in recruits. Its training programs were intense and involved periods of sleep deprivation, vigorous physical conditioning, and extensive religious and ideological indoctrination. One video of an AQI camp showed a training instructor equipped with tactical gear and military attire as part of a deliberate effort to emphasize that AQI recruits are training not for a militia but for a country, in this case the Islamic Emirate of Iraq. The name of one of these camps, Masada al-Aqsa (active as of November 2006) showed as well that these installations were training troops not only for action in Iraq, but beyond ("al-Aqsa" refers to the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem).[110]

Approved for Release

---

[107] Ibid.
[108] [| Military | 25 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS GBR/X1)~~ Despite ample reporting by Coalition human intelligence on the existence of AQI training facilities in Anbar, such camps were rarely discovered by the Coalition due to their remote locations far removed from the province's major population centers. Other training camps were located in 1.4b or along the Iraqi border with 1.4b The absence of significant infrastructure at AQI training sites complicated Coalition efforts to locate them - a training camp located by Coalition forces at Wadi Sakran in December 2006 consisted of a series of sandbagged firing positions, concertina wire, and obstacles built from automotive tires and wooden poles set up to allow for a variety of small arms fire exercises and individual movement drills.[111]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI/FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO IRAQ)~~ An AQI training camp, operated by AQI fighters from Umm Tinah and Manak, was located east of the village of Uklah (also known as Udayntayn). The camp exploited the uninhabited desert south of al-Qaim as a refuge and operational staging area. AQI's al-Qaim amir b 6 used the Uklah and related training camps to train between 25-50 fighters, some of whom were recent graduates from AQI training facilities in 1.4b In addition, the Uklah training facility was a base for AQI fighters operating between al-Qaim and Akashat.[112]

Islamic Emirate of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts in the Hit-Haditha Corridor

~~(S)~~ By February 2007, all the insurgent groups operating in the Hit-Haditha corridor were loyal to the Islamic Emirate of Iraq. Taha Abu Abd al-Rahman was the primary conduit of Emirate funding, receiving money from unidentified backers in Baghdad and then giving it to (b)(6) for distribution in the Hit-Haditha corridor. Among the recipients of b 6 generosity were al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leader Muhammad Cent as well as AQI amirs b 6 (Abu S'ud, killed by the SAA in January 2007) and b 6 This support was not given to b 6 or 1920 Revolution Brigade, however, which created animosity between the two groups and AQI, leading to a declaration by (b)(6) that it would not support AQI financially in Hit. As part of AQI's effort to create a parallel government, (b)(6) money went towards the constructions of schools, farms, hospitals, and other civic projects in the vicinity of Hit.[113] AQI leadership also oversaw the financial care of the families of AQI members who had been killed or detained by the Coalition.[114]

Al-Zawraa: Easy Communication Capacity for the New Emirate

~~(S)~~ In late December 2006, AQI found a golden opportunity to increase publicity, indoctrination, and propaganda efforts, through negotiations with former Iraqi MP Mishan al-Jaburi. To show his good faith, Mishan sent $300,000 to an AQI leader in Anbar along with a letter stating that he was prepared to support the group financially, morally, and through the use of his al-Zawraa satellite channel. The AQI leadership's reception of Mishan's offer was mixed. Some refused to cooperate with the former Ba'athist or accept his assistance on ideological grounds, while others saw it as an opportunity to attract donors through better publicity. Those AQI leaders who agreed to work with

Approved for Release

[111] Ibid.
[112] [| Military | 13 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[113] [| Military | 8 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[114] [| Military | 6 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Mishan were provided with funding as well as access to Mishan's network of former and current Iraqi soldiers, oil protection officers, and defense ministry officials that he had cultivated as the leader of the Reconcilitation and Liberation Bloc, opening new relationships between AQI and Mishan's Ba'athist allies. AQI leadership intended their cooperation to be short-term and planned to eliminate Mishan once he was no longer of any use to them.[115]

~~(S)~~ While the Iraqi government had suspended al-Zawraa's license after its inflammatory programming following the announcement of the Saddam verdict, this actually freed the station to express even more vehement anti-government and anti-Shi'a views. Its Baghdad offices were abandoned and its six primary correspondents on the run, but al-Zawraa's broadcasts into Iraq and throughout the Middle East continued 24 hours a day, aided by the Egyptian satellite distributor Nilesat. The station used its comprehensive video library of insurgent attacks, collected through Mishan's collaboration with multiple insurgent groups, to play insurgent propaganda videos and classes on IED construction.[116]

AQI Use of Google Earth

~~(S)~~ Because Google Earth was the easiest way to view free, high-resolution satellite imagery through the internet, by January 2007 it was often used to support insurgent activities in Iraq. Google Earth provided maps of Iraq with a fifteen-meter or higher resolution using the World Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS84) datum to provide latitude and longitude information with a GPS receiver. In Anbar, insurgents combined GPS and laptops with Google Earth installed to ascertain their location and then determine the azimuth, range, and elevation necessary to conduct accurate IDF attacks on targets of their choosing. While Google Earth images were usually eighteen months old, this did not hinder their effective use by insurgents to target stationary facilities such as Coalition bases, Iraqi police station, and government buildings.[117]

~~(S)~~ The shift towards Google Earth was first hinted at in March 2005 when AQAM established an "electronic jihad" organization called the Media Jihad Brigade to use technologies like Google Earth to advance the global jihad agenda. By early August 2005, Islamic Renewal Organization posted a message containing the option to download a copy of Google Earth. While AQI had been using Google Earth in Anbar at least as far back as December 2005, by January 2007 the group had considerably refined their reliance on the system to integrate it with GPS data when conducting IDF or planning attacks against static targets. Most AQI cells now designated their most computer literate member as their Google Earth expert.[118]

AQI and Inter-Insurgent Politics

~~(S)~~ The new state did face serious problems from within the ranks of AQI, especially among those leaders of the group who were held at Coalition detention facilities or had recently been released. The detained AQI leaders believed that the declaration of the Emirate had been premature, that

[115] [| Military | 01 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[116] Ibid.
[117] [| Military | 04 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070101 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[118] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

those now in detention would be excluded from positions of influence and power within it, and that the declaration had forced the Coalition to conduct operations in certain important districts of Ramadi. There were also rumors among various AQI amirs that (b)(6) intended the Emirate to begin killing those members of the group who had taken part in the unauthorized murder of Iraqi civilians. This would win popular support for the *shari'ah* courts that the group was seeking to set up throughout Iraq. Fears about possible criminal prosecution became a major concern for those followers of Zarqawi who continued his brutal ways even after his demise.[119]

~~(S)~~ While the level of AQI dissension should not be exaggerated, (b)(6) was under pressure from AQSL, including UBL and (b)(6) to unite Iraqi Sunnis, a move that AQSL believed had been jeopardized by (b)(6) tactics. In particular, AQSL had disapproved of (b)(6) brutal attacks on civilians, his efforts to incite sectarian warfare, and above all his disregard for what they saw as innocent Muslims. (b)(6) tried to change these tactics, but some low and mid-level AQI members refused to follow his lead, which widened the gap between them and the national leadership. As a result of these divides, the interactions between AQI and other insurgent groups differed, sometimes dramatically, from town to town, village to village, and even cell to cell. This led to further rifts between AQI and high-ranking leaders of Ansar al-Sunna that created increased tension between the two in some areas of Iraq.[120]

~~(S)~~ For these Ansar al-Sunna leaders, the presence of foreigners in AQI's highest leadership was interpreted as a fundamental mistrust of Iraqi jihadis. Yet the dislike of AQI by some high-ranking Ansar al-Sunna commanders did not prevent the two groups from cooperating closely in places like Ramadi, where Sheikh Naji issued fatwas for both groups authorizing the murder of collaborators, or Haditha where the two groups continued to cooperate closely, sharing resources, facilities, and fuel. The Ansar al-Sunna criticism was echoed by AQI senior leader Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, who continued to believe that he rather tha (b)(6) hould have been chosen to replace Zarqawi. This led some of Janabi's followers from the 2004 Fallujah Mujahideen Shura sinking deep into denial, claiming that Janabi was the true leader of AQI and (b)(6) was a media creation.[121]

~~S~~ To brin Ansar al-Sunna and other insurgent groups closer to AQI, b 6 b 6 was tasked with working on cross-insurgency cooperation. A former member of the Republican Guard Special Forces, (b)(6) was an ideal figure to coordinate between AQI and dubious allies. He had ties to numerous insurgent groups and had been the leader of (b)(6) himself, before turning to AQI and being given operational command of many of Sheikh Abdullah Janabi's followers. Based in the Amariyah area, (b)(6) was aided by a number of high-ranking allies across Iraq, including Sheikh Abdullah Janabi's second-in-command Sheikh Muhannad Subhi Huwaysh al-Kubaysi, who acted as (b)(6) direct liaison to b 6 [122]

Developments within Other Insurgent Groups

Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna

[119] [| Military | 03 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070103 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.
[122] [| Military | 22 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ It is significant that precisely at this point, certain leaders within Ansar al-Sunna decided that it might be possible to come to an understanding with the Coalition. In mid-January 2007, Ansar al-Sunna leaders (b)(6) organized a meeting of leaders from elements of Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh al-Fatihin, 1920 Revolution Brigade, b 6 GSPC, and other smaller Sunni insurgent groups opposed to AQI. The purpose of the meeting was to form a new organization called Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna, which would consolidate efforts against AQI and agree to a cease-fire with the Coalition. Because the insurgent leaders feared AQI attack if they moved against them, Abu Wa'il assured them that Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna could oppose AQI through non-violent means, such as providing intelligence to the Coalition, and that the group would only use violence if attacked first. He stressed, however, that the elimination of AQI and the Islamic Emirate of Iraq was now essential for the survival and future of Iraq.[123]

~~(S)~~ To further his plan, (b)(6) agreed to provide the other Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna leaders with access to Ansar al-Sunna's extensive database of photographs, documents, and CDs on AQI activity in order to end the group's foreign and domestic financing. (b)(6) intended to make a case to the 1.4b that there was no religious justification for what A I was doin . The could then promote Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna to AQI's extensive network of 1.4b donors. Concerning a cease-fire with the Coalition, Abu Wa'il informed the other members of his conspiracy that they had to reevaluate their priorities and that the "real threat" to the Sunni community was 1.4b rather than the Coalition. To demonstrate Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna's bonafides to the Coalition, (b)(6) planned to select an area in which all members of his conspiracy would inform their followers to cease all attacks against Coalition forces with the understanding that once the Coalition responded that the cease-fire could be duplicated in other areas. Abu Ghraib and Khan Dhari were considered particularly favorable because AQI presence was assessed to be minimal.[124]

~~S~~ In late January 2007, (b)(6) met with Ansar al-Sunna's supreme leader b 6 (b)(6) outside Baghdad to discuss b 6 earlier proposal for opening negotiations with the Coalition (see Chapter 6c). While b 6 permission to proceed, he warned him not to get too close to the other insurgent groups, reminding him that they were not to be trusted. (b)(6) was more concerned about b 6 second-in-command (b)(6), who strongly opposed any discussion of a cease-fire or dialogue with the Coalition. While (b)(6) was not worried that b 6 would agree to swear bayat to b 6 he did fear that the other man might convince b 6 and his followers from Ansar al-Sunna and to continue attacks against the Coalition and the Iraqi government.[125]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) was not concerned about (b)(6) joining forces with AQI because Ansar al-Sunna was embroiled in a dispute with the other organization over the murder of three Ansar al-Sunna members by AQI fighters in northern Iraq. The Ansar al-Sunna leadership had sent a letter to b 6 requesting an explanation for this killing and threatening to go public with the dispute. It was

[123] [| Military | 24 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070124 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[124] Ibid.
[125] [| Military | 9 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070209 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

b 6 belief that (b)(6) would not respond, thus further alienating the Ansar al-Sunna national leadership from AQI.[126]

(S) (b)(6) did respond, saying that his group had the right to kill members of any insurgent group that it suspected of collaborating with the Coalition. He cited the precedent (also a sore point with the Ansar al-Sunna leadership) of an incident in which AQI had kidnapped and tortured an Ansar al-Sunna member in reaction to allegations that he was a "collaborator." Indeed, the death of the three Ansar al-Sunna members in northern Iraq had been a local AQI leader's response to reports that Ansar al-Sunna leaders were contemplating a cease-fire with the Coalition. The intent of that leader, echoed by (b)(6) was that any perceived effort by Ansar al-Sunna to move against AQI would be met with lethal force by its larger and more capable counterpart.[127]

(S) (b)(6) however, had long harbored concerns about AQI's strategic and tactical direction in Iraq with or without Zarqawi, leading to his continued effort to enlist other Ansar al-Sunna leaders who felt the same way. It should be noted that (b)(6) desire for a cease-fire with the Coalition had less to do with him moderating his extremist views than it did with his recognition that Ansar al-Sunna could not defeat AQI, the Coalition, and Shi'a militias without reaching an arrangement with one of them.[128]

(S) Despite b 6 efforts, the likelihood of the Ansar al-Sunna leadership actually negotiating with the Coalition was low. Some Ansar al-Sunna leaders saw negotiations as a way to convince the Coalition to recognize the group as a legitimate militia so that it could continue attacks against the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias. Yet others, like b 6 were vehemently opposed to any negotiations or ceasefire. Whatever (b)(6) beliefs, (b)(6) was quite willing to defect to AQI if the Ansar al-Sunna leadership agreed to a cease-fire against the Coalition - a significant threat since he was one of the group's longest-serving members. Indeed, the most likely outcome should (b)(6) conspiracy succeed would be a mass exodus of Ansar al-Sunna fighters to AQI or similar organizations.[129]

(b)(6)

(S) In late January 2007, (b)(6) had a series of meetings in 1.4b to assess the group's position within the Iraqi insurgency. Among those who attended were the grou 's o erational leader b 6 military chief b 6 (b)(6) b 6 Durin the meetin , (b)(6) learned about the Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna conspiracy and informed (b)(6) that a cease-fire with the Coalition and the unification of the SAR insurgents was a good idea.[130]

Approved for Release

[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.
[130] [| Military | 15 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

~~(S/NF)~~ The AQI senior leadership recognized that if al-Jaburi succeeded in obtaining a fatwa from th 1.4b lergy against the Islamic Emirate of Iraq, he would create a major threat to the religious legitimacy of the strategy pursued by (b)(6) AQI, and AQSL. As a result, both (b)(6) and AQSL b 6 mounted a successful effort to prevent the issuing of an anti-Islamic Emirate of Iraq fatwa, while encouraging other clerics to issue their own fatwas declaring support for the Emirate as a counter-measure.[133]

The Crisis of Jaysh al-Mujahideen

~~(S)~~ Jaysh al-Mujahideen was yet another insurgent group that would become interested in some sort of agreement with the Coalition. The group remained based in Fallujah, carrying out the majority of its operations throughout the Fallujah-Baghdad corridor with smaller cells in Ramadi, Hit, Haditha, Mosul, Samarra, and Rutbah. Because the group was the result of a merger of SRE groups (see Chapter 4), Jaysh al-Mujahideen was a highly decentralized organization best described as local commanders working under a common banner for their own agendas. The group therefore operated under a wide variety of names and took part in a diverse array of insurgent activities.[134]

~~(S)~~ Over time the group's most radicalized elements (as well as its founder) came under the operational control of AQI, leaving the group's national and local leaders far less extreme than it had previously been. This enabled some local leaders to contemplate at least short-term cooperation with Iraqi police and government officials to fight perceived threats to Iraq, such as 1.4b 1.4b This shift in agenda can be seen as far back as the December 2005 Iraqi elections, when some of the group's cell leaders supported Sunni political participation and even worked with the Iraqi

[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] [| Military | 07 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070107 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

police to protect residents from AQI attacks and Shi'a death squads. Despite these local shifts, Jaysh al-Mujahideen cells remained very nationalistic and believed that all foreign influence—whether AQI or Coalition—must be expelled from Iraq. They also supported the restoration of Sunni rule in Iraq., with some adopting the view that this might take decades to affect.[135]

~~(S)~~ While Sheikh Abdullah Janabi had been instrumental to the formation of Jaysh al-Mujahideen, his flight to 1.4b meant that he had lost much of his ability to influence its leaders even as he himself was radicalized by AQI. Despite this, Janabi continued to support Jaysh al-Mujahideen cells financially in return for their attacks on Coalition forces and their help with his smuggling operations. With Janabi no longer a major operational influence on the group, b 6 b 6 assumed command of the grou , onl to be ca tured b the Coalition. He was succeeded by (b)(6) (b)(6), who met with a similar fate. In Anbar, the group's senior leaders were (b)(6) (b)(6) in Saqlawiyah and former Ba'athist (b)(6) who oversaw the Hit-Baghdadi corridor.[136]

~~(S)~~ Under al-Azawi and al-Kharaji, Jaysh al-Mujahideen contemplated merging with Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh al-Fatihin (then Islamic Army of Iraq) in May 2005. Following their capture and internal differences within Jaysh al-Mujahideen over MML's support for the political process, this triple alliance disintegrated. By late 2005 local Jaysh al-Mujahideen elements in Anbar were forming tactical relationships with AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, or Jaysh al-Fatihin for their own survival on the basis of personal relationships between local commanders. Although discussions between the national leadership of Jaysh al-Mujahideen and other insurgent groups never moved beyond the planning stages, by late 2006 the group's more stridently Salafist members embraced the Islamic Emirate of Iraq and pledged bayat to (b)(6) as their amir.[137]

~~(S)~~ In retrospect, it seems likely that this was a reaction by members of Jaysh al-Mujahideen who vehemently disagreed with their comrades over support for the Iraqi political process or alliances with SAR groups like 1920 Revolution Brigade against AQI. Because of the diverse and decentralized nature of Jaysh al-Mujahideen, a wholesale merger between the group and AQI was impossible. As a result, at the same time that many Jaysh al-Mujahideen leaders were pledging bayat to (b)(6) a number of their counterparts in Anbar were patrolling alongside the Iraqi police in Fallujah; attempting to negotiate a cease-fire with the Coalition in Ferris Town; competing with AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and 1920 Revolution Brigade in the Jazira area for resources and funding; working to eliminate AQI in Ramadi; or attempting to establish themselves as the armed wing of AMS.[138]

~~(S)~~ Yet the willingness of local Jaysh al-Mujahideen leaders to support political engagement also weakened the group, widening the gulf between those leaders that supported political engagement to better oppose AQI and Shi'a militias, and their counterparts that continued to push for a closer alliance with AQI in order to better fight the Coalition and Iraqi security forces. Other events, such

[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

as the loss of al-Azawi and his successor al-Kharaji, weakened the group as well, and by 2006 it had dwindled so much that many of its members deserted to join stronger insurgent groups such as AQI.[139]

~~(S)~~ Despite this disparate and highly chaotic organization, Jaysh al-Mujahideen and its core of roughly 700 fighters were quite capable at IED, SAF, and IDF attacks as well as propaganda, kidnapping, and intimidation campaigns. Kidnappings in particular were important to the group in order to obtain funding, with its first appearance in the press involving its role in the kidnapping of Indonesian journalists. In addition to the continued patronage of Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, the group was able to solicit funding from Saddam Hussein's daughter Raghad. As a result, the group remained an active part of the Iraqi insurgency even in the absence of its coherent structure.[140]

~~(S)~~ One faction of Jaysh al-Mujahideen attempted to reconstitute itself by establishing a training camp in a forest near Bayji. This camp ran two one-week courses for new recruits, one focused on the proper operation and maintenance of AK-47s, PKCs, RPGs, pistols, and the Dragunov sniper rifle and the second focused on religious and ideological indoctrination. The camp had two commanders, former Saddam Hussein bodyguard Rawad Abu Ahmad al-Tikriti who ran the first course and Sheikh Muhammad Sa'id al-Jumayli (Abu Sayf) who ran the second. The location of the camp indicated a possible understanding by the camp's patrons of the Coalition's operational boundaries and battle spaces.[141]

SAR Cease-Fire Initiatives

~~(S)~~ Despite these attempts at cease-fire initiatives, there were no negotiated agreements between the Coalition and SAR national leaders for over a year. This may have been because the prospective cease-fires revolved around a belief that the Coalition was struggling militarily against the Sunni insurgent and that Coalition leaders should regard the SAR leadership as their equals. All the cease-fire offers involved the elevation of SAR groups to militia status or full inclusion in the Iraqi security forces with Coalition approval to continue targeting 1.4b (i.e. Shi'a political leaders or any Shi'a group believed to pose a threat to the Sunni population). Essentially, the cease-fire initiative was a bid by the SAR leadership to have any action carried out by their groups—except those against the Coalition—redefined as legitimate so that their groups could continue their operations without the need to expend resources by attacking the Coalition simultaneously.[142]

~~(S)~~ Put another way, the SAR leaders who were most interested in pursuing cease-fire initiatives did not support the Coalition but rather were terrified of AQI and hated the Shi'a. They believed that they could capitalize on anti-AQI sentiment to reestablish their groups' dominance in the Sunni areas of Iraq and to better target the Shi'a militias.[143]

Approved for Release

---

[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] [| Military | 5 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[142] [| Military | 12 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070212 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[143] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ Despite this bad faith on the part of SAR national leaders, there were a number of successful local cease-fire initiatives between SAR leaders and local Iraqi security forces or tribal leaders. While all these initiatives contained agreements to cease attacks on the Coalition, in every case there was no statistically significant decline in the number of attacks following these agreements. In October 2006 for instance, Jaysh Muhammad leaders in Fallujah struck a deal with the Iraqi police to form an alliance against AQI. As noted earlier, by late January 2007 the Anbar Revolutionaries had successfully coopted 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh al-Fatihin in Fallujah.[144]

~~(S)~~ The cease-fire initiatives were more viable at the local level than nationally because national SAR leaders had only limited control over individual cells. Many cells were made up of men who had joined the organization for criminal or financial reasons and as a result any cease-fire initiative with a SAR group had to include an employment provision for rank and file members. With unemployment ranging between 50-80% across Anbar, ordinary insurgents were often willing to shift their allegiances to a group that paid them per attack rather than to cease fighting the Coalition. In Fallujah, a number of 1920 Revolution Brigade fighters are known to have joined AQI following the cease-fire decision. Jaysh al-Fatihin (b)(6)'s cease-fire initiative (see Chapter 6c also failed for exactly this reason. In contrast, Ansar al-Sunna's second-in-command (b)(6) justified his opposition to (b)(6) cease-fire initiative to other members of the organization by arguing that he was opposed to any truce with "unbelievers."[145]

~~(S)~~ The AQI leadership understood that it was vulnerable to a united and coordinated opposition by SAR insurgents, so they adopted a two-track response. The first was an extreme version of the group's existing murder and intimidation that had helped to create much of the anti-AQI sentiment to begin with. The second was the installation of Iraqis as the primary leaders of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq, which provided a more indigenous framework for AQI. The group could now distance itself from the perception that it was a foreign organization and thus facilitate cooperation between insurgent groups.[146]

~~(S)~~ None of this generated more goodwill toward AQI amongst SAR leadership, and yet even their anti-AQI stance created problems, since so many of their subordinates depended on AQI logistical support for their attacks. All this meant that the rise of anti-AQI groups such as the SAA represented a far more workable means of lowering attacks than did national (as opposed to local) cease-fire negotiations with the SAR insurgency.[147]

Expatriate Organizations

The ACC, INDF and Harakat al-Qiwa' al-Wataniyah wa al-Qawmiyah

~~(S/NF)~~ These SAR groups were not alone in their desire to form some sort of effective anti-AQI force. Several expatriate organizations in 1.4b were also eager to contest AQI for influence in Anbar. As discussed in Chapters 6b and 6c, throughout the latter half of 2006 there was

[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

a great deal of Anbari political activity in Amman that resulted in the formation of three major expatriate organizations: the Anbar Central Council (ACC), the Independent National Dialogue Front (INDF), and the Harakat al-Qiwa' al-Wataniyah wa al-Qawmiyah (HQWQ). Of the three, by January 2007 the INDF had become defunct as a result of the inability of its leader [b 6] to win Western or Arab support for his planned coup plot against the Iraqi government (see Chapter 6b).[148]

~~(S)~~ The HQWQ, meanwhile, made efforts in October 2006 to establish a council of tribal leaders to fight AQI including Dulaymi confederation leaders Sheikh Majid Ali Sulayman al-Assafi and Sheikh Amer Abdul Jabbar Ali Sulayman al-Assafi as well as Albu Mahal leader Sheikh Sabah Sattam al-Aftan al-Mahalawi, but they were upstaged by the creation of the Anbar Emergency Council (see Chapter 6c) and decided to hold off their efforts to observe the progress of Sheikh Abdul Sattar.[149]

~~(S/NF)~~ In mid-January 2007, HQWQ planned to organize a provincial-level military force for Anbar made up of 2,500 officers drawn from former Iraqi military personnel that could be based in the al-Asad or H3 airfields under the commander of General Ra'ad Hamdani. HQWQ leaders believed that this force could help to professionalize the two Iraqi divisions already active in Anbar. As the former commander of the Allahu Akbar Division of the Republican Guard, General Ra'ad was regarded as a credible figure among former Iraqi military personnel. He was also the head of HQWQ's external relations department and used his contacts in the former Iraqi military to work on uniting all the SAR groups under HQWQ's banner for the purposes of political representation. As one of Anbar's wealthiest families, the [(b)(6)] family planned to bankroll General Ra'ad's efforts, reportedly attempting to purchase 500 armored cars from Russia.[150]

~~(S/NF)~~ Because of HQWQ's opposition to Prime Minister Maliki and embrace of former Ba'athists, there was little chance the group would receive permission from the Iraqi government or the SAA to establish itself as a military force in Anbar and in fact, HQWQ initiatives to establish security in Anbar were entirely opportunistic. For several years, the leading members of the [(b)(6)] family remained unconcerned observers in [1.4b] while unprecedented violence took place in Anbar. The [(b)(6)] family's interest in stabilizing Anbar now that the SAA had done much of the heavy lifting was little more than seizing an opportunity to get credit for security in the province without doing the hard work.[151]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Anbar Central Council, a loose association of business and tribal leaders, was more economic than political. Led by wealthy businessman Sheikh Tariq Khalaf Abdullah al-Halbusi, the group refused to support the SAA because of Harith al-Dhari's influence (see Chapter 6c), and as a result had little impact on politics in Anbar.[152]

~~(S/NF)~~ The [1.4b] expatriate organizations were essentially opposition factions despite the fact that many of their individual members were in regular communication with the Iraqi

[148] [| Military | 09 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[149] Ibid.
[150] [| Military | 26 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070126 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[151] Ibid.
[152] [| Military | 09 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

government. Their preferred policies were anti-federalist, anti-militia, and pro-SAR, which was standard for Sunni parties outside the Iraqi governing coalition. Sheikh Tariq and the al-Gaoud family were both sympathetic to the Ba'athists (they had gained their wealth under Saddam Hussein), while Salih Mutlaq still considered himself a Ba'athist and was in communication with (b)(6) (b)(6) (see Chapter 6a). As a result of these similarities, these organizations were not so much political organizations as they were vehicles intended to serve as power bases for particular individuals. Only HQWQ was able to develop an infrastructure inside Iraq and only then because (b)(6) spent vast amounts of his own money with little or nothing to show for it in terms of popular support.[153]

~~(S/NF)~~ A few Anbari personalities, such as Sheikh Majid, transcended the boundaries between the different organizations. Sheikh Majid was a Dulaymi member of the Anbar Central Council, who had a good working relationship with the al-Gaoud family even though he detested the (b)(6) and Sheikh Tariq. Most of the individuals involved in these groups were, however, more likely to engage in intrigue against one another than to try to build up their own organizations. For instance, b 6 founded HQWQ after Sheikh Tariq and his allies prevented the (b)(6) (b)(6) family from obtaining leadership positions in the ACC. Moreover, the expatriate organizations were essentially competing for the same pool of supporters and potential supporters among former generals, sheikhs, intellectuals, and technocrats.[154]

~~(S/NF)~~ Of the three expatriate organizations it was ironically Salih Mutlaq's moribund expatriate INDF that had the most potential for growth; since it had the support of eleven Iraqi MPs that theoretically represented 1,100,000 Iraqi citizens (each MP theoretically represented 100,000 Iraqis). Yet none of these groups had much influence on the situation on the ground in Anbar. In the absence of a successful expatriate movement, the SAA was able to capitalize on its success in the province, attracting an impressive popular following despite its support for the Iraqi government and the Coalition. As long as the expatriate leaders continued to adopt an outmoded opposition to the Iraqi government and refused to participate in the political process, the SAA was free to continue to grow.[155]

Sheikh Abdullah Janabi and the Mujahideen Shura Council

~~(S)~~ The other potential contender for public support in Anbar was Mujahideen Shura Council of Fallujah (see Chapter 6a), which continued to be supported from 1.4b by Sheikh Abdullah Janabi. Unlike the other expatriates, however, Sheikh Abdullah Janabi continued to support AQI and had AQI members amongst his closest contacts. One of his couriers, for instance, was (b)(6) (b)(6) a member of AQI's national Mujahideen Shura Council who had been a Ba'athist recruiter in Fallujah pre-OIF before being arrested for counterfeiting currency. (b)(6) brother b 6 was a veteran AQI IED and mortar operative who was (b)(6) primary contact in Fallujah.[156]

Approved for Release

---

[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.
[156] [| Military | 05 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070105 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

The Ba'athists Continue to Plot

~~(S)~~ The remnants of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, and (b)(6) in particular, now believed that it was possible to dismiss negotiations with the United States in favor of escalating attacks inside Iraq using both remaining Ba'athist loyalists and existing insurgent groups. From b 6 perspective, the Coalition was rapidly reaching a conviction that it had arrived at a dead end in Iraq and was about to withdraw. To further this plan, Iraqi Ba'athists based in 1.4b compiled lists of tribal sheikhs in central and southern Iraq. They hoped to convince those sheikhs still loyal to the Ba'ath Party to rejoin the Party and help it to rebuild its shattered infrastructure.[157]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) also restructured the Ba'athist leadership inside Iraq, replacing Ba'athist commanders in Diyala and Salahaddin with new leaders like Staff Brigadier Abdallah Jassim Hamadi al-Duri in the hopes of galvanizing their operations. Ba'athist operations in the Tikrit-Baghdad corridor were seen as crucial for the Party's return to power and as a result great effort was made in northern and central Iraq to coordinate with Ansar al-Sunna, AQI, and 1920 Revolution Brigade. By January 2007, Ba'athists were collaborating with AQI on financing, intelligence collection, and targeting in Diyala, Fallujah, and Hawijah.[158]

~~(S)~~ Because (b)(6) plan involved a major increase in anti-Coalition operations, Ba'athist cells inside Iraq were ordered to carry out IED, VBIED, and IDF attacks that would inflict 30-40 Coalition fatalities per day. This scheme was wildly at odds with the Party's actual capacities, ye (b)(6) b 6 was not deterred by this state of affairs, and continued to call for attacks despite his inability to see them carried out.[159]

The Role of (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ Through her control of her father's money, b 6 was involved in all the intrigues amongst Anbar's expatriates. Following Saddam Hussein's execution, a group of sheikhs from the Dulaymi tribal confederation offered Raghad their condolences on her loss, proposing to hold a full state funeral for Saddam and to bury him in Ramadi if Tikrit was unavailable. The Anbari sheikhs who approached Raghad were members of the Anbar Central Council living in 1.4b who had profited handsomely under Saddam Hussein.[160]

~~(S/NF)~~ Even those expatriates who were not members of the ACC owed their status to Saddam Hussein. The immensely wealthy (b)(6) famil rofited heavily from the UN Oil-for-Food Program, while the meglomaniacal (b)(6) made hundreds of millions of dollars smuggling for Saddam Hussein while Iraq was under UN sanctions. As a result, (b)(6) had protected Saddam Hussein's family after the overthrow of his regime and frequently met with b 6 to support Ba'athist reconstitution in Iraq. (b)(6) however, was something of the exception to the rule regarding expatriate tribal leaders, who tended to be

Approved for Release

[157] [| Military | 09 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.
[160] [| Military | 18 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070118 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

businessmen rather than ideologues. Much of the expatriate interaction with (b)(6) and other Ba'athist leaders was motivated by either money or the prospect of making money.[161]

~~(S/NF)~~ Yet, although (b)(6) was now the de facto head of the Hussein family, she had support only from a small minorit amon those Iraqi Ba'athists that continued to revere Saddam Hussein after his death. (b)(6) and his lieutenants were now well-entrenched in their leadership of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party and they continued to use Saddam's name in their pronouncements. Only her access to former regime cash (perhaps still numbering in the billions) allowed (b)(6) to cultivate support among expatriate tribal leadership in order to maintain her relevance to both her small clique of supporters and the high society of Iraqi expatriates in 1.4b [62]

Approved for Release

[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

More Moves by the Anbar Salvation Front

Anbar Salvation Front Efforts to Reconcile with Expatriate Sheikhs

~~(S/NF)~~ In an effort to seek rapproachment with the Anbari expatriate leaders, two senior SAA delegations traveled to [1.4b] on January 3 and January 8, 2007, hoping to persuade academics, doctors, engineers, and tribal leaders to work with the group against AQI. Among the biggest surprises of the two meetings was a concession from [b 6] to reduce AMS's anti-SAA campaign by 40%. [(b)(6)] retained his staunch opposition to the group, however, viewing it as illegitimate because of its close collaboration with the Coalition and the Iraqi government. While there were no other concrete agreements with the expatriates, the SAA leadership believed that as the organization continued to expand its influence it could bring at least some of the expatriate opposition around and therefore wanted to keep communications open.[163]

~~(S/NF)~~ Yet the SAA was not without allies among the Anbari expatriates. Leading Dulaymi confederation member Sheikh Amer Abdul Jabbar Ali Sulayman, Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi Aifan of the Albu Issa (whom the group persuaded to return to Iraq), Sheikh Awrans Meteb Mahrous al-Hathal of Rutbah, and Sheikh Sabah Sattam Aftan al-Mahalawi of the Albu Mahal all supported the SAA. Even so, Sheikh Hikmat Muhammad Samir of the Mohamdi, Sheikh Khamis Abdul Karim of the Albu Fahd, Sheikh Sa'ad al-Naif of the Albu Issa, Sheikh Anwar al-Kharbit of the Albu Khalifa opposed the efforts of Sheikh Abdul Sattar, as did his own uncle Sheikh Fawzi Ftaykhan al-Rishawi.[164]

Anbar Salvation Front Religious Support

~~(S)~~ Despite its continued expansion and efforts to support security in Anbar by coordinating between Anbari tribes, police, the Iraqi army, and the Anbar Revolutionaries, the SAA lacked religious support from any major Sunni cleric or religious organization to counter the religious rhetoric used by AQI. This was due in part to AQI's pervasive murder and intimidation campaign throughout 2006, which intimidated, murdered or forced abroad those religious leaders that opposed the organization.[165]

~~(S/NF)~~ However, the [rou] did en[o] the covert su[ort] of a number of Anbari religious figures. Among these was [(b)(6)] a senior Ramadi imam who had been a commando in the Iran-Iraq War before becoming an Islamic scholar. As the leader of AMS in Anbar, [(b)(6)] supported the Ramadi Shura Council's insurgency until July 2005, when he had begun to support MML's negotiations with the Coalition, attending a number of reconstruction and security meetings in December 2005. After AQI began assassinating anyone connected with the Anbar People's Committee, [(b)(6)] went into hiding until November 2006, after which he began supporting the efforts of the SAA against AQI.[166]

---

[163] [| Military | 22 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[164] Ibid.
[165] [| Military | 29 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070129 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[166] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ While still recovering from his assassination attempt at the hands of AQI, MML also supported the SAA as a leader of JUI, which he intended to serve as a counter-weight to (b)(6) (b)(6). It was Sheikh Abdul Sattar's ultimate intention that the SAA would receive support from both JUI and the expatriate Anbari sheikhs in 1.4b [167]

~~(S/NF)~~ Sunni Endowment head b 6 would also become a supporter of the SAA. As noted in Chapter 6c, al-Samarra'I had long planned to establish a new Sunni religious organization (an expansion of the Iraqi Fatwa Council mentioned in Chapter 6c) that could serve as a moderate alternative to AMS. In February 2007, he resumed his efforts and enlisted the support of more than 200 Islamic scholars in 1.4b as well as many current members of AMS (including the group's spokesman (b)(6) (b)(6). A strong supporter of Sheikh Abdul Sattar, al-Samarra'i saw an alliance with the SAA as the key to bringing down (b)(6) but had been forced to postpone his plans due to the Sunni outrage that followed the Iraqi government's arrest warrant against (b)(6) [168]

~~(S)~~ While (b)(6) reinvigorated efforts to form an alternative to AMS were a positive sign, it should be noted that (b)(6) had worked on this since 2005 without success. However, by early 2007 (b)(6) had gained the support not only of Sheikh Abdul Sattar but also of its IIP rival. On February 4, 2007, IPP leader (b)(6) publicly attacked AMS, calling for religious scholars and imams to form a new association and accusing AMS of becoming a political rather than a religious organization. As a result, (b)(6) was now in a position to lend the prestige of the Sunni Endowment to the SAA, providing the group with the national religious support that it had so far lacked.[169]

Jamaat Ulema al-Iraq

~~(S/NF)~~ b 6 task was made more difficult by the fact that another alternative to the AMS, the Jama'at Ulema al-Iraq (JUI, Iraqi Islamic Scholars' Group), had already been formed in mid-January by a group of Sunni clerics.[170] The JUI leadership signed a communique stating that Iraq was at a historic moment in which the country's identity, belief, and holy sites were subject to local, regional, and international danger by the ongoing sectarian and insurgent violence. Because of these dangers, the group's leadership believed that strong religious direction was needed to help the Sunni population critically reassess traditional views such as the Shi'a-Sunni divide. JUI was to be headquartered in Baghdad with branch offices in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Basra and there were plans to set up branches in Mosul and other cities in Salahaddin province.[171]

~~(S/NF)~~ The JUI leadership believed that there was currently no independent religious-based organization or council that exercised moderation. In addition, the group believed that only 10% of

Approved for Release

---

[167] Ibid.
[168] [| Military | 18 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070218 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[169] Ibid.
[170] The group's executive council was made up of Sheikh Abdul Latif Humayyim Muhammad al-Lafi al-Fahdawi, Dr. Abdul Qadir al-Ani, Sheikh Dhafir al-Ubaydi, MML, Muthafir al-Hayani, Hussein Mustafa al-Jaburi, Khalid al-Mulla, Yusuf al-Hamdani, and former Fallujah city council member Abdul Sattar Abbas Huthafah al-Jumayli.
[171] [| Military | 22 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070122 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Iraqi Sunni clerics were adequately represented by the current AMS leadership. JUI was thus intended to speak for what its leadership believed to be the Sunni "silent majority." The groups would assist in the Iraqi transition away from violence and sectarianism and toward national unity and peaceful coexistence between Sunni and Shi'a by establishing cultural, informational, media, and educational institutions. This "Islamic humanism" resonated with many SAR insurgents and their supporters, making it a far more credible challenge to AMS's core constituency than the Iraqi Fatwa Council.[172]

~~(S/NF)~~ As with the Iraqi Fatwa Council, JUI was largely drawn from current or former AMS members who were fed up with AMS's hardline leadership and sought to present a more moderate Sunni position. While the Iraqi Fatwa Council had an optimistic beginning, its influence dissipated dramatically after the Iraqi government's arrest warrant for Harith al-Dhari led Sunni community leaders to rally to his side. JUI leaders had likely worked with AQI to some degree or other in the course of the insurgency, but they were more oriented toward SAR insurgents than toward AQI.[173]

~~(S)~~ Of the group's leadership, b 6 not to be confused with insurgent financier (b)(6), who was known as "the Incorruptible" because he refused a bribe from Saddam Hussein, was respected as an Islamic scholar by residents of Ramadi. Since June 2003, (b)(6) had resided in 1.4b holding both the Coalition occupation of Iraq and the insurgency in disdain. However, he was also an associate of b 6 (b)(6) who had provided $300,000 to Ramadi Ba'athist leader b 6 and had generally supported the efforts of Ramadi FRE and SAR organizations to restore Sunni dominance to Iraq.[174]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) was the former head of the Sunni Endowment under Saddam Hussein and the founder of the February 2004 attempt to create the Council of Sunni Communities of Iraq (CSCI) to develop a unified political voice for the Iraqi Sunnis. In April 2004, b 6 had come to the opinion that (b)(6) was responsible for the kidnapping of foreign nationals and issued a fatwa against the taking of hostages. However, he had also allied himself with Sheikh Abdullah Janabi after Operation VIGILANTE RESOLVE and had helped him to recruit foreign fighters in 1.4b

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Dhafir Sobhe Bukori al-Ubaydi was the second-in-command to Sheikh Abdullah Janabi in Fallujah (see Chapter 4) and involved in anti-Coalition activities in the town since at least June 2003. During the rule of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, Sheikh Dhafir had been the public face for the organization while Janabi had held the real power behind the scenes. In comparison to Janabi, Dhafir was a more pragmatic individual who distrusted the influence of foreign jihadis like Zarqawi and opposed Janabi's alliances with both b 6 and Muqtada al-Sadr while in Fallujah. In an effort to save Fallujah from Coalition attack, Sheikh Dhafir challenged Sheikh Abdullah Janabi for leadership of the city in late October 2004, only to lose out and be exiled from the city with his followers. Since Operation AL FAJR, Sheikh Dhafir had resided in 1.4b but had

Approved for Release

[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

been willing to join other Sunni expatriates in negotiations with the Iraqi government over the constitution.[176]

~~(S/NF)~~ Of the other JUI leaders, MML was still recovering in 1.4b from injuries he had suffered during an AQI assassination attempt, while Hussein Mustafa al-Jaburi was a SAR insurgent leader who had been active in Baghdad as late as July 2005. b 6 were both moderate Sunni leaders in Basra who had condemned both Shi'a excesses and Sunni terrorism. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abbas Huthafah al-Jumayli was a former member of the Fallujah city council who had resided in 1.4b since the February 2006 assassination of the Fallujah city council chairman.[177]

Further Developments in Foreign Connections with the Insurgency

Cross-Border Insurgent Activity

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile AQI and other national insurgent groups operating in Anbar were increasing their cross-border and cross-provincial connections. In some ways, these groups maintained a symbiotic relationship of mutual support with their counterparts active in Baghdad. Weapons and money from Baghdad supported the insurgency in Anbar, while vehicles, weapons, and foreign fighters from Anbar supported the insurgency in Baghdad. While Coalition operations in Anbar had lessened the flow of logistical support to Baghdad from the Iraqi border with 1.4b Iraq still possessed insufficient border resources, rampant official border corruption, and a difficulty regarding Anbar's sheer size that allowed insurgent facilitation activity to continue between Iraq and 1.4b [78]

~~(S)~~ This cross-border smuggling took many forms, with a majority occurring at the border crossings. Large quantities of people, weapons, and money could be easily transitted at these spots due to the absence of border enforcement technology and the corruption of many Iraqi customs officials. Furthermore, since the Iraqi government was the primary oversight authority at the border crossings, the Coalition's ability to reduce corruption was limited. All of this served to facilitate insurgent cross-border smuggling. For instance, 1.4b network used the Husaybah border crossing to move weapons through Husaybah with the aid of corrupt customs officials. AQI leader Sheikh Abdullah Janabi's followers relied extensively on 1.4b network to smuggle foreign fighters across the 1.4b border and into al-Qaim or Rabiyah, at which point they were moved along the Euphrates River valley into Yusufiyah before they were sent to Baghdad.[179]

~~(S)~~ Some rural smuggling that occurred in Anbar took place under the cover of nomadic activies such as sheep smuggling, a well-established practice among many of the border tribes that occupied territory extending across international borders. AQI border cells often emulated this practice, supplementing their income by stealing and then smuggling sheep. By disguising themselves as shepherds, AQI operatives were able to move across international borders without detection, facilitating the transfer of foreign fighters and money as well as their own movement. While this was

Approved for Release

[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid.
[178] [| Military | 09 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[179] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

much slower than moving through official Iraqi border crossings, it was extremely difficult to differentiate between legitimate shepherds and AQI operatives posing as such.[180]

~~(S)~~ Nor was AQI the only group that relied upon sheep smuggling as a cover for its activities. Both Ansar al-Sunna and its predecessor Ansar al-Islam had used sheep smuggling as a cover for financing, weapons trafficking, and the facilitation of foreign fighters into Haditha. Historical AQAM connections to cross-provincial Kurdish sheep smugglers based in Nineveh province allowed both Ansar al-Sunna and AQI to smuggle goods into the Haditha area and transport them as far south as Karmah.[181]

~~(S)~~ As a result of Coalition operations in 2005 and 2006, Anbar was no longer the primary source of foreign fighters in Baghdad. While the Euphrates River valley had been the preferred route for foreign fighter transport, Coalition operations in al-Qaim, Rutbah, Haditha, and Ramadi had forced the group to shift its focus to the Tigris River valley. Many insurgent smugglers also shifted their activity from the closed Husaybah border crossing and the Walid border crossing to the Rabiyah border crossing due to the rampant corruption at the latter post. While foreign fighters continued to use every possible route to infiltrate into Iraq, the number that were smuggled through Anbar was on the decline and the 1.4b network was under heavy pressure from the AQI senior leadership, because of its inability to meet their demand for foreign fighters.[182]

Foreign Fighters Continue to Infiltrate

~~(S)~~ Even with its reach shortened by Coalition operations, the 1.4b network remained the largest established AQI foreign fighter facilitation network. After 1.4b Sheikh Abdullah Janabi was the next largest facilitator, working with AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Jaysh al-Fatihin operations in Fallujah, Karmah, Ramadi, Baghdad, Yusufiyah, Abu Ghraib, and Mosul. Collaborating with the 1.4b network, Janabi aided the movement of foreign fighters along the Euphrates River valley to Yusufiyah so that they could be integrated into AQI operations to impact both eastern Anbar and other nearby provinces.[183]

~~(S)~~ By February 2007, elements of the 1.4b etwork appear to have broadened their focus from forei n fi hter facilitation to include VBIED manufacturing. From 1.4b a number of 1.4b network members including (b)(6) had begun to assemble VBIEDs and smuggle them into Iraq for use in attacks. On February 1, 2007, one of the group's VBIEDs was used by AQI to carry out an attack in al-Qaim. This shift in the 1.4b network's efforts was spearheaded by AQI amir (b)(6), who had formerly been based in Rutbah but had fled to 1.4b[184]

~~(S)~~ At b_6 direction, the 1.4b network began facilitating the movement of bulk explosives such as TNT and VBIEDs from 1.4b to Bayji through the Jazira desert. While AQI

[180] Ibid.
[181] [| Military | 7 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[182] [| Military | 09 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070109 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[183] [| Military | 14 Jan 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070114 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[184] [| Military | 8 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

traditionally manufactured VBIEDs much closer to their intended area of use to prevent interdiction, by February 2007 elements of the 1.4b network had concluded that importing VBIEDs from 1.4b was a more effective means of preventing Coalition or Iraqi police interdiction operations during the assembly phase.[185]

Syrian Support for the Iraqi Insurgency

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ As part of his foreign fighter facilitation, 1.4b set up a terrorist training camp between 1.4b to train classes of 35-40 fighters at a time. The camp was overseen by b 6 who would then assist recruits in traveling to Iraq once they had completed their training.[186] Upon completing their training, the AQI fighters would split up into three groups and begin infiltrating into the al-Qaim area.[187]

~~(S)~~ This camp was indicative of a larger trend in the relationship between 1.4b and AQI. While several larger insurgent training camps had been located in 1.4b since at least 2005 if not earlier, many of these were overseen by former regime figures and directed by Iraqi army officers. Over the course of 2006, however, AQI actively set up its own training facilities (of which b 6 was one) to teach 3-6 month courses for as many as 500 recruits. Graduates of the courses were sent to western Anbar in order to reinvigorate AQI's influence in the area. However, the strong Coalition presence in the al-Qaim area restricted the freedom of movement for many of these AQI fighters, preventing them from infiltrating back into Iraq in the numbers that the group's leadership required.[188]

~~(S/NF)~~ The 1.4b helped out as well, maintaining a facility outside Damascus International Airport that was run by security and intelligence personnel. The facility offered courses in Strella rockets and M-16s to Iraqi nationals and was run by 1.4b (b)(6) the former of whom had previously managed a Ba'athist training camp at Abu Kamal in December 2006. Given the proximity of the facility to Damascus Airport, which was now under the supervision of 1.4b, it is hi hl unlikely that the ongoing training of Iraqi nationals would have escaped the attention of the 1.4b government.[189]

Approved for Release

[185] Ibid.
[186] [| Military | 6 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[187] [| Military | 26 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[188] [| Military | 6 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[189] [| Military | 22 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Pages 43 through 44 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(6), 1.4b
1.4b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

1.4b, (b)(6)

AQI Weakness in the Ramadi Area (February-March)

Coalition Action and AQI Reaction in Ramadi

~~(S)~~ While these cross-border ties helped AQI to continue its attacks even as the Coalition and SAA cut into its operations in Anbar, there was one area AQI suffered steady setbacks: the Ramadi area. The Coalition's new strategy of clearing and holding the city continued to take neighborhoods away from AQI and created zones free of insurgent influence. The establishment of static Coalition positions along 17th Street, for instance, forced AQI to relocate its primary base of operations in Ramadi from the Qatana district to the al-Qudar Mosque in the northern Shrikah district of the city.[199] A number of AQI's allies like Ansar al-Sunna leader (b)(6) appear to have followed the group's exodus into the Shrikah district.[200] Soon afterwards, the al-Qudar Mosque became a major center of activity for AQI and its allies under the command of former Qatana district amir b 6 [201]

~~(S)~~ The Ansar al-Sunna leadership in Ramadi remained under the command of the group's military leader b 6 and his superior b 6 b 6 was primarily based out of the Dental College in the Shrikah district, relying on Ansar al-Sunna operatives osin as local security uards to rotect himself and his lieutenants (b)(6) (b)(6). The area around the Ramadi Fire Station also was a center for the housing of Ansar al-Sunna fighters and weapons. Meeting with his AQI allies at the al-Qudar Mosque to coordinate strategy, (b)(6) led a force of up to forty fighters in Ramadi and was involved in the killing of Iraqi police, murder and intimidation, and the construction of IEDs and VBIEDs.[202]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) was one of AQI's mid-level leaders in Ramadi, having been a lieutenant to both (b)(6) prior to their deaths. Reportedly commanding as many as 75-100 fighters, (b)(6) coordinated his operations with Ansar al-Sunna and those Islamic Army of Iraq fighters loyal to AQI. Operating in the Hay al-

Approved for Release

198 Ibid.
199 [| Military | 4 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
200 [| Military | 6 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070206 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
201 [| Military | 4 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
202 [| Military | 7 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Dhubat and Shrikah districts, (b)(6) based his operations out of Muayim High School and the al-Qadir Mosque.[203]

~~(S)~~ AQI also tried to expand its efforts to influence Ramadi schools (see Chapter 6c), as armed fighters going from school to school and intimidating students. AQI's primary target in addition to its ongoing murder and intimidation campaign was to prevent the next generation of Ramadi youth from being taught what it regarded as un-Islamic concepts such as representative democracy as well as to enforce *shari'ah* and recruit students into the insurgency. It also represented recognition on the part of the Ramadi AQI leadership that if they could not close the schools down that they would at least exercise influence over what was taught there. School curricula, particularly the College for Psychology's curricula, was removed by AQI and replaced with its own.[204]

~~(S)~~ Paralleling AQI efforts in western Anbar in the latter half of 2006, in February 2007 the group's fighters in Ramadi began posting signs and moving house to house, ordering residents to terminate internet access in the belief that they are using it to view pornography and stating that those wishing to access the internet should do so at various internet cafes located throughout the city. This was not without precedence, as AQI had attempted to control communication and information sharing in Ramadi at least as far back as August 2005, leading to the destruction of cell phone towers on September 2005 (see Chapter 5b) and the destruction of the telephone switchboard in February 2006 (see Chapter 6a).[205]

~~(S)~~ Yet the internet remained extremely important to AQI senior leadership as an effective means of issuing guidance to large numbers of their followers without placing themselves in personal jeopardy. (b)(6) for instance, relied heavily on the internet to disseminate his orders to large numbers of his followers. On February 13-14, 2007 the Coalition carried out raids in Ramadi, Karmah and Ba hdad to ca ture members of b 6 ersonal network resultin in the detention of (b)(6) [206]

~~(S/NF)~~ Of the detainees, (b)(6) was the general manager and system administrator of the Barq Center communications center and internet cafe in the Qatana district of Ramadi who acted as a courier for (b)(6) was the owner of the Barq Center, while b 6 were the primary AQI computer experts that (b)(6) relied upon to relay his orders to low and mid-level AQI leaders operating in Ramadi.[207]

~~(S/NF)~~ Denied access to traditional medical facilities in Ramadi as a result of Coalition raids on the Ramadi General Hospital, the Women and Children's Hospital, and the detention of (b)(6) (b)(6) AQI was forced to rely on a number of ad-hoc facilities to see to the injuries of wounded fighters. The Risala Mosque in Shajariyah, the al-Tumadun School for Girls, the al-Nur Mosque, and

[203] [| Military | 9 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070209 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[204] Ibid.
[205] [| Military | 14 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070214 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[206] [| Military | 14 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070214 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[207] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

the al-Rahma Clinic in the Sufia district were all used by AQI fighters for medical treatment. For more extensive injuries, AQI relied on hospitals in Hit and the Albu Ubayd tribal area.[208]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ The relative weakening of AQI in Ramadi proper allowed elements of Jaysh al-Mujahideen, under the leadership of b 6 to fill some of the void in the Qatana district. This was the first time that Jaysh al-Mujahideen fi hters had been active in Ramadi since August 2006 and was apparently part of an effort by (b)(6) to exploit local anti-AQI sentiments in favor of a "nationalist" insurgent organization.[209]

AQI Continues to Lose Ground in Ramadi

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ Despite these efforts, Coalition and SAA operations began to squeeze AQI out of the city. On February 17, the Coalition launched Operation MURFREESBORO, pushing AQI fighters from the Malaab to the al-Iskan district.[210] The Tamim district came under assault next. To break the AQI use of fuel to influence residents, Coalition forces and Iraqi police began conducting fuel drops in Tamim, where residents were far more open to their presence than they had been in the past due to the level of AQI's murder and intimidation campaign. As a result of successful Iraqi police raids against the AQI node in the White Apartments in December 2006 (see Chapter 6c), many residents now sided with the Iraqi police and the Coalition in the belief that they would drive AQI out of their district. Sheikh Abdul Sattar had also been organizing security measures for the Tamim district since December 2006, outlining near, mid, and long-term goals aimed at providing security to the area.[211]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Coalition and SAA effort was aided by targeting of AQI leadership. For instance, on February 10, 2007, AQI Ramadi amir Thamir Hamad Nahar was killed by Iraqi police. However, Thamir had foreseen prior to his demise that his enemies were closing in on him and had ceased directly coordinating attacks against the Coalition, shifting his role to planning and coordinating activities among the roughly sixty members of the AQI administrative shura in Ramadi.[212]

~~S/NF~~ With Thamir dead, he was succeeded as amir of Ramadi by his subordinate (b)(6) b 6 who had previously overseen the AQI command and control node located at the al-Qudar Mosque, carrying out attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces and selling black market fuel to fund AQI operations.[213] Originally an AQI IED cell leader in the Albu Bali and Shajariyah areas, (b)(6) had been a major AQI leader in the Shrikah district prior to the relocation of many AQI fighters to the Shrikah district due to the Coalition sealing off the Qatana district (Operation HUE CITY) and the AQI flight from the Malaab district (Operation MURFEESBORO).[214] Based in the Shrikah district (b)(6) ought to facilitate a rise in IED and

Approved for Release

[208] [| Military | 26 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[209] [| Military | 28 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070228 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[210] [| Military | 1 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[211] [| Military | 2 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070302 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.
[214] [| Military | 5 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

VBIED attacks inside Ramadi as part of an effort to reestablish AQI rather than SAA as the dominant organization in the provincial capital.[215]

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) rise to the head of AQI in Ramadi also elevated a number of his subordinates to positions of authority in the city. To protect his command and control node around the al-Qudar mosque, (b)(6) began organizing security patrols and laying IEDs along the major routes to the mosque.[216]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ AQI recruiting under (b)(6) was focused around the Qatana district of Ramadi, with AQI recruiters focusing on young, unmarried and unemployed men between the ages of 14-30. Potential recruits were also judged on how often they attended mosque. Despite AQI's desire to recruit fighters motivated by religion, the group was more than willing to exploit Anbar's high unemployment in order to recruit financially motivated individuals. In general, AQI paid Qatana district residents $27 per attack or a lump sum of $400 for multiple attacks.[217]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ There were now only two districts under AQI influence. To deal with the Shrikah district, the Coalition began planning Operation OKINAWA to restrict AQI movement in and out of the district and to capture or kill its leaders in the hopes of forcing them out of Shrikah and into the Hay al-Dhubat Thanya district. Once both Shrikah and Hay al-Dhubat Thanya had been secured, AQI would be completely displaced from Ramadi and forced into the rural areas of the city where they would be subject to attack by the SAA's ERUs and allied tribesmen.[218]

~~(S/NF)~~ The threat posed to AQI by this type of exposure was highlighted on March 17, 2007 with the Iraqi police's capture of b 6), the leader of the AQI network in the Jazira area that had murdered Albu Ali Jassim tribal leader Sheikh Khalid Araq, his son, and his cousin. Forced to flee from Jazira to Julaybah to escape the tribal backlash, Tariq assumed command of AQI's anti-aircraft network made up of former pilots and air defense officers from the former regime.[219]

~~(S/NF)~~ Between March 8th and 20th, Operation OKINAWA drove AQI out of the Shrikah district and led to a raid on the al-Qudar Mosque. As the Iraqis established a permanent presence in Shrikah, the district began to improve despite a brief rise in attacks by those AQI fighters who opted not to flee with their leaders to the Hay al-Dhubat Thanya district, which was now the last major center of AQI influence in Ramadi.[220]

Approved for Release

---

215 Militar 2 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM 20070302 ~~S/NF~~

(b)(6)

[Military | 5 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
217 [| Military | 16 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070316 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
218 [| Military | 5 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
219 [| Military | 18 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070318 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
220 [| Military | 21 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070321 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ The systematic, deliberate clearing of neighborhoods, establishment population control measures, and the backfilling of neighborhoods with combat outposts and Iraqi police stations embodied by Operation OKINAWA and its counterparts had a significant impact on AQI's ability to operate in Ramadi. The massive shift in attack statistics in the city between July 2006 and January 2007 were telling: daily attacks were down 38%, IEDs were down 57%, and the maximum number of fighters per attack had dropped from twenty to twelve. Ninety percent of the IEDs used by AQI were now surface rather than subsurface laid, indicating the group did not have the freedom of movement necessary to plant and conceal the devices.[221]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI was also beginning to struggle financially in Ramadi. While kidnapping, vehicle theft, and extortion continued to provide individual cells with large amounts of money, a more regular amount of AQI income had come from "ghost" payrolls and sympathetic business owners. On December 21, 2006, Coalition forces detained b 6, the most significant AQI financier in Ramadi. Operating a currency exchange and cigarette store that was a cover for his activities, (b)(6) facilitated upwards of $600,000 a month to AQI through currency smuggling. With the detention of b 6 took over the operation of his currency exchange, though he was only able to provide AQI with $128,000 from January to March 2007, a small fraction of what (b)(6) was able to supply.[222]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's allies in Ramadi were faring little better. Fearful of capture, Ansar al-Sunna Sufia district amir 1.4b, (b)(6) with his personal bodyguards. As one of the primary leaders of the combined AQI-Ansar al-Sunna attack on Sufia in November 2006, (b)(6) (b)(6) had good reason to fear for his life in Ramadi. In his absence, (b)(6) assumed the leadership of Ansar al-Sunna in Sufia, but he was not as experienced as (b)(6) and had been appointed due to his family ties to Ansar al-Sunna's Ramadi amir Abu Ubayda.[223]

~~(S/NF)~~ Interestingly, in March 2007 AQI (b)(6) were both meeting regularly to discuss strategy and coordinate their operations in Ramadi. In sharp contrast to the view adopted by the national leaderships of the various SAR groups, in Ramadi members of Ansar al-Sunna, Islamic Army of Iraq, al-Nu'man Brigade (see Chapter 5b for a discussion of AQI's absorption of the al-Nu'man Brigade), and Jaysh al-Mujahideen had all been radicalized to the point where they readily cooperated with AQI under the umbrella of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq.[224]

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's Hit-based ally al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal tried to expand its reach into the Ramadi area. b 6 was Muhammad Cent's top lieutenant in Ramadi, coordinating the movement of up to fifty foreign fighters from Hit into the rural area between Saddamiyah, Muthana, and Habbaniyah southeast of Lake Thar Thar. This route was particularly favored by AQI and al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal because of the high concentration of AQI fighters in proportion to the relatively low population of the area. AQI maintained a significant freedom of movement in the area, favoring its close proximity to Samarra, Ramadi, and Baghdad to

[221] [| Military | 22 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070322 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[222] [| Military | 12 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070312 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[223] [| Military | 9 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[224] [| Military | 21 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070321 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

use it as an operational and logistics node for their operations in the three cities. In the end, this attempt would fail and by April 2007, Ramadi would be nearly free of insurgent influence for the first time since 2003.[225]

Tribal Justice

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite these improvements, a major area of concern in Ramadi remained the lack of a functioning judicial s stem. In an effort to im ose some law and order in the city, the tribal leaders of the Albu Dhiab, (b)(6) met in the Albu Ali Jassim tribal area under the banner of the SAA to set up a system of local and tribal laws that would govern their respective tribal areas, including punishments for specific crimes. Residents found in violation of these laws would be arrested by the Iraqi police and brought before the council of their tribe to determine justice. The tribal leaders agreed that some penalties would need to be harsh in order to deter a crime wave from occuring now that AQI's influence was waning in Ramadi.[226]

~~(S/NF)~~ The goal of the tribal justice system was to discourage both criminal and insurgent activity while demonstrating to the Coalition and the Iraqi government that the tribal leadership was willing to take steps to establish law and order. The tribal laws proposed by the SAA helped to reestablish law and order and strengthened tribal leaders while removing the negatives associated with extra-judicial proceedings. The only question was whether or not tribal leaders would be willing to relinquish their new-found authority once a functioning justice system returned to Anbar.[227]

Prime Minister Maliki Goes to Ramadi

~~(S)~~ In recognition of the improvements in the city, on March 13, 2007 Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and other members of the Iraqi central government visited Ramadi to meet with Governor Mamoun and representatives of all the major tribal figures within the SAA. This was the first visit by Prime Minister al-Maliki to Anbar, though former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari had visited both Fallujah and Ramadi in January 2006. The meeting between al-Maliki and the various Anbari notables went well, with Governor Mamoun retaining his composure despite being the target of several verbal attacks by tribal representatives.[228]

Fallujah Becomes the Center of the Fight Again

AQI's Insurgent Unification Efforts in Fallujah

~~(S)~~ As its influence decreased in Ramadi, AQI placed even more emphasis on increasing its presence in Fallujah. To further this goal, on January 19, a number of Fallujah AQI leaders including financier (b)(6) Sheikh Abdallah Mahdi's lieutenant (b)(6) and Sheikh Abdallah al-Fahdli met with 1920 Revolution Brigade leader and sniper chief (b)(6) (b)(6) at the Hajji Muhammad Abdallah al-Fahdli Mosque to discuss the

[225] [| Military | 4 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070304 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[226] [| Military | 11 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070311 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[227] Ibid.
[228] [| Military | 14 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070314 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

potential for cooperation and combined attacks against the Coalition. Because a large number of AQI and 1920 Revolution Brigade members were now being apprehended in Fallujah as a result of Coalition and Iraqi police actions, members of both groups in Fallujah believed that they had no choice but to cooperate or they would be overwhelmed. Given that this occurred at about the same time as Abu Wa'il's Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna conspiracy, this illustrates once again that the national insurgent leaders who were the most eager to negotiate with the Coalition often had the least control over their followers.[229]

~~(S)~~ While the outcome of this meeting is unknown, soon afterward AQI scaled up its operations in Fallujah with the February 2, 2007 assassination of city council secretary Abbas Ali Hussein at his home. A key political figure in Fallujah, Abbas had been the secretary of the Fallujah city council since its reestablishment, though he had also been acting city council chairman after the September 24, 2006 assassination of Najim Abdullah Saud al-Issawi.[230]

~~(S)~~ In an effort to replicate a tactic that had proven successful in Ramadi, AQI began intimidating Fallujah gasoline venders into selling their gasoline at a higher price than that set by the government and then cornering the black market in gasoline. Because of supply and demand, the black market for gasoline in Fallujah was even higher than those for propane and cigarettes that AQI already controled. As a result of this initiative, AQI intimidated local Fallujah gas vendors (known to residents as "Jolly Boys" because of their jerry cans) into complying with their demands, particularly in the Jubayl district.[231]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ Within Fallujah proper, AQI was now led by (b)(6) a former member of the Black Flags Battalion in Karmah who received his instructions directly from senior AQI leaders including Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, (b)(6) and Sheikh Nazar Sa'di Zahir. An experienced AQI leader, (b)(6) attempted to reestablish AQI influence inside the city by setting up a *shari'ah* court in the Nazal district.[232]

Anbar Revolutionaries' Expansion into Fallujah

~~(S/NF)~~ AQI's increased activity in Fallujah did not pass unchallenged. At the end of January 2007, the Anbar Revolutionaries co-opted elements of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh al-Fatihin in Fallujah to help aid its fight against AQI by highlighting the group's murder of innocent Sunnis and the personal enrichment of many of its leaders at the expense of the Anbari people. After killing eight AQI leaders and dumping their bodies at the IIP office in the Hay al-Jamhuria district, the group posted a list of 134 known AQI members operating in Fallujah stating that they would suffer the same fate. In literature distributed to Fallujah residents, the Anbar Revolutionaries referred to AQI as "the 1.4b" accusing them of "disfiguring the reputation of real mujahideen" through their actions and stating that they had one week to leave the city or they would be killed.[233]

---

[229] [|Military | 1 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070201 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[230] [| Military | 2 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070202 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[231] [| Military | 5 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[232] [| Military | 9 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[233] [| Military | 9 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(~~S~~) The Anbar Revolutionaries' campaign in Fallujah was modeled after its efforts in Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah, where the group had posted the names of ninety-five known AQI members operating in Khalidiyah. Many of the individuals listed fled to Fallujah and by early February 2007 Khalidiyah and Habbaniyah were secure enough that the Anbar Revolutionaries could directly engage imams, sheikhs, and other civic leaders to acquire their cooperation without fear of attack. To achieve similar success in Fallujah, the group strengthened its intelligence collection and direct action efforts in the city.[234] In addition, the group distributed a letter in the Zawiyah district of Fallujah that was purportedly written by a former AQI member (it was in fact written by a relative of Sheikh Khamis) stating that while the group claimed to be representing Islam its actions showed just the opposite, as AQI desecrated everything that Muslims believed in. In addition, the letter questioned AQI's use of foreign fighters from 1.4b noting that the regimes in all three nations were far worse than those of Iraq.[235]

(~~S~~) Cooperation between the Fallujah police and the Anbar Revolutionaries was facilitated by (b)(6) (b)(6) the latter group's representative who reached an agreement with Fallujah police chief Colonel Faisal that the Fallujah police would employ the Anbar Revolutionaries, allowing them to distribute propaganda as well as to take part in joint patrols and raids alongside the regular Fallujah police.[236]

Improvements in the Fallujah Security Forces

(~~S/NF~~) The successes of the Anbar Revolutionaries were greatly aided by improvements in the Iraqi police and army. Fallujah police chief Colonel Faisal Ismail Hussein improved the ability of local police to target the insurgency, leading to the detention of 282 AQI fighters in February. Colonel Faisal worked closely with the Anbar Revolutionaries to support the Fallujah police and conducted joint raids into Zaidon. As a member of the Zobai tribe, Colonel Faisal had played a role in the Anbar Revolutionaries' successful coopting of 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh al-Fatihin in Fallujah.[237]

(~~S/REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) The creation of the Special Missions Group (SMG), a police unit aimed at capturing HVTs, enabled the Iraqi police to more effectively target AQI leaders operating in the Fallujah area. The SMG, created in November 2006, was the brainchild of Iraqi police Captain Amar, who was the unit's executive officer until he was kidnapped in Baghdad. Among the group's most notable achievements was the detention of former Karmah mayor Majid Hamid Mudin al-Halbusi.[238]

(~~S/REL TO USA AND MCFI~~) The biggest success by far of the Fallujah police was the March 8, 2007 capture of Brigadier General Ali Dawud Sulayman Nayil al-Khalifawi. A high-ranking Ba'athist under Saddam Hussein, Brigadier General Ali had become a high-ranking AQI financier and facilitator, traveling often to 1.4b to acquire funding from Sheikh Abdullah Janabi for insurgent groups in the city. Along with many of his family members, Brigadier General Ali had played a role

---

[234] Ibid.
[235] [| Military | 11 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070211 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[236] [| Military | 18 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070218 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[237] [| Military | 02 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070302 | (~~S/NF~~) |]
[238] [| Military | 15 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070315 | (~~S/NF~~) |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

in coordinating the Fallujah insurgency since at least the beginning of 2004 and was referred to by residents as "the Usama bin Laden of Iraq." As one of Zarqawi's top lieutenants in Fallujah, Brigadier General Ali had played a prominent role in the defense of the city during Operation AL FAJR, facilitating IED and small arms attacks between Fallujah and Ramadi.[239]

~~(S/NF)~~ While Brigadier General Ali had gone underground after Operation AL FAJR, he and his family had apparently remained loyal to AQI following Zarqawi's demise and continued to operate in the Ramadi-Fallujah corridor. Brigadier General Ali and his family regarded AQI as the only vehicle capable of helping them to restore the status that the Sulayman family had in the Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein, and saw the Coalition as occupiers and enemies of Islam.[240]

~~(S/NF)~~ These advances in the Fallujah police were paralleled by similar progress in the Iraqi army. On January 20, 2007, Brigadier General Khalid Ju'ad Khadum of the Iraqi army was relieved of command for engaging in a variety of illegal activities rangin from ilferin his soldiers' salaries to stealing government property. Following his replacement by (b)(6) the Iraqi army in Fallujah made dramatic improvements in accountability and eliminated the problem "ghost soldiers" that had plagued it throughout Brigadier General Khalid's tenure.[241]

~~(S/NF)~~ While AQI and its allies remained a long-term threat to Fallujah stability, the transition of the Fallujah city limits from Coalition to Iraqi operational control led to a significantly lower degree of AQI activity inside the city. The physical presence of the Iraqi army and the Coalition prevented AQI from establishing a foothold inside Fallujah proper. However, local government remained a problem as the Fallujah city council only functioned intermittently at best due to multiple AQI assassinations and their after-effects.[242]

The Zaidon Area Remains Problematic

~~(S/NF)~~ The situation in Fallujah remained strongly influenced by AQI strength in the nearby Zaidon area. Operation THREE SWORDS did not dislodge AQI leader (b)(6) from the Zaidon area. Operating under the command of Yemeni AQI leader (b)(6) based his operations out of a compound in the Zobai tribal area with his followers. As before, b 6 b 6 enforced an extreme interpretation of *shari'ah*, decapitating suspected "traitors" and "apostates" in front of their families. In addition, (b)(6) stole tractor trailers passing through the vicinity of Zaidon, taking their drivers back to the Zobai tribal area and beheading them.[243]
~~(S)~~ In addition to (b)(6) Zaidon also was a command and control node for b 6 (b)(6) a senior AQI leader who was a member of the Zobai tribe and closely associated with a number of Zobai subtribal sheikhs. According to b 6 former lieutenant (b)(6) the villages of al-Anaz, Mu'amir, and Nu'aymiyah had been major AQI nodes

Approved for Release

[239] [| Military | 11 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070311 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[240] Ibid.
[241] [| Military | 2 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070302 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[242] Ibid.
[243] [| Military | 5 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

since at least 2005. The entire Zaidon area was also notorious for involvement in AQI weapons smuggling to Fallujah, particularly of 14.5mm and 23mm heavy machine guns.[244]

~~(S)~~ Despite Abu Sabah's brutality (or perhaps because of it), many residents of al-Anaz hated Coalition involvement with the Iraqi government even more. They believed that the Iraqi government was little more than a Coalition puppet that aided the American theft of Iraqi oil. Al-Anaz was thus useful as an AQI node not only due to its strategic location in the Zaidon area and close proximity to the Euphrates River, but also because these sentiments helped the organization to operate freely in the village.[245]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ In addition, AQI used the village of As Sa'dun in southern Zaidon as a center from which to conduct regular checkpoints aimed at identifying members of the Iraqi police, army, or 1920 Revolution Brigade. Within As Sa'dun itself, AQI had imposed a curfew and forbidden smoking throughout the village. At the end of February 2007, 100-150 1.4b 1.4b AQI fighters from As Sa'dun entered the markets and houses of a number of Zaidon villages, threatening residents with death if they cooperated with the Coalition and attempting to coerce them into helping AQI. The discovery of three dead bodies (one of them headless with its hands bound behind its back) in the Zaidon area by Coalition forces confirmed how serious AQI was at implementing its murder and intimidation campaign.[246]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ AQI's murder and intimidation campaign in eastern Zaidon was soon overshadowed by fighting between AQI and 1920 Revolution Brigade due to the support of al-Hamam tribe for the latter group. This conflict forced AQI to abandon the al-Zaidon Mosque for its strongholds in southern Zaidon such as the villages of Dwalibah and Qaryat al-Hathut. The fighting occurred as a result of the violent murder and intimidation campaign pursued by (b)(6) b 6 particularly an incident in which b 6 reportedly tied a man behind his car and dragged him through the streets of Zaidon as a warning to those who opposed AQI.[247]

AQI's Foothold in Karmah

~~(S)~~ AQI also maintained a strong and persistent presence in Karmah, using the town as a center from which to conduct attacks into Fallujah. Karmah was an AQI logistical and foreign fighter node as well, facilitating the group's smuggling between Baghdad and areas west and north of Anbar. Networks stretching from 1.4b to Baghdad were connected to the greater Karmah area and by February 2007 the number of attacks in the area had risen dramatically. Because IED attacks were deemed to be most effective, IEDs made up 64% of the attacks in the Karmah area.[248]

Approved for Release

[244] [| Military | 15 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070215 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[245] [| Military | 14 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070214 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[246] [| Military | 25 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[247] [| Military | 26 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[248] [| Military | 14 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070214 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ AQI in Karmah was under the leadership of b 6 and Sheikh Nazar Sa'di Zahir, who shot down a CH-46 helicopter northwest of the town on February 7 using a MANPAD and carried out opportunistic IED attacks in their aftermath.[249]

~~(S)~~ AQI's presence in Karmah was sustained in part by the dissatisfaction of many residents with the Coalition despite their tiring of indiscriminate attacks against innocent civilians. There was also an active murder an intimidation campaign in the town, made easier by the lack of constant Coalition or Iraqi government presence. AQI and Islamic Emirate of Iraq propaganda displayed on Karmah homes and mosques threatened death for "collaborators" or those who opposed AQI. Moreover, there were no residents in the town who would oppose the organization. Sheikh Mehsen Abbas Muhammad of the large and influential uma li tribe had fled to Amman, the town's former mayor Majid had been a collaborator with (b)(6) of the local police had supported the Fallujah insurgents throughout 2004. When Sheikh Abdul Sattar contacted Sheikh Mushir Jasim of the Albu Jassim tribe to convince him to raise 500 tribal fighters to oppose AQI in addition to the 200 that the SAA was prepared to send into the area, Sheikh Mushir declined to do so out of fear of AQI.[250]

The Fight Intensifies in Western Anbar

Anbar Salvation Front Expansion into Hit

~~(S)~~ The situation in Western Anbar mirrored the positive example of Ramadi far more than the setbacks in the Fallujah area, yet it shared one problem with the latter area: driving AQI from the cities simply sent them into nearby small villages, where they regained strength and then used their safe havens to carry out attacks and intimidation in the larger towns.

~~(S)~~ The positive developments were thus most obvious is Hit and Haditha. Although the insurgency in Hit was one of the most robust throughout Anbar, the rise of the SAA and the Hit police meant that AQI and its allies found themselves facing a serious threat that began to reverse long-established trends in Hit and created significant improvements in the town.[251]

~~(S)~~ One of the first results of the presence of a permanent Iraqi police force and the SAA was the killing of AQI's Hit amir Fadil Rashid Hilal al-Zambouri and the capture, interrogation, and summary execution of al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leader Hikmat Majid Jasim. These killings led to the flight of AQI and al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leaders from Hit to 1.4b Rutbah, Muhammadi, and the Albu Tiban tribal area. The insurgent fighters who remained in the city were members of al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal and Muhammadi Cell Alpha, both of which were loyal to the Islamic Emirate of Iraq.[252]

Muhammadi Cell Alpha

---

[249] Ibid.
[250] Ibid.
[251] [| Military | 14 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070214 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[252] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ In response to the growing pressure from the police and SAA, AQI associate group Muhammadi Cell Alpha targeted the Hit police, carrying out multiple suicide attacks on February 3-4. Muhammadi Cell Alpha was an AQI associate group based around Muhammadi that used the town as a logistical and operational staging point for its attacks in Hit and Ramadi. Members of Muhammadi Cell Alpha were well-trained and equipped, employing careful planning considerations when conducting attacks. Well-versed in intelligence collection, the group used this capability to maximize the effectiveness of its attacks.[253]

~~(S)~~ Among the leaders of Muhammadi Cell Alpha were (b)(6) who was involved in planning the January 28, 2007 chlorine attacks against the SAA's ERU headquarters in the Jazira area north of Ramadi. Muhammadi Cell Alpha itself was subordinate to al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leader Muhammad Cent despite the fact that Cent had sworn bayat directly to (b)(6) With the death of AQI Hit amir al-Zambouri and the capture of (b)(6) at the hands of the SAA and their allies in the Iraqi police however, Abu Anas decided to carry out more independent operations.[254]

Iraqi Police Efforts in Haditha

~~(S)~~ Successes against the insurgency were also experienced in Haditha, which now had a permanent police presence for the first time in years. The Iraqi police expanded their intelligence collection ability in the city, specifically targeting women due to their unique place in society and access to information. AQI fighters often spoke freely around women and in at least one case, the Iraqi police used prostitutes as informants because of the number of AQI fighters who frequented their brothels and bragged about their actions or attacks they intended to carry out in the future. As a result of this increased intelligence capability, the Haditha police were able to detain nineteen suspected AQI fighters between February 8th and 13th.[255]

AQI's Efforts to Reconstitute in Barwanah

~~(S)~~ On January 26, 2007, AQI leadership for the Haditha area held a meeting in Barwanah at the home of AQI member (b)(6) with local amir Abu Ahmad to discuss the group's recent setbacks in the Haditha area. With AQI leader (b)(6) recently fled to Bayji and his lieutenants (b)(6) both captured by the Coalition, (b)(6) declared a "military emergency" for AQI in Barwanah. Realizing that a viable police force was a major threat to their long-term viability, the AQI leaders decided to infiltrate the police with their own men, dissuade tribesmen from participating in the police through intimidation, and threaten the local Albu Nimr tribal leader Sheikh Abdullah Aafeen. While these efforts were only partially successful, they reflected all the major pillars of AQI strategy on how to undermine the Iraqi police force.[256]

Approved for Release

---

[253] [| Military | 4 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070204 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[254] Ibid.
[255] [| Military | 13 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070213 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[256] [| Military | 5 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070205 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~S~~ Usin the K-3 housin area and Khaffajiyah as his primary bases, Khoulan's lieutenant (b)(6) (b)(6) was able to carry out suicide bombings against Coalition forces and Iraqi police in Barwanah. b 6 ability to revive AQI's activity in Barwanah was due to his access to foreign fighters (as noted previously, the K-3 housing facility was known to residents as "Little Afghanistan") and his good relations with b 6 [257] Bani Dahir was another redoubt for b 6 followers due to their continuing alliance with Ansar al-Sunna fighters led by (b)(6) who assumed command the group in Bani Dahir after his predecessor b 6 (b)(6) was captured by the Coalition on January 23, 2007. Another of b 6 (b)(6) allies was (b)(6) an experienced AQI fighter from Rawah who had been detained twice by the Coalition.[258]

AQI's Failure to Reconstitute in western Anbar

~~(S)~~ Despite this counteroffensive, these attempts at reconstitution would run into serious problems because of the activity by the SAA in Hit; resistance by the Albu Mahal (in the form of the revived Hamza Battalion); and decisive action by the Coalition and Iraqi security forces. By February 2007, the renewed fighting between AQI and the Hamza Battalion that had started in December 2006 (see Chapter 6c) had swung decisively in favor of the Albu Mahal. AQI leader (b)(6) (b)(6) network of villages (e.g. Samsiyah, Gharbya, Brudiyah, and Bubiyah) that had been his redoubts throughout much of 2006 had all fallen to the Hamza Battalion or become far less willing to accomodate AQI. As a result, Anwar was reduced to seeking refuge with his Karbuli tribal allies in the villages of al-Riaq, Suwaysah, and Umm al-Udham. AQI leader (b)(6) recognized the changed circumstances, describing the situation in Gharbya as "bad" in a courier message to the AQI senior leadership captured by the Coalition.[259]

~~(S)~~ (b)(6) reliance on small villages in the open desert north of the Euphrates River had been a major part of AQI strategy since Operation SAYYID II. Because these small villages did not often appear on Coalition maps and had historically been associated with smuggling activity, they had been perfect safe areas from which AQI fighters in western Anbar could regroup, rearm, and plan attacks. Their locations along historic smuggling routes also provided an excellent opportunity to use AQI's existing cross-border supply lines. Unfortunately, the traits that had made the villages such assets also made them vulnerable to attack by the Albu Mahal tribe, which had their own history in the smuggling trade.[260]

~~(S)~~ In addition to the renewed fighting between AQI and the Albu Mahal, successful Coalition and Iraqi security force operations significantly degraded AQI in a part of Anbar that had historically been one of the group's most important logistical nodes. These included Operation RIVER SQUEEZE in October 2006 that resulted in the discovery of numerous arms caches and the capture of multiple AQI facilitators. Additional operations in the area during November and December 2006 resulted in the deaths of AQI leaders Abu Ammar al-Masri, Hamud Kanush, and Badran Turki's lieutenant Muhammad Talib Ibrahim. When combined with Coalition operations in Rawah,

[257] [| Military | 7 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[258] [| Military | 13 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070213 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[259] [| Military | 9 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070209 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[260] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Anah, and the surrounding areas as well as the establishment of a permanent Coalition presence, the AQI influence in the area significantly decreased. This was a major defeat for AQI, which had relied on the rural villages of western Anbar (such as Tuzliyah) as its redoubts following SAYYID II. [261]

~~(S)~~ As a result of this previously favorable environment, AQI fighters active in the area had a high degree of experience and tactical proficiency. Throughout the fall of 2006, these AQI fighters were able to initiate a number of complex attacks against Coalition patrols. Despite the group's notable setbacks in western Anbar, the AQI provincial leadership was determined to reconstitute itself in the area. This involved local initiatives by AQI leaders to reinforce the group's standards of discipline and religious virtue to rank-and-file members in the belief that the group would prevail in western Anbar if it held to an idealized vision of moral purity.[262]

~~(S/REL USA AUS CAN GBR)~~ In late February 2007, AQI's Rawah amir (b)(6) (b)(6) hosted an AQI leadership summit in al-Zilah village to discuss increasing the number of IED attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces between Rawah and al-Qaim. With the death or flight of so many other AQI leaders in western Anbar, b 6 was now a regional leader and began coordinating the increase in IED attacks along the Rawah-Karabilah corridor and north of the Euphrates River.[263]

~~(S/NF)~~ Coalition and Iraqi actions in Anah now shifted AQI members to the village of Reyannah, yet AQI was still able to maintain a murder and intimidation campaign in Anah proper, killing residents Adnan Jum'ah Shihab and Dargham Ali Jum'ah on the belief that they were undercover Iraqi police officers. AQI leaders in Anah made a deliberate effort to ensure that one AQI agent was infiltrated into each class of Iraqi police recruits to help the group obtain as much information as possible about their prospective targets.[264] AQI also began actively murdering the relatives of Haditha police chief Colonel Faruq living in the Anah area, killing four between February 21-22.[265]

Approved for Release

[261] [| Military | 11 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070211 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[262] Ibid.
[263] [| Military | 26 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070226 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[264] Ibid.
[265] [| Military | 28 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070228 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Tribal Infighting Continues to Create Problems

Kateebat al-Bira'

~~(S)~~ The successes of the SAA in organizing tribal resistance to AQI did not mean that tribesmen automatically followed the example of their sheikhs. Within several tribes, serious divisions remained, and would lead to intratribal warfare in early 2007. The situation with the Albu Ali Jassim is typical of this problem. Outside Ramadi, former members of b 6 AQI network (which itself had formerly been the Abu Harun Group) reconstituted in the Albu Ali Jassim tribal area as the Kateebat al-Bira', declaring their official separation from the rest of the Albu Ali Jassim and pledging to kill Coalition soldiers and Iraqi police. It soon began carrying out IED, VBIED, and IDF attacks similar to those formerly employed by the Abu Harun Group. Led by b 6 b 6 the group's disassociated from its tribal leaders because the Albu Ali Jassim tribe had publicly sided with the SAA.[266]

Albu Bali and Abu Hazim

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite tentative efforts by the Albu Bali and Albu Hazim tribes to establish neighborhood watch programs modeled after those of SAA to combat AQI, both tribes continued to suffer from a heavy intimidation campaign. This was due to a variety of reasons, foremost among them being the willingness of local leaders in both tribes to collude with AQI in order strengthen their positions in tribal disputes. Since all the strong leaders in both tribes had fled abroad for fear of AQI, there was no one in either tribe willing to lead a campaign against the group. Since meeting with a delegation of Albu Hazim tribal leaders in January 2007, Sheikh Abdul Sattar had attempted to organize resistance against AQI in their area and the Jazira Council had agreed to allow the Albu Hazim to participate in their efforts at local government once their tribal area was free of AQI influence.[267]

Albu Issa Infighting Resumes

~~(S)~~ Attempts by the pro- and anti-AQI subtribes of the Albu Issa to reconcile ended on February, 5 2007 when fighting resumed by the two factions.[268] The Albu Issa were now in a state of inter-tribal conflict, with Albu Khamis, Albu Aifan, and Albu Abdallah Khamat subtribes actively opposing AQI and the Fuhaylat, Albu Salah, and Albu Hawa supporting AQI. Fearful of being drawn into the conflict, the comparatively weak leadership of the Albu Yusuf, Albu Khalid, and Albu Jahara declared their neutrality in the fighting and sought to resolve the matter peacefully.[269]

~~(S/NF)~~ The de facto leader of the pro-AQI Albu Issa was Sheikh Ahmad Husayn Ali, who now was the head of the *shari'ah* court for the Jazira area, using mosques centered around Fuhaylat tribal territory to implement a murder and intimidation campaign against Jazira residents who cooperated

[266] [| Military | 21 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[267] [| Military | 1 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[268] [| Military | 8 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070208 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[269] [| Military | 16 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070216 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

with the Coalition. Those Iraqi police who refused to "repent" of their loyalty to the Iraqi government were kidnapped and murdered on Sheikh Ahmad's orders.[270]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR)~~ On February 27, 2007 the Iraqi army with Coalition assistance detained senior AQI leader Abu Athil with three associates including Sheikh Ahmad. While the capture of Abu Athil was a major win on its own right, the capture of Sheikh Ahmad deprived AQI of its most charismatic political and religious leader among its allies of the Albu Issa tribe.[271]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ This did not stop the tribal infighting, however. The Albu Issa had already armed their tribesmen, and they now set up roadblocks, checkpoints, and neighborhood watches to prevent AQI from entering their tribal lands. Fearful of being detained by the Coalition or having their weapons confiscated, the Albu Issa leadership concealed these measures from the Coalition, and instead met with members of the Anbar Revolutionaries, hoping to form the Fallujah Revolutionaries as their own offshoot organization. Yet in March 2007, the Albu Issa tribal feuding had so escalated that the Albu Issa tribal leaders of the Amariyah area requested Coalition assistance to drive the pro-AQI subtribes and their foreign fighters from the region.[272]

~~(S)~~ The Anbar Revolutionaries had difficulty answering the call of the Albu Issa tribal leaders lay in its origins as a vigilante force made up largely of off-duty or former police and military personnel and their families. Hiding among the general population much the same way that AQI did to avoid being targeted, the Anbar Revolutionaries were hard-pressed to enter a town as small as Amariyah without attracting notice and being hunted down by those they had come to fight.[273]

~~(S)~~ Sheikh Khamis Hasnawi and other Albu Issa tribal leaders now requested Coalition help not because they supported the Iraqi government or the Coalition, but because they recognized that they could not prevail against AQI without outside aid. The new cooperation was put to the test in a battle between AQI and the Albu Issa from February 28 through March 1 in which Iraqi police supported by armed tribesmen and reinforced by Coalition counter-battery fire defeated an estimated force of forty AQI fighters.[274]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ In mid-March, elements of the Fuhaylat, Albu Hatim, and Albu Hawa subtribes allied with AQI launched a powerful counteroffensive, attacking the Albu Alwan tribe with mortars, kidnapping Albu Alwan tribesmen from the Halabsa area in retaliation for their support of the Iraqi army and the Anbar Revolutionaries.[275] Later that month AQI and their allied Albu Issa subtribes mounted a series of chlorine-ladden SVBIED attacks against the Amariyah police, anti-AQI Albu Issa civilians, and the residence of Sheikh Khamis.[276] These attacks injured hundreds of civilians but killed relatively few.[277] The attacks against the civilian population of

Approved for Release

[270] [| Military | 20 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070220 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[271] [| Military | 28 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070228 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[272] [| Military | 4 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070304 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[273] Ibid.
[274] Ibid.
[275] [| Military | 16 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070316 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[276] [| Military | 25 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070325 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[277] Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Amariyah showed that the AQI supporters among the Albu Issa were now willing to use any means necessary against their opposition.

AQI Financing Becomes More Creative

AQI Extortion of the Anbar Economy

~~(S)~~ Changing patterns in AQI financing reflected the shift of the group from Ramadi to the Fallujah area. One of the group's major targets for extortion now became oil tankers owners, who were forced to pay the group $400 for each truck that they wanted to safely reach their destination. If the owner refused to pay, AQI fighters ambushed his trucks and drained the oil to be resold on the black market. This method of extortion began in 2006, when AQI fighters loyal to (b)(6) (b)(6) orchestrated the theft of fuel trucks to resell their contents at AQI-controlled gas stations. Karmah-based AQI operatives (b)(6) adopted a similar strategy for providing fuel to the gas stations they controlled in Deir Digla, four kilometers north of Karmah.[278]

1.4b

Cracking Down on Oil Corruption

~~(S/NF)~~ For a variety of reasons ranging from a desire to hinder AQI financing to a need to break the group's monopoly on the Anbari black market for the cross-border smuggling operations of its tribal leaders, the SAA began to move against corrupt oil managers. Among these was (b)(6) (b)(6) the director-general for oil distribution in Anbar who had fled to Fallujah from Ramadi in 2005 for fear of Abu Khattab. Detained by the Coalition in Fallujah in late July 2006, he had been released without charge, but in February 2007 he was re-captured by the SAA and taken to Fallujah for detention.[280]

Approved for Release

[278] [| Military | 11 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070211 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[279] [| Military | 21 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[280] [| Military | 7 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070207 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ Yet (b)(6) who remained indispensable to both Anbar and the insurgency (see Chapter 6c), was not targeted. On December 6, 2006 (b)(6) was contacted by the Albu Alwan tribe to request that he resume his duties as director for oil distribution in Ramadi with a promise that he would not be targeted by the SAA.. In January 2007, (b)(6) met with Sheikh Abdul Sattar who confronted him with his past involvement in the insurgency but stated that he had no choice but to allow him to resume his duties. His extensive network of contacts within Iraq's oil departments and his knowledge of the oil industry made him untouchable.[281]

Anbar and the Bayji Oil Refinery

~~(S/NF)~~ The Bayji refinery was something of a case study for all that was wrong with the Iraqi oil industry: political corruption, pay-offs to sheikhs and security officials, AQI financing, and criminal activity, to say nothing of the endless seemingly technical problems that made all this possible. Because of all these problems, the Iraqi oil ministry's ability to control the Bayji refinery through official channels was sporadic and often limited. [282]

~~(S)~~ In February 2007, a series of steps were taken to deal definitively with the problems at Bayji. First, February 6, 2007 Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki ordered the 4th Iraqi Army Division to provide security to the Iraqi oil industry, including the Bayji refinery. The 4th Iraqi Army Division was ordered to provide for the need of oil-related products to the Iraqi citizenry, provide fuel to power stations, conduct a review of the command and control of the Infrastructure Security Forces, and to conduct operations against illegal gas stations.[283] Not long afterward, long-standing Bayji refinery director b 6 was replaced by (b)(6) a director-general from the Iraqi oil ministry in Baghdad (b)(6) had allowed AQI to steal up to $40,000 a day through AQI operatives who were members of his personal security detail.[284]

~~(S)~~ Lieutenant General Abdul Aziz Abdel Rahman al-Mufti of the 4th Division planned to increase the pace of activity and improve process controls in order to lessen the opportunity for Bayji facility employees and drivers to engage in illicit activities and to provide security for fuel convoys into Anbar to avoid their mass theft or extortion by AQI.[285]

City Stories

Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah

~~(S)~~ On February 24, 2007 AQI carried out in Habbaniyah the deadliest single SVBIED attack against Anbari civilians since the beginning of OIF. Despite this attack, the SAA was able to persevere because of the collective safety net that the organization provided for tribes that would be unable to withstand AQI on their own.[286]

Approved for Release

---

[281] Ibid.
[282] [| Military | 13 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070213 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[283] [| Military | 14 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070214 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[284] [| Military | 13 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070213 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[285] Ibid.
[286] [| Military | 25 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070225 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ There were several factors that made the SAA so dominant in this part of Anbar. Like the greater Ramadi area, the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah corridor was inhabited by small tribes without any one dominant over the others. The SAA's reliance on mutual cooperation between various tribes was therefore easily applied to the region. In addition, because of its relative experience, structured organization, and success to date at resisting AQI, the SAA was well-situated to influence the Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah area. It used its frequent media exposure via al-Iraqiyah Television to highlight civilian deaths, lessen support for AQI, and cast itself in a favorable light by emphasizing its role in fighting the group.[287] Finally, while some problems had arisen between residents of the two cities and the SAA due to the latter's tactics of targeting elements of the Albu Fahd and Albu Hazim tribes loyal to AQI, the February 2007 SVBIED attack galvanized residents' resolve in favor of the SAA and led them to encourage aggressive action against AQI fighters.[288]

~~(S)~~ According to the Khalidiyah police, the SAA in the city were made up of 150 fighters with the support of 50-75 intelligence agents and sources. Even so, the organization would not have been able survive in the city without the support of the local community. Using family and tribal connections, the older Anbar Revolutionaries had brought a unique understanding of local factors in Khalidiyah to the SAA, which gave them a level of collective security that AQI found extremely difficult to counter. Persistent Coalition presence and tribal engagement efforts had now paid off in the form of an indigenous security force that the general population now viewed as legitimate.[289]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ SAA members now began openly conducting joint patrols alongside Iraqi police and army officers, subordinating themselves to the existing Iraqi security forces while helping to directly engage sheikhs, imams, and other civic figures to help develop credible intelligence to assist in future operations against AQI. The ultimate effect of this effort, beyond the detention of significant AQI leaders, was a mythology that grew around the SAA that had now spread throughout the province. In other parts of eastern Anbar, local Iraqi police and tribal leaders were actively forming their own chapters of the SAA to great effect on the security environment in their areas.[290]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ By contrast, the Malahimah and Ghazwan farmlands north of Habbaniyah were heavily populated by AQI supporters. At least one AQI training facility was located on one of the Malahimah farms, teaching both Iraqi and foreign recruits how to manufacture IEDs and VBIEDs.[291]

Approved for Release

[287] Ibid.
[288] [| Military | 4 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070304 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[289] [| Military | 22 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070322 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[290] [| Military | 15 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070315 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[291] [| Military | 19 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070319 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Julaybah

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ In contrast to Khalidiyah-Habbaniyah, AQI retained a strong influence in the Julaybah area, with the group's primary nodes located at the Hadi al-Bashir (Abu Musa), Risala, Abdallah ibn Abbas, and Fatima al-Zahara mosques. The Risala Clinic was referred to by residents as "the Mujahideen Hospital" because of the number of AQI fighters that traveled there to receive treatment, while the Risala Mosque was a redoubt for AQI and Ansar al-Sunna fighters following the failed attack on the Sufia district.[292]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ AQI regarded the Julaybah area as a favorable location to store weapons and plan attacks because it was isolated and offered multiple avenues of escape for individual operatives. AQI-operated checkpoints and IED defensive belts helped to reinforce the perception among AQI fighters that the area was relatively safe for them to operate in, with a number of mid- and senior AQI leaders including Umar Daham Hanush active in the area. While the Coalition had established COP Julaybah during Operation CHURUBUSCO in February 2007 to provide greater security to the area, it stood alone as the only permanent Coalition or Iraqi presence in Julaybah.[293]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ As in other parts of Iraq, AQI's murder and intimidation campaign planted the seeds for its own downfall in Julaybah. On March 11, 2007, AQI amir Ala Daham Hanush kidnapped (b)(6) for his support of the Iraqi police in the area. This kidnapping, combined with other AQI murder and intimidation activities such as the beheading of local residents, infuriated the Julaybah tribesmen. Residents formed a neighborhood watch called "the Julaybah Scouts" by Coalition forces and killed both Ala Daham and Hamid Hanush.[294]

Karmah

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ (b)(6) (al-Ghafur) was one of the major leaders of AQI in Karmah, carrying out IED attacks inside the town and focusing his attacks on the Shahabi village that was populated largely by Iraqi police and their families. Establishing a *shari'ah* court in Karmah, (b)(6) attempted to enforce religious edicts against those who cooperated with the Coalition or the Iraqi police.[295]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ Karmah water purification director (b)(6) was the public face of AQI in the city, possibly serving as the local group's second-in-command. Water treatment facilities such as those controlled by (b)(6) in Karmah were known storage sites for large amounts of chlorine. In addition, (b)(6) allowed AQI to use the water treatment facility for storing IEDs and IED components. At city council meetings, (b)(6) exerted considerable influence over which contractors would receive Coalition civil affairs contracts. (b)(6) took detailed notes at these meetings that were forwarded to his superiors in the AQI leadership. In addition, (b)(6) used water

[292] [| Military | 13 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[293] Ibid.
[294] [| Military | 14 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070314 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[295] [| Military | 19 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070319 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

tankers to transport fuel and weapons to AQI fighters active in the vicinity of Lake Thar Thar and Saddamiyah.[296]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ (b)(6) was AQI's security amir for the Karmah area, charged with implementing *shari'ah* as part of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq. One of (b)(6) earliest challenges was the case of former Green Battalion member (b)(6) who now was the leader of an AQI IED and sniper cell in the greater Karmah area. For the last several months b 6 had been caught up in a feud over the alleged kidnapping of (b)(6) cell member (b)(6) by (b)(6) men that had left several members of (b)(6) family dead. Ultimately, the feud was resolved by the local *shari'ah* court, which agreed to mediate the case between the two men so that their anti-Coalition operations could resume[297]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ In early March 2007, the Coalition carried out raids against a set of chicken farms southeast of Karmah that severely hindered AQI's IED manufacturing efforts. Soon afterwards, the group was forced to raise the price for IED manufacturing from $225 to $300 due to the short supply of IEDs and difficulty in acquiring new artillery rounds for use as IEDs. As a result, AQI fighters who had previously traveled to Karmah to obtain weapons were now forced to shift their efforts to Karmah or Saqlawiyah.[298]

Amariyah

~~(S)~~ AQI's access to foreign and domestic money enabled it to easily recruit from among the Albu Issa subtribes. As a result, the rural Amariyah area became a major center of AQI activity along with Karmah and Zaidon, acting as a holding and staging area for the group's operations into Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad as well as serving as a link to AQI supporters further south in the vicinity of Yusufiyah.[299]

Zaidon

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ As a result of fighting between AQI and the 1920 Revolution Brigade, AQI fighters were pushed out of Zaidon village and south across the Abu Ghraib canal. Aided by members of the Albu Soda tribe loyal to the SAA, northwestern Zaidon was now free of AQI influence and residents of the area began smoking and become more welcoming of Coalition forces. The fighting between AQI and 1920 Revolution Brigade was now centered around southern Zaidon in the AQI-occupied villages of Dwalibah, Rufush, As Sa'dun, and Albu Soda.[300]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ Despite their dispersal from northwestern Zaidon, AQI retained a strong presence throughout the remainder of the area through a continuous murder and intimidation campaign. Aware that anti-AQI groups were unlikely to lessen their campaign, AQI

Approved for Release

[296] [| Military | 1 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[297] [| Military | 6 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[298] [| Military | 23 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070323 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[299] [| Military | 4 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070304 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[300] [| Military | 6 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

leaders began planning to relocate south of Abu Ghraib, north of Nasser wa Salaam, or east towards Baghdad in the event that their current situation became untenable.[301]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ As AQI became more desperate in southern Zaidon, its actions became more and more draconian. The form of *shari'ah* promulgated and enforced by AQI's religious courts in the region (supervised by b 6 prohibited residents from smoking, drinking carbonated sodas, or any other activities that the AQI fighters believed had not occurred during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the Caliph Uthman. To stop any support for 1920 Revolution Brigade or other rival factions, AQI members led by Shalah Muhammad Batah and b 6 (b)(6) began targeting members of al-Hamam tribe, kidnapping and beheading twelve tribesmen and running cars over their children.[302]

Hit

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(6) was "minister of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq in Hit," coordinating IED attacks and executing residents accused of violating *shari'ah*. A former member of Ansar al-Sunna's assassination cell, Dawud joined AQI in September 2006 and become a lieutenant of al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leader (b)(6) While Dawud had been arrested by the Hit police on no less than four occasions, each time he had been released by order of Hit police chief Colonel Hamid, allegedly on the grounds that Dawud was his best source inside the insurgency. In fact, Colonel Hamud was a corrupt individual who released AQI fighters for payments of $14-60,000.[303]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS GBR/MR)~~ Fearful of a pledge by Sheikh Hatim to provide 1,000 Albu Nimr tribesmen to serve in the Iraqi army and police, AQI amir (b)(6) and Muhammadi Cell Alpha began a major effort to collect intelligence on the Hit police. While AQI still maintained checkpoints and conducted an extensive propaganda campaign against the Hit police, the group's leadership in the city perceived their situation to be increasingly grim, and al-Asa'ab al-Ahwal leader Muhammad Cent attempted to flee to Syria before seeking refuge in Saddamiyah.[304]

~~(S/NF)~~ The town of Khasraj north of Hit was a favored destination for many AQI fighters fleeing the city, though other rural villages were also used as redoubts. Khasraj imam (b)(6) (b)(6) of the Abada bin al-Samid Mosque supported AQI in the city, using his religious authority to support the organization.[305]

Muhammadi

~~(S/NF)~~ By March 2007, the Hit police had begun conducting raids into Muhammadi, capturing (b)(6) on March 2. This was significant both because of AQI's historically high level of n uence n u ammadi and the Albu Tiban tribal area and because

[301] Ibid.
[302] [| Military | 14 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070314 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[303] [| Military | 23 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070323 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[304] [| Military | 07 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070307 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[305] [| Military | 09 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070309 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

of the status of (b)(6) within AQI. A member of the Albu Mahal tribe, (b)(6) had sided with AQI against his own tribesmen during the group's battles with the Hamza Battalion over the course of 2005, becoming the AQI amir for al-Qaim and supervising the group's horrific murder and intimidation campaign in the city. Forced to flee al-Qaim for Rutbah during Operation STEEL CURTAIN, b 6 and had been displaced again during Operation WESTERN SHIELD and had been forced to seek refuge in Muhammadi with (b)(6) the AQI amir for the Hit-Ramadi corridor, another member of the Albu Mahal tribe who had joined AQI.[306]

~~(S/NF)~~ The capture of (b)(6) was possible because Muhammadi residents and Albu Tiban tribesmen were becoming more willing to support the Iraqi police and stand up to AQI. This effort was buttressed by members of the Albu Mahal and the Albu Assaf, both of which were members of the SAA, and complemented by the anti-AQI efforts of the Albu Nimr in the Zuwayyah and al-Furat areas on the other side of the Euphrates River. As a result, the Hit police were able to establish a police station in Muhammadi to help bolster the confidence of local residents and disrupt AQI's ability to organize attacks along the Hit-Ramadi corridor.[307]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS GBR/MR)~~ In mid-March 2007, the Hit police captured (b)(6) the AQI amir for the Hit-Ramadi corridor and the leader of al-Asa'ab al-Iraq al-Jihad, while he was attempting to cross the Euphrates River from Muhammadi to Zuwwayah. With the capture of (b)(6) and a number of his associates such as (b)(6) the atmospherics in Muhammadi began to improve as AQI was less able to intimidate the general population into submission without fear of local reprisal.[308]

Baghdadi

~~(S/NF)~~ Sheikh Aziz al-Hayyani, the dominant tribal leader in Albu Hyatt, had long been a supporter of AQI who helped to facilitate their efforts in the Baghdadi area and made Albu Hyatt into a safe haven for members of the organization. A staunch opponent of the Baghdadi police, Sheikh Aziz had opposed their presence in Albu Hyatt and refused to cooperate with the Baghdadi city council. On March 4, 2007 however, he upped the ante by facilitating an AQI SVBIED attack on the Baghdadi police.[309]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI/RELIDO/MR)~~ AQI fighters operated primarily out of Dulab, Baghdadi, and Albu Hyatt, staging a murder and intimidation campaign against the Baghdadi police and their families who lived in the Military Housing Complex. In response to this campaign, which included two suicide bombings against the complex, Baghdadi police officer (b)(6) (b)(6) organized a special police task force that performed well in response to the increase in attacks.[310]

Haditha

[306] [| Military | 5 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[307] Ibid.
[308] [| Military | 16 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070316 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[309] [| Military | 5 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[310] [| Military | 14 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070314 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S)~~ As in Hit and Rutbah, Coalition efforts in the Haditha area (including entry control points, badging programs, and census operations) helped to keep known AQI fighters from the larger population centers. The establishment of a persistent Coalition presence in the form of combat outposts alongside Iraqi security stations denied AQI the freedom of movement that they had once enjoyed in the area. As a result, there were only eight enemy incidents in the entire Haditha area between March 1-7 of 2007 in contrast to the sixty-seven between September 6th and 13th of 2006. During the same period in Hit, there only three incidents where there had been fifty-eight between September 21st and 27th of 2006.[311]

~~(S)~~ Fearful that Sheikh Barem Abd al-Qadr Ayfan al-Mahalawi, the senior sheikh of the Albu Mahal in Haditha, would support the expansion of Iraqi police in Haditha, AQI assassinated him on March 6, 2007 at his home on Hawijah Island in Haditha. This was somewhat ironic because while Sheikh Barem had worked with the Coalition since December 2004, supporting especially the return of the Haditha police in 2005 and 2006, as a result of AQI's murder and intimidation campaign throughout most of 2006 he had become neutral towards the Coalition.[312]

Anah

~~(S/NF)~~ As a result of the earlier disruption of AQI operations in Anah, local leaders called security in the town the best it had been in years. Even so, by March 2007 AQI was making an active effort to reassert its influence in Anah, carrying out IED attacks, threatening to destroy the homes of any residents that cooperated with the Coalition, and burning down a local internet cafe in an effort to prevent residents from providing intelligence to the Coalition.[313]

Al-Qaim

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ In March 2007, al-Qaim was by far the most secure major city in Anbar. As we have seen, this trend began in November 2005 and, while AQI attempted to thwart this development by attacking the local police, this strategy was unsuccessful throughout 2006. Both the al-Qaim police and the Desert Protectors continued to become more effective as their experience and intelligence-gathering capabilities improved. This trend continued into 2007 despite the reduced Coalition presence in the area and captured AQI documents illustrated the group's internal acknowledgement that it was unable to regain influence in the region. As a result, AQI's efforts were centered on the rural areas east and south of al-Qaim's major population centers as part of a plan to exploit the reopening of the Husaybah border crossing over the summer of 2007.[314]

Approved for Release

311 [| Military | 22 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070322 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
312 [| Military | 07 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070307 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
313 [| Military | 01 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
314 [| Military | 18 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070318 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Rutbah

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ After a period of relative dormancy, the insurgency reemerged in Rutbah in the form of AQI, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaysh al-Fatihin, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen. As in other parts of Anbar, however, differences between the four groups prevented them from coordinating against the Coalition. In addition to the broader ideological and strategic divides, tactical cooperation between the four groups proved to be impossible as a result of an inability to resolve the issue of whether or not to conduct attacks on the Iraqi police, which AQI and Jaysh al-Fatihin supported and 1920 Revolution Brigade and Jaysh al-Mujahideen decried. Many Rutbah residents, moreover, continued to be discontent with AQI's view of Islam and the group's brutal imposition of *shari'ah*.[315]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR)~~ Following the assumption of responsibility for Rutbah by TF 1.4a there was a noticeable reduction of AQI and criminal activity in Rutbah and surrounding areas. Residents felt a far greater level of security than they had previously and were now willing to cooperate with the Coalition. The SAA and Anbar Revolutionaries paralleled the efforts of TF 1.4a leading to a dramatic improvement in security. An Iraqi police recruiting drive yielded 200 recruits, the city council conducted regular meetings in cooperation with the Coalition, and many residents expressed optimism concerning the city's future.[316]

Further Development of the Islamic Emirate of Iraq as a State

AQI Financial Structure

~~(S/NF)~~ In the meantime, the Islamic Emirate continued its evolution into a state within a state. According to AQI documents discovered by Coalition forces in the village of Tuzliyah, each AQI "district" maintained its own financial department which meticulously recorded financial transactions. The documents indicated that at the time they were written (fall 2006), AQI was a self-sustaining network that was a dominant economic force in western Anbar. The Tuzliyah documents noted that AQI raised a majority of its money in Anbar through kidnapping, extortion, exploitation of government infrastructure, theft, and black market activity, all of which were called "mechanisms for collecting financial expenses."[317]

~~(S/NF)~~ External sources in the form of large payments labeled either "Budget" or "Revenue to the District," accounted for 54% of AQI's financial support, indicating that this financial support was provided by more senior elements of the AQI leadership in Anbar. For instance, one document listed a transaction in which the "district" received a $23,000 deposit from "Imad," identified in AQI courier letters as a senior financier for AQI in Anbar. In addition, a representative was sent to Ramadi every month to receive a $10,000 stipend from the AQI leadership in the city.[318]

Approved for Release

---

315 [| Military | 02 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070302 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
316 [| Military | 04 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070304 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
317 [| Military | 11 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070311 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
318 Ibid.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ The Tuzliyah documents listed $330,000 in material expenditures to purchase vehicles, munitions, and supplies. Weapons and explosives were a large part of these expenditures, but AQI also purchased computers and peripherals, thumb drives, and video cameras. It was the vehicle-associated costs that were the most substantial however, accounting for 36% of all material expenditures. This was due to AQI's decision to recruit impoverished young Iraqis by offering them free cars, thus explaining why the group went to such time and effort to maintain a large fleet of vehicles with meticulous records as to appearance and mechanical condition.[319]

~~(S/NF)~~ The other large portion of AQI's financial resources between al-Qaim and Anah were "salaries" and other personnel-related expenditures. AQI fighters were given a periodic salary based on a "pay scale:" individual members received 60,000 dinars per month if they were single with no dependents, with additional payments of 30,000 dinars per month for every dependent. In addition to regular pay, AQI members were often reimbursed for rent, medical, and legal expenses as well as for special occasions such as weddings. If an AQI member got married, he was payed between $500-1,000 as a bonus. If an AQI member was killed, his family received an immediate "martyrdom payment" of $500 in addition to his regular salary. In an area as economically depressed as western Anbar, these financial incentives helped to entice residents into AQI.[320]

AQI Organization and Operational Security

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ The Islamic Emirate of Iraq also placed great emphasis on awareness of its members' operational security, hard targeting measures, and both precautionary and regulatory security procedures. Documents captured at Albu Qarta indicate that members of the Emirate were familiar with Coalition observation methods as well as detention procedures and knew the amount of evidence required to retain a detainee. This information was likely obtained either as a result of the detailed observations of AQI operatives who had been on multiple occasions by the Coalition and later released or as a result of infiltration of the Iraqi army and other Coalition organizations by the Islamic Emirate of Iraq's internal intelligence apparatus.[321]

~~(S/REL TO USA AND MCFI)~~ Highlighting the level of sophistication now present within AQI were the Albu Qarta documents' repeated references to amirs, weekly reports, supervisors, military branches, and security branches, all of which illustrated the elaborate level of organization, tasking, and responsibility that existed within AQI both in Anbar and in other parts of Iraq.[322]

AQI Military Sophistication Grows

AQI Snipers

~~(S)~~ Along with the evolution of the Emirate as a state, AQI military techniques and organization also grew more complex. The development of separate cadres of snipers and of troops to specifically target one of the Coalition's main advantages—helicopters—shows this growing sophistication.

[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid.
[321] [| Military | 12 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070312 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[322] Ibid.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

While neither the existence of insurgent snipers nor the highlighting of their activities were new phenomena (see Chapter 6a), by March 2007 AQI was training special sniper cadres at facilities in both Iraq and 1.4b This training included comprehensive marksmanship instruction and sniper instruction, but had only the most rudimentary field instruction. This led to a failure by most AQI training facilities to produce individuals capable of understanding the fundamentals of successful sniper operations. That said, a few of the AQI training facilities possessed a sophisticated curriculum that was capable of producing small numbers of highly trained snipers capable of executing effective attacks against the Coalition. Propaganda videos of these snipers' exploits were widely circulated on pro-insurgent websites and by al-Zawraa.[323]

~~(S/NF)~~ Among the most notorious AQI sniper cells in Anbar was that of AQI amir (b)(6) (b)(6) based in Sadi iyah. Made u of (b)(6) (b)(6) cell operated between Ramadi and Habbaniyah. Discovering the Coalition's operational boundaries through trial and error, (b)(6) cell was able to exploit this information and carry out both pre-planned and target of opportunity sniper attacks against Coalition forces, in some cases planting IEDs in an effort to draw the Coalition into a designated "kill zone."[324]

AQI's Anti-Helicopter Squads

~~(S/NF)~~ Between January 20 and February 7, Coalition helicopters were shot down or forced to execute hard landings due to enemy fire. This loss of seven helicopters in less than three weeks was unprecedented. With the exception of the helicopters lost during Operations VIGILANTE RESOLVE and AL FAJR, the number of successful insurgent SAFIRE attacks in Anbar had dropped significantly since May 2003, though the general vicinity of Ramadi remained a high threat area. Comparatively, the number of helicopters lost in the Baghdad-Taji-Balad corridor had steadily increased from 2004-2005. The spike in successful SAFIRE attacks against Coalition helicopters in early 2007 was particularly surprising, however, since there had been no increase in the overall amount of SAFIRE activity during the same period.[325]

~~(S/NF)~~ Preplanned and well-coordinated attacks against Coalition aircraft were rare, with the vast majority of the successful attacks on Coalition helicopters being actions directed against targets of opportunity consistent with insurgent modus operandi.[326] A Soviet doctrine for fighting aircraft, which used mobile anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), a large long-range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) platform, and a group of Man-Portable Air Defense (MANPAD) gunners used in concert to provide the maximum amount of protection and lethality to the primary SAM platform, would become the basis for AQI the more successful anti-aircraft tactics in areas such as Karmah.[327]

~~(S/REL TO USA CAN AUS GBR)~~ During the Coalition air campaign at the beginning of OIF, a majority of Iraq's large air defense batteries were destroyed, leaving the country's MANPAD

[323] [| Military | 1 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070301 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[324] [| Military | 5 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070305 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[325] [| Military | 16 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070216 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[326] Ibid.
[327] [| Military | 22 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070222 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

gunners unemployed. Without training on other weapons systems, many of these Iraqi servicemen deserted, returning their weapons and munitions to existing depots or keeping them for some future use. With the rise of FRE and SRE insurgents from 2003-2005, the price of MANPAD systems rose dramatically due to the shortage of functioning grip stocks and power sources. Whereas SA-7s had cost $700 apiece during 2003, but by the end of 2004 the price for a functioning SA-7 had risen to $2,000. This inflation was due in no small part to the lack of maintenance on available systems and the prices levied on insurgent customers by 1.4b suppliers.[328]

~~(S/REL TO USA CAN AUS GBR)~~ Throughout 2005, 1.4b suppliers ensured a relative trickle of functional MANPAD systems into the Sunni insurgency, many of which ended up in the hands of Ansar al-Sunna. 1.4b also provided SA-7, SA-16, and MISHGAH-1 variant MANPADs to the Mahdi Army that were later unsuccessfully employed against Coalition aircraft near Baghdad International Airport. Due to the shortage of viable launchers, insurgent groups were known to "lease" grip stocks to one another regardless of any skills the recipient group had at actually employing the system.[329]

~~(S/NF)~~ The center of AQI's anti-aircraft efforts were network of operational and logistical air defense ersonnel that o erated between Taji and Karmah under the command o (b)(6) (b)(6) At least three members of (b)(6) lieutenants were former fixed wing aircraft pilots or air defense officers including (b)(6) (b)(6) the former commanding officer of the 50th Army Aviation Squadron of the 1st Army Aviation Division under Saddam Hussein. A former division command-level member of the Ba'ath Party, like many of his colleagues (b)(6) had been recruited into AQI following Saddam Hussein's overthrow.[330]

AQI Chlorine Weapons Come of Age

~~(S/NF)~~ The final area of military sophistication was chemical weaponry. As noted in Chapter 6c, AQI, Ansar al-Sunna, and Jaysh al-Fatihin all had ongoing chemical weapons programs intended to help develop viable weapons for use against the Coalition. Although their efforts to employ such weapons had not been unsuccessful, by February 2007 AQI had successfully incorporated chlorine into their SVBIEDs as a rudimentary chemical weapon through a mixture of trial and error. Despite this progress, AQI still experienced difficulties in perfecting the dispersal of chlorine gas from SVBIEDs because the high temperature and oxidation accompanied by exploding munitions often consumed the released chlorine prior to its dispersal. As a result, AQI sought a chlorine-ladden VBIED configuration that would create the best possible radius of harmful gas concentration, leading to a variety of different techniques and effectiveness being employed that the group was able to observe, record, and improve on as time went on.[331]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN AND GBR)~~ According to the interrogation of (b)(6) (b)(6) had sought to recruit chemical wea ons s ecialists who had formerly worked for Saddam Hussein as well as from his contacts in the 1.4b As sectarian

[328] Ibid.
[329] Ibid.
[330] Ibid.
[331] [| Military | 21 Feb 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070221 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

violence continued to rise in Iraq however, (b)(6) was increasingly dubious that his 1.4b would agree to supply him with chemical weapons for fear that they would be used against the Iraqi Shi'a. As a result, AQI operatives were instructed to prioritize their efforts on acquiring chemical weapons, toxins, biological agents, and other nuclear or radiological material so that they could be used in unconventional weaponry.[332]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR)~~ A major focus of AQI recruitment were former Ira i militar weapons designers and chemical engineers, many of whom now lived in exile in 1.4b Offering large financial incentives and other luxuries, AQI sought to recruit these individuals into setting up facilities where they could resume work on chemical weapons. While these scientific expatriates had been fairly wealthy at the beginning of their exile, by 2007 many of them had fallen on hard times and were now susceptible to AQI recruitment.[333]

~~(S/REL TO USA AUS CAN AND GBR)~~ According to Wathiq, once AQI obtained viable unconventional weaponry the group intended to target the Green Zone in Baghdad. The reason that b 6 selected the Green Zone rather than Coalition military bases was because the higher concentration of journalists in the area ensured maximum media coverage of the attack. In the event of a successful unconventional attack on the Green Zone, (b)(6) believed that the Coalition would withdraw from Iraq.[334]

The Anbar Salvation Front Surges

Jaysh Muhammad and Ba'athist Support for the Anbar Salvation Front

~~(S/NF)~~ Despite these signs of strength by AQI, anti-AQI forces continued to gain momentum. By the end of February 2007, 1.4b Jaysh Muhammad leader (b)(6) b 6 and his backers among the surviving members of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party had come to support and admire the efforts of Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the SAA, regarding Abdul Sattar as a hero for his willingness to stand up to AQI. This was significant, as (b)(6) had been a senior Jaysh Muhammad leader since the group's inception in 2003, serving as one of the group's most prominent leaders in the Fallujah area in 2004. Forced to flee to 1.4b to escape both the Coalition and AQI in 2006, b 6 remained a ma or layer within Jaysh Muhammad, overseeing the assassination of AQI leader (b)(6) and persuading the group's political advisor to refuse multiple AQI offers for a merger in late January 2007.[335]

~~(S/NF)~~ Given the relationship between Jaysh Muhammad and their Ba'athist supporters, it is not surprising that (b)(6) maintained ties to the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. While the institutional Iraqi Ba'ath Party led by b 6 remained opposed to both Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the SAA, following the execution of Saddam Hussein the Part had become embroiled in et another cycle of intrigue and succession disputes between (b)(6) By the first half of 2007 however, the dispute between the two men had taken on an ideological dimension. Al-

[332] [| 1.4c, b 3 50 USC 3507 | 20060930 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[333] [| Military | 16 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070316 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[334] [| 1.4c, b 3 50 USC 3507 | 20060930 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]
[335] [| Military | 6 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070306 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

(b)(6) condemned (b)(6) for supporting AQI's terrorist attacks and atrocities in the name of national liberation and instead supported negotiations with the Coalition to reintegrate Iraqi Ba'athists back into the military in order to protect Iraq from 1.4b and AQI. In late February 2007, (b)(6) followers in Salahaddin province contacted the US Embassy in Baghdad to discuss a cease-fire with the Coalition and to rejoin the Iraqi political process as an opposition party.[336]

~~(S/NF)~~ The issue of whether or not to seek detente with the Coalition had already fractured nearly every major SAR insurgent group, and Jaysh Muhammad was no exception. Unlike (b)(6) in Ansar al-Sunna however, (b)(6) represented a sizeable constituency within Jaysh Muhammad and had the tacit support of (b)(6) thus placing him in a far better position to negotiate with either the Coalition or the SAA than many of his contemporaries in other SAR organizations. However, Jaysh Muhammad was extremely weak in Anbar even within its traditional center of gravity in the Fallujah area, making whether or not Nuri would be able to support the SAA within his organization something of an irrelevant issue to the broader question of whether or not such support would affect security in the province.[337]

~~(S/NF)~~ In many ways, the SAA was seen as a golden opportunity by many Ba'athists and Jaysh Muhammad members. While not a sectarian, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the rest of the SAA leaders shared many of the concerns of Iraqi Ba'athists and Jaysh Muhammad members about 1.4b 1.4b on the Iraqi national government, opposed an attempt to implement 1.4b in Iraq, and feared that the Iraqi Sunnis would be left with a resource poor rump state. As a result, they saw the SAA as a legitimate vehicle through which to regain their former status.[338]

SAA Goes National

~~(S)~~ At the beginning of March 2007, the SAA launched the formation of its own political party, the Iraqi Awakening Movement (IAM). Led by Sheikh Abdul Sattar and the other SAA leaders, the IAM was the culmination of efforts by the SAA to organize a political party that stretched back to December 2006, when SAA leader Sheikh Raad Sabah al-Alwani of the Albu Alwan tribe had informed the Coalition that the group was planning a political party but lacked the necessary platform and ideology.[339]

~~(S)~~ Based on Sheikh Abdul Sattar's public statements, the intent of the IAM was to ensure that the SAA continued to play a major role in a united Iraq. As early as November 2006 he had talked about a "unification assembly" that would encompass all Iraqi tribal leaders regardless of ethno-sectarian background. He believed this assembly could resolve violence through peaceful dialogue between Sunni and Shi'a tribal leaders. While Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his lieutenants publicly praised the Iraqi government for supporting the SAA, in private they resented the fact that this support had not taken a more tangible form. Even so, Sheikh Abdul Sattar detested Harith al-Dhari and other

Approved for Release

---

[336] Ibid.
[337] Ibid.
[338] Ibid.
[339] [| Military | 13 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070313 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

prominent Iraqi Sunni leaders, viewing their sectarian prejudices as a hinderance to improving the Sunni situation in Iraq.[340]

~~(S)~~ On March 13, ranking Dulaymi confederation tribal leader Sheikh Ali Hatim Abdul Razzaq al-Assafi and Sheikh Sabah Sattam al-Sharji of the Albu Mahal (both leaders of the SAA), met with Prime Minister Maliki, indicating the group's continued reach well beyond its origins in the greater Ramadi area. Now commanding the loyalty of twelve members of the provincial council and a dominating presence in Ramadi's security apparatus, the SAA had far more political clout than it had in September 2006. Even so, the group faced a tough road ahead due to the influence of the politically entrenched but unpopular IIP, which possessed a strong national organization and party machine. Even so, as long as AQI's influence continued to wane in Ramadi, Sheikh Abdul Sattar and his followers could claim credit for the city's recovery, which translated into enormous political capital. The SAA was overwhelmingly popular in all the major Anbari population centers, but it still faced competition from other Sunni organizations as Sunni sheikhs in other provinces feared the rise of Sheikh Abdul Sattar's popularity at the expense of their own.[341]

~~(S/NF)~~ By March 2007, the SAA leadership boasted that forty major tribes were members of its organization, though it should be noted that, in the perception-centered world of Iraqi sheikhs, one man's clan or subtribe was often another man's tribe. While forty tribal organizations participated within the framework of the SAA, much of the organization's bulwark continued to be a group of twelve to fifteen tribes centered around the greater Ramadi area.[342]

Attack Data (January – March 2007)

(U) The following charts illustrate the numbers and types of insurgent attacks against Coalition forces in Anbar Province that occurred in the first trimester (January to March 2007). The first two (large – ½ page) charts provide an overview of attacks from 2003 to 2007 in the three AOs of Anbar (in two different graphic presentations). The three months are highlighted and allow comparison to the entire period. The following eight charts (small format) break down the overall data into the specific types of attacks (Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED, and Complex Attacks) arrayed over the 2003-2007 timeframe and also expanded to a week-by-week graphic.

~~(S)~~ The average number of enemy attacks during this period was lower than the highs achieved in the previous period, and was mostly stable with a slight decreasing trend across the period. While the number of IED incident counts remained mostly stable (if not increasing slightly), the number of incidents for the three other categories decreased slightly during the period, particularly after early February. Note that data was not yet available for the last full week of March.

Approved for Release

[340] Ibid.
[341] Ibid.
[342] [| Military | 18 Mar 07 MNF-W INTSUM | 20070318 | ~~(S/NF)~~ |]

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

All Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Direct Fire Incidents





Indirect Fire Incidents





IED Incidents





Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

Complex Attacks





Insurgent Profile: 2007

~~(S/NF)~~ In 2007, the typical street-level insurgent captured in Anbar was an Iraqi male about 27 years old, was slightly more likely to be married than to be unmarried, and was educated at a high-school level or less. Most captured detainees were associated with tribes and about half had some military experience. These conclusions are based on an analysis of more than 1,680 tactical interrogation reports gathered from intelligence sources.

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506



Figure 1: 2007 Street-Level Insurgent Profile ~~(S/REL TO USA, MCFI)~~

Approved for Release

~~(S/NF)~~ Most insurgents captured in 2007 were 30 years old or younger (65.6%), with a significant group (13.7%) under 20 years old, the largest percentage of any year to date. 2006 is the first year in which the mean age (28.8) is less than 29 years old. The middle 50% of the population distribution was between 22 and 33 years old. The fact that the median of 27 years is lower than the mean of 28.8 years confirms that the data is skewed younger and also indicates that the age range among older detainees has a large spread. The most common age among detainees in 2006 was 21 years old.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

~~(S/NF)~~ Almost all the insurgents captured in 2006 claimed to be Iraqi (99.3%), with only 0.7% claiming to be of foreign origin. Of those foreigners, the most frequent origins named were Egypt and Syria, though this represents just a very few individuals.

~~(S/NF)~~ The majority of detainees were associated with blue collar or other labor occupations. The most common occupations claimed were *driver* (15.3%) and *shepherd* or *farmer* (13.3%), though the largest grouping of occupations was *blue collar workers* (31.0%), which included jobs like *electrician*, *carpenter*, and *laborer*. Though only 4.0% of detainees claimed to be actively unemployed, it is likely that many more detainees were actually unemployed but provided their previous job or training when asked their occupation. In addition, a noteworthy fraction of detainees (5.8%) were employed in positions of trust such as the Iraqi police or local security forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ Less than half of those captured in 2006 claimed to have some military experience (42.5%), while a portion of those that had not served were still students and were too young to participate. This finding indicates that a large segment of the insurgent population had some form of prior military training, had combat experience, and may even have had personal access to weapons.

~~(S/NF)~~ More than three-quarters of those detained had no education beyond high-school, with nearly half (42.9%) having no more than an elementary education (6th grade or less). More than 18% had some post-secondary education or had completed a degree program.

~~(S/NF)~~ By more than double, the tribe with the most captured members in 2007 was the Fahad tribe, followed by the Albu Eissa, Ubaydi, and Jughayfi tribes. The Fahad tribe was the most captured in all three months within the study period. There were many tribes well-represented, as 76.5% of the detainees associated themselves with one of the top 20 tribes.

~~(S/NF)~~ More than 53% of all detainees claimed to be married, engaged, or widowed, though most detainees under 30 (64.3%) were still single. Of those married, 56.0% claimed to have children, which is much lower than the overall rate of children in the population. However, this data is very unreliable and a significant difference from the results from previous years. If valid, it seems that those who had families were reluctant to participate in the insurgency and less willing to risk their lives, for fear of leaving behind unsupported children.

~~(S/NF)~~ The most common places of residence among detainees were Ramadi (30.9%) and Hadithah (19.3%). 2007 is the first year in which Fallujah was not one of the two most active cities, and reflects that almost twice as many detainees came from Hadithah, proportionally, than in the previous year. Fallujah (18.3%), Al Qaim / Husaybah (5.9%), Hit (3.8%), and Rawah (3.6%) also were major claimed sources of detainees.

Conclusion: Snapshop of the Insurgency

(U) As in the previous six months, the new year opened with the insurgency presenting clear challenges for the Coalition and Iraqi government and yet offering the promise of better things ahead. Fallujah, which had been cleared of most insurgents after Operation AL FAJR, was falling under the influence of AQI and affiliated groups. By using the small villages that surrounded the

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

city as safe havens, AQI had managed to escape Coalition attention while rebuilding its strength, manpower and structure in the area. The results were increasing signs of AQI infiltration and influence, which showed the group had not given up on the city that had once been the center of its Anbar strategy.

(U) There was also a growing sophistication in AQI attacks throughout Iraq, including the successful use of chlorine weapons, intricate intelligence gathering methods, and targeting of helicopters, which suggested that the group was learning from its experiences and developing some higher forms of warfare. Coordination between AQI and other regional actors, such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian and Iranian players were also ominous.

(U) Yet the clearing of insurgents from Ramadi, Hit and Haditha, as well as other towns in Anbar; the expanding power and influence of Abdul Sattar and the SAA; and a growth in the confidence and abilities of the Iraqi police and army were harbingers of real positive change in the province. The result was a continuing decline in attacks, greater cooperation and collaboration by residents, and improved atmospherics throughout Anbar even before the Coalition "surge" began. All the conditions were in place for the defeat of the insurgency, but only if there would be enough time to finish the work that Iraqis and the Coalition had begun together.

Approved for Release